இலங்கை கடற்படை, ஞாயிற்றுக்கிழமை (15) இரவு மற்றும் திங்கட்கிழமை (16) அதிகாலை, யாழ்ப்பாணம் காங்கேசன்துறை பகுதிக்கு அருகில் உள்ள இலங்கை கடற்பரப்பில் ஒரு சிறப்பு தேடுதல் நடவடிக்கையை மேற்கொண்டது.
இதன்போது உள்ளூர் கடற்பரப்பில் சட்டவிரோத மீன்பிடி நடவடிக்கைகளில் ஈடுபட்ட இந்திய மீன்பிடி படகுகள் இரண்டை கைப்பற்றி இந்திய மீனவர்கள் 25 பேரை கைது செய்துள்ளனர்.
கைது செய்யப்பட்ட இந்திய மீன்பிடி படகுகள் மற்றும் இந்திய மீனவர்கள் மேலதிக சட்ட நடவடிக்கைகளுக்காக யாழ்ப்பாணம் மைலடி மீன்வள ஆய்வாளர் அலுவலகத்தில் ஒப்படைக்கப்பட்டுள்ளனர்.
F-35 Software Could Be Jailbreaked Like An iPhone: Dutch Defense Secretary
The F-35's vendor locked software is becoming a greater concern as relations between the U.S. and longtime allies falter.
Joseph Trevithick Updated TWZ
The F-35’s ‘computer brain,’ including its cloud-based components, could be cracked to accept third-party software updates, just like ‘jailbreaking‘ a cellphone, according to the Dutch State Secretary for Defense. The statement comes as foreign operators of the jets continue to be pressed on what could happen if the United States were ever to cut off support. President Donald Trump’s administration has pursued a number of policies that have resulted in new diplomatic strains with some long-time allies, especially in Europe.
“If, despite everything, you still want to upgrade, I’m going to say something I should never say, but I will anyway: you can jailbreak an F-35 just like an iPhone,” Gijs Tuinman said during an episode of BNR Nieuwsradio‘s “Boekestijn en de Wijk” podcast posted online yesterday, according to a machine translation.
Tuinman, who has been State Secretary for Defense in the Netherlands since 2024, does not appear to have offered any further details about what the jailbreaking process might entail. What, if any, cyber vulnerabilities this might indicate is also unclear. It is possible that he may have been speaking more notionally or figuratively about action that could be taken in the future, if necessary.
TWZ has reached out to the F-35 Joint Program Office and manufacturer Lockheed Martin for responses to Tuinman’s remarks.
As we have explored in detail in the past, the F-35 program imposes unique limits on the ability of operators to make changes to the jet’s software, as well as to associated systems on the ground. Virtually all F-35s in service today see software updates come through a cloud-based network, the original version of which is known as the Autonomic Logistics Information System (ALIS). Persistent issues with ALIS have led to the development of a follow-on Operational Data Integrated Network (ODIN), the transition to which is still ongoing.
The ALIS/ODIN network is designed to handle much more than just software updates and logistical data. It is also the port used to upload mission data packages containing highly sensitive planning information, including details about enemy air defenses and other intelligence, onto F-35s before missions and to download intelligence and other data after a sortie.
Though now dated, the video below still offers a useful explanation of ALIS’ functions.
Though now dated, the video below still offers a useful explanation of ALIS’ functions.
Issues with ALIS, as well as concerns about the transfer of nationally sensitive information within the network, have led certain operators, including the Netherlands, to firewall off aspects of their software reprogramming activities in the past. However, the work still occurs in the United States under the auspices of the U.S. military and Lockheed Martin.
As TWZ has written in the past:
“It’s this mission planning data package that is a major factor to the F-35’s survivability. The ‘blue line’ (the aircraft’s route into an enemy area) that is projected by the system is based on the fusion of a huge number of factors, from enemy air defense bubbles to the stealth and electronic warfare capabilities of the aircraft, as well as onboard sensor and weapons employment envelopes and integrated tactics between F-35s and other assets. To say the least, it is one of the F-35’s most potent weapons. Without it, the aircraft and its pilot are far less capable of maximizing their potential and, as a result, are more vulnerable to detection and being shot down.“
A member of the US Air Force uses a laptop to review maintenance data from the ALIS system. USAF
So, while jailbreaking F-35’s onboard computers, as well as other aspects of the ALIS/ODIN network, may technically be feasible, there are immediate questions about the ability to independently recreate the critical mission planning and other support it provides. This is also just one aspect of what is necessary to keep the jets flying, let alone operationally relevant.
TWZ previously explored many of these same issues in detail last year, amid a flurry of reports about the possibility that F-35s have some type of discreet ‘kill switch’ built in that U.S. authorities could use to remotely disable the jets. Rumors of this capability are not new and remain completely unsubstantiated.
At that time, we stressed that a ‘kill switch’ would not even be necessary to hobble F-35s in foreign service. At present, the jets are heavily dependent on U.S.-centric maintenance and logistics chains that are subject to American export controls and agreements with manufacturer Lockheed Martin. Just reliably sourcing spare parts has been a huge challenge for the U.S. military itself, as you can learn more about in this past in-depth TWZ feature. F-35s would be quickly grounded without this sustainment support.
F-35s undergoing maintenance. USAF
A member of the US Air Force uses a laptop to review maintenance data from the ALIS system. USAF
Issues with ALIS, as well as concerns about the transfer of nationally sensitive information within the network, have led certain operators, including the Netherlands, to firewall off aspects of their software reprogramming activities in the past. However, the work still occurs in the United States under the auspices of the U.S. military and Lockheed Martin.
As TWZ has written in the past:
“It’s this mission planning data package that is a major factor to the F-35’s survivability. The ‘blue line’ (the aircraft’s route into an enemy area) that is projected by the system is based on the fusion of a huge number of factors, from enemy air defense bubbles to the stealth and electronic warfare capabilities of the aircraft, as well as onboard sensor and weapons employment envelopes and integrated tactics between F-35s and other assets. To say the least, it is one of the F-35’s most potent weapons. Without it, the aircraft and its pilot are far less capable of maximizing their potential and, as a result, are more vulnerable to detection and being shot down.“
A member of the US Air Force uses a laptop to review maintenance data from the ALIS system. USAF
So, while jailbreaking F-35’s onboard computers, as well as other aspects of the ALIS/ODIN network, may technically be feasible, there are immediate questions about the ability to independently recreate the critical mission planning and other support it provides. This is also just one aspect of what is necessary to keep the jets flying, let alone operationally relevant.
TWZ previously explored many of these same issues in detail last year, amid a flurry of reports about the possibility that F-35s have some type of discreet ‘kill switch’ built in that U.S. authorities could use to remotely disable the jets. Rumors of this capability are not new and remain completely unsubstantiated.
At that time, we stressed that a ‘kill switch’ would not even be necessary to hobble F-35s in foreign service. At present, the jets are heavily dependent on U.S.-centric maintenance and logistics chains that are subject to American export controls and agreements with manufacturer Lockheed Martin. Just reliably sourcing spare parts has been a huge challenge for the U.S. military itself, as you can learn more about in this past in-depth TWZ feature. F-35s would be quickly grounded without this sustainment support.
Altogether, any kind of jailbreaking of the F-35’s systems would come with a serious risk of legal action by Lockheed Martin and additional friction with the U.S. government. What would have to happen for a country like the Netherlands to pursue that course of action would also likely be just one symptom of a much more serious breakdown in relations with Washington. Doing this could easily prompt a cutoff in spare parts and other support, if that had not already occurred, which would leave jailbroken jets quickly bricked on the ground. To be clear, cracking the software would do nothing to mitigate the downstream impacts of being shut out from critical sustainment pipelines.
Spats between President Trump’s administration and certain U.S. allies have already created a degree of additional turbulence for the F-35 program, as evidenced by the ‘kill switch’ reporting last year. Most recently, trade disputes and other recent rifts in relations between Ottawa and Washington have led Canadian authorities to launch a review of their F-35 acquisition plans. There are broader questions now about the future of U.S. defense exports, especially in Europe, in light of other diplomatic rifts with Washington.
At the same time, despite his comments about the possibility of needing to crack the jet’s computer systems, Dutch Defense Minister Tuinman remained broadly supportive of the F-35 during the BNR Nieuwsradio podcast.
“Even if this mutual dependency doesn’t result in software updates, the F-35, in its current state, is still a better aircraft than other types of fighter jets,” Tuinman stressed, according to a machine translation of an accompanying story about the podcast from BNR.
Altogether, questions very much remain about just what ‘jailbreaking an F-35’ might look like in practical terms, and how that might impact the operational utility of the jets in the absence of support from the U.S. government and Lockheed Martin. At the same time, Tuinman’s comments do underscore larger issues surrounding the F-35 program, especially for foreign operators, many of which are not new.
Contact the author: joe@twz.com Joseph Trevithick Avatar Deputy Editor
Joseph has been a member of The War Zone team since early 2017. Prior to that, he was an Associate Editor at War Is Boring, and his byline has appeared in other publications, including Small Arms Review, Small Arms Defense Journal, Reuters, We Are the Mighty, and Task & Purpose.
Senate Democrats Block DHS Measure as Funding Deadline Approaches
Lawmakers say they remain far apart on deal for Homeland Security to put new restrictions on immigration enforcement
Lindsay Wise and Anvee Bhutani Updated Feb. 12, 2026 WSJ
WASHINGTON—The Department of Homeland Security is on the verge of a shutdown after Senate Democrats voted to block a bill to fund the agency, saying negotiations with Republicans to put new restrictions on immigration enforcement hadn’t made enough progress.
A bill to fund DHS through September failed to advance with 52 in favor and 47 opposed, short of the 60 votes required. Republicans control the Senate 53-47 but need Democratic support to pass most bills due to the longstanding filibuster rule.
Democratic Sen. John Fetterman of Pennsylvania voted with Republicans to advance the bill, while Senate Majority Leader John Thune (R., S.D.) switched his vote from yes to no to preserve his ability to bring the bill up again. Sen. Mitch McConnell (R., Ky.) was absent.
DHS oversees Immigration and Customs Enforcement and Customs and Border Protection as well as the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Transportation Security Administration and the U.S. Coast Guard. While the failed vote sets the stage for funding to lapse at DHS for at least a week, there isn’t expected to be any significant impact on border enforcement from the shutdown.
Democrats have demanded that Republicans agree to an overhaul of DHS as a condition of funding it, following the fatal shootings of two American citizens by federal immigration officers in Minnesota last month. Earlier Thursday, the Trump administration said it was ending its immigration crackdown in the state amid public outcry.
Lawmakers have passed legislation to fund every other part of government through the end of the fiscal year in September, but they split off the DHS bill to allow time for more negotiations. A two-week stopgap funding patch expires after Friday.
“If they don’t propose something that’s strong, that reins in ICE, that ends the killing—don’t expect our votes,” said Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer (D., N.Y.).
Senate Majority Leader John Thune (R., S.D.) was pessimistic about the potential for a deal on DHS funding.Michael M. Santiago/Getty Images
Democrats want an end to roving street patrols by immigration agents, tighter rules governing warrants and use of force, independent investigations for officer misconduct and a prohibition on agents wearing masks. They also want to require agents to use body cameras and carry identification. Republicans have rejected some of the ideas—notably on masks—and have introduced their own demand to end so-called sanctuary cities.
President Trump said Thursday that Democratic demands will make law enforcement officers “totally vulnerable” and “put them in a lot of danger.” He added that some of the demands are “very hard to approve…We have to protect our law enforcement.”
Thune was so downbeat about the potential for a deal that he allowed senators to go ahead with their plans to leave Washington for a weeklong recess, despite the imminent shutdown, while making clear they might need to return quickly to vote. Both the Senate and the House are scheduled to be out of session next week because of the Presidents Day holiday, and many lawmakers are headed to a security conference in Munich this weekend.
If DHS funding lapses, essential workers will continue to report to their jobs, while other workers could be furloughed. Also, ICE and Customs and Border Protection have additional funding from Trump’s tax law last year that could be tapped to keep their operations running and avoid missed paychecks. Other workers in DHS could start to miss pay if the shutdown drags on.
A bill to fund DHS through September failed to advance with 52 in favor and 47 opposed, short of the 60 votes required.
In a speech ahead of the vote, Thune complained that Democrats were rejecting “a reasonable good-faith offer” from the White House, though he didn’t say what that offer entailed. “Now, I’m not sure if Democrats thought the White House would just agree to every one of their demands or what, but they cannot reasonably expect to reach an agreement without actual negotiations from both sides,” he said.
Democrats on Saturday released a draft legislative text that included their proposals. The White House sent text of a counteroffer to Democrats late Wednesday, but none of the negotiators have publicly released it or described its contents.
Several Democratic senators said earlier this week that the White House has rejected key parts of Democrats’ demands.
A border patrol truck near the border wall this month in Nogales, Ariz. Ash Ponders/Bloomberg News
“I see no sign that they’re willing to accept the core protections: judicial warrants, body cameras, a right of action against ICE agents who break the law,” said Sen. Richard Blumenthal (D., Conn.).
Sen. John Barrasso (R., Wyo.), the No. 2 Senate Republican, in a speech Thursday, said that Republicans thought “many of the Democrat demands would undermine public safety and the rule of law, and so do the American people. They agree with us.”
In a sign of how dug in Democrats are, centrists who opposed the record-length government shutdown in the fall—largely over a failed effort to extend enhanced Affordable Care Act subsidies—said this week they would oppose even a short-term funding patch to keep DHS open for a matter of weeks while negotiations continued.
“I am not going to support [a stopgap bill] if my Republican colleagues can’t come to the table and work with us right now and get this done,” said Sen. Catherine Cortez-Masto (D., Nev.), who voted against the last shutdown.
Cortez-Masto said she didn’t think the GOP and the White House were working in good faith with Democrats on overhauling the department.
“All we’re proposing is that ICE abide by the same rules that police forces—state police and municipal police—abide by across the country,” said Sen. Angus King (I., Maine), who caucuses with Democrats and opposed last fall’s shutdown. “Pretty straightforward.”
Insights from SSA Cyclone Ditwah Survey: More State support needed for Malaiyaha community
Central Province experienced not just flooding but also the most number of landslides in the island Source: File photo By Shashik Silva Daily Mirror
Early warnings hadn’t reached many areas. Some data collectors said they themselves never heard any warnings in estate areas, while others mentioned that early warnings were issued but didn’t reach some segments of the community
When climate disasters strike, they don’t affect everyone equally. Marginalised communities typically face worse outcomes, and Cyclone Ditwah is no exception. Especially in a context where normalcy is far from ‘normal’, the idea of returning to normalcy or restoring a life of normalcy makes very little sense.
The islandwide survey conducted by the Social Scientists’ Association (SSA), between early to mid-January on Cyclone Ditwah shows stark regional disparities in how satisfied or dissatisfied people were with the Government’s response. While national satisfaction levels were relatively high in most provinces, the Central Province tells a different story.
The Central Province (Sinhala: මධ්යම පළාත, Tamil: மத்திய மாகாணம்) is one of the nine provinces of Sri Lanka, covering an area of approximately 5,674 square kilometers. It is home to a diverse population of around 2.8 million people and includes three main districts: Kandy, Matale, and Nuwara Eliya. The capital city is Kandy.
Only 35.2% of Central Province residents reported that they were satisfied with early warning and evacuation measures, compared to 52.2% nationally. The gap continues across every measure just 52.9% were satisfied with immediate rescue and emergency response, compared with the national figure of 74.6%. Satisfaction with relief distribution in the Central Province is 51.9% while the national figure stands at 73.1%. The figures for restoration of water, electricity, and roads are at a low 45.9% in the central province compared to the 70.9% in national figures. Similarly, the satisfaction level for recovery and rebuilding support is 48.7% in the Central Province, while the national figure is 67.0%.
A deeper analysis of the SSA data on public perceptions reveals something important: these lower satisfaction rates came primarily from the Malaiyaha Tamil population. Their experience differed not just from other provinces, but also from other ethnic groups living in the Central Province itself.
The Malaiyaha Tamil community’s vulnerability didn’t start with the cyclone. Their vulnerability is a historically and structurally pre-determined process of exclusion and marginalisation. Brought to Sri Lanka during British rule to work for the empire’s plantation economies, they have faced long-term economic exploitation and have repeatedly been denied access to state support and social welfare systems. Most estate residents still live in ‘line rooms’ and have no rights to the land they cultivate and live on. The community continues to be governed by an outdated estate management system that acts as a barrier to accessing public and municipal services such as road repair, water, electricity and other basic infrastructures available to other citizens.
As far as access to improved water sources is concerned, the Sri Lanka Demographic Health Survey (2016) shows that 57% of estate sector households don’t have access to improved water sources, while more than 90% of households in urban and rural areas do. With regard to the level of poverty, as the Department of Census and Statistics (2019) data reveals, the estate sector where most Malaiyaha Tamils live had a poverty headcount index of 33.8%; more than double the national rate of 14.3%. These statistics highlight key indicators of the systemic discrimination faced by the Malaiyaha Tamil community.
Some crucial observations from the SSA data collectors who had enumerated responses from estate residents in the survey reveal the specific challenges faced by the Malaiyaha Tamils, particularly in their efforts to seek state support for compensation and reconstruction.
First, the Central Province experienced not just flooding but also the most number of landslides in the island. As a result, some residents in the region lost entire homes, access roadways, and other basic infrastructures. The lost of lives, livelihoods and land were at a higher intensity compared to the provinces not located in the hills. Most importantly, the Malaiyaha Tamil community’s pre-existing grievances made them even more vulnerable and the government’s job of reparation and restitution more complex.
Early warnings hadn’t reached many areas. Some data collectors said they themselves never heard any warnings in estate areas, while others mentioned that early warnings were issued but didn’t reach some segments of the community. According to the resident data collectors, the police announcements reached only as far as the sections they were able to drive their vehicles, and there were many estate roads that were not suitable for vehicles. When warnings did filter through to remote locations, they often came by word of mouth and information was distorted along the way. Once the disaster hit, things got worse: roads were blocked, electricity went out, mobile networks failed and people were cut off completely.
Emergency response was slow. Blocked roads meant people could not get to hospitals when they needed urgent care, including pregnant mothers. The difficult terrain and poor road conditions meant rescue teams took much longer to reach affected areas than in other regions.
Relief supplies didn’t reach everyone. The Grama Niladhari divisions in these areas are huge and hard to navigate, making it difficult for Grama Niladharis to reach all places as urgently as needed. Relief workers distributed supplies where vehicles could go, which meant accessible areas got help while remote communities were left out.
Some people didn’t even try to go to safety centres or evacuation shelters set up in local schools because the facilities there were already so poor. The perceptions of people who did go to safety centres, as shown in the provincial data, reveal that satisfaction was low compared to other affected regions of the country. Less than half were satisfied with space and facilities (42.1%) or security and protection (45.0%). Satisfaction was even lower for assistance with lost or damaged documentation (17.9%) and information and support for compensation applications (28.2%). Only 22.5% were satisfied with medical care and health services below most other affected regions.
Restoring services proved nearly impossible in some areas. Road access was the biggest problem. The condition of the roads was already poor even before the cyclone, and some still haven’t been cleared. Recovery is especially difficult because there’s no decent baseline infrastructure to restore, hence you can’t bring roads and other public facilities back to a ‘good’ condition when they were never good, even before the disaster.
Water systems faced their own complications. Many households get water from natural sources or small community projects, and not the centralised state system. These sources are often in the middle of the disaster zone and therefore got contaminated during the floods and landslides.
Long-term recovery remains stalled. Without basic infrastructure, areas that are still hard to reach keep struggling to get the support they need for rebuilding.
Taken together, what do these testaments mean? Disaster response can’t be the same for everyone. The Malaiyaha Tamil community has been double marginalised because they were already living with structural inequalities such as poor infrastructure, geographic isolation, and inadequate services which have been exacerbated by Cyclone Ditwah. An effective and fair disaster response needs to account for these underlying vulnerabilities. It requires interventions tailored to the historical, economic, and infrastructural realities that marginalised communities face every day. On top of that, it highlights the importance of dealing with climate disasters, given the fact that vulnerable communities could face more devastating impacts compared to others.
(The article is based on a survey conducted by the Social Scientists’ Association of Sri Lanka in early to mid-January 2026. The writer is the Chief Operating Officer and a researcher of the association)
Bangladesh 2026 elections explained in maps and charts
With 127 million voters set for the February 12 election, Al Jazeera analyses key numbers for Bangladesh’s crucial vote.
By Alia Chughtai 9 Feb 2026
Published On 9 Feb 2026
Published On 9 Feb 20269 Feb 2026
On February 12, Bangladesh will head to the polls to elect its next government, 18 months after Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina was ousted from office by a student-led movement.
Hasina, the daughter of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the leader of the country’s independence movement, ruled Bangladesh between 1996 and 2001 and again from 2009 until she had to flee from office in August 2024 – after ordering a brutal crackdown on protesters which killed an estimated 1,400 people – and seek exile in India.
An interim administration led by Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus has since led the country.
Here is everything you need to know about the upcoming general election:
Bangladesh at a glance
The 2026 elections are among the most consequential in the country’s 55-year history, since gaining independence from Pakistan in 1971.
With more than 173 million citizens, Bangladesh is the eighth most populous country globally and, over the past 25 years, its economy has been one of the fastest-growing in the world – though growth has cooled in recent years.
Bangladesh is a predominantly Muslim country, with more than 90 percent of the population following Islam, 8 percent practising Hinduism and the rest following other faiths.
Economically, the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) stands at $461bn, with a per capita income of $1,990.
According to the Bangladesh Bank, GDP expanded by 3.97 percent in the fiscal year ending June 2025, easing from a 4.22 percent rise in the previous year.
Millions of first-time voters
Bangladesh has one of the world’s youngest populations, with a significant portion under the age of 30.
Among those above the voting age of 18, approximately 56 million, or 44 percent, are between the ages of 18 and 37, and nearly 5 million are first-time voters.
Bangladesh is one of the most densely populated countries in the world, with 1,366 people per square kilometre (3,538 people per square mile). This density is nearly three times that of India and four times that of Pakistan.
The country’s largest city is the capital, Dhaka, which has a population of more than 37 million people – more than the entire population of Malaysia, Saudi Arabia or Australia.
How is the government structured?
Bangladesh is a parliamentary republic, where executive power is exercised by an elected government, consisting of the prime minister and cabinet.
The president of Bangladesh is the ceremonial head of state and is indirectly elected by the parliament for a five-year term.
The prime minister is the leader of the majority party or coalition in parliament.
The prime minister appoints the cabinet, oversees government policy and directs civil service.
Legislative authority rests with the Jatiya Sangsad, Bangladesh’s parliament. It consists of 350 seats, including 300 directly elected seats and 50 seats reserved for women, which are allocated proportionally based on their share of votes. Members serve five-year terms.
Administratively, Bangladesh is divided into eight divisions, 64 districts and 495 upazilas (councils). Local governments manage municipal services, education and rural development, though they depend heavily on funding and authority from the central government.
Political parties
In this 2026 election cycle, there are 59 registered political parties in Bangladesh, excluding the Awami League, Sheikh Hasina’s party, which has had its registration suspended by the election commission, nullifying its ability to field candidates in the polls.
Of these, 51 parties are actively participating in elections by fielding candidates. In total, 1,981 candidates are contesting, including 249 independent candidates.
Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) – Led by Tarique Rahman, the son of recently deceased former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia.
The BNP is one of Bangladesh’s two major traditional parties and positions itself as a nationalist and conservative alternative to the Awami League.
Jamaat-e-Islami – The Islamic party, led by Shafiqur Rahman, advocates for politics rooted in the religion’s principles and has formed an electoral alliance with the National Citizen Party (NCP) along with other Islamic parties.
National Citizen Party (NCP) – Formed by student leaders of the 2024 uprising, it is a centrist party focused on citizen-led governance and political reform. It has garnered attention from younger voters and civil society groups due to increasing dissatisfaction with established parties.
Jatiya Party (JP-Quader) – This centre-right faction of the Jatiya Party is led by Ghulam Muhammed Quader.
Jatiya Party (JP-Ershad) – Led by Anisul Islam Mahmud, this centre-right party has its roots in the military rule of former President Hussain Muhammad Ershad in the 1980s.
Left Democratic Alliance – A coalition of left-wing parties, including the Communist Party of Bangladesh and several socialist groups.
Amar Bangladesh Party (AB Party) – A centrist party that presents itself as a reform-oriented alternative to the established political blocs, appealing to voters seeking a break from traditional party politics.
Previous election results
Bangladesh’s electoral history over the past two decades has been predominantly shaped by the Awami League, which came to power in 2009 after a significant defeat of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) which had ruled from 2001 to 2006.
In the 2001 election, the Awami League suffered a major defeat, winning just 62 seats, while the BNP secured a commanding majority with 193 seats. That election marked the last clear transfer of power between the two major parties.
The balance shifted decisively in 2008, when the Awami League-led Grand Alliance returned to power in a landslide. Since then, the party has consolidated its dominance.
In 2014, with the BNP absent from the contest, Hasina’s Awami League again won in a landslide.
The party further strengthened its grip in the 2018 election, securing 300 seats, while the BNP was reduced to just seven seats, its weakest performance on record. Thousands of BNP leaders were arrested in the lead-up to the elections. The Jamaat was banned in 2015, and so it couldn’t contest. International observers and opposition groups described the election as neither free nor fair.
In the most recent 2024 election, the Awami League won 272 seats, maintaining a parliamentary majority. The BNP again boycotted, amid deepening repression of opposition leaders. The Jamaat was still banned.
Political leaders throughout history
Since Bangladesh’s independence in 1971 from Pakistan, the country’s turbulent political evolution has been shaken by internal conflicts, military intervention and fragile democratic institutions.
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman served as the country’s first president – the leader of the independence movement – who soon banned other political parties and adopted increasingly repressive policies.
Rahman was assassinated in 1975 by army officers, who killed him and most of his family. Only two members of his immediate family survived: his daughters, Sheikh Hasina and Sheikh Rehana, who were in West Germany during the attack, and then lived in India in exile. This event triggered a period of coups and counter-coups that established the military as a dominant political force in the country.
A policeman walks past a banner with a picture of Bangladesh’s founder Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, in Dhaka, Bangladesh [File:Munir Uz Zaman/AFP]
Following the assassination, cabinet minister Khondaker Mostaq Ahmad took control of the government until he was deposed in a counter-coup just months later, which led to the appointment of Chief Justice Abu Sadat Mohammad Sayem as a figurehead president.
In 1977, Major General Ziaur Rahman assumed the presidency, and a year later, he founded the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). His leadership blurred the lines between military and civilian governance. Zia, as he was called, was also assassinated in a failed coup attempt in 1981.
From 1982 to 1990, Bangladesh was ruled under a military dictatorship led by Hussain Muhammad Ershad, during which democratic institutions were weakened, and the presidency functioned as an instrument of centralised rule.
By the late 1980s, Zia’s wife and successor as BNP leader, Khaleda Zia, and Mujibur Rahman’s daughter Sheikh Hasina, joined forces to take on military rule and demand a return to democracy.
In 1990, under mounting pressure, Ershad resigned, paving the way for elections in 1991 that Khaleda won – becoming the country’s first female prime minister.
By then, the brief unity between Khaleda and Hasina had broken down. Over the next two decades, Bangladesh experienced a turbulent swapping of power between the BNP and Hasina’s Awami League. Hasina became PM in 1996, then Khaleda returned to power in 2001, and then Hasina won office again in 2009.
It would be the start of a 15-year stint marked by increasingly heavy-handed rule and repression of political opponents, accompanied by broad economic growth. By 2024, Bangladeshi youth had seen enough – and rose up in the revolt that ousted Hasina and led to this moment.
