Iran enters a new phase of conflict with Israel

 

Iran enters a new phase of conflict with Israel

Israel’s strategically questionable strikes against Iran fully ended Tehran’s long spell of ‘strategic patience.’ With no ceasefire in sight, Tel Aviv has recklessly paved a road of no return, leaving the field open for Iran and its regional allies to determine the next phase in the battle.

Khalil Nasrallah OCT 28, 2024 The Cradle

After weeks of saber-rattling, Israel followed through on its threats to attack Iran following Tehran’s 1 October military response to the assassination of Resistance Axis martyrs Ismail Haniyeh and Hassan Nasrallah.

Tel Aviv’s missile strikes targeted a variety of Iranian military bases and intelligence facilities, including air defense systems deep inside Iran, as per Israeli claims.

Both sides have provided conflicting accounts of what happened on the morning of 26 October. Israel, with its narrative echoed by western media, described the strike as precise and successful, while Iran claimed to have intercepted and thwarted most of the attacks.

Regardless, the gratuitous Israeli salvo introduced new dynamics into the West Asia battlefield. The attack early on Saturday morning revealed why Israel, backed by its western allies, deemed the strike necessary in the first place. And it has prompted new Iranian strategic calculations amid the widening regional war.

Upholding Iran’s Promise

It must be remembered that when Tel Aviv carried out its highly provocative attack targeting the Iranian consulate in Damascus on 1 April, the Iranians responded with two key demands: end the war in Gaza and de-escalate the broader regional conflict – or face a direct military response.

Less than 10 days later, frustrated by Israeli belligerence and US complicity, Iran struck back. Operation True Promise, launched on 14 April, saw an unprecedented barrage of Iranian drones and both cruise and ballistic missiles directed at three Israeli military bases, including two in southern occupied Palestine and one in the occupied Syrian Golan Heights.

This marked a turning point for Iran – shifting from a phase of what it termed “strategic patience” – enduring provocations while building strength – to a stage of “empowered retaliation,” undermining the occupation state’s deterrence precepts.

True Promise signaled Tehran’s intent to directly confront Israel, similar to its retaliation against US-occupied bases on 8 January 2020, just days after Washington assassinated Quds Force commander General Qassem Soleimani in Baghdad.

Iran’s readiness to use force dealt a strategic blow to Israeli and US ambitions, which aimed to weaken Iranian influence and curtail support for resistance forces in Palestine and Lebanon. Despite the exchange of blows, it became evident that a new balance of deterrence was emerging – one that neither Washington nor Tel Aviv could easily tip in their favor.

On 22–23 September, as Israel expanded the war into Lebanon, Tel Aviv conducted an assassination inside Iran, targeting the head of Hamas’ political bureau, Ismail Haniyeh, who was visiting as a guest at the inauguration of the newly elected Iranian president Masoud Pezeshkian.

The assassination was seen as both a strategic and personal affront to Iran. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei vowed revenge, calling it Iran’s duty to avenge its fallen guest.

Escalation by assassination

This Iranian threat was taken seriously by western and Israeli decision-makers. It briefly even opened the door to potential de-escalation through a temporary 21-day ceasefire to resolve contentious issues.

However, the assassination of Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah on 27 September disrupted those efforts, especially after Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, speaking at the UN, upped the rhetoric against Iran, committing to continue the war until a power shift occurred in the region – aiming to neutralize resistance forces and alter the dynamics across West Asia.

After Iran’s response on 1 October, Israel, with US backing, carried out a limited strike to achieve several aims. Other than desiring a face-saving response to the massive Iranian strikes, the Israeli response sought to force Tehran to reconsider its regional strategies and alliances, including the prevention of further Iranian strikes inside Israel.

Moreover, by acting aggressively when matters could have ended at Iran’s retaliation, Israel sought to stack any ceasefire agreement in favor of its own security interests, particularly with regard to Iranian interests in Lebanon and Palestine.

Reasserting Tel Aviv’s deterrence capabilities was also a key objective, as was countering Iranian efforts to undermine Israeli normalization with Arab states, especially following Operation Al-Aqsa Flood, which derailed rapprochement efforts with Arab leaders yet to formally establish ties with Tel Aviv, notably Saudi Arabia.

Tehran gets proactive

Iran has now acknowledged the Israeli strike and vowed to respond as circumstances dictate. Crucially, the Iranians successfully managed to shield their oil, nuclear, and economic assets from harm, by signaling readiness to retaliate harshly if provoked further.

Khamenei’s response encapsulated Iran’s stance: “The evil perpetrated by the Zionist regime (Israel) two nights ago must not be exaggerated or minimized,” he said in a post on X.

Iran’s supreme leader, the ultimate authority on Iranian national security affairs, stressed the need to counteract Israel’s faulty calculations. This represents Iran’s shift away from absorbing attacks to actively disrupting Israel’s strategy. Tehran reaffirmed support for the region’s Axis of Resistance, refusing to back down from its broader goals of liberating Palestine and supporting Lebanon’s fight against aggression.

Iran’s position also underscores its commitment to maintaining unity among its allies against Israeli and US designs to reshape the region – a “new Middle East” – in their favor. While the immediate threat of escalation lies largely in Israeli and US hands, the choices are stark – either adapt to the current balance of power and work towards de-escalation or risk a conflict that could spiral into an uncontrollable war.

Israeli officials’ assurances that they do not wish to escalate are not sufficient – concrete steps toward ending hostilities are required, with little patience left for the diplomatic trickery played by Tel Aviv and Washington over the past year.

As Iran asserts its “right to respond,” and with the world watching the upcoming US elections, the situation in West Asia remains highly unpredictable. Until then, and in the absence of a politically devastating ceasefire for the Netanyahu government, the battlefield will continue to dictate the terms, leaving the door open to further destabilize and erode the security of the occupation state⍐.

தினப்பொறி 20 - அந்நிய நிதி மூலதன சார்பு பாதை எதிர்ப்போம்!

 

Zelensky: Indian PM Modi Could Help End War in Ukraine

The Ukrainian president told Indian media that Delhi has leverage over Russia and should use that leverage to help pressure Russia into ending the war in Ukraine.

by Kyiv Post | October 28, 2024 

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky (R) invites Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi
for talks in Mariinskyi Palace, on August 23, 2024, (Photo by Sergei SUPINSKY / AFP)

India “cannot just say [it is] interested in the end of the war” and should use its leverage over Russia to show concrete actions, said President Volodymyr Zelensky.

The Times of India reported Monday that Zelensky said Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, as the head of state of a large nation like India, can pressure Russia through trade and economy to help put an end to Moscow’s invasion.

“Modi is the prime minister of a really huge country… Such a country cannot just say we are interested in the end of the war.

“Prime Minister Modi can influence the end of the war… blocking of [the] Russian economy, blocking cheap energy [resources]… blocking [the] defense-industrial complex of Russia [would] lead to the decrease in capacity of Moscow to wage war against us,” Zelensky told the publication.

Regarding the possibility of a Delhi-mediated peace deal, Zelensky signaled Delhi to take an active role in the upcoming peace summit in November.

“Undoubtedly it [could] be in India and Prime Minister Modi [could] really do that ... but I think we need to prepare ourselves…  and only according to our format because the war is in our land... we have the platform, which is the peace summit,” Zelensky said.

He added that Modi could help return “1,000 Ukrainian children” among those who were illegally deported to Russia back to Ukraine.

         

“Prime Minister Modi can influence the end of the war… blocking of [the] Russian economy, blocking cheap energy [resources]… blocking [the] defense-industrial complex of Russia [would] lead to the decrease in capacity of Moscow to wage war against us,” 

Zelensky

Modi has been casting himself as a possible peacemaker. He met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in July on a day that coincided with a deadly Russian strike on a Kyiv children’s hospital, with Zelensky criticizing the visit at the time as a “huge disappointment and a devastating blow to peace efforts.”

Following the brief diplomatic spat between Kyiv and New Delhi, Modi visited Ukraine in August – the first-ever visit to the country by the Indian head of state – where Zelensky and Modi had ostensibly been able to find a mutual ground with Modi reaffirming support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity.

Russia is a vital supplier of cut-price oil and weapons to India, but Moscow’s isolation from the West and growing ties with Beijing have impacted its partnership with New Delhi.

India has been reliant on Russian oil and weapons and has thus far refused to explicitly condemn Moscow’s invasion. However, it is also courting closer security partnerships with Western nations as a bulwark against its regional rival China, leading to what some called a “diplomatic tightrope.”

Western powers have in recent years also cultivated stronger relations with India as a hedge against China and its growing influence across the Asia-Pacific, while pressuring New Delhi to distance itself from Russia.

As ties with the U.S. worsen, China asks: Who’s the new Kissinger?

Chinese leader Mao Zedong, left, meets with U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger
in Beijing in 1973. (Bettmann/Bettmann Archive)

As ties with the U.S. worsen, China asks: 

Who’s the new Kissinger?

Influential voices in China are openly discussing who could act as a trusted bridge between Beijing and Washington, regardless of who wins the presidency.

By Christian Shepherd

 and 

Katrina Northrop

October 28, 2024

As the U.S. election approaches, China is on the hunt for the “new Henry Kissinger” — someone who is a friend of Beijing but has the ear of the incoming president. Someone who Chinese officials hope can cut through the bipartisan hostility toward China and encourage Washington to engage — as Kissinger did for five decades.

In Beijing’s foreign policy circles, the race for the White House is often cast as lose-lose, with former president Donald Trump and Vice President Kamala Harris both signaling they will take a tough line on China, despite differing on policy details.

Chinese experts fear Trump’s return would mean a full-blown trade war with blanket tariffs on Chinese goods.

Harris, meanwhile, would probably continue the Biden administration’s fragile stabilization of ties — but also the efforts to counter China’s technological and military rise, an approach Chinese leader Xi Jinping has labeled “containment.”

That’s why a new Kissinger is needed, Chinese experts say, following http://Xi’s calls for Americans “of foresight” to step forward and improve ties. (There is no suggestion from the Trump or Harris campaigns that they are looking for a Kissinger-style envoy.)

Influential voices in China are openly discussing who could match Kissinger’s gravitas as a statesman, his unwavering advocacy for engagement, and his ability to act as a back channel in times of crisis — regardless of who wins the presidency.

The Paper, a state-run media outlet, recently ran an eight-part series called “Looking for Kissinger,” identifying American business leaders, academics and former officials who could help keep relations stable.

The list included Stephen A. Schwarzman, the CEO of private equity firm Blackstone who launched an elite graduate program at Beijing’s Tsinghua University; John F. Kerry, the former U.S. special climate envoy who has advocated for close cooperation with Beijing to stem global warming; retired American diplomat Susan Thornton, who openly criticized the confrontational China policy adopted by Trump; and California Gov. Gavin Newsom (D), whose visit to Beijing last year fueled Chinese efforts to court local American politicians.

None of the four responded to requests for comment on their inclusion in the list.

Wang Huiyao, a prominent Chinese foreign policy thinker, says Graham Allison, an assistant defense secretary in the Clinton administration and esteemed political scientist at Harvard’s Kennedy School, would be a good Kissinger-style bridge.

“We hope that you will carry on Kissinger’s spirit and be a great supporter and promoter, and of course, great contributor to the America-China relations,” Wang told Allison earlier this year.

Allison’s warnings about a “Thucydides trap” — a theory that rising powers almost always end up at war with incumbent great powers — have been adopted by Xi to urge Western powers to accept China’s rise.

Allison, who met with Xi in Beijing in March, said the Chinese leader was eager to continue discussions he had with Kissinger about lessons from the Cold War.

Allison is a strong advocate for engagement, which he says is in America’s best interest and needed to avert conflict. “China hysteria infects too many Americans,” he said in an interview.

On Chinese social media, people have suggested that Elon Musk could be another candidate, considering the Tesla CEO’s close business ties with China and Chinese officials, as well as his growing alliance with Trump. Musk often makes arguments favored by Beijing: Last year, for example, he called Taiwan an “integral part of China.”

Almost everyone, whether in the United States or China, agrees that Kissinger’s role in the relationship was unique. But many in Beijing advocate for preserving and, to whatever extent possible, replicating his legacy to avoid competition veering into conflict.

“The search for a new Kissinger is not just about locating Kissinger number two. It’s about Chinese passion and Chinese enthusiasm to search for reasonable, forward-looking views on relations,” said Zhu Feng, dean of international studies at Nanjing University.

But it’s also a prescription for how to manage a hostile White House. “Even when Kissinger was getting older, and China grew bigger and stronger, Kissinger’s mentality remained quite accommodating,” Zhu said.

There is great nostalgia in Beijing for the Kissinger years. Leading scholars write op-eds lamenting the difficulties of reestablishing “Kissinger-style engagement” and blaming American politicians for “spoiling the atmosphere” by attacking China for political gain. They still invoke Kissinger as an example of best diplomatic practices.

Kissinger’s reputation as a visionary diplomat began with his clandestine trip to Beijing in 1971 as national security adviser to Republican President Richard M. Nixon, a trip that paved the way for the establishment of diplomatic ties in 1979.

He continued traveling to Beijing through July last year, soon after his 100th birthday, when Kissinger sealed his legacy as a tireless advocate for improved ties. “We never forget our old friends,” Xi told him in the same building where Kissinger met Premier Zhou Enlai 52 years earlier.

In Chinese state media, that visit was heralded as a turning point in a tentative warming of ties that would lead to Xi meeting with President Joe Biden in San Francisco in November, even as the State Department said Kissinger was traveling as a private citizen and not acting on behalf of the United States.

Kissinger’s death in November led to an outpouring of condolences from Chinese officials as well as a flurry of speeches and essays lamenting the Kissinger-size hole in bilateral diplomacy.

The 10-year anniversary edition of Kissinger’s book “On China,” released in April last year, has over 1.45 million reviews on Chinese online book seller Dangdang.com. Only 338 of those are negative.

Beijing prefers to deal directly with the executive branch, but tensions have made that channel more difficult, creating a need for someone like Kissinger who can act as a “direct channel to the captain of the ship,” said Da Wei, director of the Center for International Security and Strategy at Tsinghua University. “Captains sometimes cannot talk to each other with trust, so you need to find someone in between that both sides can trust.”

Da acknowledged that no one person could replace Kissinger, but there could instead be “smaller Kissingers” — several people with connections to the leadership and policy circles that can help stabilize relations, he said.

Stephen Orlins, president of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, a New York-based nonprofit that advocates for more engagement with Beijing, agreed that China’s search reflects concern that “government-to-government channels are no longer working out.”

“Whether it will be Harris or whether it’s Trump, they are going to need nongovernment channels to communicate the way Henry did for decades and decades,” Orlins said.

But Isaac Stone Fish, founder of Strategy Risks, a consulting firm that analyzes companies’ exposure to China, described Beijing’s search for a new Kissinger as one for a “new top useful idiot.”

Chinese leaders “seem to understand how advantageous it is for them to have this be something that only happens on the American side,” Stone Fish said, arguing that it makes the United States more responsible for improving the diplomatic relationship.

“Where’s the Chinese Kissinger?” he asked⍐.

Beyond ‘not easy’: the strategic significance of China-India détente

 

Beyond ‘not easy’: the strategic significance of China-India détente

By Global TimesPublished: Oct 28, 2024 According to the Indian Express on Sunday, India's Minister of External Affairs S. Jaishankar responded to a question from students by stating that it is still early for the normalization of relations between India and China. He added that rebuilding of trust and willingness to work together will naturally take time. His words came after China and India reached resolutions on issues concerning the border area on October 23.
This once again reminds us that the process of China and India promoting mutual trust is not easy, and both countries need to move forward step by step. But it is precisely because it is not easy that the significance of the resolutions is revealed.
Officials and media outlets from both sides have consistently characterized the recent breakthrough in China-India border talks as "not easy." This refers not only to the difficulty of reaching the resolutions, but also to the challenges ahead in moving forward, as building mutual trust between both sides won't be easy and will require more effort from both sides. However, from the evaluations and analyses of the resolutions in the context of China and India, as well as broader global opinions, we see that "not easy" has profound implications for Asian geopolitics and the emerging multipolar world order.
The resolutions represent more than just a border management protocol. They signal a significant shift in regional dynamics, particularly as developing nations increasingly seek strategic autonomy in a changing global landscape.
The rift in China-India relations is multifaceted, with border patrol issues illustrating each side's perceptions, emotions, land disputes and national security concerns. This complexity extends beyond border disputes to the core of Asia's geopolitical future. 

The timing and venue of this détente are telling. 
The BRICS summit, where President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Narendra Modi held their first comprehensive bilateral dialogue in five years, provided a platform that symbolizes the growing influence of developing nations in shaping global affairs. This development challenges the simplified narrative of a US-led containment strategy in the Indo-Pacific. 
The "not easy" path forward involves balancing multiple imperatives. This means maintaining strategic autonomy for India while addressing economic necessities. It demonstrates a willingness to engage in dialogue for joint development with China. 
This consensus was reached against the backdrop of the US and the West's continued use of China-India relations to inflame regional tensions, which underscores the growing confidence of China and India, as emerging powers, in independently managing their own affairs and pursuing common development in the region.
Looking ahead, the "not easy" journey of normalizing China-India relations will require a sustained diplomatic effort. However, its significance extends beyond bilateral relations. This recalibration reflects a broader trend in which more developing countries seek to maintain their independence while trying to find a balance amid Washington's fragmentation and division efforts that force nations to take sides. 
In this context, "not easy" becomes not just a description of diplomatic challenges, but also a recognition of the complex path nations must navigate in an increasingly multipolar world. The China-India détente may be remembered as a pivotal moment in which the architecture of Asian geopolitics shifted toward a more balanced and autonomous future⍐.

 

Ivalmir Silva searches for water on Puraquequara Lake, which has been affected by drought, in Manaus Brazil,
October 6, 2023. REUTERS/Bruno Kelly/File photo

Current climate pledges still fall way short on Paris goals, UN body says

By David Stanway October 28, 2024 Reuters

UN says national pledges will cut emissions 2.6% by 2030

Cut of 43% required to keep temperature goals in reach

Atmospheric CO2 sees record rise in last two decades

SINGAPORE, Oct 28 (Reuters) - National pledges to cut greenhouse gas emissions still fall far short of what is needed to limit catastrophic global warming, the United Nations said on Monday as countries prepare for the next round of climate change negotiations in November.

The "nationally determined contributions" (NDCs) already submitted by countries to the U.N. are enough to cut global emissions by 2.6% from 2019 to 2030, up from 2% last year, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) said in its annual assessment.

But they are far from sufficient to achieve the 43% cut that scientists say is required to stay within reach of a Paris Agreement target to limit global temperature rises to 1.5 degrees Celsius (2.7 Fahrenheit), it warned.

As part of their Paris obligations, nations must deliver new and stronger NDCs before a deadline in February next year, and the report's findings should mark a "turning point", said Simon Stiell, UNFCCC secretary general.

"Current national climate plans fall miles short of what's needed to stop global heating from crippling every economy and wrecking billions of lives and livelihoods across every country," he said.

"The last generation of NDCs set the signal for unstoppable change," said Stiell. "New NDCs next year must outline a clear path to make it happen."

Persuading nations to set and implement more ambitious pledges could depend on the success of COP29 climate talks beginning in two weeks in the Azerbaijani capital of Baku.

Nearly 200 countries will thrash out the details of a new global emissions trading system as well as a hefty $100 billion annual financial package to help developing countries meet their climate goals.

"What we are seeing is that in some cases, (the NDC process) might be used as a negotiating mechanism - more money for more ambition," said Pablo Vieira, global director of the NDC Partnership, a non-government group that is helping around 60 countries draw up updated pledges.

"They also want to make sure that the new NDCs are investable, that they have the necessary elements that will attract not just public finance, but also private," he said.

ATMOSPHERIC CO2 AT NEW RECORD

In a separate report, the U.N.'s weather monitoring body said on Monday that greenhouse gases have been accumulating in the atmosphere "faster than any time experienced during human existence" over the last two decades.

Carbon dioxide concentrations hit a new high of 420 parts per million (ppm) last year, up 2.3 ppm from a year earlier, and they have risen by 11.4% in just 20 years, the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) said in its annual greenhouse gas bulletin.

There are already signs that rising temperatures are driving dangerous "feedbacks" that will further increase atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations, the report warned.

Last year's increase in CO2 concentrations, the second largest annual rise of the last decade, could have been driven by a surge in forest fires, with the carbon released from Canada's worst ever wildfire season exceeding the annual emissions of most major countries.

CO2 concentrations are now 51% higher than pre-industrial levels, while methane - another potent greenhouse gas - is 165% higher than in 1750, WMO said.

"This should set alarm bells ringing among decision makers," said WMO Secretary General Celeste Saulo.

"These are more than just statistics. Every part per million and every fraction of a degree temperature increase has a real impact on our lives and our planet.⍐"

The BRICS organization refuses to grant membership to Sri Lanka

 The BRICS organization refuses to grant membership to Sri Lanka

October 27, 2024 

 

Editor S L Newslk

Foreign Affairs Minister Vijitha Herath said that Sri Lanka’s application to join BRICS as a full member was rejected by the organization.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs said that the BRICS organization has decided to reject Sri Lanka’s application considering the decision taken to keep the number of members of that organization at nine.

However, Vijitha Herath also stated that the BRICS organization has given permission to Sri Lanka to join as a partnership member country.

The Minister said that Sri Lanka has also been allowed to join the BRICS New Development Bank, which provides financial support to the member countries, but the cabinet approval is required for that.

The President of Sri Lanka has not agreed to the request to participate in the BRICS Summit, which consists of the world’s leading emerging market economies.

Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates are currently members of BRICS⍐.