BILL C-10 கியூபெக் மாணவர்கள் எதிர்த்துப் போராடும் கனேடிய கறுப்புச் சட்டம்.

What is Bill C-10?

On September 20, Justice Minister Rob Nicholson tabled Bill C-10, an omnibus bill titled the Safe Streets and Communities Act.  Combining amendments from nine separate bills that had failed to pass in previous sessions of parliament, Bill C-10 would make fundamental changes to almost every component of Canada’s criminal justice system.  It proposes:

New criminal offences

New and increased mandatory minimum sentences
The selective elimination of conditional sentences
Increased pretrial detention and new, harsher sentencing principles for young offenders
Longer waiting times before individuals can apply for pardons
Increased barriers for Canadians detained abroad who wish to serve the remainder of their sentence at home
The Bill also introduces some changes outside the criminal justice system:
Amendments to the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act would grant the Minister of Immigration broad discretion to deny work permits to any foreign national who is ‘at risk of abuse’
Amendments to various pieces of legislation to allow victims of terrorism to sue certain foreign entities and governments for damages

இரண்டரை இலட்சம் மாணவ சமுத்திரம்

What are the problems with Bill C-10?

In the CCLA’s view, the Bill proposes a few welcome changes, including requiring the Parole Board of Canada to provide annual statistics relating to record suspensions (which replace pardons for some offences) and empowering victims of terrorism to seek redress for loss and damage resulting from a terrorist act.

Overall, however, the direction these changes set out for the Canadian criminal justice system – jail more often, for longer, with more lasting consequences – is a dangerous route that is unsupported by the social science evidence and has already failed in other countries.  Indeed, the research suggests that putting an individual in jail for longer will actually increase the likelihood of re-offending.  It’s hard to see how this Bill will make streets and communities safer.  What it will do is needlessly increase the number of people in prison, skyrocketing costs and imposing unjust, unwise and unconstitutional punishments.  This is exactly the kind of policy Canada doesn’t need.

Below are six broad points where CCLA is most concerned about the impact of this Bill.

1. Broad and vague amendments to the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act: Amendments give a very broad mandate to deny any foreign national a work permit and do not specify what factors would be used to target an individual as ‘at risk’ of being exploited.  It is also poor public policy to punish foreign individuals who are vulnerable to abuse as opposed to addressing the Canadian employers who exploit these populations.

2. Hollow expansion for the rights of victims: Both torture and terrorism are serious crimes of international concern.  Numerous Canadian victims of torture have been unable to access meaningful justice in Canadian courts– and yet the government has chosen only to make these amendments available to victims of terrorism.  Even victims of terrorism would have to have their cases ‘pre-approved’ by the government, which has the ability to decide which governments can and cannot be sued.  Canada should not play politics with victims of torture and terrorism.

3. Unconstitutional use of mandatory minimums: The use of mandatory minimums for broad and vague underlying offences may result in the imposition of unjust, grossly disproportionate sentences.  The drug provisions include low-level drug offences – producing as little as six marihuana plants – and extremely broad aggravating factors which would target all those who rent or live in a house they do not own.

The child pornography provisions criminalize, and would impose mandatory minimum jail sentences, for the consensual, legal sexual activities of youth and young adults.  There is little evidence that mandatory minimums provide any deterrent impact, enhance community safety or lower crime rates.  There is also little evidence to suggest that they will significantly impact sentences for the most serious offenders – who are already being sentenced to significant amounts of jail time by the judiciary.  Rather they will handcuff the judiciary, preventing them from responding to unique facts and exceptional personal circumstances.

போராடும் மாணவர்களை நையப்புடைக்கும் பொலிஸ் பட்டாளம்

4. Prison conditions and disparate impact of amendments on aboriginal peoples and persons requiring mental health care:  The proposed will amendments greatly increase the prison population, and are likely to have a disproportionate and devastating impact on already-marginalized communities – particularly Aboriginal peoples and those with mental health needs.  These populations are already greatly over-represented in correctional institutions, and existing programs and services are already ineffective and insufficient to keep up with general demand.  The elimination of conditional sentences for a range of offences is particularly concerning, as these flexible sentencing tools are used by the judiciary to allow single mothers to continue working while serving their sentence and preventing the breakup of families, or to ensure that those with underlying mental health needs get the community treatment that best ensures their recovery and rehabilitation.

5. Unconstitutional amendments to the International Transfer of Offenders Act: The amendments attempt to give the Minister an unconstitutional level of discretion over when Canadian citizens, incarcerated abroad, can return to Canada.  From a policy perspective, facilitating such transfers enhances public safety as rehabilitation and reintegration is enhanced when individuals are close to their families and have access to high-quality, culturally-appropriate programs.  When offenders serve a portion of their sentence in Canada, it also allows the government to create records of their crimes and monitor their rehabilitation.  Absent such transfers, offenders would simply return to Canada at the end of their sentence without any records or legal restrictions on their activities.

6. Increasing transparency and accountability: The CCLA welcomes the required 5-year review of the mandatory minimum provisions set out in s. 42 of the Bill and the requirement that the National Parole Board submit an annual report that includes the number of applications for record suspensions and the number of record suspensions ordered.  Similar reviews and public reports to parliament should be undertaken with respect to the changes to the other acts.

Source: CCLA

எகிப்தில் தேர்தல்

The top two presidential candidates, Mohamed Morsi, left, and Ahmed Shafik.

In Egypt’s Likely Runoff, Islam Vies With the Past
CAIRO — The runoff to become Egypt’s first freely elected president is shaping up as a contest between two of the most powerful and polarizing forces in Egyptian society: political Islam or the leadership of the past.

After a wild and fluid two-month campaign by more than a dozen candidates, Mohamed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood and Ahmed Shafik, a former air force general who served as President
Hosni Mubarak’s final prime minister, emerged with the most votes on Friday, according to independent tallies and the official state news media.

Mr. Morsi won about a quarter of the vote and Mr. Shafik slightly less, effectively reprising the power struggle decades old between a military-backed, secular strongman and Islamists
from the Muslim Brotherhood. At least for the moment, the results appeared to dim the hope that last year’s popular uprising would open a middle path, transcending divisions that kept Egypt paralyzed between fear of religious radicalism and fear of the secular police state.

The outcome provoked frantic warnings on Friday of either a counterrevolution should Mr. Shafik win, or an Islamist takeover, should Mr. Morsi emerge as the next president. The candidates who tried to offer a more unifying vision — and were critical of both the Mubarak era and the Brotherhood — failed to overcome the deep divisions in Egyptian society. The result will be a runoff that offers a wrenching choice for the majority of voters who cast their ballots for one of the
other candidates.

“It is a shock,” said Ahmed Kabany, 38, an engineer, after the voting. “I don’t want either one, so I am not going to vote.” Although Mr. Shafik never explicitly promised to resurrect the old order, he campaigned as a strongman who would crack down on street protests, restore law and order and check the power of the Islamists. He surged in popularity toward the end of the campaign, by playing to voters’ fears of crime and lawlessness, and to the worries of Egypt’s Christian minority about the
growing power of the Islamists, who already control Parliament. And he never backed away from comments he made during the uprising against Mr. Mubarak comparing the insurrection to a
disrespectful child who slaps his father.

Mr. Morsi, facing a serious challenge from an Islamist rival during the campaign, reverted to a conservative and expressly religious appeal, portraying his platform as a distillation of
Islam itself while promising to carry out Islamic law.

Although both candidates have pledged to support the peace treaty with Israel, the runoff set up a stark choice between the Brotherhood’s vows to unite Palestinian factions in order to increase pressure on Israel to recognize a Palestinian state and Mr. Shafik’s pledges of continuity with positions of the former government.

Though official final results are to be released in a few days, early returns show that about 20 percent voted for Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh, a former Brotherhood leader campaigning as both an Islamist and as a liberal in an effort to break out of Egypt’s culture war. And another roughly 20 percent voted for Hamdeen Sabahi, a secular populist with a record of fighting the Mubarak government on behalf of the poor. (Fifth place went to Amr Moussa, a former foreign minister who presented a softer and more conciliatory version of Mr. Shafik’s secular law-and-order appeal.)

Handicapping the runoff was all but impossible. Although candidates from the Muslim Brotherhood or more conservative Islamist parties won about three-quarters of the seats in Parliament, Islamists and more secular candidates split the vote in the first stage of the presidential election. It was
unclear whether voters who picked Mr. Sabahi, the secular populist, would lean toward Mr. Morsi to avoid returning a Mubarak minister to power, or to Mr. Shafik in order to avoid giving so much power to the Brotherhood. But at the end of the day, the possibility of low turnout favors the Brotherhood because its vast political machine can drive its voters to the polls.

As soon as the results became clear, each of the two leading candidates began to try to shift to the center, by rallying against the other. In a Friday night news conference, officials of the Muslim Brotherhood announced that they were inviting the other “revolutionary candidates” — effectively, all but Mr. Shafik — to a meeting to talk about a coalition to oppose the former prime minister and about sharing power in a Brotherhood-led government.

“Rescuing the homeland includes securing victory for a candidate who belongs to the revolutionary camp, and the camp that struggles against the old regime,” Essam el-Erian, a Brotherhood lawmaker, said, trying to portray Mr. Morsi as the champion of the whole popular uprising and not just the
Islamist forces.

Supporters of Mr. Shafik, meanwhile, circulated a cellphone message urging unity against the Brotherhood. “I beg you to please put your differences aside and go vote for Shafik not because you believe in him but because it will be a catastrophe if we consolidate all power to one party (presidency and Parliament)!” the message read. “History has proved, so please spread!”

The race is further complicated by the uncertainty about the powers of the next president. A committee picked by Parliament that was supposed to draft a new charter has become deadlocked
in a dispute between Islamists and liberals. The military council that has governed Egypt since Mr. Mubarak’s ouster says it will issue an interim constitution to define the president’s powers, but it has not yet done so.

Mr. Shafik has close ties to the members of the military council, and his opponents often accuse the generals of actively supporting his campaign, but no conclusive evidence has emerged. Indeed, the Brotherhood has also indicated that it intends to take a conciliatory approach toward the generals,
allowing them to preserve the commercial empire they control, protecting their budget from public scrutiny and keeping them out of civilian courts.

Mr. Morsi, the least charismatic of the leading candidates in the race, relied mainly on the Brotherhood’s political machine to turn out his voters. He sat out the one televised debate,
and his face barely appeared in his television commercials.

Mr. Shafik, a gruff former fighter pilot, earned the nickname “the Pullover” for the sweaters he wore in television interviews and on campaign posters, apparently to make him seem more approachable. It was all but unheard-of for a Mubarak minister to appear in public without a jacket and tie. Both Mr. Morsi and Mr. Shafik were derided for their awkward speaking styles. During his brief tenure as prime minister, Mr. Shafik was forced to resign after a humiliating public debate on a television talk show with a liberal critic and author, Alaa al-Aswany. “I fought in wars,” Mr. Shafik said in
exasperation at one point. “I killed and was killed.” His signature campaign commercial plays to the public anxieties about the crime and lawlessness that have swept Egypt since Mr. Mubarak’s ouster, when police and security forces scattered or stopped working. The commercial begins with jarring television images of protests and riots, and the clipped voice of a television newscaster in the background. “Chaos,” the voice says. “The country has fallen.” Then, over somber notes from a piano, Mr. Shafik says, “Egypts needs justice, and the safety for its citizens.”