The Quad, composed of the United States, Australia, India, and Japan, is not a formal alliance. Still, the group has intensified its security and economic ties as tensions with China rise.
By experts and staff
Sheila A. Smith
CFR Expert
John E. Merow Senior Fellow for Asia-Pacific Studies
Published May 27, 2021
What does the Quad do?
The Quad, officially the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, is a group of four countries: the United States, Australia, India, and Japan. Maritime cooperation among them began after the Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004. But today the countries—all democracies and vibrant economies—work on a far broader agenda, which includes tackling security, economic, and health issues.
Over the years, the Quad’s diplomacy has waxed and waned. It is a loose grouping rather than a formal alliance. Japan initially emphasized the democratic identity of the four nations, whereas India seemed more comfortable emphasizing functional cooperation. Australian leaders have been reluctant about creating the impression that the group is a formal alliance.
As of 2021, leaders in all four countries have become more aligned in their shared concerns about China’s increasingly assertive behavior in the region and are more willing to define a constructive agenda of cooperation. All four navies participated in their first joint exercise in over a decade in November 2020. And in March 2021, U.S. President Joe Biden convened a virtual Quad meeting attended by Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga. They formed working groups on COVID-19 vaccines, climate change, and technological innovation and supply-chain resilience.
What are U.S. interests in the Quad?
Working closely with these countries is natural for the United States. Australia and Japan are U.S. treaty allies, and India is an important strategic partner. The Donald Trump administration worked closely with these countries, and the Biden administration is expanding the Quad’s agenda.
The Indo-Pacific spans two oceans and several continents, making it important to U.S. maritime interests. In 2019, $1.9 trillion [PDF] worth of U.S. trade passed through the region. This year, 42 percent of the world’s exports and 38 percent of global imports are expected to pass through, according to a UN report.
China’s growing willingness to challenge the regional status quo worries Washington, and Beijing’s challenging of democratic values over the past year has deepened other Quad partners’ concerns as well. China’s pursuit of its regional interests—including its crackdown on Hong Kong’s freedoms and criticism of nations that take issue with its actions—has not been slowed by the COVID-19 pandemic. However, the Quad’s agenda is not all about China. Leaders of the four nations also see a need for a more proactive approach to solving humanitarian and economic challenges caused by COVID-19.
What are Japan’s aims for the Quad?
Former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe was a strong believer in the Quad’s power to ensure a “free and open Indo-Pacific.” Abe worked to persuade the Trump administration of the value of this coalition approach across the Indo-Pacific.
Japan depends heavily on open sea lanes for its trade with the world. The U.S. and Japanese militaries already work closely across the region, and Japan’s Self-Defense Forces have slowly built relationships [PDF] with their Australian and Indian counterparts. Similarly, Japan has played an important role in supporting investment [PDF] in manufacturing, trade, and infrastructure development across the region.
Japan and its Quad partners share concerns about China’s role in the region and Beijing’s challenges to the rule of law. Beijing’s assertion of its sovereignty in the South China Sea, as well as Chinese provocations toward islands China and Japan both claim in the East China Sea, has made Tokyo wary of China’s military build-up. Strategic consultations with other Quad partners are vital.
Similarly, Japan is watching carefully as China imposes economic conditionality on countries in the Indo-Pacific, and it wants to offer Southeast Asian countries alternative sources of assistance and commerce to offset China’s growing influence. Tokyo has joined with Washington and Canberra to deepen the funds available for quality infrastructure. Bolstering the resilience of the Quad nations, especially for critical supply chains for goods such as semiconductors, will also be a Japanese priority.
How has China responded?
China’s relations with each of the Quad members have become more tense during the pandemic. U.S.-China tensions remain high; Beijing’s frustration was conspicuous when the new Biden foreign policy team had its first meeting with its Chinese counterpart in Alaska in March. Australia continues to bear the brunt of Chinese economic sanctions after suggesting a World Health Organization investigation into the origins of COVID-19 last year. India and Japan have clashed with China over territorial disputes. China’s ambassador to Tokyo has publicly criticized Prime Minister Suga, claiming that the new Quad diplomacy reflects a “Cold War mentality” and that it is “100 percent outdated.” In addition, recent polls have shown negative views of China have soared among publics across the region.
Yet, few policymakers in the Quad countries see an advantage in trying to contain Chinese influence militarily. Instead, the Quad leaders have emphasized cooperation across areas of shared interest to bolster confidence in the democracies’ ability to counter China’s assertion of regional influence. As long as tensions with China remain, the Quad’s agenda is likely to expand as the democracies of the Indo-Pacific seek to balance China’s growing power.
RAJNATH SINGH IS IN SRI LANKA – BEFORE INDIA SPEAKS OF SECURITY, LET SRI LANKA SPEAK OF SOVEREIGNTY
Posted on September 9th, 2026
Shenali D Waduge
Rajnath Singh’s visit comes 38 years after the previous official visit by an Indian Defence Minister. The visit is described in terms of defence cooperation, maritime security, connectivity and economic partnership. But this visit cannot be discussed without examining India’s historical and growing influence over Sri Lanka — military, political, constitutional, economic, cultural and strategic. Before India speaks of Sri Lanka’s security, Sri Lanka must first ask whether India’s actions have respected Sri Lanka’s sovereignty.
1987 — INDIA CROSSED SRI LANKAN AIRSPACE
On 4 June 1987, India launched Operation Poomalai, dropping supplies over Jaffna while Sri Lankan forces were conducting operations against the LTTE.
Indian aircraft entered Sri Lankan airspace without Sri Lanka’s consent.
It was a direct assertion of Indian power over Sri Lankan territory.
India whisked Prabakaran & family to Delhi & kept him there until the Indo-Lanka Accord was signed.
If Sri Lanka had entered Indian airspace during an Indian military operation, would India have called that respect for sovereignty?
1987–1990 — INDIA SENT ITS ARMY INTO SRI LANKA
The Indo-Lanka Accord was followed by the deployment of the Indian Peace Keeping Force.
The IPKF eventually fought the LTTE.
India’s own External Affairs Minister later described the episode as an IPKF misadventure in Sri Lanka.” Indian armed forces are accused of committing mass murder & rape.
INDIA ITSELF SAYS IT WILL INTERVENE WHEN ITS INTERESTS ARE AT STAKE
India officially speaks of non-interference.
But India’s own foreign-policy literature says that when another country’s actions have the potential to affect India’s national interests, India does not hesitate to intervene.
India’s security interests cannot automatically become Sri Lanka’s obligations.
Where does India’s security interest end and Sri Lanka’s sovereignty begin?
And who decides?
INDIA SEEKS TO INFLUENCE SRI LANKA’S CONSTITUTION
India openly states that it engages Sri Lanka at the highest levels on implementation of the 13th Amendment and beyond, including meaningful devolution.
Should a foreign government have a say in determining the constitutional structure of a sovereign country?
INDIA WANTS TO CHECK SRI LANKA’S RELATIONSHIP WITH CHINA
India’s own policy documents acknowledge its concern over Sri Lanka’s growing relationship with China and its desire to check Sri Lanka’s drift towards China.
But Sri Lanka is not an Indian state.
Sri Lanka must be free to choose India, China, Japan, America, Russia — or anyone else.
Friendship cannot mean permission.
INDIA AND CHINA — SRI LANKA BECOMES THE BATTLEGROUND
Reuters described India as muscling into port and other projects” as China expanded its presence in Sri Lanka.
While India expands its dealings with China – India deems Sri Lanka must seek its permission to deal with China.
Sri Lanka’s ports, energy and infrastructure must serve Sri Lanka’s national interest.
They cannot become prizes in a contest between New Delhi and Beijing.
Sri Lanka must not become the battlefield on which other powers compete for strategic control.
INDIA’S PUSH FOR STRATEGIC PORT ASSETS
India sought participation in Colombo’s strategic port infrastructure, including the East Container Terminal.
The formal Sri Lanka–India MOU of 2017 did not specifically name ECT; the Sri Lanka–India–Japan ECT arrangement came later.
The issue, however, is larger than one terminal.
Ports are not ordinary real estate.
They determine trade, shipping and strategic access.
How much strategic infrastructure should any one external power be able to influence and how will it impact Sri Lanka if India becomes hostile?
COLOMBO DOCKYARD — FROM JAPANESE TO INDIAN CONTROL
India’s state-owned Mazagon Dock acquired the Japanese stake and secured 51% control of Colombo Dockyard.
When a foreign defence company gains control of a strategically located Sri Lankan shipyard, the question is no longer simply investment — it is who gains strategic maritime influence over Sri Lanka.
TRINCOMALEE — STRATEGIC ENERGY
India’s involvement in Trincomalee’s strategic oil infrastructure has been controversial for decades.
Whoever controls critical energy infrastructure gains leverage over a country’s economy, transport and national security. Sri Lanka cannot afford strategic dependence for its energy security.
THE NORTH — A CHANGING STRATEGIC FOOTPRINT
AsSri Lanka’s own strategic presence in the North changes, India’s involvement inconnectivity, ports, airports and investment is increasing.
The question is what this meansfor the long-term balance of strategic influence in the North.
If Sri Lanka withdraws its own strategic presence while another power expands its footprint, the long-term question is: who will have greater strategic influence over Sri Lanka’s North?
KANKESANTHURAI — INDIA’S GATEWAY TO THE NORTH
India is funding the rehabilitation of Kankesanthurai Port and strengthening maritime links with India.
A port is more than infrastructure. A permanent foreign strategic presence at Sri Lanka’s northern gateway can alter the balance of influence in one of the country’s most sensitive regions.
PALALY — CONNECTIVITY OR STRATEGIC ACCESS?
Palaly is being developed for greater connectivity with India.
When an airport in Sri Lanka’s strategic North becomes increasingly connected to India, connectivity can also create access — and access can become influence.
DIGITAL IDENTITY — WHO CONTROLS THE DATA?
Sri Lanka’s digital identity system is being developed with Indian assistance.
A nation’s identity database is part of its sovereign infrastructure. Sri Lanka must ensure that no foreign power can obtain access, influence or control over the personal and biometric information of its citizens.
SRI LANKA’S MINERALS — THE NEXT STRATEGIC FRONTIER
India is seeking cooperation in Sri Lanka’s critical minerals, graphite and beach-sand resources, including exploration and investment.
Strategic minerals are national assets. If their exploration, extraction or export becomes externally controlled, Sri Lanka risks surrendering wealth that could determine its future economic independence.
ADANI — WHEN BUSINESS AND GEOPOLITICS MEET
Adani-linked investment now extends across ports and energy in Sri Lanka.
The danger is not Indian investment itself — it is excessive concentration of strategic assets in companies linked to one external power, creating economic leverage that can eventually become political leverage.
TRANSSHIPMENT — SRI LANKA’S HIDDEN VULNERABILITY
Colombo’s transshipment economy depends heavily on Indian-linked cargo.
Sri Lanka may own its ports, but if another country can significantly affect the cargo flowing through them, it can exert economic pressure without owning the port itself.
YUAN WANG 5 — WHEN INDIA’S SECURITY CONCERNS ENTER SRI LANKA’S PORTS
When the Chinese Yuan Wang 5 headed for Hambantota, India said it was protecting its security and economic interests.
India has security concerns. Sri Lanka has sovereignty. India’s security interests cannot become a veto over Sri Lanka’s independent decisions about its own ports and foreign relations.
THE LAND BRIDGE QUESTION
A physical connection with India would transform movement of people, goods, capital and potentially security risks between the two countries.
Once physical separation disappears, Sri Lanka’s ability to independently control borders, migration, customs and security could become far more difficult.
KATCHATHEEVU — WILL SETTLED AGREEMENTS REMAIN SETTLED?
The 1974 and 1976 maritime agreements settled the India–Sri Lanka boundary, yet Katchatheevu has been revived politically in India. Why is India not respecting what it originally signed?
If territorial settlements can be reopened for domestic politics, Sri Lanka cannot assume that agreements defining its sovereignty will remain permanently respected.
FISHING — SRI LANKA’S WATERS ARE SRI LANKAN
Indian fishermen entering Sri Lankan waters are subject to Sri Lankan law.
If Sri Lanka cannot enforce its own laws in its own territorial waters without external political pressure, sovereignty exists on paper but not in practice.
THE 1980s — THE COVERT QUESTION
India’s historical involvement with Tamil militant groups must be examined through documented evidence and clearly identified allegations.
The danger is not merely historical: foreign intervention in internal conflicts can create forces that eventually threaten the very country that intervened.
INDIA’S FOOTPRINT IS NO LONGER ONLY ON THE COAST
India’s influence in Sri Lanka is not confined to ports and maritime security.
It is increasingly present inside the country — through housing, education, healthcare, cultural institutions, community programmes, loans/grants/currency swaps, banking, investment and economic assistance.
The Indian Housing Project alone has reached 60,000 houses, with major programmes specifically targeting plantation regions. India’s current Phase IV includes another 10,000 houses, including projects in the Central Province.
India is also supporting 60 smart classrooms in plantation schools in Nuwara Eliya, Kandy and Badulla, while providing assistance to educational institutions and communities in the Central Province. India has openly described the Indian-Origin Tamil community as a living bridge” between India and Sri Lanka, and has expanded programmes covering housing, healthcare, education and community development.
At what point does development assistance become a permanent external footprint inside another country’s social, cultural and economic space?
India is also using its loans/grants to try to forward a shared history using invader Cholas. This is the newest narrative being promoted.
INDIA’S FOOTPRINT — AROUND, INSIDE, ABOVE AND BELOW SRI LANKA (INDIA’S FOUR-DIRECTIONAL FOOTPRINT)
AROUND SRI LANKA
Maritime security, shipping, ports, transshipment, Katchatheevu, fishing and India’s strategic presence across the Indian Ocean.
INSIDE SRI LANKA
Housing, education, healthcare, cultural institutions, community development, investment, energy, infrastructure and connectivity.
ABOVE SRI LANKA
Air connectivity, aviation links, telecommunications, digital systems, satellite/space cooperation and the growing technological relationship.
BELOW SRI LANKA
The mineral and resource base — graphite, ilmenite, rutile, zircon, phosphate, beach sand and other critical minerals.
India itself has identified Sri Lankan graphite, ilmenite, rutile, zircon and phosphate as minerals important to India’s critical-mineral requirements and has been pursuing cooperation in exploration and mining.
India’s footprint is no longer simply at Sri Lanka’s ports.
It is around Sri Lanka.
It is inside Sri Lanka.
It is above Sri Lanka.
It is beneath Sri Lanka.
And increasingly, it is within the systems on which Sri Lanka’s economy, security and society depend.
The question is what happens when all these projects, dependencies and relationships are viewed together.
But sovereignty is not lost only through one agreement. It can also be weakened when too many critical sectors become dependent upon one external power.
The question Sri Lanka must therefore ask is
Can Sri Lanka still say NO to India — without suffering unacceptable economic, political or strategic consequences?”
INDIA’S COMMUNITY FOOTPRINT IS ALSO EXPANDING
The Indian-Origin Tamil plantation programmes, the wider Indian-origin community including Malayalis, and the education/housing/cultural/economic initiatives.
India’s own High Commission currently describes the Indian-origin population in Sri Lanka as including Sindhis, Bohras, Gujaratis, Memons, Parsis, Malayalis and Telugu-speaking people, while separately identifying the much larger Indian-Origin Tamil plantation community.
India’s influence is not one-dimensional. It operates through COMMUNITY, CULTURE, EDUCATION, ECONOMICS, INFRASTRUCTURE, ENERGY, DIGITAL SYSTEMS, MINERALS, MARITIME SECURITY AND DIPLOMACY.
The issue is not Indian friendship.
The issue is whether friendship is gradually becoming dependence.
And that fits extremely well with your final FRIENDSHIP — YES. COOPERATION — YES. DEPENDENCE — NO.” ending.
Connectivity cannot mean strategic dependence.
And regional partnership cannot mean that Sri Lanka must choose its foreign relations according to another country’s interests.
THE PRINCIPLE IS SIMPLE:
INDIA CAN ADVISE.
INDIA CAN INVEST.
INDIA CAN COMPETE.
INDIA CAN COOPERATE.
BUT SRI LANKA MUST DECIDE.
THE QUESTION RAJNATH SINGH SHOULD HEAR
India’s Defence Minister has come to Sri Lanka to discuss security.
So perhaps Sri Lanka should ask one question first:
I2U2 and Modi’s Visit to Colombo: The New QUAD in the Indian Ocean eyes Sri Lanka?
Posted on April 16th, 2025
Ishani Agnihotri
An MOU to develop an LNG power project on the East Coast of Sri Lanka, near the coveted Indian Ocean Trincomalee Deep Sea Port, with India and the United Arab Emirates was signed on Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s recent visit to Sri Lanka by President Anura Dissanayaka.
The multicultural Eastern Province was decimated during the 30-year war between the Liberation Tigers or LTTE and the Sri Lanka military, when Israel’s Mossad agents operated from bases in the Batticaloa District to set up and train Sri Lanka’s Special Forces, some of which were later linked to Batalanda and other terror and torture house operations by State-run and other Paramilitary Groups accused of disappearences in the South during the so called JVP insurrection 1988-1990.
Israel’s Secret Service, Mossad agents, along with veterans of the British Special Air Services (SAS) , and Keenie Meenie (KMS Group, now Saladin, London) Mercenaries, were imported to Sri Lanka by the Washington-backed J.R. Jayawardena regime in the early eighties after the staged Pogrom/ Riots of 1983. These foreign intelligence agencies and mercenaries were brought to Sri Lanka purportedly to set up and train Special Forces to fight the war against the LTTE. Training Camps were set up in the Eastern Province to train the Special Force in Batticaloa District, where local people called the white mercenaries Mossadu” (cf. Phil Miller’s book, Keenie Meenie: The British Mercenaries who got away with War Crimes”).
What emerged in Sri Lanka was a classic Cold War Proxy war between the LTTE then backed by India closely allied with the Communist Soviet Union/Russia and the US-and Western allies backed regime of Yankie Dickie J.R. Jayawardena, destroying ancient patterns of co-existence among Sinhala and Tamil-speaking people in Sri Lanka. The ensuing internationally networked and run Dirty War in Sri Lanka was called an indigenous, internal ethnic conflict”.
Weaponization of Religion/s in Eastern Province by Foreign Intelligence Agencies- Past and Present
Ethno-religious identities were fragmented and fully Weaponized at the time as part of counter-terrorism operations with Mossad training- as is the case in Israel. From 1984 Israel’s Mossad operated in the Eastern Province. In Colombo they worked out of the Israeli Special Interest Section at the US embassy.
The Kathankudi Mosque Massacre was staged to destroy close relations between Muslims and Tamils in the East, and the LTTE expelled Muslims from Jaffna in 1990. Not coincidentally, Kathankudi was where the leader and members of the ISIS-claimed 2019 Easter Sunday suicide bombers hailed from. The mysterious Evangelical Zion Church was also set up in Batticaloa as part of the Cold War Weaponization of Relgion/s.
Ancient patterns of co-existence and intermarriage among Muslims and Tamils who share the unique matrilineal Kudi System of kinship and descent documented by many social scientists in the Eastern Province, were targeted and broken as in Palestine by Mossad and Shin Bet which destroyed brotherly / sisterly relations between Palestinian Muslims and Christians and Jews to set up the State of Israel. As per counter-terrorism operations.
Is history set to repeat itself in the Eastern Province of Sri Lanka, once again with I2U2 entrenching itself in Trincomalee and religion/s again being weaponized?
Recently, a mysterious boat load of Rohingya Muslims was parachuted into the eastern Seas and Mullaithivu. Red flags should fly in Sri Lanka with the I2U2 (India, Israel, and United Arab Emirates cooperating to build an LNG power plant in Trincomalee given the Mossad Chabad Houses mushrooming in Sri Lanka and Israeli Tourist and Agri-businesses in Arugambay and Kantalai?
Is the US drawing India and Sri Lanka into its latest Indian Ocean Quad, the West Asia war machine via the I2U2?
Few Sri Lankan Geopolitical Pundits, researchers and think tanks seem to know or care about the I2U2, but maybe they should? This, especially as another predictable Disinformation andCover Up investigation of the external Master-mind of the ISIS-claimed Easter Sunday Terror Attacks, who also removed the cell phones of the culprits and gamed the data unfolds, targeting a bit player called Pillayan.
I2U2 : The Aspects and the Prospects
Ishani Agnihotri | 16 August 2022
Established at the Foreign Ministers’ meet in October, 2021, I2U2 stands for India, Israel, United Arab Emirates (UAE), and the United States (US) quadrilateral partnership. The leaders of the above four member countries met (virtually)[i] for the first time on 14th July, 2022. Combining complementary strengths and capabilities to fulfill mutual socio-economic interests, the new Quad partners look forward to bolstering cooperation and partnership in the region – as indicated in the inaugural summit.[ii]
The changing dynamic of West Asia has however made the foreign policy sphere rife with speculation on the strategic and geopolitical prospects, and the viability of this newly formed mini-lateral. It is in this light that this issue brief examines the aspects of this newly formed body, and the potential prospects of cooperation that lie ahead. With a brief understanding of the purpose of this new Quad, the paper studies the nature of existent bilateral relationships between members, their individual divergent geopolitical interests, and the factors that bring them together, exploring the road ahead.
The Purpose of I2U2
I2U2 identifies 6 areas of cooperation and investment, namely – water, energy, transportation, space, health, and food security. It intends to mobilise private sector capital and expertise to help modernise infrastructure, develop low carbon development pathways for industries, improve public health, and promote the development of critical emerging and green technologies in the member countries.[iii] The countries deny any military angle to their cooperation with the agenda of the mini-lateral focused on the economic and infrastructural development.[iv]
The Nature of Relationship between the Four Member States
Two federal republics, a Jewish democratic state, and a monarchy – the four I2U2 member countries share comprehensive economic, military, and political bilateral relationship with each other. The US is the largest trading partner for both, India and Israel. India, on the other hand, is the second largest trading partner of UAE (2021) and the third-largest Asian trade partner of Israel (2019). India-UAE Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) also entered into force recently (February, 2022). In terms of trade in defence, India was the largest importer of arms in 2017-21 with Israel and the US being its third and fourth largest defence supplier respectively.[v] India is also the largest buyer of Israeli military equipment.[vi] The countries are also co-participants in different military exercises, like, the Blue Flag air combat exercise (Israel), or the Desert Flag exercise (UAE), which saw the participation of both India and the US along with other countries.
Bilaterally, India shares prolific relationships with the three other members; boasting of a ‘Global Strategic Partnership’ with the US, ‘Comprehensive Strategic Partnership’ with the UAE, and 30 years of successful diplomatic relationship with Israel. Indian expatriates today make up roughly 30 per cent of UAE’s total residents – double of the original Emirati ethnic population themselves.[vii] US and Israel also share a Strategic Partnership relationship. US was the third country to establish formal diplomatic relations with UAE post its independence in 1971. The strategic proximity of their relationship is exhibited in the fact that UAE hosts the busiest US air base in the wold for surveillance flights, Al Dhafra.[viii] It also hosts the busiest US Navy port of call, Jebel Ali.[ix] Furthermore, the signing of the Abraham Accords brokered by the US in August, 2020 has led to full normalisation of ties between the Jewish state of Israel and the Arab UAE.
The thriving bilateral relationships however do not mean that the four countries share same ideological and strategic interests. For instance, Iranian rivalry is central to the US and Israeli outlook of West Asia. India and UAE, on the other hand, continue to find ways to engage with Tehran. India’s historical and cultural relationship with Iran, though pressured under Western sanctions, continues to thrive as witnessed during the recent diplomatic exchanges between the two states.[x],[xi] Similarly, the rise of China has had different meanings for the four countries in discussion. While the US eyes the rising Chinese footprints in the region and Indo-Pacific with adversarial sight, India has a tight rope to walk with its current belligerent neighbour. Israel and UAE, on the other hand, have been observed to be benefitting from the rising Chinese economic investments in the region. China and UAE recently upgraded their ties to Comprehensive Strategic Partnership status.[xii] There has also been increased defence and technical cooperation between China and Israel which has caused concerns in Western nations, particularly the US. The Chinese investment in the construction of container terminals in Haifa port (Israel) and Khalifa port (UAE) as part of its flagship Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) further exacerbates the US security concerns in the region.[xiii]
The pending resolution of the Palestinian issue is also a point of divergence in the relationship shared by these four countries. For example, the Arab-Israel rivalry and the two states solution advertised by the UN is known to have shaped the West Asian geopolitics since 1947. India also calls for a peaceful resolution of Israel-Palestine issue.[xiv] In the light of these dynamics, India-Israel bilateral relationship remained mostly restricted to technology, defence and agriculture until recent high level visits post 2014.[xv] Economics, energy, and the emerging geopolitical trends have now paved way for a more realist outlook in the current century as witnessed in the signing of the Abraham accords.
What brings the Four Nations Together?
The creation of I2U2 is seen as one of the key dividends of the Abraham Accords that intends to pave the way for normalisation of Arab-Israel ties.[xvi] Today, Israel has newly established diplomatic relationships with four Arab League countries, namely UAE, Bahrain, Sudan and Morocco. The evolving geopolitical, economic, security and social realities of the region are encouraging new diplomatic dialogues. For example, the Neom Meeting between Saudi Crown Prince and Israel Prime Minister was held in November, 2020.[xvii] With the potential coming together of the West Asian region, the four nations’ foreign ministers’ meeting was held in a hybrid format last year. India, Israel, UAE, and the US, explored possibilities for joint infrastructure projects in transportation, tech, maritime security, economics and trade, as well as for additional joint projects. In this meeting, the Ministers decided to establish a forum for economic cooperation to take forward their maiden dialogue which eventually led to the current format of I2U2. In the event of this converging foreign policy interests of the otherwise socially and regionally diverse countries, it becomes essential to understand what brings these nations together.
The four members of I2U2 seem to be bound by two major interests – the regional geopolitical footprint expansion and the global socio-economic security. For the US, the creation of this alliance serves two purposes, firstly, it negates the notion” of the US withdrawal from West Asia, and secondly, it strengthens its strategic footprints in the region by fulfilment of the long term American commitment towards Israeli economic, political and strategic integration in the region.[xviii] For Israel and UAE, the two nations bound by economic realism, this alliance can create blueprint for effective West Asian future cooperation.[xix] The founding membership of this Western mini-lateral also reaffirms the leadership role that India holds today in consolidation of the South Asian rimland. I2U2 offers India a platform to more openly engage with Israel and other Arab countries beyond bilateral means to benefit economically, socially and geopolitically in the region.
Speaking of the global socio-economic security interest, the world, as we know today, is witnessing a new set of emerging challenges beyond the conventional threats. If the global growth was at risk (as reported by the UN)[xx], the COVID-19 pandemic, increasing competition for global dominance, and the current Russia-Ukraine war have made the economic and social costs of dwindling growth more visible. Supply chains break-down, trade wars, energy insecurity and geopolitical-economic issues have been observed to pull down the global economic recovery attempts.[xxi] Whereas ecologically, the food insecurity, declining soil productivity, global warming, and climate change threaten the long term survival of the societies itself.[xxii] It is in this light that the convergence of different capabilities becomes important to counter the forces of unsustainability – as depicted in the agenda for I2U2.[xxiii]
What Benefits Lie for the Four Nations?
For the US, the ‘West Quad’ allows for expansion of the geographic scope of its relationship in the region – securing the East Mediterranean Coast to the Persian Gulf axis. This becomes important when viewed in conjunction with the speculated development of the Russia-China-Iran triangle in the region.[xxiv] It will also help the States reinvigorate the partnerships which suffered during the previous presidency of Donald Trump. A stable, connected and cooperative West Asia further ensures the security of the US’ socio-economic interests and investments in the region as its policy focus expands to the Indo-Pacific.[xxv]
I2U2 also presents India with an opportunity to play global leadership role alongside the US while keeping its strategic autonomy and national interests intact. Deepening of ties with the West Asia region as a whole presents holistic diplomatic and infrastructural connectivity channels for India. This can benefit both, the large Indian diaspora in West Asia, as well as India’s own economic and political interests. For example, the realisation of India-Arab-Mediterranean Corridor, as a next step of India – West Asia connectivity, can provide economically viable alternate trade routes connecting the Indian subcontinent to the European Mainland.[xxvi] The prospective completion of this supply chain corridor will not only benefit the people to people connect but will also strengthen India’s trade and energy security.
The newly formed diplomatic ties between Israel and UAE also have the potential to benefit the West Asia region at large. For UAE, it impresses upon the growing prominence of the country in the Gulf region with its cosmopolitan high economic profile. Whereas for Israel, it presents opportunity for initiation, expansion and solidification of formal diplomatic ties with other Arab states. A successful cooperation between Israel and UAE within the American umbrella and Indian support can open doors for realisation of economic relationship between Israel and Saudi Arabia as a next step.
While on paper this new found grouping is said to be entirely focussed on economic and infrastructural development, one cannot completely ignore the security and geopolitical issues which surround the four member states. Different scholars have questioned the viability of this union when it comes to conflicting ideological and national interests; the response to Iranian threat being a case in point.
Convergence in Divergence
As noted by Winston Churchill, We have no permanent friends, but permanent interests”. The combined fear of weaponisation of Iranian nuclear program is known to bring diverse nations together complemented by American support. While there exists an anti-Iran front, there also coexists a sense of balance in the region when viewed from UAE and Indian perspective. India has been working with and around Western sanctions to maintain the strategic warmth of its historic relationship with Iran.[xxvii] This also becomes important in the light of recent Chinese strategic overtures in the region.
China is overtly known for making its economic inroads into West Asia since the beginning of this century.[xxviii] Although Chinese investments in Israel, UAE, and other Gulf countries have remained economic till now, the surfacing of Iran-China Strategic Partnership Agreement bodes deeper engagement in the region. The growing Chinese economic, and now strategic, heft in the region, bodes a possibility of competition and contestation in the region in the race for polarity. The I2U2 goals would thus benefit by disengaging the forum’s economic and development agendas from the member states’ individual security and strategic interests. The denial of any military angle in the first summit of the grouping hints in this direction.
The Road Ahead
I2U2 offers a unique combination of Israeli innovative technology, US global industrial expertise, Emirati economic resources and Indian market leadership together to present sustainable competitive opportunities that can benefit the global economic order today. In light of current global turmoil like the COVID-19 pandemic fall-outs and the ongoing Russia-Ukraine crisis, the areas of cooperation identified by this grouping namely – water, energy, transportation, space, health, and food security – are both short term requirements and long term imperatives. The burgeoning global population, and the declining planet capacity, in conjunction with potentially destructive multipolarity contestations, can thus use responsible leadership to attain balance in the above domains.
As far as India is concerned, it is no longer content to be passive recipients of outcomes in the West Asian region, and it is with this understanding with which Delhi is becoming more proactive about deepening its relationships in the region. Rather than waiting for the ties to take shape organically or mere reciprocation to events as they occur, I2U2 presents India with a much suited leadership role for shaping the global socio-economic security structure. However, it remains equally essential for the member states to not lose out on the above global goals for individual geopolitical interests. A stable, less volatile, and cooperative West Asia holds hope for the otherwise restive world today.
*****
* Ishani Agnihotri, Research Intern, Indian Council of World Affairs, Sapru House, New Delhi. Disclaimer: The views are of the author.
Endnotes
[i] Omri Nahmias, (2022, July 14), Leaders of Israel, US, India and the UAE meet for the inaugural ‘I2U2’ virtual summit, Retrieved from The Jerusalem Post: https://www.jpost.com/breaking-news/article-712091, Accessed on July 18, 2022
Sri Lanka, India sign three defence MoUs to strengthen cooperation
Sri Lanka and India have signed three Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) covering air-defence capability, military education and youth cooperation, further strengthening defence and strategic ties between the two countries.
The agreements were signed following talks between President Anura Kumara Dissanayake and visiting Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh in Colombo, with maritime security and regional stability emerging as key areas of bilateral cooperation.
The three MoUs focus on the upgradation of six L70 air-defence guns operated by the Sri Lanka Air Force, academic cooperation between the National Defence Colleges of Sri Lanka and India, and cooperation between the National Cadet Corps of the two countries.
India to Upgrade Six Sri Lanka Air Force L70 Guns
Under the first MoU, India will provide a Government of India grant for the upgradation of six 40mm L70 air-defence guns operated by the Sri Lanka Air Force.
The upgraded systems are expected to significantly strengthen Sri Lanka's air-defence architecture, particularly the protection of critical assets.
The L70 guns were previously provided to the Sri Lanka Air Force by the Government of India. India supplied 24 of these air-defence systems to Sri Lanka between 2000 and 2006 and has previously undertaken maintenance work on 18 of them.
The latest agreement therefore extends India's support from maintenance to the modernisation and capability enhancement of the remaining six systems.
The assistance is also significant in the context of Sri Lanka's broader efforts to maintain and strengthen the operational capabilities of its armed forces while focusing on the protection of strategically important national assets.
Defence Colleges to Strengthen Academic Links
The second MoU establishes academic cooperation between India's National Defence College (NDC) in New Delhi and Sri Lanka's National Defence College.
The agreement will facilitate knowledge sharing between the two institutions and is expected to strengthen the longstanding academic and professional relationship between the two sister institutes.
Defence education has been an important component of India-Sri Lanka military engagement, with senior Sri Lankan officers and officials participating in India's National Defence College programme over several decades.
The closer institutional relationship is expected to provide further opportunities for professional interaction, exchange of expertise and discussions on national security and strategic affairs.
The cooperation also comes as India and Sri Lanka increasingly focus on common security concerns in the Indian Ocean, where developments in maritime security have implications for both countries.
The third MoU covers cooperation between the National Cadet Corps of India and the National Cadet Corps of Sri Lanka. The agreement will formalise the NCC youth exchange programme between the two countries.
The programme provides NCC cadets from Sri Lanka and other countries with opportunities to travel to New Delhi each year and participate in NCC events. It offers young participants opportunities for cultural interaction, knowledge sharing and exposure to different training and educational experiences.
Beyond its youth-development role, the agreement is expected to contribute to stronger people-to-people links between India and Sri Lanka and develop relationships among future generations.
Defence Cooperation Expands Beyond Military Engagement
The three MoUs demonstrate the increasingly broad nature of India-Sri Lanka defence cooperation.
While the upgradation of the L70 guns directly strengthens Sri Lanka's defence capability, the agreements on defence education and cadet exchanges extend cooperation into professional development, institutional engagement and youth relations.
The latest agreements also build on a broader defence cooperation framework between the two countries.
India and Sri Lanka signed an umbrella five-year defence cooperation MoU in April 2025, providing a structured framework for military engagement and cooperation on shared security concerns in the Indian Ocean.
The framework includes areas such as joint military exercises, capacity building, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief cooperation, increased naval port calls and opportunities for cooperation in the defence industry.
Maritime Security Remains a Key Priority
The strengthening of defence ties comes amid growing attention to maritime security in the Indian Ocean.
Sri Lanka's strategic location along major Indian Ocean shipping routes makes the country an important partner for India in maintaining maritime security and addressing shared regional security concerns.
Sri Lankan officials have previously stressed the close link between the security interests of the two countries, particularly in the Indian Ocean.
The latest discussions between Singh and Sri Lankan authorities are therefore expected to further develop cooperation in areas including maritime security, military training, professional education, equipment support and regional security.
Meanwhile, President Dissanayake recalled his interactions with PM Modi and reiterated that Sri Lanka would never allow its territory to be used for any activities inimical to India’s security interests.
Rajnath Singh's Sri Lanka Visit
Following his meeting with President Dissanayake, Singh described the discussions as “warm and extremely productive.”
He said he conveyed the greetings of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and congratulated President Dissanayake on the successful completion of two years of his government.
Singh described India and Sri Lanka as “civilisational twins, close neighbours and maritime partners”, stressing that the two countries would continue to work together for development and the welfare of their people.
He also said India and Sri Lanka would work jointly to ensure the safety, security, peace and prosperity of the region.
Singh's visit is particularly significant as it marks the first official visit to Sri Lanka by an Indian Defence Minister in 38 years. The previous such visit was made by Indian Defence Minister K.C. Pant in 1988.
A Broader Strategic Partnership
The latest defence agreements come against the backdrop of expanding India-Sri Lanka relations across defence, maritime security, connectivity, energy, investment and people-to-people ties.
The two countries have maintained close defence relations for decades, although their relationship has also passed through challenging periods, particularly during India's involvement in Sri Lanka during the late 1980s.
In recent years, however, defence cooperation has increasingly focused on training, capacity building, humanitarian assistance, maritime security and institutional engagement.
The three new MoUs add another layer to that relationship by combining defence capability enhancement with professional education and youth cooperation, according experts.
For Sri Lanka, the arrangements provide additional support for maintaining and upgrading existing defence assets while expanding opportunities for military education and international engagement.
For India, closer defence cooperation with Sri Lanka supports its broader objective of strengthening partnerships with Indian Ocean neighbours and promoting a secure and stable regional maritime environment.
