Part II:
The Story
The following three chapters provide an empirical narrative of the Sri Lankan peace process: its long run-up and its short-lived progress (this chapter), the fragmentation and tensions that it brought about (chapter 5) and the war that followed(chapter 6). Much of this chronology has been described elsewhere (Balasingham,2004, Fernando, 2008; Goodhand and Klem, 2005; Goodhand et al., 2011 a and b; Goodhand, Korf and Spencer, 2011; Gooneratne, 2007; Rupesinghe, 2006;Sahadevan, 2006; Stokke, and Uyangoda, 2011), but our discussion of Norway’s strategies and activities adds empirical detail and insight to the literature. We use key turning points (the headings) in the sequence of events to scrutinize Norwegianresponses in relation to the knowledge and opportunities that were available at the time.
chapter 4.
First Explorations, a Ceasefire and Peace Talk
(1990s–2003)
http://tenn1917.blogspot.com/2011/11/1.html
chapter 5.
Fragmentation and Crisis
(2003-2006)
http://tenn1917.blogspot.com/2011/11/2.html
chapter 6. War, Victory and Humanitarian Disaster
(2006-2009)
http://tenn1917.blogspot.com/2011/11/3.html#
Following a long period of ‘no-war-no-peace’, large-scale, territorial offensives resume in July 2006. Norway faces a difficult dilemma whether or not to remain involved in Sri Lanka, but decides to stay engaged, because it sees a role for itself in limiting the adverse impacts of the war. It applies pressure on the parties about humanitarian concerns and supports humanitarian initiatives. Continued involvement of the Norwegian team and the SLMM is also seen to be useful in case a new stalemate emerges. The parties prolong their invitation to Norway and the SLMM, whilst claiming a commitment to the CFA, but at the same time the war intensifies.
26 July 2006: the Mavil Aru incident sparks open warfare
The EU proscription of the LTTE has implications for the SLMM. Three out of five contributing countries are EU members and so is the recently appointed Head of Mission: the Swedish retired Major General Ulf Henricsson. The SLMM leader has issued a memo arguing against the ban: there are immediate negative consequences for the SLMM and it could aggravate the escalating dynamics of violence.196 Norway refrains from intervening in EU decision making, but also makes it clear that a ban will have negative consequences, mainly for the monitoring mission.197 Just after the announcement of the ban, Norway organises a second set of talks between the parties in Oslo (8-9 June 2006), but upon arrival, the LTTE refuses to meet the governmentdelegation. The Norwegians manage to get LTTE security guarantees for the SLMM staff. Subsequently, however, the LTTE issues a deadline for the removal of monitors from EU countries. Denmark, Finland and Sweden withdraw their monitors.Iceland increases its personnel contribution, but barely has more people available (also because it has no armed forces). Norway explores whether other non-EU countries – including Switzerland – could join the mission198, but this does not materialize. Oslo thus adds some staff, but is reluctant to fill all vacancies, partly to show the LTTE the consequences of its decision199 and partly, because the situation is not conducive to effective monitoring by the SLMM anyway. The mission’s presence in the field becomes very limited and it is unable to closely follow the flurry of incidents and attacks that will follow.
The LTTE keeps up the military pressure. It enlists over 10,000 civilians for ‘selfdefence’ training, forcefully recruits children, and attacks with roadside bombs and grenades in different parts of the north-east. On 25 June President Rajapaksa
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196 SLMM memo titled ‘SLMM Assessment of Possible Consequences of EU Banning the LTTE’, dated 18 April 2006 and signed by Henricsson.
197 Communication with the Norwegian MFA 070F.
198 Interview 010A.
199 MFA. 307.3 (2006/00083-106).
Pawns of Peace – Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997-2009 61
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offers a two-week ceasefire, indicating he is willing to have direct talks, but the initiative is perceived as a ‘smokescreen’.200 An LTTE suicide bomb kills the army Deputy Chief of Staff that same day and violence continues. Eventually, it is the Mavil Aru incident that sparks the resumption of open warfare. In an attempt to mimic the government strategy of blocking resources and economic assets for military purposes, the LTTE closes an irrigation sluice gate in Mavil Aru (south of Trincomalee) on 20 July 2006. The affected population is not very large, but the place is sensitive due to the tri-ethnic composition of the area, the strategic location between the north and the east, and its proximity to the Trincomalee harbour. Mutual accusations and threats follow. It appears the LTTE is trying to show its strength and provoke the government, but this proves to be a miscalculation by the rebels. Henricsson and Hanssen-Bauer try to defuse the matter in Trincomalee and Kilinochchi respectively. They manage to convince the LTTE to pull back,201 but government forces seize the opportunity to launch a ground offensive on 31 July 2006.
The LTTE strikes back and occupies the neighbouring town Muthur. Within days,however, the army recaptures the Muslim dominated town and presses on to overrun Sampur, a key hub for the LTTE. The government deploys heavy artillery, leading to civilian losses and displacement. In the midst of these offensives, seventeen local aid workers of the French NGO Action Contre la Faim are executed in their compound on 5 August 2006, which leads to significant international criticism. The SLMM is not allowed to investigate – Henricsson in fact narrowly escapes an artillery attack in this period – but holds the government responsible.202 The SLMM commander openly speculates about the withdrawal of his mission. The LTTE is pushed southward and forces the civilian population to withdraw with them. Large numbers of civilians get trapped as an LTTE ‘human shield’ in the battle zones on the eastern front. ICRC manages to broker a brief
ceasefire to let civilians out.203 International attention, however, is dominated by the simultaneous escalation of war in Lebanon. The army continues to advance with heavy bombardments, while the TMVP attacks LTTE camps further south. A second offensive is opened in the north on 11 October with a large-scale attack across the Jaffna frontline, but in sharp contrast to the east, the LTTE puts up stiff resistance. The army incurs heavy losses and call off the attack within a day. The biggest demonstration so far is held against the peace process in Colombo on 4 October. An effigy of Prabhakaran draped in a Norwegian flag is carried through the streets.204The political channel is not completely closed, however. The second Geneva
meeting(28-29 October 2006) takes place as intended and discussions focus onhumanitarian issues,
a political settlement, reduction of violence, political pluralismand democracy. Expectations are low but the Norwegian team hopes they will atleast extract an agreement about future meetings and some reduction of violence on the ground.205 Neither materializes, but the event helps to keep up the diplomatic pressure on the parties, the Norwegians feel.206 They realise, however, they have
================
200 Communication with the Norwegian MFA 070F.
201 Interview 010A and 012A.
202 SLMM ruling dated 29 August 2006, titled ‘Assassination of 17 Civilian Aid Workers on the 4th of August 2006’.
203 Interview 059B.
204 MFA 307.3 (2006/00083-187).
205 MFA. 307.3 (2006/00083-200).
206 Communication with the Norwegian MFA 070F.
62 Pawns of Peace – Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997-2009
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become a ‘side show’.207 In a direct meeting, the team tells the president’s brother Basil Rajapaksa (December 2006) that Norway realizes the government is engaged in full-scale war. As there is no longer any peace process ongoing, Norway will take no new initiatives before the parties reconfirm their readiness to resume negotiations. Special Envoy Hanssen-Bauer offers to withdraw the SLMM and to close down Norwegian support to the peace secretariats. The government however responds that communication channels with Kilinochchi may still be useful, because the outcome of the war is still unclear.208 A similar meeting is held with the LTTE.209 Both parties ask Norway to maintain their support to the peace secretariats and the SLMM. In fact, they request Norway to expand the number of monitors.210 Communication with the LTTE becomes increasingly difficult, however. With the death of Anton Balasingham, who has already moved to the margin, in December 2006, there is limited access to the highest level. Continued involvement in Sri Lanka continues to be a point of discussion among the Norwegians. While there is concern about becoming a peace alibi, those in favour argue that a departure will not have
any positive effect, and if it makes a difference at all, it will only fuel the escalation. There are increasing humanitarian concerns that warrant attention and Norway’s established network with the parties, the co-chairs, India and humanitarian agencies could be useful in addressing these issues. Moreover, proponents of continued involvement argue a new stalemate may emerge. Finally, Norway’s reputation as a persistent and patient mediator would suffer and key players like the US and India may conclude that the Norwegians arenot up to the task.211 International NGOs and diaspora organisations voice concerns about massive human rights violations and Western countries step up their criticism. Having already banned the LTTE, their statements about the government receive most attention. Among the donors, Germany emerges asmost critical and officially freezes new aid projects. Under mounting international pressure, including periodicco-chair statements, President Rajapaksa installs a Commission of Inquiry (COI) to investigate sixteen of the gravest alleged human rights abuses in November 200 Two months later, Norwegian (and co-chair) efforts result in the creation of an International Independent Group of Eminent Persons (IIGEP) to monitor and exert pressure on the commission. The government does not collaborate with the IIGEP, however,and no meaningful investigations are made. The Sri Lankan government effectively counters and dilutes Western pressure.Firstly, it adopts the Western discourse of humanitarian intervention and anti-terrorism to defend its course of action. It also points to the hypocrisy of Western countries raising concerns about human rights given the abuses and civilian casualties associated with Western intervention in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. Secondly,it strongly resists the debates around the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ by emphasizing
==================
207 MFA. 307.3 (2006.00109-64).
208 Interview 010A and communication with the Norwegian MFA 070F.
209 Communication with the Norwegian MFA 070F.
210 Communication with the Norwegian MFA 070F.
211 Interview 030A.
Pawns of Peace – Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997-2009 63
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its sovereignty and the need for home-grown solutions.212 Thirdly, it secures the political backing of powerful countries in the region, most saliently India and China.The Norwegians continue to solicit a more active Indian role in support of the talks in 2007, but Delhi continues to decline the suggestion.213 As the military offensive intensifies, it becomes increasingly clear that India will not apply pressure on the SriLankan government to call off the offensive. Behind the scenes, India is ‘not hesitant to support the government’s offensive against the LTTE,’ but realizes it needs to ‘manage the political fallout,’ according to a senior Indian diplomat reflecting on this period.214 It is considered a ‘no-brainer’ that India should ‘support the government in this offensive.’215 In public, however, the Indian government refrains from voicing these views.
The Norwegian government realizes its role has become very difficult and limited.Against the background of discussions on whether or not to stay engaged and how,the mediation team develops a number of scenarios. On the military front they foresee either: 1) no war no peace, 2) resumed peace talks, or 3) full-scale war.216 Politically, they expect the government to either remain dependent on its junior partner, or enter into a coalition with the UNP. If neither works, new elections may be the result. Indian and US pressure to stop the war may affect the scenarios.217 During an internal strategy session with Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Støre in May 2007, the mediation team reiterates that: ‘All observers think that this is a conflict that cannot be won by military means and most believe that the government cannot beat the LTTE militarily.’
Moreover, the group concludes: ‘International pressure does not seem to have any positive influence, but rather to contribute to locking the military strategies of the parties.’218 Strategic thinking thus tends to hinge on the premise that at some point a new stalemate may emerge, either because the LTTE rolls back the frontline (as it did several times in the past), or resorts to guerrilla style tactics to avert defeat. In hindsight, the Norwegian team underestimates the Sri Lankan government’s strength, both militarily and politically. The team considers a wide range of likely and less likely scenarios, but (like most observers at the time), it does not reckon with the sequence of events that is to follow: a strong SLFP-led coalition and a military victory.
The military advances proceed. With support from Indian and US intelligence, the Sri Lankan navy is increasingly proficient in intercepting LTTE shipments on the Indian Ocean, thus cutting off the rebel’s main supply channel. The insurgents strike back with several naval attacks. LTTE suicide attacks on top officials in Colombo become common, and in March 2007, they launch their first air strike (against the Katunayake airport), followed by a second raid in April. The raids are seen as a symbolic triumph for the LTTE, but are largely insignificant in military terms and do not impede the government’s offensive in the east. In July 2007, the whole region is 212 As mentioned, none of these mechanisms makes much progress, though the APRC produces substantive discussion. Tamil nationalist do not have much faith in the process, and they are further
disappointed when the Supreme Court rules the north-east merger unconstitutional on 16 October 2006. The de-merger pleases the Muslims, but backtracks on the Indo-Lankan Accord and the 13th Amendment.
==============
213 MFA 303.3 (2007/00140-4) and MFA 307.3 (2007/00635-37).
214 Interview 044D.
215 Interview 044D.
216 MFA 303.3 (2007/00149-15).
217 MFA. 307.3 (2007/00635).
218 MFA. 307.3 (2007/00635-49).
64 Pawns of Peace – Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997-2009
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taken over by the government forces. The LTTE appears to retreat rather than fight back and attention shifts to the insurgents’ main bastion in the north. The government prepares the ground – politically, diplomatically and militarily – for what it claims will be the final offensive. On 2 January 2008, it formally terminates the Ceasefire Agreement and the SLMM withdraws its monitors. The LTTE responds with a wave of bombings and assassinations in the south. Following some initial exchanges of fire, which the LTTE successfully resists, the government’s main operation starts with the conquest of Maddhu in the southern Vanni in May 2008. The military increasingly uses LTTE-style attacks – alongside conventional warfare –including claymore mine attacks and Special Infantry Operation Teams. The army marches on and the whole Western Vanni falls to the government with the capture of Pooneryn in November that year. In that same month, Tamilselvan – head of the Political Wing and effectively Balasingham’s replacement – dies in a government aerial bombardment.
Throughout these offensives, Norway continues its efforts to keep Sri Lanka’s war on the international agenda. The co-chairs keep issuing critical statements towards both parties about civilian suffering and the need to resume a political track. Aware of the limited leverage of bilateral aid, EU member countries generate a discussion on the union’s preferential trade agreement with Sri Lanka (GSP+),which is conditional on compliance with international human rights law.219 Sri Lanka does not meet some of the criteria, including those on civil rights, child rights, and on disappearances. Norwegian envoy Hanssen-Bauer provides a thorough assessment of the situation in Sri Lanka to EU decision-makers in October 2008. He avoids taking a position on GSP+, but underlines that the EU could apply pressure on the human rights
situation.220 With critical reports by international human rights NGOs, Brussels feels pressured to take a stance, particularly when the Sri Lankan government remains largely unresponsive to EU concerns.221 January 2009: Government forces capture Kilinochchi In view of the rapid offensive, the Norwegians conclude in August 2008 that the army will probably capture the Vanni sometime in 2009, but it cannot be ruled out that this is a tactical LTTE retreat. The team concludes: ‘It is very likely that the LTTE will disappear as dominant power in any geographic area during 2009 and that the government will start a rehabilitation process in the north like the one we see in the east.’222 They expect, however, that the insurgents will flee to the jungle and continue guerrilla style warfare and will not fully disappear as long as Prabhakaran is alive. The Norwegian team decides that even if the government military prevails, it needs to keep reminding the Sri Lankan government of the need for a political solution.223 They also maintain a dialogue around sensitive issues of rehabilitation and the resettlement and return of displaced people.224 (219?) More specifically, GSP+ beneficiaries must have ratified and effectively implemented 27 specified international conventions in the fields of human rights, core labour standards, sustainable development and good governance. Sri Lanka is the only country where GSP+ was formally suspended.
===============
220 Interview 019B and communication with the Norwegian MFA 070F.
221 Intervew 064B.
222 MFA. 307. 3 (2008/00128-59) and MFA 307.3 (2008/00192-53).
223 MFA. 307. 3 (2008/00128-59) and MFA 307.3 (2008/00192-53).
224 Communication with the Norwegian MFA 070F.
Pawns of Peace – Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997-2009 65
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It becomes clear that the endgame has started when the army captures Kilinochchi– the symbolic rebel headquarters in the Vanni – on 2 January 2009. The remaining LTTE territory around Puthukuduyiripu and Mullaitivu shrinks quickly. The LTTE’s human shield of hundreds of thousandsof civilians225 who are not allowed to escape, form a crucial part of the insurgent’s defence. Continued forced recruitment of ever younger child soldiers and brutalities are reported (Human Rights Watch, 2008). The civilian presence slows down the army offensive, but the government is determined not to let casualties change the course of events. The LTTE suffersfrom low morale (International Crisis Group, 2010) and internal dissent (Jeyaraj,2010), and appears to pin unrealistic hopes on the diaspora, India or Western countries coming to their rescue.
Towards the end of 2008, international actors realize the game is changing. Aid agencies are requested to vacate the Vanni in September 2008 and it is clear that the government is closing in on the rebels. Concerned with the possible humanitarian consequences, four players, the UN, the ICRC, the US and Norway, coordinate their efforts closely. The UN and ICRC are primarily engaged with preserving humanitarian access: getting aid in and (wounded) civilians out of the war zone. The UN (through the World Food Program) provides food and medicine; the ICRC supplies the remaining doctors and tries to evacuate civilians; and Norway and the US make several diplomatic attempts to avoid the bloodshed of a final onslaught.226 The cochairs agree to work towards some form of LTTE surrender, but Japan and the EU are not engaged directly in subsequent negotiations.227 India is not involved in these efforts either, but makes some parallel pleas for limiting civilian casualties. The Indian government also makes it very clear that it
supports a continuation of the offensive and the defeat of the LTTE.228 Pressure from Western countries on the Sri Lankan government is mounting, however. The EU postpones its decision on the GSP+ trade framework. An IMF standby credit, direly needed in view of economic downturn and budget deficits, is also held back. These measures invoke protests from the Sri Lankan government, but have no discernable impact on offensives on the ground.229 Soon after the conquest of the geographically strategic Elephant Pass (9 January) and the remaining rebel pockets on the Jaffna peninsula (14 January), the government unilaterally declares a No Fire Zone (NFZ) on the LTTE’s southern and western defence line (21 January). Dropping leaflets from the air, it requests civilians to move there while the offensive continues. The LTTE continues
to fire from inside the zone. The government also launches sustained, heavy bombardments on this purported safe haven. A UN convoy, grounded in the Vanni because of the LTTE’s refusal to let local UN staff vacate the area230 seeks shelter in the zone and gets barraged with bombs and shells. Many civilians, who had come to seek safety, die
===========
225 The assessment at the time was that about 200.000 civilians were trapped with the LTTE in the Vanni (see e.g. Human Rights Watch,2009), but the number later proved to have been as high as 365.000 (International Crisis Group, 2010).
226 Interview 034C.
227 Interview 010A.
228 Interview 033E.
229 Later efforts for a resolution in the UN Human Rights Council, led by Germany, the Netherlands and the UK, result in a humiliating defeat for these countries. Sri Lanka is supported by India, China, Russia and a larger group of Asian (and other developing) countries and successfully neutralises a reprimanding resolution (27 May 2009).
230 The Norwegian embassy, in close touch with the UN and other humanitarian actors, exerted strong pressure on both government and LTTE to enable UN agencies and the ICRC to provide emergency assistance. Pressure on the LTTE to let the UN convoy go fell on deaf ears, however (MFA 397.3 (2009/00028-6).
66 Pawns of Peace – Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997-2009
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on the spot. Militarily experienced eyewitnesses and satellite imagery provide evidence for these humanitarian atrocities (Human Rights Watch, 2009; International Crisis Group, 2010; UN Panel of Experts, 2011; Weiss, 2011). In the following days,the District Hospital and the Ponnambalam Hospital in Puthukkudiyiruppu, packed with injured people (as well as some wounded LTTE cadres in the second hospital), get bombed. Government statements initially acknowledge, then deny the attack (Human Rights Watch, 2009; International Crisis Group, 2010; UN Panel of Experts, 2011; Weiss, 2011). The World Food Program and ICRC keep up their attempt to provide aid, but there are heavy government restrictions and supplies often do not reach the whole population.The government declares a limited ceasefire from 1 to 3 February 2009 to allow civilians to leave, but the LTTE restricts the number of people allowed to depart and uses the lull to launch a counter strike. On February 3, a co-chair statement publicly asks the LTTE to
lay down arms and suggests both parties declare a temporary cease-fire and resume dialogue. The insurgents ignore the statement. LTTE (child) recruitment and forced detainment of the civilian population in the war zone continues as the army keeps moving forward. As the front line moves, Puthukkudiyiruppu’s hospital is moved further into LTTE territory, but shelled again on 9 February. The government calls off the first No Fire Zone and announces a new one on the narrow strip of land on the east coast north of Mullaitivu (12 February). The army presses on and shelling into the zone and on demarcated hospitals will continue over the next three months. In this period, the remaining ICRC expatriates vacate the area. Evacuations and supplies continue by sea – between the No Fire Zone and Pulmoddai further south. On 24 February, the LTTE sends a letter to the EU, US, Japan and Norway indicating they request a ceasefire, but offers no firm guarantees in return. The government calls the letter an ‘unrealistic prayer about a ceasefire’231 and turns the request down. International actors call on the LTTE to lay down weapons and attempts to negotiate an ‘organised end to the war’ continue.In close dialogue with the US, Norway continues its efforts to resolve the humanitarian crisis through some form of surrender. The ideas circulated consist of fourmain components: 1) a government guaranteed amnesty for LTTE cadres other than the top leadership; 2) the LTTE handing
in their weapons to the UN; 3) LTTE cadres surrendering to the UN or the ICRC; and 4) the co-chairs promising involvement to improve the situation for civilians and support a political solution to the conflict.232 The US is prepared to make landing vessels available for transport to Trincomalee. Preparations are made for an international presence in the war zone – by the UN Resident Representative or in another way – and make sure both India and the US stand witness to the implementation of whatever arrangement emerges. The Norwegian team receives signals that the Sri Lankan government may accept LTTE surrenderat this point, though they are resistant to the idea of a UN envoy and the Norwegians are not sure the military can be convinced either. The Norwegian team hopes the ‘face saving measures’ will make it easier for the LTTE to accept.233 Inter-
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231 MFA. 307. 3 (2009/00028-12), Colombo to MFA, 24 February, 2009.
232 MFA. 307. 3 (2009/00028-23), MFA to Washington D.C., New York, Brussels, 24 April, 2009.
233 MFA. 307. 3 (2009/00028-23), MFA to Washington D.C., New York, Brussels, 24 April, 2009.
Pawns of Peace – Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997-2009 67
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views and archives suggest the plan for LTTE leaders was to transfer them to Colombo and provide international guarantees for their well-being, but according to testimony from former LTTE operator ‘KP’ (with whom the Norwegians have a meeting in Malaysia on 26 February), the LTTE expected the evacuation of 25 to 50 LTTE leaders and their families to a foreign country to be a possibility. Prabhakaran, however,rejects the proposal out of hand as ‘unacceptable’ (Jeyaraj, 2010). The LTTE leadership is living in a ‘dream world’, the diplomats involved conclude. The LTTE seems to believe in ‘miracles’; ‘Prabhakaran had survived on numerous previous occasions by a miracle and perhaps believed he would do it again,’ according to one of the Norwegians.23 As the net around the insurgents closes, LTTE surrender becomes a less and less attractive option for Colombo. It is also doubtful India has any interest in the LTTE surviving the end of the war. Non-Western countries tell the Sri Lankan government to ignore Western pressure and ‘get it over with,’ according to the testimony of a Sri Lankan diplomat.235 Another former government official adds, the government has ‘hardly any reason to let the LTTE surrender or escape’, ‘to think twice before grabbing the cobra by its head, and maybe have trouble again for another twenty years.’236 It is in this period that the Sri Lankan government terminates Norway's facilitator role in Sri Lanka.237 Attempts to get the government to agree to internationally monitored safe havens fail. Additional time pressure is generated by the Indian elections. Though considered unlikely, there is a chance of the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya
Janata Party (BJP)238 defeating the ruling Congress party.239. A less permissive Indian position poses a risk for the Sri Lankan government. Although a major change in the Indian stance is very unlikely, the government really fears someone will come to the insurgents’aid.240 Following more international pressure, the government announces another two-day ceasefire in April to enable civilians to get out, after which the offensive resumes. On 29 April, foreign ministers Miliband (UK) and Kouchner (France) make an unexpected visit to Colombo and try to convince the government to change its stance, without success. In fact, hardly anyone even notices their efforts, and critical aid workers refer to it as ‘a joke’.241 The second No Fire Zone is replaced by a third zone which covers a very small piece of land on 8 May. On the next day, the last ICRC ship reaches the Vanni. Subsequent shipments are called off due to the heavy fighting. Indian Home Minister Chidambaram contacts Prabhakaran and suggests the LTTE agrees to a pre-drafted statement that they will lay down their weapons.242 The document leaks to Vaiko, a radical but marginal Eelamist politician in Tamil Nadu, who rejects it as a Congress trick and assures the LTTE that BJP will win the
====================
234 Interview 030A.
235 Interview 033E.
236 Interview 069E.
237 On 12 April 2009, Tamil demonstrators broke into the Sri Lankan embassy in Oslo. The Norwegian government apologized for this incident, but it caused great resentment in Colombo and Sri Lankan Foreign Minister Bogollagama stated that, ‘in this situation’,there was no longer anything Norway could contribute to as facilitator of a peace process. (Interview 044A).
238 And its Tamil Nadu ally, the All India Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK).
239 And its Tamil Nadu ally, the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK).
240 Interview 033E.
241 Interview 056B.
242 Interview 043D.
68 Pawns of Peace – Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997-2009
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ongoing Indian elections and come to the Tigers’ rescue. The army launches its final offensive. Improvised LTTE plans to evacuate their leader fail (Jeyaraj, 2010) and their chain of command unravels. A group of civilians as large as 60,000 attempts a mass break out across the lagoon on 14 May. Many of them drown, however, and when the army on the other shore tries to extend its help, LTTE cadres open fire (UTHR, 2009). In the night between 17 and 18 May, Nadesan (head of the LTTE Political Wing) and Pulidevan (head of the LTTE Peace Secretariat) contact the Norwegians as well as the UK and US embassy, the ICRC, and Chandra Nehru (a Tamil politician in Colombo) indicating their last-minute willingness to surrender. Following hasty negotiations with presidential advisor and brother Basil Rajapaksa, they are told to walk across the frontline with a white flag. The last phone conversation is held shortly before their departure. Hours later they are reported shot. Government troops move into the last LTTE stronghold and kill LTTE chief Prabhakaran and the remaining LTTE leaders including Soosai (Sea Tigers) and Pottu Amman (intelligence). Tens of thousands of civilians escape the war zone in the days before the last battle, but some 30,000 civilians remain entrapped. The civilian death toll during the last night alone is estimated at 1000 to 4000 (UTHR, 2009). No firm overall evidence is available, but the International Crisis Group’s estimate on the basis of population movements suggests the total number of civilians who died in the last months plausibly exceeds 30,000 (International Crisis Group, 2010).
