நோர்வே அறிக்கை- அகசுயநிர்ணய உரிமைக்கு அடமானம் போன அரசியல் சுதந்திரம் பாகம்-2

Part II:
The Story

The following three chapters provide an empirical narrative of the Sri Lankan peace process: its long run-up and its short-lived progress (this chapter), the fragmentation and tensions that it brought about (chapter 5) and the war that followed (chapter 6). Much of this chronology has been described elsewhere (Balasingham,
2004, Fernando, 2008; Goodhand and Klem, 2005; Goodhand et al., 2011 a and b; Goodhand, Korf and Spencer, 2011; Gooneratne, 2007; Rupesinghe, 2006; Sahadevan, 2006; Stokke, and Uyangoda, 2011), but our discussion of Norway’s strategies and activities adds empirical detail and insight to the literature. We use key turning points (the headings) in the sequence of events to scrutinize Norwegian responses in relation to the knowledge and opportunities that were available at the time.

4. First Explorations, a Ceasefire and Peace Talks  (1990s–2003)

5. Fragmentation and Crisis (2003-2006)

The narrative in the preceding chapter describes the high point of the peace process after a long and troublesome run-up. The period of progressive negotiations in fact lasted less than a year and during the last three rounds of talks in 2003, the cracks were clearly emerging. This chapter describes the subsequent period of political fragmentation and increasing military tension.

21 April 2003: LTT E suspends participation to the talks

In an attempt to preserve the momentum, strengthen international support and orchestrate incentives for the parties, a new donor conference is scheduled in Japan. Sri Lanka’s long-time biggest bilateral donor has shown keen interest in the peace process. In line with its broadening portfolio in international affairs98, Japan
has assigned Yasushi Akashi as special envoy and aspires to take on a more prominent role in Sri Lanka.99 This dovetails with Norway’s strategy of developing an international network in support of its peace efforts. Wickremesinghe’s pro-peace, proreform, and pro-Western outlook is well received among most donors, some of which see Sri Lanka as a potential liberal peacebuilding success story, with limited
risks attached. Wickremesinghe’s administration goes a long way in signing agreements with the IMF, World Bank and other donors. On the surface, this strategy also converges with the LTTE’s call to address the needs of the Tamil population.

Preparations for the Tokyo conference are underway in parallel to the fifth and sixth rounds of talks, and a preparatory meeting is scheduled in the margins of a World  Bank summit in Washington DC. Then, however, the LTTE puts on the brakes. The movement airs press releases on 4 April and 12 April 2003 criticizing the Washington conference which it cannot attend due to US anti-terrorist legislation. As a result they are reviewing their participation in the scheduled conference in Tokyo as well. The statements remain unanswered by the government and two weeks later, the LTTE increases the pressure.

In a letter to Wickremesinghe dated 21 April 2003, Anton Balasingham announces the suspension of LTTE participation in the peace talks, because of: ‘the exclusion of the LTTE from [sic] critical aid conference in Washington, the non-implementation of the terms and conditions enunciated in the truce document, the continuous suffering and hardship experienced by hundreds of thousands of internally displaced Tamils, the aggressive military occupation of Tamil cities and civilian settlements,the distortion and marginalisation of the extreme conditions of poverty and 98 Manifest in for example (non-combat) support for US-led military interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan and its lobby for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council.

99 India did not oppose Japanese involvement, but there was little enthusiasm for an overly political Japanese role. In the words of an Indian diplomat, ‘Akashi was pretty much irrelevant’ (interview 040D).

Pawns of Peace – Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997-2009 45 deprivation of the Tamils of the northeast in the macro-economic policies and strategies of the government, […]’. (Balasingham, 2004: 439). The LTTE does notwithdraw from the peace talks altogether, the statement underlines. According to the insurgents, talks can proceed if the government addresses the above points.

In a private message to Solheim, Balasingham reiterates: ‘we have no intention of terminating talks. Mr P [Prabhakaran] is firmly determined that the government should take action to fulfil the obligation of the CFA.’100

The Washington conference appears to be a pretext for the LTTE. In fact, the conference was discussed during the sixth round of talks and government delegate Milinda Morogoda stated that they had no problem with the LTTE participating.101

He in fact tried to explore whether the US was ready to make an exception and when that was not possible, both parties agreed to send Jay Maheshwaram, who is not formally part of the LTTE, but can participate on their behalf.102 However, the underlying issues – the government’s economic policy, the lack of progress on normalisation and High Security Zones and the ‘international peace trap’ – are a persistent source of concern for the LTTE and they expressed their unhappiness about them during the talks. Remarkably, media coverage on the LTTE’s decision emphasises that the peace process has not collapsed altogether.103 Some of the Tamil papers express sympathy for the move104, while Sinhala media highlight mounting international pressure on the LTTE.105 The Norwegian team is not sure whether the LTTE is making a tactical manoeuvre (wanting to return to talks), or turning its back altogether.106 Averting a complete derailment at this sensitive stage requires an extremely pro-active approach in terms of keeping the process together and securing tolerance from critical actors,most obviously President Kumaratunga. Norway continues to communicate with her regularly.107 A meeting is also held with the Sri Lankan opposition (including then
opposition leader and future President Mahinda Rajapaksa).108 Other political players, most significantly the JVP, refuse to meet the Norwegians. What follows is a bifurcation of the process: the government and international actors proceed with their meetings as planned, while the LTTE travels around the world to rally support and develop an interim proposal. Norway stays in close touch with both parties. It has increasing difficulty accessing the LTTE – which also gets picked up by the press109 – but meets with Balasingham who is once more transferred to London for medical treatment.110
===================
100 MFA 307.3 (2003/00027-219).
101 MFA 307.3 (2003/00027-44).
102 Interview 002B and 069E, see also Gooneratne (2007: 43). Maheshwaram could travel as a representative of the Tamil
=================
Rehabilitation Organisation (TRO), formally an NGO, but practically an LTTE proxy. Milinda Morogoda, according to a letter from Solheim to Balasingham (MFA 307.3 (2003/00027-220)), was very annoyed about Balasingham’s reference to the Washington meeting and reiterated the LTTE could have called him any time to address the issue. Also, high level US officials tried (unsuccessfully) to get the State Department to make an exception and allow Balasingham to visit the US (interview 035C).

103 Lakbima for example, headlines a quote from LTTE spokesman Daya Master ‘This is not a decision to go back to war’ (23 April 2003) and the government paper Daily News emphasizes there is ‘No breakdown in peace process’ (25 April 2003).

104 For example: ‘Temporary withdrawal of the Tigers a fair action’ (Thinakkural, 27 April 2003). The same paper also expressed concern about US pressure on the LTTE and the exclusion from the Washington meeting: ‘The American threat to Tamil Sovereignty’(27 April 2003).
105 For example: ‘LTTE cannot call the shots, say diplomats’ (The Island, 28 April 2003).
106 MFA 307.3 (2003/00027-43).
107 Communication with the Norwegian MFA 071F.
108 MFA 307.3 (2003/00027-52-68).
109 ‘Balasingham avoiding Solheim’ (Lakbima, 28 April 2003).
110 MFA 307.3 (2003/00027-35-51).

46 Pawns of Peace – Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997-2009
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Efforts to convince the LTTE to change its stance and turn up at the Tokyo aid conference continue until the very last minute, but without success. The meeting takes place on 9 June 2003. Donors pledge an unprecedented US$ 4.5 bn. and the Tokyo Declaration links its disbursement to ‘substantial and parallel progress toward fulfilment of the objectives agreed upon by the parties in Oslo.’ Conditions include
compliance with the CFA, Muslim participation in the talks, promotion and protection of human rights, gender equity, and progress toward a final political settlement. The declaration disguises major differences within the donor community. In the end, the declaration has no discernable impact on disbursements and aid continues to flow despite the collapsing peace process and ceasefire violations.111 The moremeaningful legacy of Tokyo is the creation of three co-chairs to the meeting, Japan, the US, and the EU, along with Norway. This was instigated by the Wickremesinghe administration, which saw it as a logical part of their ‘international safety net’.112

The most influential player – India – sticks to its role behind the scenes. The cochairs build on the personal interest taken by Richard Armitage (US), Akashi (Japan) and to a lesser extent Chris Patten (EU) and in the years to come they persistently express their support for the Norwegians, encourage the parties to seek a negotiated settlement and become increasingly fierce in their criticism towards the LTTE, and to a lesser extent the government. Norway thus finds a forum through which to orchestrate international leverage, but the co-chairs struggle with internal dissent and there is little evidence their statements have a major impact. In the words of one of Kumaratunga’s advisors: ‘I never spent any time worrying about the cochairs, but rather about the LTTE and India’.113

Before the Tokyo conference, Balasingham asks Helgesen to request the government to develop a temporary administrative structure for reconstruction of th north-east with ‘adequate powers’ and a clear role for the LTTE. The government comes forward with a ‘discussion document’ proposing a ‘Provisional Administration Structure for the Northern and Eastern Provinces’. The proposal grants the LTTE the
majority in a newly created ‘Provisional Administrative Council’. This body is to administer rehabilitation, reconstruction and resettlement, but sensitive policy areas, including police, security and tax, remain with the central government. The document does not include constitutional changes, which the UNP government is
unable to make, given its fragile co-habitation with the President114, whose critical stance finds support in the Sinhala nationalist media.115 The LTTE rejects the proposal as too minimalist and tries to develop its own, maximalist proposal.116 With Norwegian logistical support, input is gathered from experts in the diaspora. Political Wing leader Tamilselvan and his team combine consultations with a PR tour to various European countries. Norway also arranges for a South African invitation to the LTTE to learn from the experience of overcoming apartheid. This causes annoyance with the Sri Lankan government, which fears the normative and symbolic 111 In the media, however, significant importance is attributed to donor pressure. In the run-up to the Tokyo conference, papers propagate headlines like ‘The Tiger-Government conflict endangers international assistance’ (Weekend Virakesari, 27 April 2003) and ‘Promised aid will only be a dream if peace talks collapse – many countries inform the government’ (Lankadeepa, 27 April 2003).
=============
112 Interview 014A.
113 Interview 003B.
114 MFA 307.3 (2003/00027-60 and 55).
115 Sinhala Urumaya nonetheless calls the government proposal ‘a threat to Lanka’s unity’ (The Island, 5 August 2003), the JVP announces protest (Lanka, 8 June 2003) and the Tamil party EPDP proclaims it will ‘take the government to courts over interim body’ (Daily Mirror, 29 July 2003).
116 MFA 307.3 (2003/00027-55).

Pawns of Peace – Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997-2009 47
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associations of comparing the Tamil issue to the ANC and Mandela.117 Balasingham plays no discernable role in the process and the Norwegian team is concerned about the diaspora’s ‘radical’ influence at the cost of more moderate voices.118 On 31 October 2003, the LTTE presents its proposal for an Interim Self-Governing Administration (ISGA).119 The ISGA combines aspects of the Indo-Lankan accord, the devolution debate and issues discussed in the peace talks combining them in a structure with maximal
autonomy controlled by the LTTE. It comprises an interim administration for the whole of the north-east,120 which is to be responsible for pretty much all aspects of governance (reconstruction, land, marine resources). The budget is to be provided through government allocations and the North East Reconstruction Fund (see more in chapter 10). The document stipulates the immediate cessation of army presence on civilian lands, but does not mention LTTE disarmament or arrangements for police and military. Members of the Interim Self-Governing Administraion (ISGA) are to be appointed by the government, the LTTE and the Muslim community for the first five years, after which elections are scheduled. Apart from the far-reaching
scope of the ISGA (just short of secession), the catch of the proposal is that during the interim period, the LTTE reserves an absolute majority for itself and appoints the chairperson and chief executive. This is unacceptable for the north eastern (Muslim, Sinhala) minorities, for the government and for India, all of whom are concerned that the proposed referendum after the interim period could still lead to some form
of secession.121 Critical Sinhalese122 and Muslim123 media slam the proposal as an LTTE ploy and condemn the Wickremesinghe government for not doing the same.124 The Norwegian team is unsurprised by this response, but considers it a major milestone that the LTTE formally puts down a written proposal other than Tamil Eelam.

4 November 2003: Presidential take-over

Within days (4 November 2003) President Kumaratunga intervenes. Using her constitutional powers, she declares a state of emergency and assumes control over the three ministries responsible for Defence, Law and Order, and Media. This effectivelystifles Wickremesinghe’s government, who, in Kumaratunga’s words, ‘misused the powers’ she has given him.125 The intervention does not come as a surprise. In fact, it has been subject of near continuous political speculation and anticipation, and Sinhala nationalist groups have repeatedly called for it.126 Though there is also disapproval and anxiety about the President’s move127, she reads the country’s mood
==================
117 MFA 307.3 (2003/00027-35-51).
118 Interview 025A and 029A.
119 Already prior to the release of the document, pressure is mounting in some of the Tamil media, underlining the need to take the forthcoming proposal seriously. Karuna forecasts international repercussions, if ‘our draft is rejected’ (Sudar Oli, 20 October 2003). Virakesari relays a similar message, warning that ‘Division of country is unavoidable if our draft is not implemented’ (27 October2003).
120 It encompasses the districts Ampara, Batticaloa, Jaffna, Kilinochchi, Mannar, Mullaitivu, Trincomalee and Vavuniya.
121 Interview 025A an 069E.
122 Illustrative critical headlines include: ‘Sangha [the Buddhist clergy] see proposals as “Trojan horse”’ (Daily Mirror, 4 November 2003); ‘Interim administration: wolf to take care of chickens’ (Lankadeepa, 5 November 2003), and ‘Proposals indicate that LTTE has no solution short of Tamil Eelam’ (Divaina, 3 November 2003).
123 The newspaper Virakesari carries the headline that ‘Muslim aspiration is totally denied in Tiger’s draft’ (3 November 2003).
124 Lanka, for example, criticises the ‘massive media operation to white wash Tiger proposals’ (2 November 2003).
125 In the interview with the authors (London, 9 June 2011), she explained: ‘I could have taken the entire government, but I did not. My message was: ‘you thought I could not do this, but I can.’
126 The following headlines provide some examples: ‘President will use powers if necessary – Mahinda in Los Angeles’ (The Island, 26 September 2002), ‘As long as we have an executive President we don’t allow Ranil to divide the country – Anura [Kumaratunga’s brother]’ (The Island, 26 June 2002), and the explicit call by the Sinhala tabloid Lakjana on Kumaratunga to ‘save the nation from the trio Ranil-Prabha-Norway’ in its editorial titled: ‘When will executive powers be used?’ (14 September 2003).
127 For example, just before the take-over leading monks of the influential Asgiriya and Malwatte chapters call on Kumaratunga: ‘Don’t take over Defence’ (Daily Mirror, 3 November 2003).

48 Pawns of Peace – Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997-2009
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well. The wave of hope and optimism set off by the Ceasefire Agreement has died down. Though there is still significant backing for continued peace efforts, continued recruitment, taxation and violent intimidation by the LTTE in the north and east fuel anger among the Muslims, Sinhalese and anti-LTTE parts of the Tamil community. The lack of public denunciation from the government, the SLMM, and the Norwegian
team creates the impression that the insurgents are given a free hand. Meanwhile there is a gradual trasformation going on in Sinhala politics. This precedes and transcends the peace process, but is reinforced by the government’s strategy of unpopular economic reforms and LTTE appeasement both of which play badly in the vernacular media. At least two processes collide in that transformation. First, the JVP makes a gradual, but very effective comeback into electoral politics from the mid-1990s onwards. It moves from one (1994) to ten (2000) to sixteen (2001) seats in the national parliament and sustains a similar record in sub-national polls. It comes close to changing the received two-party dynamic in Sri Lankan politics into a triangular one and effectively takes the ‘nationalist baton’ from the UNP and SLFP (Rampton and Welikala, 2005). Second, a change takes place in Sinhalese Buddhist dynamics. This is manifest in the cult that emerged around Gangodavila Soma, a Sinhala monk at an Australian monastery who returned to Sri Lanka in 1996. Propagated through television and other modern media, his teachings of purifying Buddhism by shedding Hindu influences and resisting the global Christian hegemony attracts massive support among the Sri Lankan middle class (Berkwitz, 2008; Deegalle, 2004). His popularity has significant political implications and can be connected to the emergence of the Sinhala Urumaya (heritage) party in 2000. There is thus an important ‘ground current’ within parts of Sri Lankan society, and the UNP’s controversial policies provide a unifying adversary for these forces. The UNP had not just left the President in the cold; it had in fact lost important parts of the electorate. Kumaratunga’s take-over – though evidently driven by personal political self-interest as well – taps into these popular resentments as well as unease within the military about concessions to the LTTE. While these nationalist supportbases provide political space for Kumaratunga to sideline the UNP, they also limit her room for manoeuvre. She walks a tightrope by openly allying herself with the JVP in the parliamentary elections that result from her move (see below), while onthe other hand preventing a complete unravelling of the peace process. She confirms the government’s adherence to the Ceasefire Agreement128, maintains Norway’s status as a third party and expresses her willingness to proceed with the process. She expresses her thanks to Norway for asking the LTTE to remain calm, and apologizes for having sent home former SLMM commander Tellefsen.129 With Indian support, the UNP and SLFP hold talks about power-sharing.130 According to Kumaratunga’s account,131 she proposes to form a ‘national government’ with Wickremesinghe standing as the joint UNP-SLFP candidate at the next presidential elections. During this whole intermediary period, it is unclear which parts of the
=================
128 ‘No return to war – President’ (Daily News, 7 November 2003).
129 MFA 307.3 (2003/00027-151).
130 Interview 014A.
131 Interview with former President Kumaratunga (London, 9 June 2011).

Pawns of Peace – Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997-2009 49
===============
government are in charge of what, and this poses a major challenge to the Norwegian team. They have strongly aligned themselves with the UNP administration and the troublesome experience with Kumaratunga’s government (including the controversyover Solheim’s status) has left some bad feelings on both sides. Helgesen visits Colombo in mid-November and meets both Kumaratunga and Wickremesinghe.

‘It is clearly not, and it never has been, within Norway’s mandate to facilitate between the political parties in the south’, he says at a press conference, and emphasises there is no ‘clarity about who is holding political authority and responsibility on behalf of the Government to ensure continuation of the ceasefire and the
resumption of peace negotiations.’132 He announces that Norway will put its activities on hold until political clarity emerges in Colombo.

In the meantime, the Norwegians try to keep the LTTE engaged and firm up the international network around the crumbling peace process through the co-chairs and discussions with UN Secretary General Kofi Annan.133 With the peace talks deadlocked, however, it becomes clear international support for the process is increasingly fragmented. India refuses to take a more overt role, the US anti-terrorism
dominated discourse is of limited use in confronting the political crisis in the south, Japan is hesitant to stick its neck out and the EU does not play a salient role. The apparent unity and determination donors expressed in the Tokyo Declaration prove to be feeble in practice. Solheim also holds a discussion with the Muslim
leadership, which is under pressure after the Oluvil declaration to demand a separate Muslim delegation to peace talks. Many north-eastern Muslims feel the ISGA will surrender them to legalised LTTE terror. SLMC leader Hakeem explains it would be more politically expedient if a separate Muslim delegation is at least not rejected outright. More critical voices, like activist-politician MIM Mohideen, express fierce criticism of the SLMM’s failure to protect the Muslims against the LTTE. Solheim is unable to promise any change under the circumstances.134 Norway also uses this impasse to review its own performance. A new internal strategy
document dated 27 January 2004 spells out the need for the parties to define ‘best alternatives to a negotiated agreement’. It identifies international support, a pro-active media policy, and the preservation of the military balance of power as sources of concern. Norway should position itself as a ‘peace architect’ and prioritise six main challenges: 1) address CFA violations; 2) establish contact with LTTE, the UNP, the PA, and India on a daily basis; 3) bring about economic progress in the north and east; 4) mobilise ‘track two’ civil society involvement, also outside Colombo; 5) generate pressure from international actors; and 6) sustain the Norwegian morale.135

26 March 2004: Karuna split

Before getting a chance to recover from the political crisis in the south, the peace process suffers another serious blow in the east. The break-away of the LTTE’s eastern commander Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan (alias ‘Colonel’ Karuna Amman) in March 2004 confirms the pattern of political fragmentation and alters the mili-
================
132 MFA 307.3 (2003/00027-149).
133 MFA 307.3 (2004/00007-18).
134 MFA 307.3 (2003/00027-171-187).
135 MFA 307.3 (2004/00007-48).

50 Pawns of Peace – Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997-2009
===============
tary balance in a fundamental way.136 Whilst to some extent a result of attempts to instigate a transformation of the LTTE, the split will prove severely destabilising and marks a vital shift in the forthcoming regression back to war. As one of the most senior military commanders, Karuna is personally credited with major LTTE successes.

With his defection, the LTTE loses thousands of cadres, its firm grip on the east, and suffers the biggest intelligence leak in its history. Unlike earlier rifts an tensions in the movement, Karuna’s break-away partly reflects the longer history of cultural-linguistic differences and political standoffs between the northern (‘Jaffna’) and the eastern (‘Batticaloa’) Tamil community. There are longstanding grievances over the massive recruitment of eastern youths, while more prosperous Jaffna families sent their children abroad. This bolsters the feasibility and impact of the split, but the event itself is set in motion by the peace process. Part of the whole peace process strategy – especially for the Sri Lankan government – was to expose the LTTE to the world beyond the war zone and thus make them more amenable to  compromise. Arguably this strategy worked, but it had unintended and unforeseen outcomes. Although various allegations are made against Karuna including financial misappropriation and controversy around his sexual morale, the eastern commander himself identifies disagreements over strategy as the key issue. He claims to be the driving force behind the LTTE’s consent to the ‘Oslo communiqué’. Balasingham in his view was hesitant, while he had his eyes opened by travelling around the world and saw a negotiated settlement as the best way forward. Having
overstepped the mark, he fell out with Prabhakaran after returning to the Vanni. Unable to persuade his leader and the LTTE central committee, Karuna backs out and bides his time in the east, which he runs more or less autonomously (including in the fields of finance and intelligence). On 3 March 2004, he declares himself autonomous within LTTE. Weeks later, on 26 March 2004, Prabhakaran reportedly sends out a team to kill him, but Karuna’s own intelligence finds out and he escapes. He then formally declares himself independent of the LTTE and anticipates a full-blown attack. On Good Friday (9 April 2004), Vanni cadres launch an overwhelming offensive across the Verugal River and within a few days, as the military stands by, Karuna faces defeat. He disbands his forces and with help from a Muslim politician, he manages to arrange his escape to Colombo on 12 April.137 His faction is nearly completely wiped out; only a few manage
to find shelter in Colombo. The President keeps him under protection (and in custody), but decides not to engage him politically. She refuses to see him, but against her wishes the military starts interrogating him and seeks collaboration.138 Significantly, this is the first time the Sri Lankan military plays an autonomous role of significance. Karuna is subsequently brought to India, but his remaining cadres work with the Sri Lankan armed forces to make a comeback in the east.139 A ne wave of security incidents hits the east as both factions take out each other’s camps, and try to take over control of civilian life. Community leaders and politicians are intimidated and assassinated by either side.136 Even before the split, the LTTE told Solheim and Furuhovde it was concerned about the government’s military build-up with significant procurement and increasing signs of Indian backing (MFA 307.3 (2004/00007-53)).
====================
137 Interview 004B.
138 Interview 003B.
139 Interview 004B.

Pawns of Peace – Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997-2009 51
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Even prior to the split, the Norwegian team maintains contact with Karuna alongside other LTTE leaders, among others to voice concern over violence against Muslims. During meetings in Colombo (1 September 2003) and Batticaloa (8 September 2003), Karuna makes it clear he has ‘gotten more authority’ and ‘probably will be in more direct contact with Norway’.140 Just before the split (on 3 and 4 March),
his secretary contacts both Ambassador Brattskar (who has now succeeded Westborg) and SLMM Head of Mission Furuhovde, and tells them Karuna plans to ‘break out’.141 The Norwegians are ‘surprised’ and realise ‘things will be difficult and different’.142 They inform the LTTE that they will talk to Karuna, but they are very hesitant to start meddling in intra-LTTE affairs.143 Tamilselvan moreover assures them that the split will be dealt with peacefully. The Norwegian team thus does not accede to Karuna’s plea to accept him as a separate party and signatory to the CFA and waits to see how the situation unfolds.144 With multiple crises at hand, the Norwegian team agrees to the following approach:145 1) they will apply pressure on both the UNP and the PA to collaborate and request India to convey the same message146; 2) the SLMM will invite the parties to review the Ceasefire Agreement; 3) Norwegian aid will target influential actors that can make a difference for the peace process; and 4) they will have regular contact with a wide range of politicians, administrators and foreign players. On a positive note in relation to the last point, Muslim politicians agree to establish the Peace Secretariat for Muslims which is setup on 17 December 2004 (with Norwegian support) in an attempt to unify Muslim concerns.In parallel to the Karuna split, fresh parliamentary elections take place. Defeating Wickremesinghe, Kumaratunga’s alliance with the JVP wins the April 2004 elections with a significant margin.147 Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU), a newly founded party of nationalist Buddhist monks, surprises many by winning nine seats. With the apparent crushing of Karuna’s revolt and Kumaratunga’s electoral victory, some of the dust appears to settle. Norway insists on written confirmation from both sides that they want Norway to continue its efforts.148 Both sides confirm their support to the Ceasefire Agreement and the search for a negotiated settlement, but are in fact highly entrenched in their positions. The LTTE is weakened and apparently feels it has nothing to gain when talking from such a bargaining position. The government sees fresh military opportunities and feels it can pose conditions which also helps to keep their internal opposition (JVP) in line.149 Much like in the period 1995-1996 and in 1999-2001, the process is stifled by disagreement during ‘talks about talks’. Firstly, the parties disagree about the agenda. Predictably, the LTTE wants to talk about an interim arrangement on the basis of its ISGA proposal.
Kumaratunga does not reject the ISGA out of hand, but only wants to talk about it
========================
140 307.3 (2003/00027-89).
141 MFA 307.3/442 (2004/00007-45).
142 Interview 014A.
143 Interview 014A.
144 Contrary to what Karuna says in media interviews, Ambassador Brattskar does not receive a request for protection, but he informs his ministry that Norway should evaluate the possibility of cooperating with another country to accommodate Karuna (MFA 307.3/442 (2004/00007-45)).
145 MFA 307.3 (2004/00007-151).
146 Meanwhile, Foreign Minister Kadirgamar uses this leverage the opposite way and – in Norway’s assessment – tries to muster Indian support to ‘straighten Norway up’. (MFA 307.3 (2004/00007-58)).
147 The UPFA wins 102 seats, the UNP 82. The JVP reaches its electoral height with 39 (of the 102 UPFA) seats.
148 MFA. 307.3 (2004/00007-56).
149 Although the JVP allied itself with President Kumaratinga, it was in many ways behaving like an opposition party. They continued to steer a very critical course regarding the peace process.

52 Pawns of Peace – Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997-2009
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in relation to a final and comprehensive settlement. Secondly, Kumaratunga wants to meet in Sri Lanka (Colombo or Vanni), while the LTTE wants to meet abroad. And thirdly, the parties disagree on revising the Ceasefire Agreement, particularly where it concerns the situation at sea.150 Neither party seems to have any faith in the outcome of negotiations, but they also avoid the resumption of open war. They prefer to stand their ground and call each other’s bluff. After all, the LTTE has barely overcome the split and Kumaratunga’s limited time left in office hinges on the JVP not letting her down. In October 2004, the President creates the National Advisory Council for Peace and Reconciliation (NACPR), but it never plays a significant role.

The Norwegians are frustrated with the lack of progress and the embassy sends a report to Oslo entitled ‘Waiting for Godot’: ‘The peace process is now characterised by everybody waiting for something to happen, but nobody knows what will happen or when it will happen’.151 Gradually however, violence escalates with mutual (unclaimed) attacks in the east and the post-CFA first suicide attack.152 Prabhakaran’s “Heroes’ Day” speech in November 2004 is interpreted as war-oriented and messages from the north-east and the diaspora suggest the LTTE is collecting recruits and funds for the ‘final war’. In an apparent attempt to adopt Palestinian tactics, the movement stages a ‘Jaffna intifada’, combining attacks on the security forces with student protests and ‘activists’ throwing stones at government forces.

The LTTE further militarizes the situation through the enlistment and training of entire communities into a so-called ‘people’s force’ (Jeyaraj, 2005b).

26 December 2004: Tsunami

The war preparations are cut short by a completely unforeseen disaster. The immediate impact of the Boxing Day tsunami outdoes the war in the short run and has a massive direct effect on the south. Over 35.000 Sri Lankans die on the day itself, at least 21,000 are injured and over 550,000 displaced (Asian Development Bank et al., 2005). The Muslim dominated coast of Ampara District is most affected, followed by (LTTE controlled) Mullaitivu District. Rescue operations, the domestic aid response and the rallying for international support start immediately. The disaster causes great international publicity, but the government refuses high-profile visitors like UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and former US president Bill Clinton (in his private capacity) access to LTTE controlled areas, much to the movement’s annoyance.

It is nevertheless clear that the tsunami can have a game-changing impact on the attitudes of the parties, the political space available to them and their militar strength. The disaster interrupts the war-oriented dynamic, provides a temporary suspension of ‘normal politics’, and people reach out across entrenched fault lines.

There thus appears to be a window of opportunity to resume a political process between the Kumaratunga government and the LTTE. The President is strongly involved in the aid response and sees an opportunity to complete what she began in 1994, just before her political career expires. Prabhakaran, according to the Norwegians who visit him shortly after the tsunami, is ‘devastated’, ‘shattered’, and ‘clearly at a different level emotionally than previously’.153
===========================
150 MFA 307.3 (2004/00007-198).
151 MFA 307.3 (2004/02485-17).
152 A suicide cadre attempts to kill EPDP leader Devananda, but fails.
153 Interview 014A.

Pawns of Peace – Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997-2009 53
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By mid-January 2005, both parties show willingness to develop a ‘Joint Mechanism’ (later branded more neutrally: Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure, P-TOMS). Though this is technically a limited arrangement for tsunami aid – and presented as such to reduce controversy – it is very clear that both parties and their mediator see P-TOMS as a stepping stone for new negotiations by providing ‘the contours for a political solution.’154 Prabhakaran indicates his willingness to develop a joint mechanism when the Norwegian ministers Petersen (Foreign Affairs) and Frafjord Johnson (International Development) visit the Vanni on 22 January.155 Norwegian shuttle diplomacy156 and direct negotiations between Pulidevan (head of the LTTE Peace Secretariat) and Kumaratunga’s team (Lakshman Kadirgamar, Harim Peiris and Ram Manikkalingam) result in a first government draft by 26 February.157 Government officials keep the Indian High Commission closely involved,158 while the Norwegians talk to now opposition leader Wickremesinghe.159 Texts keep moving back and forth and the Norwegian team tries to even out contentious issues. Tamilselvan insists there should be a clause on the sea – tensions between the navy and
the Sea Tigers continue to cause trouble – but Solheim manages to convince him to drop that demand. Prabhakaran and Kumaratunga are directly involved in the process and go over it ‘word by word’.160 The jointly supported (but confidential) proposal emerges on 22 March.161 It comprises a revised version of SIHRN (the aid sub-committee agreed during the peace talks) and steers clear from the ISGA. The apex
body is to consist of government, LTTE and Muslim representation. Ethnically balanced district committees are responsible for everyday decisions and allocations. NERF (the World Bank administered aid trust fund created for SIHRN) will provide the money.

Both parties claim that the peace talks and the joint mechanism negotiations are de-linked. However, in parallel to the P-TOMS negotiations, they develop closer daily communication on other issues. Confidential agreements are made on the practical implementation of aid projects and reconstruction efforts. Looking back, a government official explains: ‘We managed to get a lot more stuff done in the Vanni than the UNP had done. The World Bank would have money for roads and the Road Development Authority would make a plan. We would sit down with the LTTE and talk concretely: this road ok, why not this one, shall we make this one broader and so on. In detail. And it would be done.’162 Similar channels are used to discuss security issues when killings and attacks occur. ‘We would check our information against each other. Who had killed whom and why. And sometimes we would call it even’.Meanwhile, however, the agreement on Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure (P-TOMS) remains unsigned. The President needs to convince Muslim leaders, whose community is most heavily affected by the tsunami and deeply anxious
about exclusion from the peace process. And she needs to preserve her fragile
=====================
154 Interview 057E.
155 MFA. 307.3 (2005/00092-22) and communication with the Norwegian MFA 071F.
156 MFA. 307.3 (2005/00520-1), MFA. 307.3 (2005/00520-2), and MFA. 307.3 (2005/00520-3).
157 MFA. 307.3 (2005/01004-1).
158 Interview 003B.
159 MFA. 307.3 (2005/00092-28).
160 Interview 003B.
161 MFA. 307.3 (2005/00520-4).
162 Interview 003B.

54 Pans of Peace – Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997-2009
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alliance with the JVP which is strongly opposed to lending any legitimacy to the LTTE. The political configuration is further complicated by the widespread belief thatKumaratunga will use the opportunity to extend her political future beyond her second (and constitutionally last) term in office.163 Norway expresses its concern about the JVP scuttling the agreement, but Kumaratunga tells them not to worry,she will take care of them.164 Time keeps passing, however, and the scheme starts losing its operational relevance. The co-chairs encourage the mechanism early on165 and when donors pledge another US$ 3 billion at the 16 May donor conference in Kandy, Kumaratunga presents an inspiring and politically daring speech. Meanwhile
the LTTE makes another tour across Europe to argue their case. With time, however,the paralysis around P-TOMS becomes a source of distrust and irritation rather than a nucleus for further collaboration. Eventually, the JVP breaks the political gridlock and walks out of government. The agreement is signed (24 June 2005),166 but subsequently when the JHU files a case to the Supreme Court, which eventually rules the mechanism unconstitutional. By that time, the ground situation has changed significantly. The massive influx of
foreign aid creates tensions between communities. Political actors and the bureaucracy jockey for control and local and foreign aid agencies fall prey to ‘competitive humanitarianism’.167 Soon after the tsunami, ambushes and assassinations resume. Kaushalyan (the LTTE’s political leader in the east) is ambushed in
government-controlled territory on 8 February. The LTTE has trouble moving its cadres between the north and east as becomes clear when forty cadres (including the political leader of Ampara) narrowly escape an ambush on 5 June in government area. The LTTE’s crackdown on suspected Karuna loyalists resumes as well. In parallel to these strings of retaliatory violence, both sides build up their militaries. LTTE child recruitment increases and they develop a rudimentary air wing. The government discovers their airstrip in the Vanni and voices alarm. President Kumaratunga formally raises the issue in a letter to Norwegian Prime Minister Bondevik,168 but verification is prevented by the insurgents who do not allow the SLMM to access
the area. In India, where the Congress Party has come back to power in 2004, there is concern too and Delhi offers its radar services to Sri Lanka. The government’s own arms build-up continues unimpeded by the tsunami. International policies increasingly reinforce the asymmetry between the government and the rebels.

Various Asian countries sell weapons to Sri Lanka, while criticism of the LTTE is stepped up. The US government periodically reminds the insurgents that it will face a capable and determined Sri Lankan military if they opt for a return to war. When the LTTE expands the tit-for-tat killings to Colombo and a suspected LTTE sniper kills Foreign Minister Kadirgamar on 12 August 2005, there is widespread condemnation from all foreign players. Norwegian Foreign Minister Petersen writes a letter warning Prabhakaran: ‘If the LTTE does not take a positive step forward at
======================
163 Kumaratunga strongly denied to the authors that she wished to go for a third term.
164 Interview 029A.
165 MFA. 307.3 (2005-00092-23).
166 Kumaratunga faces intra-party opposition as well. Two of her main political allies, Mangala Samaraweera and Lakshman Kadirgamar,do not support P-TOMS. Avoiding an open rift, they evade the parliamentary vote on the agreement by travelling abroad.
167 There is a lot of literature on this. See for example: Fernando and Hilhorst (2006), Fraser (2005), Frerks and Klem (2011), Kaldor (2005), Korf (2005), Korf (2006), Korf et al (2010), McGilvray (2006), Ruwanpura (2008), Shanmugaratnam (2005), Stirrat (2006), and Telford, Cosgrave and Houghton (2006).
168 MFA. 307.3 (2005/00812-4).

Pawns of Peace – Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997-2009 55
====================
this critical juncture, the international reaction could be severe.’169 A month later,the EU announces it is considering LTTE proscription and suspends receiving their delegations with immediate effect. The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs reviews the possible consequences and concludes a European ban would not be conducive to possibilities for peace and would impair their role as facilitator.170 They also review their own strategy and identify seven lines of action: 1) strategize with either outcome of the forthcoming presidential elections; 2) re-launch Norway as a third party after the forthcoming presidential elections in Sri Lanka; 3) broaden international support, for example through a Group of Friends; 4) engage with influential (non-NGO) civil society; 5) attempt to broaden countries participating in SLMM and install a non-Norwegian Head of Mission; 6) implement a more offensive media strategy; and 7) replace Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure (P-TOMS) with a less complicated, more pragmatic mechanism for aid delivery in north-east.171 Among Muslim and Sinhala constituencies, already upset about P-TOMS, Kadirgamar’s death strengthens criticism of perceived Norwegian appeasement of the LTTE. There is a flurry of rumours and theories, some of which are propagated in the state media, about Norway trying to cut off aid to Sri Lanka and blackmailing the government to collaborate with the LTTE. Written protests and street demonstrations occur from early 2005 onwards.172 With a faltering President Kumaratunga and the UNP firmly associated with the Norwegian peace efforts, neither mainstream party can capitalize on these sentiments. The JVP and JHU sense victory.

Their walk out from government (JVP) and the court case against P-TOMS (JHU) are well received by their constituencies, but neither party can capture the political centre ground. Mahinda Rajapaksa – an experienced southern politician, but relatively inconspicuous as an opposition leader and Prime Minister – manages to step into this political vacuum and becomes a ‘repository’173 for public dissent and frustration.

In October 2005, the Norwegian team again reviews their own role in the peace process and the prospects following the presidential election. Among the points discussed are (a) the need for better access to Prabhakaran; (b) the possibility for ‘freezing’ the Norwegian facilitation or pulling back for a period; (c) the terms for continued Norwegian engagement; (d) the need for a broader cooperation with the international community and Sri Lankan civil society, including Buddhist monastic orders; (e) a more offensive information strategy; and (f) a less exclusive peace process.174

19 November 2005: Rajapaksa’s presidential victory

The campaign for the presidential elections becomes a neck-and-neck race between Rajapaksa, who runs on an SLFP ticket, and UNP candidate Wickremesinghe. Not implicated by the controversies of the Ceasefire Agreement and the peace talks, Rajapaksa presents himself as an advocate of peace with dignity. The Norwegians,the SLMM, and Solheim get slammed in milder or harsher terms on various
========================
169 MFA 307.3 (2005/010004-10).
170 MFA 307.3 (2005/010004-22).
171 MFA. 307.3 (2005/01004-34).
172 MFA. 307.3 (2005/00092-8).
173 Interview 033E.
174 MFA. 307.3 (2005/01004-34).

56 Pawns of Peace – Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997-2009
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occasions during the campaign. Rajapaksa makes it clear he is willing to resume negotiations with the LTTE, but only on his terms. Wickremesinghe, however, manages to secure the UNP block votes and makes overtures to the Muslim and Tamil electorates. Ironically, his defeat is determined in the Vanni. The LTTE decides to enforce a boycott among Tamil voters175, thus tipping the balance to Rajapaksa, who wins with a margin of less than two percent.176 The narrow margin underlines the political divisions in Sri Lanka. Wickremesinghe’s substantive support, both from the minorities and the Sinhala majority, shows there is still a constituency for his approach to the peace process despite all the turmoil. Rajapaksa’s victory is significant, however, because it signifies a more fundamental and enduring shift in Sri Lankan politics. First, the revival of modern Buddhism and Sinhala nationalism – predating the peace process, but reinforced by it – moves
back to the political centre. Second, the elections are won with a nearly exclusive Sinhala vote, thus breaking the pattern of ethnic minorities serving as kingmakers.

Third, and most importantly, Rajapaksa’s success in reaching Sri Lanka’s highest position ends the uninterrupted dominance of Colombo elite dynasties since late colonial times. He represents an established ‘political family’, but comes from a non-Anglicised, non-Colombo background and is widely perceived to be more conversant with the concerns of the common Sinhala people. His political manifesto and overall plan ‘Mahinda Chinthanaya’ bears some resemblance to Premadasa’s style and policies.177 It propagates a strong, protective state, investment in visible infrastructure, and glorifies Sri Lanka’s traditions and culture,
unspoiled village life in particular.

Foreign media inadequately contrast the two candidates as a hawk (Rajapaksa) and a dove(Wickremesinghe). Norway’s initial assessment is that Sri Lanka’s new president is a pragmatist without a pronounced vision or strategy. They have regularly kept him informed in his preceding years as opposition leader and Prime Minister.178 He avoided taking a clear position then, but was open to discussing a federal solution to the conflict.179 Having assumed office, Rajapaksa’s first speech to parliament on 25 November states that the government will start a new peace process through direct talks with the LTTE. He rejects federalism and P-TOMS, avoids mentioning Norway, and instead suggests facilitation by the UN, India or another regional power. Two days later, Prabhakaran broadcasts his annual “Heroes’ Day” speech
and tells the government to offer a reasonable solution or face the consequences of the LTTE establishing a separate state unilaterally. To show their teeth, they initiate an unprecedented spree of attacks and assaults, concentrated in the north this time. Many attacks directly target government forces and troops die day by day in December 2005.175 There is no firm evidence on the LTTE’s motivation, but going by media reports and interviews (see also Jeyarai 2005a), it plausibly includes: 1) revenge on Wickremesinghe’s international peace trap, 2) the realisation that only a hardliner can enforce change in southern politics, and 3) a possible financial or other arrangement with Rajapaksa prior to the polls. In January 2006 in a meeting between President Rajapaksa and Erik Solheim, the President in a jocular mood instructed Solheim to thank Prabhakaran for helping him to win the election. Solheim passed this message on when he met the LTTE leader a few days later (MFA.307.3 (2006/00085-27).
====================
176 Rajapaksa gets 50 percent, Wickremesinghe 48 percent.
177 Ranasinghe Premadasa, president from 1989 until his assassination by the LTTE in 1993, was known for his nationalist outlook,powerful political rhetoric, cunning strong-arm politics, and pro-poor, pro-rural, populist measures, mainly in the form of large-scale development patronage.
178 Interview 030A.
179 Interview 014A.

Pawns of Peace – Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997-2009 57
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Amidst these opening salvos, Solheim receives a confidential report from ArneFjørtoft, who is familiar with the Rajapaksa family and has explored the new government’s attitudes. A close confidant of Mahinda Rajapaksa explains that his government distrusts Norway and believes they supported the UNP during the election campaign, but there is scope to set the record straight. Fjørtoft reports: ‘Mahinda is balancing on a thin rope and has little room for manoeuvre. But he has the direction ready and wants to continue with Norway (for pragmatic reasons) if it can be done in an acceptable way.’180 The Norwegians realize prospects are bleak, but feel that they should try to keep up their efforts. From US sources, the Norwegians
are told that Rajapaksa probably wants to have it both ways: to use Norway in the peace process, and as a buffer in the domestic political game.181 Ambassador Brattskar visits both parties to clarify their stance on Norway’s role. Two meetings are also held between Basil Rajapaksa, Solheim and Fjørtoft.182 Despite all the killings, the LTTE welcomes continued Norwegian involvement and so does Rajapaksa– realising there is no feasible scope for replacing the Norwegians given the absence of alternatives and international support for them playing this role.183 The rhetorical commitment to peace is not matched by developments on the ground. There is no let up in the fighting and the military and their proxy the TMVP184 (the new name for Karuna’s cadres) retaliate with guerrilla style attacks. Tamil MP Joseph Pararajasingham is killed in the middle of Christmas Mass in Batticaloa and on 2 January the security forces abuse and execute five Tamil students in the heart of Trincomalee town.

Fearing it runs the risk of being manipulated in these turbulent times, Norway poses three conditions for its continued involvement: 1) a direct meeting with Prabhakaran every three months; 2) the government is to stop undermining Norwegian involvement; and 3) the parties have to commit themselves to carrying the peace process forward.185 There are also changes within the Norwegian team following the October
2005 change of government in Oslo. Helgesen leaves office, Solheim becomes Minister of International Development, and in March 2006 Jon Hanssen-Bauer takes his place as Special Envoy for Sri Lanka.

Despite the near continuous sequence of ambushes, grenade throwing and assassinations, neither party is ready to formally abrogate the Ceasefire Agreement and start war. It is unclear, however, whether this is for strategic reasons (prefer a political settlement), tactical considerations (e.g. reputational damage, build up strength for next attack, attempt to test military power balance), or some combination of both. The Norwegian team manages to bring about resumed talks on 22-23 February

2006. Rajapaksa opposes a Norwegian venue, the LTTE prefers a European

location, but with the EU travel ban, most of the continent is off-limits to the movement.

The Swiss government takes an active role and Geneva is selected as the

location for new talks.186 This also creates scope for discussions with ICRC on

humanitarian concerns.187 The talks are premised on reviewing the Ceasefire Agree-
===========================
180 MFA 307.3 (2005/00812-243).
181 MFA 307.3 (2005/01004-35).
182 Interview 043A.
183 Interview 029A.
184 TMVP stand for Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (Tamil People’s Liberation Tigers).
185 MFA 307.3 (2006/00083-6).
186 Interview 061B.
187 Interview 058B.

58 Pawns of Peace – Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997-2009
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ment and possibly proceeding to more substantive political discussions later. However,they result in mutual accusations and public pronouncements rather than constructive dialogue. The government delegation covers the entire political spectrum and thus includes obstructive hardliners.188 Instead of trying to actually turn the tide, both parties extract unrealistic promises from their opponent in an apparent attempt to call their bluff: the LTTE is to stop recruitment – child recruitment in particular – and infringements on civilian life and the government agrees to curb ‘paramilitary groups’ (Karuna’s TMVP). The SLMM is requested to report on compliance, but soon concludes neither promise is met.189 The next meeting, originally scheduled for April 2006, is called off by the LTTE quoting government non-compliance as the reason. Persistent Norwegian efforts to persuade them to come fail. Following a brief time of relative quiet in the north east in the run-up to Geneva,hostilities resume with increasing forcefulness. The attempted suicide attack on army chief Sarath Fonseka (25 April 2006) at the army headquarters in central Colombo marks a new level of violence. The government responds with air raids on LTTE controlled area. An attack on a navy personnel carrier (11 May 2006) killing seventeen troops provokes retaliation. Buses get ambushed and the death toll rises quickly. Despite these skirmishes, the Norwegian team manages to make some progress with SCOPP (the government peace secretariat). During secret discussions in Barcelona190, a joint plan is made to move to more substantive political discussions in three phases: 1) strengthen the Ceasefire Agreement and start negotiations (May – September 2006); 2) devise interim arrangements to facilitate the return of normalcy (October 2006 – April 2007); and 3) reach agreement on a permanent solution (May 2007 – December 2007).191 SCOPP, however, proves to have drifted apart from its political leaders and it soon becomes clear that the government does not buy into the plan. The Norwegians are frustrated with the government, which is consumed by ‘all tactics, no strategy’ in their view.192 On 6 April, 2006 Hanssen-Bauer and Brattskar have a tense meeting with Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa. In response to a question about whether the ethnic and political problems in Sri Lanka could be solved by military means Gotabaya answers, ‘yes’.193 In the same period, international actors close ranks against the LTTE. Canada bans
the LTTE on 10 April 2006 and the Council of the EU follows suit on 30 May 2006.

Norway is now the only of the four co-chairs (Norway, EU, US, and Japan) still willing to meet with the LTTE. Though the co-chairs continue to release critical statements towards both parties condemning the violence and urging them to resume negotiations, Japan is hesitant to criticise the government. More importantly, Indian opposition to the LTTE starts to translate into firmer backing for the Sri Lankan government. Faced with diverse interests (geo-political dominance, regional security, Tamil Nadu politics) the Indian government has persistently struck a
=====================
188 Interview 030A.
189 Reports by SLMM Head of Mission Ulf Henricsson, titled ‘Geneva Report 24 February – 28 May 2006’ and ‘Geneva Report 29 May– 31 August 2006’.
190 Communication with the Norwegian MFA 070F.
191 MFA 306.3 (2006/00109-18).
192 Interview 030A.
193 MFA.307.3 (2006/00109-8).

Pawns of Peace – Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997-2009 59
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balance between advocating Tamil rights while opposing separatism. However, crushing the LTTE has become the overriding concern after the disasters of the Indo-Lankan Accord in 1987 and the subsequent LTTE assassination of former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in May 1991. The return to power of the Indian National Congress (now headed by his widow Sonia Gandhi) in 2004 and declining influence of Sri Lanka on Tamil Nadu politics (see chapter 7) mean that there are fewer inhibitions on a military solution to the conflict. India thus continues to advocate for the accommodation of Tamil aspirations in Sri Lanka, but does not apply any pressure against the Rajapaksa government in relation to the military option. On the political
track, Rajapaksa initiates an All Party Conference (APC, January 2006) and the All Parties Representative Committee (APRC, July 2006) to foster dialogue with a wide range of political actors in pursuit of exploring a home-grown, constitutional solution to the conflict. The initiative is criticised by domestic and foreign observers as a time-buying, window-dressing exercise.

The SLMM continues to grapple with the sea issue. Its newly installed Head of Mission Ulf Henricsson takes a bold step by formally declaring naval movements as a government prerogative, thus suggesting the Sea Tigers have no right – under the Ceasefire Agreement or otherwise – to operate.194 LTTE political leader Tamilselvan reacts furiously. India nevertheless criticizes Norway in private meetings for being too‘LTTE friendly’ and underlines the need to ‘put the LTTE in its place’.195 Concerned with the LTTE’s military build up, particularly at sea and even in the air, India provides vital radar and intelligence information to the Sri Lanka forces. Delhi maintains it will not provide offensive military assets – due to the political sensitivity of Indian weapons being used against Tamils – but off the record, it does not object to Sri Lanka purchasing weaponry elsewhere. The Rajapaksa government expands the arms deals that were already in the pipeline under previous administrations (see chapter 9 for more detail). With new aircrafts, drones, radar, tanks, artillery and patrol vessels, and the ability to use Karuna’s cadres and intelligence, the military
regains confidence. The government feels it can dictate its terms to the LTTE and launch an attack if the rebels do not give in.
============
194 This is in fact a spur of the moment decision. On the way from Jaffna to Mannar, Henricsson learns that his monitors have come under LTTE attack at sea and he has to respond quickly.
195 MFA 307.3 (2006/00083-10)

Pawns of Peace – Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997-2009
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6. War, Victory and Humanitarian Disaster
 (2006-2009)
(தொடரும்)