New Criminal Laws will take effect from July 1: Union Law Minister

New Delhi , Jun 16 : Minister of State (MoS) (Independent Charge) Law and Justice, Arjun Ram Meghwal on Sunday said that the new Criminal Laws, namely Bharatiya Nyay Sanhita, Bharatiya Suraksha Sanhita, and Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, will come into force on July 1, 2024.

“IPC, CrPC, and Indian Evidence Act are changing. After following the due consultation process and keeping in mind the reports of the Law Commission of India, the three laws have been changed,” said Meghwal.

“The three laws will be implemented from July 1 with the names Bharatiya Nyay Sanhita, Bharatiya Suraksha Sanhita, and Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam. Training facilities for the three new laws are being provided in all states,” said Meghwal.

He highlighted that Bureau of Police Research and Development (BPRD) is providing training for it. He added, “Our judicial academies, national law universities are also providing training for the same. Everything is going hand in hand and from July 1, all these three laws which is crucial for criminal justice system will be implemented in the country.”

Notably, under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, police custody under general criminal laws has been increased from 15 days to 90 days, depending on the nature of the offense.
Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita will have 358 sections (instead of 511 sections in the IPC). A total of 20 new crimes have been added to the bill, and the imprisonment sentence has been increased for 33 of them. The amount of the fine has been increased in 83 crimes and mandatory minimum punishment has been introduced in 23 crimes. The penalty of community service has been introduced for six crimes and 19 sections have been repealed or removed from the bill.

Bharatiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita will have 531 sections (in place of 484 sections of CrPC). A total of 177 provisions have been changed in the bill, and nine new sections as well as 39 new sub-sections have been added to it. The draft act has added 44 new provisions and clarifications. Timelines have been added to 35 sections and audio-video provision has been added at 35 places.

A total of 14 sections have been repealed and removed from the bill Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam will have 170 provisions (instead of the original 167 provisions), and a total of 24 provisions have been changed. Two new provisions and six sub-provisions have been added and six provisions have been repealed or deleted from the bill.

The recent criminal justice reform in India marks a significant shift in priorities, placing crimes against women, children, and the nation at the forefront. This stands in stark contrast to colonial-era laws, where concerns like treason and treasury offenses outweighed the needs of ordinary citizens. (ANI)⍐

Russia and the DPRK: Article by Vladimir Putin

 Article by Vladimir Putin in Rodong Sinmun newspaper, 

Russia and the DPRK: Traditions of Friendship and Cooperation Through the Years June 18, 2024 00:00

On the eve of my state visit to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, I would like to address the Korean and foreign audience of the Rodong Sinmun newspaper to share my thoughts on the prospects for partnership between our states and on their role in the modern world.

The relations of friendship and neighbourliness between Russia and the DPRK, based on the principles of equality, mutual respect and trust, go back more than seven decades and are rich in glorious historical traditions. Our peoples cherish the memory of their difficult joint struggle against Japanese militarism and honour the heroes who fell in it. In August 1945, Soviet soldiers, fighting shoulder to shoulder with Korean patriots, defeated the Kwantung Army, liberated the Korean peninsula from colonisers, and opened the way for the Korean people to develop independently. As symbol of combat brotherhood of the two nations, a monument was erected in 1946 on the Moranbong Hill in the centre of Pyongyang to commemorate the liberation of Korea by the Red Army.

The Soviet Union was the first among the world’s states to recognise the young Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and establish diplomatic relations with it. As early as on March 17, 1949, when the founder of the DPRK Comrade Kim Il Sung paid his first visit to Moscow, the USSR and the DPRK signed the Agreement on Economic and Cultural Cooperation, establishing a legal framework for further strengthening of their bilateral interaction. Our country helped the Korean friends to build their national economy, create a healthcare system, develop science and education, and train professional administrative and technical staff. 

 In 1950–1953, during the difficult years of the Fatherland Liberation War, the Soviet Union also extended a helping hand to the people of the DPRK and supported them in their struggle for independence. Later on, the Soviet Union provided significant assistance in restoring and strengthening the national economy of the young Korean state and in building a peaceful life.

My first visit to Pyongyang in 2000 and the return visit of Comrade Kim Jong Il, Chairman of the National Defence Commission of the DPRK, to Russia the following year marked new important milestones in the relations between our countries. The bilateral declarations signed back then defined the main priorities and areas of our constructive multidimensional partnership for years to come.

Comrade Kim Jong Un, who leads the DPRK today, confidently continues the policies of his predecessors – prominent statesmen and friends of the Russian people, Comrades Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. I had another chance to see it when we met last September at the Vostochny Cosmodrome in Russia.

Today, as before, Russia and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea are actively advancing their multifaceted partnership. We highly appreciate the DPRK’s unwavering support for Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine, their solidarity with us on key international matters and willingness to defend our common priorities and views within the United Nations. Pyongyang has always been our committed and like-minded supporter, ready to confront the ambition of the collective West to prevent the emergence of a multipolar world order based on justice, mutual respect for sovereignty and consideration of each other’s interests.

The United States is going out of its way to impose on the world what it calls the “rules-based order”, which is essentially nothing more than a global neo-colonial dictatorship relying on double standards. Nations that disagree with such an approach and pursue an independent policy face increasing external pressure. The US leadership views such a natural and legitimate aspiration for self-reliance and independence as a threat to its global dominance.

The United States and its satellites openly declare that their objective is to inflict a “strategic defeat” on Russia. They are doing everything they can to protract and further exacerbate the conflict in Ukraine, which they have themselves provoked by supporting and organising the 2014 armed coup in Kiev and the subsequent war in Donbass. What is more, over the years they have repeatedly rejected all our attempts to resolve the situation peacefully. Russia has always been and will remain open to equal dialogue on all issues, including the most difficult ones. I reiterated this at my recent meeting with Russian diplomats in Moscow.

Our adversaries, meanwhile, continue to supply the neo‑Nazi Kiev regime with money, weapons and intelligence information, allow – and, effectively, encourage – the use of modern Western weapons and equipment to deliver strikes on the Russian territory, aiming at obviously civilian targets in most cases. They are threatening to send their troops to Ukraine. Furthermore, they are trying to wear out Russia’s economy with more new sanctions and fuel socio-political tension inside the country.

No matter how hard they tried, all their attempts to contain or isolate Russia have failed. We continue to steadily build up our economic capability, develop our industry, technologies, infrastructure, science, education and culture.

We are pleased to note that our Korean friends – despite the years-long economic pressure, provocations, blackmailing and military threats on the part of the United States – are still effectively defending their interests. We see the force, dignity and courage with which the people of the DPRK fight for their freedom, sovereignty and national traditions, achieving tremendous results and genuine breakthroughs in strengthening their country in terms of defence, technology, science and industry. At the same time, the country’s leadership and its head Comrade Kim Jong Un have repeatedly expressed their intention to resolve all the existing differences by peaceful means. But Washington, refusing to implement previous agreements, keeps setting new, increasingly harsh and obviously unacceptable requirements.

Russia has incessantly supported and will support the DPRK and the heroic Korean people in their struggle against the treacherous, dangerous and aggressive enemy, in their fight for independence, identity and the right to freely choose their development path.

We are also ready to closely work together to bring more democracy and stability to international relations. To do this, we will develop alternative trade and mutual settlements mechanisms not controlled by the West, jointly oppose illegitimate unilateral restrictions, and shape the architecture of equal and indivisible security in Eurasia.

It goes without saying, we will develop people-to-people interaction between our countries. We plan to promote academic mobility between Russian and Korean higher education institutions, mutual tourist trips as well as cultural, educational, youth and sports exchanges – everything that makes communication between countries and nations people-centred, everything that enhances confidence and mutual understanding.

I am convinced that our joint efforts will take our bilateral interaction to a higher level, which will facilitate mutually beneficial and equal cooperation between Russia and the DPRK, strengthen our sovereignty, promote trade and economic ties, people-to-people contacts and, ultimately, improve the well-being of the citizens of both states.

I would like to extend wishes of good health to Comrade Kim Jong Un and those of peace and great success on the path of development – to the friendly people of the DPRK.⍐

Source:http://en.kremlin.ru/

Is the IMF setting Sri Lanka up for a second car crash?

Is the IMF setting Sri Lanka up for a second car crash?

Sri Lanka is bankrupt and restructuring its debts. But there’s a high risk that this restructuring will not be thorough enough, leaving the country with a festering problem that will probably just lead to another default. And to a large extent, this is a result of the IMF’s bizarrely puny targets. The IMF argues that Sri Lanka’s debt will be sustainable if the country gets its public debt down to 95 per cent of GDP by 2032. From the March programme:

B. Restoring Public Debt Sustainability 

 17. Sri Lanka’s public debt is assessed as unsustainable. The debt-to-GDP ratio is projected to have reached 128 per cent of GDP in 2022, due to exchange rate depreciation, the fiscal deficit, and negative real GDP growth. The authorities’ fiscal adjustment alone cannot reduce debt to sustainable levels. 

 18. The authorities are committed to restoring debt sustainability (see Annex II). Their objectives are to: (i) reduce the level of public debt below 95 per cent of GDP by 2032; (ii) reduce average central government gross financing needs (GFNs) in 2027—32, including from the materialization of contingent liabilities, below 13 per cent of GDP, so that rollover risks under stress are manageable; (iii) keep FX debt service of the central government below 4.5 per cent of GDP in any year during 2027-32; and (iv) ensure that the fiscal and external financing gaps are closed.

Those are ridiculously unambitious target. This basically means that Sri Lanka’s debts will be judged sustainable even if the burden tops its GDP over the next decade. Remember, this is a country that got into trouble with a pre-pandemic debt-to-GDP ratio below 80 per cent. In addition, there are no targets for the external debt stock — the IMF’s founders would be aghast. 

The IMF’s new debt sustainability model focuses on “gross financing needs” instead of the net present value of Sri Lanka’s external debt. And the model seems to say that Sri Lanka’s debts are sustainable as long as it keeps gross financing needs below 13 per cent of GDP. There isn’t an explicit limit on the amount Sri Lanka can pay on its external debt, but the requirement that foreign-currency financing needs remains below 4.5 per cent of GDP functions like a limit on the amount of expected external debt servicing. However, Sri Lanka’s basic problem has historically been its low ability to collect taxes.

Revenues averaged just 11.5 per cent of GDP in the decade prior to Sri Lanka’s default — and dipped below 10 per cent of GDP after an ill-advised tax cut just before the pandemic. The IMF program now forecasts that revenue will rise to around 15 per cent of GDP — a skinny revenue base for such a country with public debts of over 100 per cent of GDP. Let’s do some basic debt math. If you assume a 5 per cent average interest rate on Sri Lanka’s debt and a debt-to-GDP ratio around 100 per cent. the IMF’s revenue projections imply that Sri Lanka will spend about a third of its revenue on interest payments alone in years to come. 

Even this calculation is optimistic. In the low interest rate era of the past decade, Sri Lanka’s average debt costs hovered around 8 per cent. Plugging this in the calculation above means more than half of Sri Lanka’s revenue would be gobbled up with interest payments. According to the IMF, only four countries for which data is available in 2023 will spend more than a third of their revenue on interest payments: Pakistan, Egypt, Ghana, and Malawi. Ghana and Malawi are already undergoing debt restructurings. Egypt and Pakistan are in IMF programs and arguably should bite the bullet and restructure their debts too. 

Additionally, none of these countries can access the international bond markets for meaningful sums. Yet the IMF programme envisages that Sri Lanka will be back in the market in 2027. If the expected $1.5bn in bond market funding doesn’t materialise, Sri Lanka could face a significant drain on foreign reserves just as it loses access to its IMF lifeline. 

 To be fair, Sri Lanka did sustain high interest payments as a share of revenue in the past. But its interest to revenue ratio of between 30 and 40 per cent was fundamentally a function of unusually low revenues — interest payments of 5.6 per cent of GDP and revenues of 12 per cent of GDP in 2019 for example. That was part of the reason why Sri Lanka couldn’t manage its debt through the shock of the pandemic.

The IMF’s targets for Sri Lanka have an internal logic with the IMF’s frameworks, but they are fundamentally hard to square with the Fund’s targets for Zambia, which looks remarkably like Sri Lanka on many metrics underpinning debt service capacity. The two countries have similar levels of public debt-to-GDP and external debt-to-GDP, for example. 

If anything, Zambia looks stronger as it historically has had a larger export sector and collects about 20 per cent of GDP in revenue annually. But the IMF has set much more demanding targets for Zambia than Sri Lanka. 

For example, a quick calculation shows that Zambia’s target for external debt service as a share of revenue is less than half the one the IMF set (indirectly) for Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka’s targets, in essence, are the result of threshold effects induced by the sharp difference between the IMF’s two models for assessing debt sustainability — the one for low-income countries, and the one for “market-access countries”. 

 The lines between the models are blurred of course — a number of low-income countries in practice have had more market access than Sri Lanka (eg Ghana). But it certainly seems like the supposedly state of the art market-access model isn’t doing a good job setting debt restructuring targets for lower middle-income countries with volatile revenue and export bases. There’s also a second issue with the market-access debt sustainability model: by focusing entirely on the stock of public debt and overall gross financing needs, the model creates an incentive to use domestic debt as a variable of adjustment.

 At first, the Sri Lankan authorities had presented a restructuring plan that only encompassed external debt, which makes sense for a country that defaulted on its external debt because it had literally run out of reserves but continued to service its domestic debt. But following a demand by bondholders, Sri Lanka is now also undergoing a domestic debt “optimisation”. 

 From a July presentation to investors:

However, this exercise seems driven by a need to reduce the contribution of domestic debt service to the gross financing needs rather than tackle any real vulnerability, instead enabling Sri Lanka to maximise debt service to foreign creditors within the IMF’s generous targets. Sri Lanka is not going to default because it can’t rollover bills held by the central bank: the domestic debt optimisation exercise addresses what in effect is non-existent vulnerability. 

 So what happens next? 

 Well, the IMF isn’t going to change its targets. External creditors — be they the bondholders or China’s policy banks — certainly aren’t going to be pushing for any adjustments to the IMF’s targets.In fact, Sri Lanka’s Eurobonds rallied from a bottom in the low 20s in November 2022 as the IMF targets leaked into the market and are currently hovering around 45 cents on the dollar. 

 That puts the onus on Sri Lanka to insist that the IMF targets cannot be the baseline scenario and reach a deal that hacks down the stock of external debt and limits the future burden of servicing it. 

 This is obviously easier said than done — most restructurings try to sweep in as much debt service as the IMF program allows. And there’s one more twist: Sri Lanka wasn’t eligible for the G20’s Common Framework, and therefore isn’t negotiating with a single official creditors committee. 

 China has refused to join the committee formed by India, Japan and France with most other official bilateral creditors. In fact, Sri Lanka is negotiating with many distinct external creditor groups — the official bilateral creditor committee organised by the Paris Club; China’s official creditors (basically China Eximbank); “private” Chinese state banks like ICBC and the China Development Bank (CDB); private bondholders; and other non-bonded debt holders like HSBC or Deutsche Bank. Chinese creditors don’t want to negotiate in a single forum with the Paris Club — and it sure seems like China Exim and CDB don’t want to negotiate together either. Coordinating multiple comparable restructurings is always a challenge. However, Sri Lanka should insist on at least one thing: if creditors want anything close to the maximum allowed by the IMF program, they don’t need any more upside. 

 Value-recovery instruments like GDP-linkers should be compensation for real debt relief, not a sweetener on top of an already too sweet deal.The Paris Club creditors should set an example here and not insist on following the model of Zambia’s restructuring, which features a one-off state-contingent trigger that lets official creditors extract more debt service if the economy outperforms IMF forecasts. 

 Going forward however, we draw three lessons from Sri Lanka:

 — Complex models should not trump common sense: countries that dedicate more than a third of projected revenue to interest payment are not likely to be sustainable and regain market access. 

 — Separate program targets need to be set on external debt, notably on the stock. External debt is a claim on reserves and export proceeds — and thus is fundamentally different from domestic debt. 

 — Setting targets for public debt instead of external debt will generate pressure for unnecessary domestic debt restructurings. If the IMF thinks a domestic debt restructuring is necessary, as it was in Ghana, the program should be built around this domestic debt restructuring from the start. 

The IMF and the World Bank are now reviewing the low-income country debt sustainability model. But it could well be more urgent to conduct a review of whether the market-access model — which was designed to be an indicator of building fiscal vulnerabilities — is producing appropriate targets for the restructuring of the external debt of middle-income countries experiencing balance of payments difficulties⍐.

Source:

FT - Theo Maret and Brad Setser 

SEPTEMBER 5 2023

Theo Maret is a research analyst at Global Sovereign Advisory and writes a sovereign debt newsletter. Brad Setser is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and a former Treasury Department official.

The IMF knife threatening democracy

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) delegation addressing the media in Colombo

The IMF after much fanfare released its third tranche from its Extended Fund Facility program for Sri Lanka amounting to US$ 336 million. These tranches that are released every six months after excruciating reviews and much trepidation in the media are peanuts! For example last year the remittances from Sri Lankan migrant workers on average was about US$ 500 million per month, compared to the IMF’s US$ 336 million every six months. Furthermore, Sri Lanka’s foreign earnings, whether it be remittances or export earnings, don’t have to be returned. However, the IMF funds are a loan that has to be paid back in foreign currency, and as I have shown in my previous column, for the US$ 3 billion IMF program over four years, we have to make interest payments alone of US$ 2 billion over the next ten years. 

IMF analysis

In this column, I address the IMF analysis and approach 

towards Sri Lanka’s economy. Furthermore, its 159-page document released last week is not just about the economy, but rather betrays a political push. The IMF’s mask is coming off as Sri Lanka approaches the presidential elections later this year, and parliamentary elections next year. The IMF is backing Sri Lanka’s authoritarian regime, which is uninterested in negotiating in the interest of its people and bending over backward to embrace the policies of the IMF. Worse, the IMF’s rhetoric betrays a blatant disregard for the democratic rights of the Sri Lankan people. 

 Free trade, attack on labour and privatization

The statement last week following the IMF Executive Board’s Second Review of the Sri Lanka programme had the following to say:

“The economy is starting to recover, inflation remains low, revenue collection is improving, and reserves continue to accumulate. Despite these positive developments, the economy is still vulnerable and the path to debt sustainability remains knife-edged.” 

While, the IMF programme with its devastating austerity measures were sold in Sri Lanka as the only assured path of recovery, we are now told that the path is “vulnerable” and “knife-edged”. In effect, there is the real possibility of another IMF program, which would be Sri Lanka’s eighteenth, and second default on its external debt.  

 Worrying policies

The threats to the economy they outline, in my view, are now more and more created by the IMF policies themselves; but such a situation in turn is used to justify further worrying policies. The statement goes on to push for more drastic measures: 

“Key priorities include steadfast implementation of the governance reforms; further trade liberalisation to promote exports and foreign direct investment; labour reforms to upgrade skills and increase female labour force participation; and state-owned enterprise reforms to improve efficiency and fiscal transparency, contain fiscal risks, and promote a level playing field for the private sector.” 

The IMF, while characterising the crisis in Sri Lanka as a problem of corruption that can be dealt with in governance, advances the global system of free markets that itself promotes a corrupt elite. Furthermore, it is such free markets that create repeated and deeper crises around the world, as with the seventy countries around the world like Sri Lanka that are in debt distress.   

Explicit language

In this context, the IMF has become bolder in its explicit language on Sri Lanka, as in the quote above calling for trade liberalization, labour reforms and privatisation. What these processes will do to aggravate the economic and social landscape of the country, as imports flood and destroy local production and livelihoods, workers and particularly women workers lose their rights and protections, and privatisation leads to unaffordable public services are of little concern to the IMF. The IMF’s main priority remains one of creating markets and profits for global capital. 

If the IMF’s cynical agenda of pushing Sri Lanka into the precipice of neoliberal cycles of crises is all too clear from its Executive Board at the beginning of its long report, the statement by the IMF Executive Director for Sri Lanka at the end of the report, speaking apparently for the country is even more worrying: 

“To mitigate any risks to the program posed by upcoming elections, our authorities are dedicated to protecting the hard-earned gains and frontloading measures in government revenue mobilisation and reserve accumulation. The key elements of the economic adjustment program supported by the EFF arrangement have been incorporated into the Economic Transformation Bill, which was submitted to Parliament in May 2024.” 

In my column two weeks ago, it is precisely the incorporation of the IMF targets, including the exact numbers of total public debt of 95% of GDP and external debt servicing each year of 4.5% of GDP, into Sri Lankan law with the Economic Transformation Bill that I critiqued. And here, the statement above is congratulating Sri Lanka for those very measures. The IMF is clearly on the side of a government without legitimacy seeking to make laws without a mandate that reify the IMF’s targets into law. 

The political opposition in Sri Lanka has a clear challenge before them. The opposition parties in the running to win state power claim they will renegotiate the IMF agreement, but they are yet to articulate how they will do that. If the political opposition does not articulate the concrete measures they will renegotiate or an alternative path altogether, they will be stuck with the baggage of a stagnating economy under the IMF straight jacket. But first they must realise that when the IMF says Sri Lanka’s economy is on a knife-edge and speaks of the “risks to [its] programme posed by upcoming elections”, it is in fact holding a knife to the throat of Sri Lanka’s democracy⍐. 

Source: 17 June 2024 Daily Mirror

IMF அதானி ஆட்சிக்கமைய நாட்டில் 90 புதிய சட்ட மூலங்கள்

 15 மிக முக்கியமான கட்டளைச் சட்டங்களை நடைமுறைப்படுத்த ஏற்பாடு!

எதிர்வரும் சில வாரங்களில் சுமார் 15 மிக முக்கியமான கட்டளைச் சட்டங்களை நிறைவேற்றுவதற்கான ஏற்பாடுகள் தற்போது மேற்கொள்ளப்பட்டு வருவதாக நீதி அமைச்சர் விஜயதாச ராஜபக்ச (Wijeyadasa Rajapakshe) தெரிவித்துள்ளார்.

கடந்த 18 மாதங்களில் சுமார் 75 புதிய சட்டமூலங்கள் நாடாளுமன்றத்தில் சமர்ப்பிக்கப்பட்டு நிறைவேற்றப்பட்டு நாட்டுக்குத் தேவையான அடிப்படை மாற்றங்களைச் செய்ய முடிந்துள்ளதாகவும் அமைச்சர் குறிப்பிட்டுள்ளார்.

மேலும் தெரிவிக்கையில், ” இந்த காலகட்டத்தை நமது நாட்டின் நீதித்துறையில் நீதி நிர்வாகம் தொடர்பாக மிகப்பெரிய சட்ட சீர்திருத்தங்கள் மேற்கொள்ளப்பட்ட காலகட்டமாக அறிமுகப்படுத்தலாம்.

இரண்டு மாற்றங்கள் 

கடந்த 18 மாதங்களில் சுமார் 75 புதிய சட்டமூலங்கள் நாடாளுமன்றத்தில் தாக்கல் செய்யப்பட்டு நிறைவேற்றப்பட்டுள்ளன.

அது நாட்டிற்கு தேவையான அடிப்படை மாற்றத்தை ஏற்படுத்த உதவும் என்பதை கவனத்தில் கொள்ள வேண்டும்.

15 மிக முக்கியமான கட்டளைச் சட்டங்களை நடைமுறைப்படுத்த ஏற்பாடு! 

 (Provision For Execution Of 15 Major Ordinances)

காதி நீதிமன்றம் தொடர்பாக இதுவரை பல பிரச்சனைகள் எழுந்துள்ளன. அதன்படி, இரண்டு மாற்றங்கள் முன்மொழியப்பட்டுள்ளன.

வெளிநாடுகளில் வழங்கப்படும் தீர்ப்புகள் தொடர்பான வெளிநாட்டு தீர்ப்புகளை செயல்படுத்துவதற்கான வரைவு சமர்ப்பிக்கப்பட்டுள்ளது.

மேலும் அடுத்த சில வாரங்களில் சுமார் 15 மிக முக்கியமான அரசாணைகளை நிறைவேற்ற ஏற்பாடுகள் செய்யப்பட்டு வருகின்றன.

குற்றவியல் நடைமுறைச் சட்டத்திலும் பல திருத்தங்கள் முன்மொழியப்பட்டுள்ளன. நாங்கள் சமீபத்தில் நிறைவேற்றிய நீர் அறிவியல் சட்டத்தை அடுத்த ஆண்டு நடைமுறைப்படுத்தலாம்” என்றார்⍐.

Source: Tamilwin

 

Manohara, others warn of inherent dangers of 13-A

‘That legislation in its entirety is illegal and contrary to the unitary status –Gen Dias

By Shamindra Ferdinando

The full implementation of the 13th Amendment to the Constitution portends massive risks and, therefore, those political parties and alliance seeking to woo Tamil speaking voters should be wary of the threat to the country’s unitary status, top constitutional lawyer Manohara de Silva said yesterday.

The President’s Counsel was commenting on Samagi Jana Balawegaya (SJB) and Opposition Leader Sajith Premadasa’s recent declaration in Kilinochchi that the 13th Amendment would be implemented.

President Ranil Wickremesinghe and Jathika Jana Balawegaya (JJB), too, have declared their intention to fully implement the 13th Amendment in line with their overall bid to reach consensus with the Tamil National Alliance (TNA).

Pointing out that discussions on the 13th Amendment often centred on the need to grant land and police powers to the provinces, de Silva said that ancient and historical monuments and records, agriculture, irrigation, education, roads, as well as housing, come within the Provincial Council list.

The ruling Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP) is yet to state its position, officially, though about a year ago that party questioned the rationale in the incumbent President declaring his intention to fully implement the 13th Amendment against the backdrop of all previous Presidents having declined to do so.

Political parties shouldn’t, under any circumstance, forget that the concurrent list that included land acquisition, registration of births, renaming of villages, festivals (LTTE commemoration possible), archaeological sites, religious institutions are within the legislative and executive competence of Provincial Councils, the PC said.

When The Island pointed out that the Parliament could intervene to thwart threatening moves on the part of Provincial Councils, the Executive Committee member of the National Joint Committee emphasized that those who reached electoral agreements with the TNA wouldn’t be able to resist the coalition partner.

“Do you really think that the SJB leader, or any other presidential poll candidate, will be allowed, by coalition partners, to override the Provincial Council legislation on the concurrent list,” de Silva asked.

The outspoken lawyer pointed out that former Speaker and Deputy Leader of the UNP Karu Jayasuriya, in his current capacity as the Chairman of the National Movement of Social Justice (NMSJ) and the UK-headquartered Global Tamil Forum (GTF) have declared their support for the SJB’s position.

De Silva said that close on the heels of parliamentarian M.A. Sumanthiran, on behalf of the TNA, publicly regretting its decision to boycott the 2005 Presidential Polls, as directed by the LTTE – a contentious move that deprived Ranil Wickremesinghe of certain victory – Premadasa and JVP Leader Anura Kumara Dissanayake met the TNA leadership on Monday (10) and Tuesday (11), respectively.

The TNA parliamentary group consists of 10 MPs. In parliament, the TNA group is recognized as Illankai Thamil Arasu Kadchchi (ITAK).

De Silva said it would be interesting to see whether President Wickremesinghe, SJB leader Premadasa and JJB leader Dissanayake seek the support of other political parties representing the Northern and Eastern Provinces.

The other Tamil parties are the EPDP (two MPs), AITC (two), TMVP, TMTK (one). Of them, the EPDP and TMVP represent the Wickremesinghe-Rajapaksa government.

Retired General Jagath Dias who had been quite critical, recently, of the moves to fully implement the contentious piece of legislation, told The Island that though the right of political parties to engage in negotiations should be respected they couldn’t, under any circumstances, pursue an agenda inimical to national interests.

“There is absolutely no ambiguity. The 13th Amendment, forced on us by India under the Indo-Lanka Accord signed on July 29, 1987, in its entirety is illegal and contrary to our unitary status. That is the truth,” the war veteran said.

Having served the Army for over 35 years, Dias retired in Dec 2015 as the Chief of Staff. During Eelam War IV (August 2006-May 2009), Dias commanded the 57 Division that was tasked to liberate Kilinochchi.

Recalling the circumstances the 13th Amendment had been enacted, just months after India thwarted ‘Operation Liberation’ intended to clear the Jaffna peninsula of the LTTE, the former combat officer said that the piece of legislation should be constitutionally done away with.

Giving into unjust political demands made by the TNA/ITAK and trying to appease its Indian masters should be considered as a treacherous act, the Gajaba Regiment veteran said. Dias regretted that even 15 years after the eradication of separatist terrorism, the Parliament hadn’t taken into consideration post-war ground realities when addressing, what he called, the North East issues.

Both Manohara de Silva and Jagath Dias emphasized that the Eastern Province couldn’t be merged with the Northern Province just to appease those who still harboured separatist sentiments.

The Supreme Court in Oct 2006 declared that the merger of the two provinces, in line with the Indo-Lanka Accord, was defective and invalid.

The President’s Counsel said that the country’s unitary status, that had been preserved at a tremendous, cost couldn’t be abolished. Referring to recent reports of some group distributing leaflets in the North demanding that the Tamil electorate boycott the Presidential Poll, scheduled to be conducted later this year, until the unitary status is done away with, de Silva said those who genuinely value the eradication of the LTTE conventional fighting capacity should take a collective stand as regards the 13th Amendment⍐.

 

Cartoon: SL Media

US welcomes IMF approval of Sri Lanka’s second review

ECONOMYNEXT — The United States has welcomed the International Monetary Fund (IMF)’s approval of the second review of Sri Lanka’s IMF programme which allows for the disbursement of 330 million US dollars.

US Ambassador to Sri Lanka Julie Chung tweeted Friday June 14 that her government encourages Sri Lanka’s leaders to stay committed to measures needed to foster growth.

“Recognising that reforms can be challenging, the United States continues to encourage Sri Lanka’s leaders to stay committed to take needed measures that ensure accountability, transparency, and representative governance, to foster investment and growth,” she said.

Julie Chung – Image credit: Un Yarat]/Flickr

Chung met State Minister of Finance Shehan Semasinghe in Washington at the IMF Spring Meeting in April where she said Sri Lanka had made “great progress”.

“Pleasure to see State Minister Semasinghe ahead of his trip to Washington for the IMF Spring Meeting, an opportunity for policymakers, economists, and stakeholders to collaborate on finding solutions to global economic challenges and promote international economic cooperation.

“Sri Lanka has made great progress on the IMF program, and we hope Sri Lanka can take the final steps necessary to unlock the next round of funding that will promote economic stability, foster growth, and improve the welfare of the people of Sri Lanka,” she tweeted at that,” said. 

( Economy Next Colombo/Jun14/2024)