நோர்வே அறிக்கை- அகசுயநிர்ணய உரிமைக்கு அடமானம் போன அரசியல் சுதந்திரம் பாகம்-3

Part II:
The Story
The following three chapters provide an empirical narrative of the Sri Lankan peace process: its long run-up and its short-lived progress (this chapter), the fragmentation and tensions that it brought about (chapter 5) and the war that followed(chapter 6). Much of  this chronology has been described elsewhere (Balasingham,2004, Fernando, 2008; Goodhand and  Klem, 2005; Goodhand et al., 2011 a and b; Goodhand, Korf and Spencer, 2011; Gooneratne, 2007;  Rupesinghe, 2006;Sahadevan, 2006; Stokke, and Uyangoda, 2011), but our discussion of Norway’s strategies and activities adds empirical detail and insight to the literature. We use key  turning points (the headings) in the sequence of events to scrutinize Norwegianresponses in relation to the knowledge and opportunities that were available at the time.


chapter 4. First Explorations, a Ceasefire and Peace Talk
(1990s–2003)
http://tenn1917.blogspot.com/2011/11/1.html

chapter 5. Fragmentation and Crisis
(2003-2006)
http://tenn1917.blogspot.com/2011/11/2.html

chapter 6. War, Victory and Humanitarian Disaster
(2006-2009)
http://tenn1917.blogspot.com/2011/11/3.html#

Following a long period of ‘no-war-no-peace’, large-scale, territorial offensives resume in July 2006. Norway faces a difficult dilemma whether or not to remain involved in Sri Lanka, but decides to stay engaged, because it sees a role for itself in limiting the adverse impacts of  the war. It applies pressure on the parties about humanitarian concerns and supports humanitarian initiatives. Continued involvement of the Norwegian team and the SLMM is also seen to be useful in case a new stalemate emerges. The parties prolong their invitation to Norway and the SLMM, whilst claiming a commitment to the CFA, but at the same time the war intensifies.

26 July 2006: the Mavil Aru incident sparks open warfare

The EU proscription of the LTTE has implications for the SLMM. Three out of five contributing countries are EU members and so is the recently appointed Head of Mission: the Swedish retired Major General Ulf Henricsson. The SLMM leader has issued a memo arguing against the ban: there are immediate negative consequences for the SLMM and it could aggravate the escalating dynamics of violence.196 Norway refrains from intervening in EU decision making, but also makes it clear that a ban will have negative consequences, mainly for the monitoring mission.197 Just after the announcement of the ban, Norway organises a second set of talks between the parties in Oslo (8-9 June 2006), but upon arrival, the LTTE refuses to meet the governmentdelegation. The  Norwegians manage to get LTTE security guarantees for the SLMM staff. Subsequently, however, the LTTE issues a deadline for the removal of monitors from EU countries. Denmark, Finland and Sweden withdraw their monitors.Iceland increases its personnel contribution, but barely has more people available (also because it has no armed forces). Norway explores whether other non-EU countries – including Switzerland – could join the mission198, but this does not materialize. Oslo thus adds some staff, but is reluctant to fill all vacancies, partly to show the LTTE the consequences of its decision199 and partly, because the situation is not conducive to effective monitoring by the SLMM anyway. The mission’s presence in the field becomes very limited and it is unable to closely follow the flurry of incidents and attacks that will follow.

The LTTE keeps up the military pressure. It enlists over 10,000 civilians for ‘selfdefence’ training, forcefully recruits children, and attacks with roadside bombs and grenades in different parts of the north-east. On 25 June President Rajapaksa
=============
196 SLMM memo titled ‘SLMM Assessment of Possible Consequences of EU Banning the LTTE’, dated 18 April 2006 and signed by Henricsson.
197 Communication with the Norwegian MFA 070F.
198 Interview 010A.
199 MFA. 307.3 (2006/00083-106).

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offers a two-week ceasefire, indicating he is willing to have direct talks, but the initiative is perceived as a ‘smokescreen’.200 An LTTE suicide bomb kills the army Deputy Chief of Staff  that same day and violence continues. Eventually, it is the Mavil Aru incident that sparks the resumption of open warfare. In an attempt to mimic the government strategy of blocking resources and economic assets for military purposes, the LTTE closes an irrigation sluice gate in Mavil Aru (south of Trincomalee) on 20 July 2006. The affected population is not very large, but the place is sensitive due to the tri-ethnic composition of the area, the strategic location between the north and the east, and its proximity to the Trincomalee harbour. Mutual accusations and threats follow. It appears the LTTE is trying to show its strength and provoke the government, but this proves to be a miscalculation by the rebels. Henricsson and Hanssen-Bauer try to defuse the matter in Trincomalee and Kilinochchi respectively. They manage to convince the LTTE to pull back,201 but government forces seize the opportunity to launch a ground offensive on 31 July 2006.

The LTTE strikes back and occupies the neighbouring town Muthur. Within days,however, the army recaptures the Muslim dominated town and presses on to overrun Sampur, a key hub for the LTTE. The government deploys heavy artillery, leading to civilian losses and displacement. In the midst of these offensives, seventeen local aid workers of the French NGO Action Contre la Faim are executed in their compound on 5 August 2006, which leads to significant international criticism. The SLMM is not allowed to investigate – Henricsson in fact narrowly escapes an artillery attack in this period – but holds the government responsible.202 The SLMM commander openly speculates about the withdrawal of his mission. The LTTE is pushed southward and forces the civilian population to withdraw with them. Large numbers of civilians get trapped as an LTTE ‘human shield’ in the battle zones on the eastern front. ICRC manages to broker a brief
ceasefire to let civilians out.203 International attention, however, is dominated by the simultaneous escalation of war in Lebanon. The army continues to advance with heavy bombardments, while the TMVP attacks LTTE camps further south. A second offensive is opened in the north on 11 October with a large-scale attack across the Jaffna frontline, but in sharp contrast to the east, the LTTE puts up stiff resistance. The army incurs heavy losses and call off the attack within a day. The biggest demonstration so far is held against the peace process in Colombo on 4 October. An effigy of Prabhakaran draped in a Norwegian flag is carried through the streets.204The political channel is not completely closed, however. The second Geneva
meeting(28-29 October 2006) takes place as intended and discussions focus onhumanitarian issues,
a political settlement, reduction of violence, political pluralismand democracy. Expectations  are low but the Norwegian team hopes they will atleast extract an agreement about future meetings and some reduction of violence on the ground.205 Neither materializes, but the event helps to keep up the diplomatic pressure on the parties, the Norwegians feel.206 They realise, however, they have

================
200 Communication with the Norwegian MFA 070F.
201 Interview 010A and 012A.
202 SLMM ruling dated 29 August 2006, titled ‘Assassination of 17 Civilian Aid Workers on the 4th of August 2006’.
203 Interview 059B.
204 MFA 307.3 (2006/00083-187).
205 MFA. 307.3 (2006/00083-200).
206 Communication with the Norwegian MFA 070F.

62 Pawns of Peace – Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997-2009
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become a ‘side show’.207 In a direct meeting, the team tells the president’s brother Basil Rajapaksa (December 2006) that Norway realizes the government is engaged in full-scale war. As there is no longer any peace process ongoing, Norway will take no new initiatives before the parties reconfirm their readiness to resume negotiations. Special Envoy Hanssen-Bauer offers to withdraw the SLMM and to close down Norwegian support to the peace secretariats. The government however responds that communication channels with Kilinochchi may still be useful, because the outcome of the war is still unclear.208 A similar meeting is held with the LTTE.209 Both parties ask Norway to maintain their support to the peace secretariats and the SLMM. In fact, they request Norway to expand the number of monitors.210 Communication with the LTTE becomes increasingly difficult, however. With the death of Anton Balasingham, who has already moved to the margin, in December 2006, there is limited access to the highest level. Continued involvement in Sri Lanka continues to be a point of discussion among the Norwegians. While there is concern about becoming a peace alibi, those in favour argue that a departure will not have
any positive effect, and if it makes a difference at all, it will only fuel the escalation. There are increasing humanitarian concerns that warrant attention and Norway’s established network with the parties, the co-chairs, India and humanitarian agencies could be useful in addressing these issues. Moreover, proponents of continued involvement argue a new stalemate may emerge. Finally, Norway’s reputation as a persistent and patient mediator would suffer and key players like the US and India may conclude that the Norwegians arenot up to the task.211 International NGOs and diaspora organisations voice concerns about massive human rights  violations and Western countries step up their criticism. Having already banned the LTTE, their statements about the government receive most attention. Among the donors, Germany emerges asmost critical and officially freezes new aid projects. Under mounting international pressure, including periodicco-chair statements, President Rajapaksa installs a Commission of Inquiry (COI) to investigate sixteen of the gravest alleged human rights abuses in November 200 Two months later, Norwegian (and co-chair) efforts result in the creation of an International Independent Group of Eminent Persons (IIGEP) to monitor and exert pressure on the commission. The government does not collaborate with the IIGEP, however,and no meaningful investigations are made. The Sri Lankan government effectively counters and dilutes Western pressure.Firstly, it adopts the Western discourse of humanitarian intervention and anti-terrorism to defend its course of action. It also points to the hypocrisy of Western countries raising concerns about human rights given the abuses and civilian casualties associated with Western intervention in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. Secondly,it strongly resists the debates around  the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ by emphasizing
==================
207 MFA. 307.3 (2006.00109-64).
208 Interview 010A and communication with the Norwegian MFA 070F.
209 Communication with the Norwegian MFA 070F.
210 Communication with the Norwegian MFA 070F.
211 Interview 030A.

Pawns of Peace – Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997-2009 63
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its sovereignty and the need for home-grown solutions.212 Thirdly, it secures the political backing of powerful countries in the region, most saliently India and China.The Norwegians continue to solicit a more active Indian role in support of the talks in 2007, but Delhi continues to decline the suggestion.213 As the military offensive intensifies, it becomes increasingly clear that India will not apply pressure on the SriLankan government to call off the offensive. Behind the scenes, India is ‘not hesitant to support the government’s offensive against the LTTE,’ but realizes it needs to ‘manage the political fallout,’ according to a senior Indian diplomat reflecting on this period.214 It is considered a ‘no-brainer’ that India should ‘support the government in this offensive.’215 In public, however, the Indian government refrains from voicing these views.
The Norwegian government realizes its role has become very difficult and limited.Against the background of discussions on whether or not to stay engaged and how,the mediation team develops a number of scenarios. On the military front they foresee either: 1) no war no peace, 2) resumed peace talks, or 3) full-scale war.216 Politically, they expect the government to either remain dependent on its junior partner, or enter into a coalition with the UNP. If neither works, new elections may be the result. Indian and US pressure to stop the war may affect the scenarios.217 During an internal strategy session with Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Støre in May 2007, the mediation team reiterates that: ‘All observers think that this is a conflict that cannot be won by military means and most believe that the government cannot beat the LTTE militarily.’
Moreover, the group concludes: ‘International pressure does not seem to have any positive influence, but rather to contribute to locking the military strategies of the parties.’218 Strategic thinking thus tends to hinge on the premise that at some point a new stalemate may emerge, either because the LTTE rolls back the frontline (as it did several times in the past), or resorts to guerrilla style tactics to avert defeat. In hindsight, the Norwegian team underestimates the Sri Lankan government’s strength, both militarily and politically. The team considers a wide range of likely and less likely scenarios, but (like most observers at the time), it does not reckon with the sequence of events that is to follow: a strong SLFP-led coalition and a military victory.

The military advances proceed. With support from Indian and US intelligence, the Sri Lankan navy is increasingly proficient in intercepting LTTE shipments on the Indian Ocean, thus cutting off the rebel’s main supply channel. The insurgents strike back with several naval attacks. LTTE suicide attacks on top officials in Colombo become common, and in March 2007, they launch their first air strike (against the Katunayake airport), followed by a second raid in April. The raids are seen as a symbolic triumph for the LTTE, but are largely insignificant in military terms and do not impede the government’s offensive in the east. In July 2007, the whole region is 212 As mentioned, none of these mechanisms makes much progress, though the APRC produces substantive discussion. Tamil nationalist do not have much faith in the process, and they are further
disappointed when the Supreme Court rules the north-east merger unconstitutional on 16 October 2006. The de-merger pleases the Muslims, but backtracks on the Indo-Lankan Accord and the 13th Amendment.
==============
213 MFA 303.3 (2007/00140-4) and MFA 307.3 (2007/00635-37).
214 Interview 044D.
215 Interview 044D.
216 MFA 303.3 (2007/00149-15).
217 MFA. 307.3 (2007/00635).
218 MFA. 307.3 (2007/00635-49).

64 Pawns of Peace – Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997-2009
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taken over by the government forces. The LTTE appears to retreat rather than fight back and attention shifts to the insurgents’ main bastion in the north. The government prepares the ground – politically, diplomatically and militarily – for what it claims will be the final offensive. On 2 January 2008, it formally terminates the Ceasefire Agreement and the SLMM withdraws its monitors. The LTTE responds with a wave of bombings and assassinations in the south. Following some initial exchanges of fire, which the LTTE successfully resists, the government’s main operation starts with the conquest of Maddhu in the southern Vanni in May 2008. The military increasingly uses LTTE-style attacks – alongside conventional warfare –including claymore mine attacks and Special Infantry Operation Teams. The army marches on and  the whole Western Vanni falls to the government with the capture of Pooneryn in November that year. In that same month, Tamilselvan – head of the Political Wing and effectively Balasingham’s replacement – dies in a government aerial bombardment.
Throughout these offensives, Norway continues its efforts to keep Sri Lanka’s war on the international agenda. The co-chairs keep issuing critical statements towards both parties about civilian suffering and the need to resume a political track. Aware of the limited leverage of  bilateral aid, EU member countries generate a discussion on the union’s preferential trade agreement with Sri Lanka (GSP+),which is conditional on compliance with international human rights law.219 Sri Lanka does not meet some of the criteria, including those on civil rights, child rights, and on disappearances. Norwegian envoy Hanssen-Bauer provides a thorough assessment of the situation in Sri Lanka to EU decision-makers in October 2008. He avoids taking a position on GSP+, but underlines that the EU could apply pressure on the human rights
situation.220 With critical reports by international human rights NGOs, Brussels feels pressured to take a stance, particularly when the Sri Lankan government remains largely unresponsive to EU concerns.221 January 2009: Government forces capture Kilinochchi In view of the rapid offensive, the Norwegians conclude in August 2008 that the army will probably capture the Vanni sometime in 2009, but it cannot be ruled out that this is a tactical LTTE retreat. The team concludes: ‘It is very likely that the LTTE will disappear as dominant power in any geographic area during 2009 and that the government will start a rehabilitation process in the north like the one we see in the east.’222 They expect, however, that the insurgents will flee to the jungle and continue guerrilla style warfare and will not fully disappear as long as Prabhakaran is alive. The Norwegian team decides that even if the government military prevails, it needs to keep reminding the Sri Lankan government of the need for a political solution.223 They also maintain a dialogue around sensitive issues of rehabilitation and the resettlement and return of displaced people.224 (219?) More specifically, GSP+ beneficiaries must have ratified and effectively implemented 27 specified international conventions in the fields of human rights, core labour standards, sustainable development and good governance. Sri Lanka is the only country where GSP+ was formally suspended.
===============
220 Interview 019B and communication with the Norwegian MFA 070F.
221 Intervew 064B.
222 MFA. 307. 3 (2008/00128-59) and MFA 307.3 (2008/00192-53).
223 MFA. 307. 3 (2008/00128-59) and MFA 307.3 (2008/00192-53).
224 Communication with the Norwegian MFA 070F.

Pawns of Peace – Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997-2009 65
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It becomes clear that the endgame has started when the army captures Kilinochchi– the symbolic rebel headquarters in the Vanni – on 2 January 2009. The remaining LTTE territory around Puthukuduyiripu and Mullaitivu shrinks quickly. The LTTE’s human shield of hundreds of thousandsof civilians225 who are not allowed to escape, form a crucial part of the insurgent’s defence. Continued forced recruitment of ever younger child soldiers and brutalities are reported (Human Rights Watch, 2008). The civilian presence slows down the army offensive, but the government is determined not to let casualties change the course of events. The LTTE suffersfrom low morale (International Crisis Group, 2010) and internal dissent (Jeyaraj,2010), and appears to pin unrealistic hopes on the diaspora, India or Western countries coming to their rescue.
Towards the end of 2008, international actors realize the game is changing. Aid agencies are requested to vacate the Vanni in September 2008 and it is clear that the government is closing in on the rebels. Concerned with the possible humanitarian consequences, four players, the UN, the ICRC, the US and Norway, coordinate their efforts closely. The UN and ICRC are primarily engaged with preserving humanitarian access: getting aid in and (wounded) civilians out of the war zone. The UN (through the World Food Program) provides food and medicine; the ICRC supplies the remaining doctors and tries to evacuate civilians; and Norway and the US make several  diplomatic attempts to avoid the bloodshed of a final onslaught.226 The cochairs agree to work towards some form of LTTE surrender, but Japan and the EU are not engaged directly in subsequent negotiations.227 India is not involved in these efforts either, but makes some parallel pleas for limiting civilian casualties. The Indian government also makes it very clear that it
supports a continuation of the offensive and the defeat of the LTTE.228 Pressure from Western countries on the Sri Lankan government is mounting, however. The EU postpones its decision on the GSP+ trade framework. An IMF standby credit, direly needed in view of economic downturn and budget deficits, is also held back. These measures invoke protests from the Sri Lankan government, but have no discernable impact on offensives on the ground.229 Soon after the conquest of the geographically strategic Elephant Pass (9 January) and the remaining rebel pockets on the Jaffna peninsula (14 January), the government unilaterally declares a No Fire Zone (NFZ) on the LTTE’s southern and western defence line (21 January). Dropping leaflets from the air, it requests civilians to move there while the offensive continues. The LTTE continues
to fire from inside the zone. The government also launches sustained, heavy bombardments on this purported safe haven. A UN convoy, grounded in the Vanni because of the LTTE’s refusal to let local UN staff vacate the area230 seeks shelter in the zone and gets barraged with bombs and  shells. Many civilians, who had come to seek safety, die
===========
225 The assessment at the time was that about 200.000 civilians were trapped with the LTTE in the Vanni (see e.g. Human Rights Watch,2009), but the number later proved to have been as high as 365.000 (International Crisis Group, 2010).
226 Interview 034C.
227 Interview 010A.
228 Interview 033E.
229 Later efforts for a resolution in the UN Human Rights Council, led by Germany, the Netherlands and the UK, result in a humiliating defeat for these countries. Sri Lanka is supported by India, China, Russia and a larger group of Asian (and other developing) countries and successfully neutralises a reprimanding resolution (27 May 2009).
230 The Norwegian embassy, in close touch with the UN and other humanitarian actors, exerted strong pressure on both government and LTTE to enable UN agencies and the ICRC to provide emergency assistance. Pressure on the LTTE to let the UN convoy go fell on deaf ears, however (MFA 397.3 (2009/00028-6).

66 Pawns of Peace – Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997-2009
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on the spot. Militarily experienced eyewitnesses and satellite imagery provide evidence for these humanitarian atrocities (Human Rights Watch, 2009; International Crisis Group, 2010; UN Panel of Experts, 2011; Weiss, 2011). In the following days,the District Hospital and the Ponnambalam Hospital in Puthukkudiyiruppu, packed with injured people (as well as some wounded LTTE cadres in the second hospital), get bombed. Government statements initially acknowledge, then deny the attack (Human Rights Watch, 2009; International Crisis Group, 2010; UN Panel of  Experts, 2011; Weiss, 2011). The World Food Program and ICRC keep up their attempt to provide aid, but there are heavy government restrictions and supplies often do not reach the whole population.The government declares a limited ceasefire from 1 to 3 February 2009 to allow civilians to leave, but the LTTE restricts the number of people allowed to depart and uses the lull to launch a counter strike. On February 3, a co-chair statement publicly asks the LTTE to
lay down arms and suggests both parties declare a temporary cease-fire and resume dialogue. The insurgents ignore the statement. LTTE (child) recruitment and forced detainment of the civilian population in the war zone continues as the army keeps moving forward. As the front line moves, Puthukkudiyiruppu’s hospital is moved further into LTTE territory, but shelled again on 9 February. The government calls off the first No Fire Zone and announces a new one on the narrow strip of land on the east coast north of Mullaitivu (12 February). The army presses on and shelling into the zone and on demarcated hospitals will continue over the next three months. In this period, the remaining ICRC expatriates vacate the area. Evacuations and supplies continue by sea – between the No Fire Zone and Pulmoddai further south. On 24 February, the LTTE sends a letter to the EU, US, Japan and Norway indicating they request a ceasefire, but offers no firm guarantees in return. The government calls the letter an ‘unrealistic prayer about a ceasefire’231 and turns the request down. International actors call on the LTTE to lay down weapons and attempts to negotiate an ‘organised end to the war’ continue.In close dialogue with the US, Norway continues its efforts to resolve the humanitarian crisis through some form of surrender. The ideas circulated consist of fourmain components: 1) a government guaranteed amnesty for LTTE cadres other than the top leadership; 2) the LTTE handing
in their weapons to the UN; 3) LTTE cadres surrendering to the UN or the ICRC; and 4) the co-chairs promising involvement to improve the situation for civilians and support a political solution to the conflict.232 The US is prepared to make landing vessels available for transport to Trincomalee. Preparations are made for an international presence in the war zone – by the UN Resident Representative or in another way – and make sure both India and the US stand witness to the implementation of whatever arrangement emerges. The Norwegian team receives signals that the Sri Lankan government may accept LTTE surrenderat this point, though they are resistant to the idea of a UN envoy and the Norwegians are not sure the military can be convinced either. The Norwegian team hopes the ‘face saving measures’ will make it easier for the LTTE to accept.233 Inter-
================
231 MFA. 307. 3 (2009/00028-12), Colombo to MFA, 24 February, 2009.
232 MFA. 307. 3 (2009/00028-23), MFA to Washington D.C., New York, Brussels, 24 April, 2009.
233 MFA. 307. 3 (2009/00028-23), MFA to Washington D.C., New York, Brussels, 24 April, 2009.

Pawns of Peace – Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997-2009 67
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views and archives suggest the plan for LTTE leaders was to transfer them to Colombo and provide international guarantees for their well-being, but according to testimony from former LTTE operator ‘KP’ (with whom the Norwegians have a meeting in Malaysia on 26 February), the LTTE  expected the evacuation of 25 to 50 LTTE leaders and their families to a foreign country to be a  possibility. Prabhakaran, however,rejects the proposal out of hand as ‘unacceptable’ (Jeyaraj, 2010). The LTTE leadership is living in a ‘dream world’, the diplomats involved conclude. The LTTE seems to believe in ‘miracles’; ‘Prabhakaran had survived on numerous previous occasions by a miracle and perhaps believed he would do it again,’ according to one of the Norwegians.23 As the net around the insurgents closes, LTTE surrender becomes a less and less attractive option for Colombo. It is also doubtful India has any interest in the LTTE surviving the end of the war. Non-Western countries tell the Sri Lankan government to ignore Western pressure and ‘get it over with,’ according to the testimony of a Sri Lankan diplomat.235 Another former government official adds, the government has ‘hardly any reason to let the LTTE surrender or escape’, ‘to think twice before grabbing the cobra by its head, and maybe have trouble again for another twenty years.’236 It is in this period that the Sri Lankan government terminates Norway's facilitator role in Sri Lanka.237 Attempts to get the government to agree to internationally monitored safe havens fail. Additional time pressure is generated by the Indian elections. Though considered unlikely, there is a chance of the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya
Janata Party (BJP)238 defeating the ruling Congress party.239. A less permissive Indian position poses a risk for the Sri Lankan government. Although a major change in the Indian stance is very unlikely, the government really fears someone will come to the insurgents’aid.240 Following more international pressure, the government announces another two-day ceasefire in April to enable civilians to get out, after which the offensive resumes. On 29 April, foreign ministers Miliband (UK) and Kouchner (France) make an unexpected visit to Colombo and try to convince the government to change its stance, without success. In fact, hardly anyone even notices their efforts, and critical aid workers refer to it as ‘a joke’.241 The second No Fire Zone is replaced by a third zone which covers a very small piece of land on 8 May. On the next day, the last ICRC ship reaches the Vanni. Subsequent shipments are called off due to the heavy fighting. Indian Home Minister Chidambaram contacts Prabhakaran and suggests the LTTE agrees to  a pre-drafted statement that they will lay down their weapons.242 The document leaks to Vaiko, a radical but marginal Eelamist politician in Tamil Nadu, who rejects it as a Congress trick and  assures the LTTE that BJP will win the
====================
234 Interview 030A.
235 Interview 033E.
236 Interview 069E.
237 On 12 April 2009, Tamil demonstrators broke into the Sri Lankan embassy in Oslo. The Norwegian government apologized for this incident, but it caused great resentment in Colombo and Sri Lankan Foreign Minister Bogollagama stated that, ‘in this situation’,there was no longer anything Norway could contribute to as facilitator of a peace process. (Interview 044A).
238 And its Tamil Nadu ally, the All India Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK).
239 And its Tamil Nadu ally, the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK).
240 Interview 033E.
241 Interview 056B.
242 Interview 043D.

68 Pawns of Peace – Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997-2009
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ongoing Indian elections and come to the Tigers’ rescue. The army launches its final offensive. Improvised LTTE plans to evacuate their leader fail (Jeyaraj, 2010) and their chain of command unravels. A group of civilians as large as 60,000 attempts a mass break out across the lagoon on 14 May. Many of them drown, however, and when the army on the other shore tries to extend its help, LTTE cadres open fire (UTHR, 2009). In the night between 17 and 18 May, Nadesan (head of the LTTE Political Wing) and Pulidevan (head of the LTTE Peace Secretariat) contact the Norwegians as well as the UK and US embassy, the ICRC, and Chandra Nehru (a Tamil politician in Colombo) indicating their last-minute willingness to surrender. Following hasty negotiations with presidential advisor and brother Basil Rajapaksa, they are told to walk across the frontline with a white flag. The last phone conversation is held shortly before their departure. Hours later they are reported shot. Government troops move into the last LTTE stronghold and kill LTTE chief Prabhakaran and the remaining LTTE leaders including Soosai (Sea Tigers) and Pottu Amman (intelligence). Tens of thousands of civilians escape the war zone in the days before the last battle, but some 30,000 civilians remain entrapped. The civilian death toll during the last night alone is estimated at 1000 to 4000 (UTHR, 2009). No firm overall evidence is available, but the International Crisis Group’s estimate on the basis of population movements suggests the total  number of civilians who died in the last months plausibly exceeds 30,000 (International Crisis Group, 2010).

மூன்றாவது அத்தியாயம் முற்றும்.

நோர்வே அறிக்கை- அகசுயநிர்ணய உரிமைக்கு அடமானம் போன அரசியல் சுதந்திரம் பாகம்-2

Part II:
The Story

The following three chapters provide an empirical narrative of the Sri Lankan peace process: its long run-up and its short-lived progress (this chapter), the fragmentation and tensions that it brought about (chapter 5) and the war that followed (chapter 6). Much of this chronology has been described elsewhere (Balasingham,
2004, Fernando, 2008; Goodhand and Klem, 2005; Goodhand et al., 2011 a and b; Goodhand, Korf and Spencer, 2011; Gooneratne, 2007; Rupesinghe, 2006; Sahadevan, 2006; Stokke, and Uyangoda, 2011), but our discussion of Norway’s strategies and activities adds empirical detail and insight to the literature. We use key turning points (the headings) in the sequence of events to scrutinize Norwegian responses in relation to the knowledge and opportunities that were available at the time.

4. First Explorations, a Ceasefire and Peace Talks  (1990s–2003)

5. Fragmentation and Crisis (2003-2006)

The narrative in the preceding chapter describes the high point of the peace process after a long and troublesome run-up. The period of progressive negotiations in fact lasted less than a year and during the last three rounds of talks in 2003, the cracks were clearly emerging. This chapter describes the subsequent period of political fragmentation and increasing military tension.

21 April 2003: LTT E suspends participation to the talks

In an attempt to preserve the momentum, strengthen international support and orchestrate incentives for the parties, a new donor conference is scheduled in Japan. Sri Lanka’s long-time biggest bilateral donor has shown keen interest in the peace process. In line with its broadening portfolio in international affairs98, Japan
has assigned Yasushi Akashi as special envoy and aspires to take on a more prominent role in Sri Lanka.99 This dovetails with Norway’s strategy of developing an international network in support of its peace efforts. Wickremesinghe’s pro-peace, proreform, and pro-Western outlook is well received among most donors, some of which see Sri Lanka as a potential liberal peacebuilding success story, with limited
risks attached. Wickremesinghe’s administration goes a long way in signing agreements with the IMF, World Bank and other donors. On the surface, this strategy also converges with the LTTE’s call to address the needs of the Tamil population.

Preparations for the Tokyo conference are underway in parallel to the fifth and sixth rounds of talks, and a preparatory meeting is scheduled in the margins of a World  Bank summit in Washington DC. Then, however, the LTTE puts on the brakes. The movement airs press releases on 4 April and 12 April 2003 criticizing the Washington conference which it cannot attend due to US anti-terrorist legislation. As a result they are reviewing their participation in the scheduled conference in Tokyo as well. The statements remain unanswered by the government and two weeks later, the LTTE increases the pressure.

In a letter to Wickremesinghe dated 21 April 2003, Anton Balasingham announces the suspension of LTTE participation in the peace talks, because of: ‘the exclusion of the LTTE from [sic] critical aid conference in Washington, the non-implementation of the terms and conditions enunciated in the truce document, the continuous suffering and hardship experienced by hundreds of thousands of internally displaced Tamils, the aggressive military occupation of Tamil cities and civilian settlements,the distortion and marginalisation of the extreme conditions of poverty and 98 Manifest in for example (non-combat) support for US-led military interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan and its lobby for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council.

99 India did not oppose Japanese involvement, but there was little enthusiasm for an overly political Japanese role. In the words of an Indian diplomat, ‘Akashi was pretty much irrelevant’ (interview 040D).

Pawns of Peace – Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997-2009 45 deprivation of the Tamils of the northeast in the macro-economic policies and strategies of the government, […]’. (Balasingham, 2004: 439). The LTTE does notwithdraw from the peace talks altogether, the statement underlines. According to the insurgents, talks can proceed if the government addresses the above points.

In a private message to Solheim, Balasingham reiterates: ‘we have no intention of terminating talks. Mr P [Prabhakaran] is firmly determined that the government should take action to fulfil the obligation of the CFA.’100

The Washington conference appears to be a pretext for the LTTE. In fact, the conference was discussed during the sixth round of talks and government delegate Milinda Morogoda stated that they had no problem with the LTTE participating.101

He in fact tried to explore whether the US was ready to make an exception and when that was not possible, both parties agreed to send Jay Maheshwaram, who is not formally part of the LTTE, but can participate on their behalf.102 However, the underlying issues – the government’s economic policy, the lack of progress on normalisation and High Security Zones and the ‘international peace trap’ – are a persistent source of concern for the LTTE and they expressed their unhappiness about them during the talks. Remarkably, media coverage on the LTTE’s decision emphasises that the peace process has not collapsed altogether.103 Some of the Tamil papers express sympathy for the move104, while Sinhala media highlight mounting international pressure on the LTTE.105 The Norwegian team is not sure whether the LTTE is making a tactical manoeuvre (wanting to return to talks), or turning its back altogether.106 Averting a complete derailment at this sensitive stage requires an extremely pro-active approach in terms of keeping the process together and securing tolerance from critical actors,most obviously President Kumaratunga. Norway continues to communicate with her regularly.107 A meeting is also held with the Sri Lankan opposition (including then
opposition leader and future President Mahinda Rajapaksa).108 Other political players, most significantly the JVP, refuse to meet the Norwegians. What follows is a bifurcation of the process: the government and international actors proceed with their meetings as planned, while the LTTE travels around the world to rally support and develop an interim proposal. Norway stays in close touch with both parties. It has increasing difficulty accessing the LTTE – which also gets picked up by the press109 – but meets with Balasingham who is once more transferred to London for medical treatment.110
===================
100 MFA 307.3 (2003/00027-219).
101 MFA 307.3 (2003/00027-44).
102 Interview 002B and 069E, see also Gooneratne (2007: 43). Maheshwaram could travel as a representative of the Tamil
=================
Rehabilitation Organisation (TRO), formally an NGO, but practically an LTTE proxy. Milinda Morogoda, according to a letter from Solheim to Balasingham (MFA 307.3 (2003/00027-220)), was very annoyed about Balasingham’s reference to the Washington meeting and reiterated the LTTE could have called him any time to address the issue. Also, high level US officials tried (unsuccessfully) to get the State Department to make an exception and allow Balasingham to visit the US (interview 035C).

103 Lakbima for example, headlines a quote from LTTE spokesman Daya Master ‘This is not a decision to go back to war’ (23 April 2003) and the government paper Daily News emphasizes there is ‘No breakdown in peace process’ (25 April 2003).

104 For example: ‘Temporary withdrawal of the Tigers a fair action’ (Thinakkural, 27 April 2003). The same paper also expressed concern about US pressure on the LTTE and the exclusion from the Washington meeting: ‘The American threat to Tamil Sovereignty’(27 April 2003).
105 For example: ‘LTTE cannot call the shots, say diplomats’ (The Island, 28 April 2003).
106 MFA 307.3 (2003/00027-43).
107 Communication with the Norwegian MFA 071F.
108 MFA 307.3 (2003/00027-52-68).
109 ‘Balasingham avoiding Solheim’ (Lakbima, 28 April 2003).
110 MFA 307.3 (2003/00027-35-51).

46 Pawns of Peace – Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997-2009
==============
Efforts to convince the LTTE to change its stance and turn up at the Tokyo aid conference continue until the very last minute, but without success. The meeting takes place on 9 June 2003. Donors pledge an unprecedented US$ 4.5 bn. and the Tokyo Declaration links its disbursement to ‘substantial and parallel progress toward fulfilment of the objectives agreed upon by the parties in Oslo.’ Conditions include
compliance with the CFA, Muslim participation in the talks, promotion and protection of human rights, gender equity, and progress toward a final political settlement. The declaration disguises major differences within the donor community. In the end, the declaration has no discernable impact on disbursements and aid continues to flow despite the collapsing peace process and ceasefire violations.111 The moremeaningful legacy of Tokyo is the creation of three co-chairs to the meeting, Japan, the US, and the EU, along with Norway. This was instigated by the Wickremesinghe administration, which saw it as a logical part of their ‘international safety net’.112

The most influential player – India – sticks to its role behind the scenes. The cochairs build on the personal interest taken by Richard Armitage (US), Akashi (Japan) and to a lesser extent Chris Patten (EU) and in the years to come they persistently express their support for the Norwegians, encourage the parties to seek a negotiated settlement and become increasingly fierce in their criticism towards the LTTE, and to a lesser extent the government. Norway thus finds a forum through which to orchestrate international leverage, but the co-chairs struggle with internal dissent and there is little evidence their statements have a major impact. In the words of one of Kumaratunga’s advisors: ‘I never spent any time worrying about the cochairs, but rather about the LTTE and India’.113

Before the Tokyo conference, Balasingham asks Helgesen to request the government to develop a temporary administrative structure for reconstruction of th north-east with ‘adequate powers’ and a clear role for the LTTE. The government comes forward with a ‘discussion document’ proposing a ‘Provisional Administration Structure for the Northern and Eastern Provinces’. The proposal grants the LTTE the
majority in a newly created ‘Provisional Administrative Council’. This body is to administer rehabilitation, reconstruction and resettlement, but sensitive policy areas, including police, security and tax, remain with the central government. The document does not include constitutional changes, which the UNP government is
unable to make, given its fragile co-habitation with the President114, whose critical stance finds support in the Sinhala nationalist media.115 The LTTE rejects the proposal as too minimalist and tries to develop its own, maximalist proposal.116 With Norwegian logistical support, input is gathered from experts in the diaspora. Political Wing leader Tamilselvan and his team combine consultations with a PR tour to various European countries. Norway also arranges for a South African invitation to the LTTE to learn from the experience of overcoming apartheid. This causes annoyance with the Sri Lankan government, which fears the normative and symbolic 111 In the media, however, significant importance is attributed to donor pressure. In the run-up to the Tokyo conference, papers propagate headlines like ‘The Tiger-Government conflict endangers international assistance’ (Weekend Virakesari, 27 April 2003) and ‘Promised aid will only be a dream if peace talks collapse – many countries inform the government’ (Lankadeepa, 27 April 2003).
=============
112 Interview 014A.
113 Interview 003B.
114 MFA 307.3 (2003/00027-60 and 55).
115 Sinhala Urumaya nonetheless calls the government proposal ‘a threat to Lanka’s unity’ (The Island, 5 August 2003), the JVP announces protest (Lanka, 8 June 2003) and the Tamil party EPDP proclaims it will ‘take the government to courts over interim body’ (Daily Mirror, 29 July 2003).
116 MFA 307.3 (2003/00027-55).

Pawns of Peace – Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997-2009 47
================
associations of comparing the Tamil issue to the ANC and Mandela.117 Balasingham plays no discernable role in the process and the Norwegian team is concerned about the diaspora’s ‘radical’ influence at the cost of more moderate voices.118 On 31 October 2003, the LTTE presents its proposal for an Interim Self-Governing Administration (ISGA).119 The ISGA combines aspects of the Indo-Lankan accord, the devolution debate and issues discussed in the peace talks combining them in a structure with maximal
autonomy controlled by the LTTE. It comprises an interim administration for the whole of the north-east,120 which is to be responsible for pretty much all aspects of governance (reconstruction, land, marine resources). The budget is to be provided through government allocations and the North East Reconstruction Fund (see more in chapter 10). The document stipulates the immediate cessation of army presence on civilian lands, but does not mention LTTE disarmament or arrangements for police and military. Members of the Interim Self-Governing Administraion (ISGA) are to be appointed by the government, the LTTE and the Muslim community for the first five years, after which elections are scheduled. Apart from the far-reaching
scope of the ISGA (just short of secession), the catch of the proposal is that during the interim period, the LTTE reserves an absolute majority for itself and appoints the chairperson and chief executive. This is unacceptable for the north eastern (Muslim, Sinhala) minorities, for the government and for India, all of whom are concerned that the proposed referendum after the interim period could still lead to some form
of secession.121 Critical Sinhalese122 and Muslim123 media slam the proposal as an LTTE ploy and condemn the Wickremesinghe government for not doing the same.124 The Norwegian team is unsurprised by this response, but considers it a major milestone that the LTTE formally puts down a written proposal other than Tamil Eelam.

4 November 2003: Presidential take-over

Within days (4 November 2003) President Kumaratunga intervenes. Using her constitutional powers, she declares a state of emergency and assumes control over the three ministries responsible for Defence, Law and Order, and Media. This effectivelystifles Wickremesinghe’s government, who, in Kumaratunga’s words, ‘misused the powers’ she has given him.125 The intervention does not come as a surprise. In fact, it has been subject of near continuous political speculation and anticipation, and Sinhala nationalist groups have repeatedly called for it.126 Though there is also disapproval and anxiety about the President’s move127, she reads the country’s mood
==================
117 MFA 307.3 (2003/00027-35-51).
118 Interview 025A and 029A.
119 Already prior to the release of the document, pressure is mounting in some of the Tamil media, underlining the need to take the forthcoming proposal seriously. Karuna forecasts international repercussions, if ‘our draft is rejected’ (Sudar Oli, 20 October 2003). Virakesari relays a similar message, warning that ‘Division of country is unavoidable if our draft is not implemented’ (27 October2003).
120 It encompasses the districts Ampara, Batticaloa, Jaffna, Kilinochchi, Mannar, Mullaitivu, Trincomalee and Vavuniya.
121 Interview 025A an 069E.
122 Illustrative critical headlines include: ‘Sangha [the Buddhist clergy] see proposals as “Trojan horse”’ (Daily Mirror, 4 November 2003); ‘Interim administration: wolf to take care of chickens’ (Lankadeepa, 5 November 2003), and ‘Proposals indicate that LTTE has no solution short of Tamil Eelam’ (Divaina, 3 November 2003).
123 The newspaper Virakesari carries the headline that ‘Muslim aspiration is totally denied in Tiger’s draft’ (3 November 2003).
124 Lanka, for example, criticises the ‘massive media operation to white wash Tiger proposals’ (2 November 2003).
125 In the interview with the authors (London, 9 June 2011), she explained: ‘I could have taken the entire government, but I did not. My message was: ‘you thought I could not do this, but I can.’
126 The following headlines provide some examples: ‘President will use powers if necessary – Mahinda in Los Angeles’ (The Island, 26 September 2002), ‘As long as we have an executive President we don’t allow Ranil to divide the country – Anura [Kumaratunga’s brother]’ (The Island, 26 June 2002), and the explicit call by the Sinhala tabloid Lakjana on Kumaratunga to ‘save the nation from the trio Ranil-Prabha-Norway’ in its editorial titled: ‘When will executive powers be used?’ (14 September 2003).
127 For example, just before the take-over leading monks of the influential Asgiriya and Malwatte chapters call on Kumaratunga: ‘Don’t take over Defence’ (Daily Mirror, 3 November 2003).

48 Pawns of Peace – Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997-2009
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well. The wave of hope and optimism set off by the Ceasefire Agreement has died down. Though there is still significant backing for continued peace efforts, continued recruitment, taxation and violent intimidation by the LTTE in the north and east fuel anger among the Muslims, Sinhalese and anti-LTTE parts of the Tamil community. The lack of public denunciation from the government, the SLMM, and the Norwegian
team creates the impression that the insurgents are given a free hand. Meanwhile there is a gradual trasformation going on in Sinhala politics. This precedes and transcends the peace process, but is reinforced by the government’s strategy of unpopular economic reforms and LTTE appeasement both of which play badly in the vernacular media. At least two processes collide in that transformation. First, the JVP makes a gradual, but very effective comeback into electoral politics from the mid-1990s onwards. It moves from one (1994) to ten (2000) to sixteen (2001) seats in the national parliament and sustains a similar record in sub-national polls. It comes close to changing the received two-party dynamic in Sri Lankan politics into a triangular one and effectively takes the ‘nationalist baton’ from the UNP and SLFP (Rampton and Welikala, 2005). Second, a change takes place in Sinhalese Buddhist dynamics. This is manifest in the cult that emerged around Gangodavila Soma, a Sinhala monk at an Australian monastery who returned to Sri Lanka in 1996. Propagated through television and other modern media, his teachings of purifying Buddhism by shedding Hindu influences and resisting the global Christian hegemony attracts massive support among the Sri Lankan middle class (Berkwitz, 2008; Deegalle, 2004). His popularity has significant political implications and can be connected to the emergence of the Sinhala Urumaya (heritage) party in 2000. There is thus an important ‘ground current’ within parts of Sri Lankan society, and the UNP’s controversial policies provide a unifying adversary for these forces. The UNP had not just left the President in the cold; it had in fact lost important parts of the electorate. Kumaratunga’s take-over – though evidently driven by personal political self-interest as well – taps into these popular resentments as well as unease within the military about concessions to the LTTE. While these nationalist supportbases provide political space for Kumaratunga to sideline the UNP, they also limit her room for manoeuvre. She walks a tightrope by openly allying herself with the JVP in the parliamentary elections that result from her move (see below), while onthe other hand preventing a complete unravelling of the peace process. She confirms the government’s adherence to the Ceasefire Agreement128, maintains Norway’s status as a third party and expresses her willingness to proceed with the process. She expresses her thanks to Norway for asking the LTTE to remain calm, and apologizes for having sent home former SLMM commander Tellefsen.129 With Indian support, the UNP and SLFP hold talks about power-sharing.130 According to Kumaratunga’s account,131 she proposes to form a ‘national government’ with Wickremesinghe standing as the joint UNP-SLFP candidate at the next presidential elections. During this whole intermediary period, it is unclear which parts of the
=================
128 ‘No return to war – President’ (Daily News, 7 November 2003).
129 MFA 307.3 (2003/00027-151).
130 Interview 014A.
131 Interview with former President Kumaratunga (London, 9 June 2011).

Pawns of Peace – Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997-2009 49
===============
government are in charge of what, and this poses a major challenge to the Norwegian team. They have strongly aligned themselves with the UNP administration and the troublesome experience with Kumaratunga’s government (including the controversyover Solheim’s status) has left some bad feelings on both sides. Helgesen visits Colombo in mid-November and meets both Kumaratunga and Wickremesinghe.

‘It is clearly not, and it never has been, within Norway’s mandate to facilitate between the political parties in the south’, he says at a press conference, and emphasises there is no ‘clarity about who is holding political authority and responsibility on behalf of the Government to ensure continuation of the ceasefire and the
resumption of peace negotiations.’132 He announces that Norway will put its activities on hold until political clarity emerges in Colombo.

In the meantime, the Norwegians try to keep the LTTE engaged and firm up the international network around the crumbling peace process through the co-chairs and discussions with UN Secretary General Kofi Annan.133 With the peace talks deadlocked, however, it becomes clear international support for the process is increasingly fragmented. India refuses to take a more overt role, the US anti-terrorism
dominated discourse is of limited use in confronting the political crisis in the south, Japan is hesitant to stick its neck out and the EU does not play a salient role. The apparent unity and determination donors expressed in the Tokyo Declaration prove to be feeble in practice. Solheim also holds a discussion with the Muslim
leadership, which is under pressure after the Oluvil declaration to demand a separate Muslim delegation to peace talks. Many north-eastern Muslims feel the ISGA will surrender them to legalised LTTE terror. SLMC leader Hakeem explains it would be more politically expedient if a separate Muslim delegation is at least not rejected outright. More critical voices, like activist-politician MIM Mohideen, express fierce criticism of the SLMM’s failure to protect the Muslims against the LTTE. Solheim is unable to promise any change under the circumstances.134 Norway also uses this impasse to review its own performance. A new internal strategy
document dated 27 January 2004 spells out the need for the parties to define ‘best alternatives to a negotiated agreement’. It identifies international support, a pro-active media policy, and the preservation of the military balance of power as sources of concern. Norway should position itself as a ‘peace architect’ and prioritise six main challenges: 1) address CFA violations; 2) establish contact with LTTE, the UNP, the PA, and India on a daily basis; 3) bring about economic progress in the north and east; 4) mobilise ‘track two’ civil society involvement, also outside Colombo; 5) generate pressure from international actors; and 6) sustain the Norwegian morale.135

26 March 2004: Karuna split

Before getting a chance to recover from the political crisis in the south, the peace process suffers another serious blow in the east. The break-away of the LTTE’s eastern commander Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan (alias ‘Colonel’ Karuna Amman) in March 2004 confirms the pattern of political fragmentation and alters the mili-
================
132 MFA 307.3 (2003/00027-149).
133 MFA 307.3 (2004/00007-18).
134 MFA 307.3 (2003/00027-171-187).
135 MFA 307.3 (2004/00007-48).

50 Pawns of Peace – Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997-2009
===============
tary balance in a fundamental way.136 Whilst to some extent a result of attempts to instigate a transformation of the LTTE, the split will prove severely destabilising and marks a vital shift in the forthcoming regression back to war. As one of the most senior military commanders, Karuna is personally credited with major LTTE successes.

With his defection, the LTTE loses thousands of cadres, its firm grip on the east, and suffers the biggest intelligence leak in its history. Unlike earlier rifts an tensions in the movement, Karuna’s break-away partly reflects the longer history of cultural-linguistic differences and political standoffs between the northern (‘Jaffna’) and the eastern (‘Batticaloa’) Tamil community. There are longstanding grievances over the massive recruitment of eastern youths, while more prosperous Jaffna families sent their children abroad. This bolsters the feasibility and impact of the split, but the event itself is set in motion by the peace process. Part of the whole peace process strategy – especially for the Sri Lankan government – was to expose the LTTE to the world beyond the war zone and thus make them more amenable to  compromise. Arguably this strategy worked, but it had unintended and unforeseen outcomes. Although various allegations are made against Karuna including financial misappropriation and controversy around his sexual morale, the eastern commander himself identifies disagreements over strategy as the key issue. He claims to be the driving force behind the LTTE’s consent to the ‘Oslo communiqué’. Balasingham in his view was hesitant, while he had his eyes opened by travelling around the world and saw a negotiated settlement as the best way forward. Having
overstepped the mark, he fell out with Prabhakaran after returning to the Vanni. Unable to persuade his leader and the LTTE central committee, Karuna backs out and bides his time in the east, which he runs more or less autonomously (including in the fields of finance and intelligence). On 3 March 2004, he declares himself autonomous within LTTE. Weeks later, on 26 March 2004, Prabhakaran reportedly sends out a team to kill him, but Karuna’s own intelligence finds out and he escapes. He then formally declares himself independent of the LTTE and anticipates a full-blown attack. On Good Friday (9 April 2004), Vanni cadres launch an overwhelming offensive across the Verugal River and within a few days, as the military stands by, Karuna faces defeat. He disbands his forces and with help from a Muslim politician, he manages to arrange his escape to Colombo on 12 April.137 His faction is nearly completely wiped out; only a few manage
to find shelter in Colombo. The President keeps him under protection (and in custody), but decides not to engage him politically. She refuses to see him, but against her wishes the military starts interrogating him and seeks collaboration.138 Significantly, this is the first time the Sri Lankan military plays an autonomous role of significance. Karuna is subsequently brought to India, but his remaining cadres work with the Sri Lankan armed forces to make a comeback in the east.139 A ne wave of security incidents hits the east as both factions take out each other’s camps, and try to take over control of civilian life. Community leaders and politicians are intimidated and assassinated by either side.136 Even before the split, the LTTE told Solheim and Furuhovde it was concerned about the government’s military build-up with significant procurement and increasing signs of Indian backing (MFA 307.3 (2004/00007-53)).
====================
137 Interview 004B.
138 Interview 003B.
139 Interview 004B.

Pawns of Peace – Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997-2009 51
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Even prior to the split, the Norwegian team maintains contact with Karuna alongside other LTTE leaders, among others to voice concern over violence against Muslims. During meetings in Colombo (1 September 2003) and Batticaloa (8 September 2003), Karuna makes it clear he has ‘gotten more authority’ and ‘probably will be in more direct contact with Norway’.140 Just before the split (on 3 and 4 March),
his secretary contacts both Ambassador Brattskar (who has now succeeded Westborg) and SLMM Head of Mission Furuhovde, and tells them Karuna plans to ‘break out’.141 The Norwegians are ‘surprised’ and realise ‘things will be difficult and different’.142 They inform the LTTE that they will talk to Karuna, but they are very hesitant to start meddling in intra-LTTE affairs.143 Tamilselvan moreover assures them that the split will be dealt with peacefully. The Norwegian team thus does not accede to Karuna’s plea to accept him as a separate party and signatory to the CFA and waits to see how the situation unfolds.144 With multiple crises at hand, the Norwegian team agrees to the following approach:145 1) they will apply pressure on both the UNP and the PA to collaborate and request India to convey the same message146; 2) the SLMM will invite the parties to review the Ceasefire Agreement; 3) Norwegian aid will target influential actors that can make a difference for the peace process; and 4) they will have regular contact with a wide range of politicians, administrators and foreign players. On a positive note in relation to the last point, Muslim politicians agree to establish the Peace Secretariat for Muslims which is setup on 17 December 2004 (with Norwegian support) in an attempt to unify Muslim concerns.In parallel to the Karuna split, fresh parliamentary elections take place. Defeating Wickremesinghe, Kumaratunga’s alliance with the JVP wins the April 2004 elections with a significant margin.147 Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU), a newly founded party of nationalist Buddhist monks, surprises many by winning nine seats. With the apparent crushing of Karuna’s revolt and Kumaratunga’s electoral victory, some of the dust appears to settle. Norway insists on written confirmation from both sides that they want Norway to continue its efforts.148 Both sides confirm their support to the Ceasefire Agreement and the search for a negotiated settlement, but are in fact highly entrenched in their positions. The LTTE is weakened and apparently feels it has nothing to gain when talking from such a bargaining position. The government sees fresh military opportunities and feels it can pose conditions which also helps to keep their internal opposition (JVP) in line.149 Much like in the period 1995-1996 and in 1999-2001, the process is stifled by disagreement during ‘talks about talks’. Firstly, the parties disagree about the agenda. Predictably, the LTTE wants to talk about an interim arrangement on the basis of its ISGA proposal.
Kumaratunga does not reject the ISGA out of hand, but only wants to talk about it
========================
140 307.3 (2003/00027-89).
141 MFA 307.3/442 (2004/00007-45).
142 Interview 014A.
143 Interview 014A.
144 Contrary to what Karuna says in media interviews, Ambassador Brattskar does not receive a request for protection, but he informs his ministry that Norway should evaluate the possibility of cooperating with another country to accommodate Karuna (MFA 307.3/442 (2004/00007-45)).
145 MFA 307.3 (2004/00007-151).
146 Meanwhile, Foreign Minister Kadirgamar uses this leverage the opposite way and – in Norway’s assessment – tries to muster Indian support to ‘straighten Norway up’. (MFA 307.3 (2004/00007-58)).
147 The UPFA wins 102 seats, the UNP 82. The JVP reaches its electoral height with 39 (of the 102 UPFA) seats.
148 MFA. 307.3 (2004/00007-56).
149 Although the JVP allied itself with President Kumaratinga, it was in many ways behaving like an opposition party. They continued to steer a very critical course regarding the peace process.

52 Pawns of Peace – Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997-2009
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in relation to a final and comprehensive settlement. Secondly, Kumaratunga wants to meet in Sri Lanka (Colombo or Vanni), while the LTTE wants to meet abroad. And thirdly, the parties disagree on revising the Ceasefire Agreement, particularly where it concerns the situation at sea.150 Neither party seems to have any faith in the outcome of negotiations, but they also avoid the resumption of open war. They prefer to stand their ground and call each other’s bluff. After all, the LTTE has barely overcome the split and Kumaratunga’s limited time left in office hinges on the JVP not letting her down. In October 2004, the President creates the National Advisory Council for Peace and Reconciliation (NACPR), but it never plays a significant role.

The Norwegians are frustrated with the lack of progress and the embassy sends a report to Oslo entitled ‘Waiting for Godot’: ‘The peace process is now characterised by everybody waiting for something to happen, but nobody knows what will happen or when it will happen’.151 Gradually however, violence escalates with mutual (unclaimed) attacks in the east and the post-CFA first suicide attack.152 Prabhakaran’s “Heroes’ Day” speech in November 2004 is interpreted as war-oriented and messages from the north-east and the diaspora suggest the LTTE is collecting recruits and funds for the ‘final war’. In an apparent attempt to adopt Palestinian tactics, the movement stages a ‘Jaffna intifada’, combining attacks on the security forces with student protests and ‘activists’ throwing stones at government forces.

The LTTE further militarizes the situation through the enlistment and training of entire communities into a so-called ‘people’s force’ (Jeyaraj, 2005b).

26 December 2004: Tsunami

The war preparations are cut short by a completely unforeseen disaster. The immediate impact of the Boxing Day tsunami outdoes the war in the short run and has a massive direct effect on the south. Over 35.000 Sri Lankans die on the day itself, at least 21,000 are injured and over 550,000 displaced (Asian Development Bank et al., 2005). The Muslim dominated coast of Ampara District is most affected, followed by (LTTE controlled) Mullaitivu District. Rescue operations, the domestic aid response and the rallying for international support start immediately. The disaster causes great international publicity, but the government refuses high-profile visitors like UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and former US president Bill Clinton (in his private capacity) access to LTTE controlled areas, much to the movement’s annoyance.

It is nevertheless clear that the tsunami can have a game-changing impact on the attitudes of the parties, the political space available to them and their militar strength. The disaster interrupts the war-oriented dynamic, provides a temporary suspension of ‘normal politics’, and people reach out across entrenched fault lines.

There thus appears to be a window of opportunity to resume a political process between the Kumaratunga government and the LTTE. The President is strongly involved in the aid response and sees an opportunity to complete what she began in 1994, just before her political career expires. Prabhakaran, according to the Norwegians who visit him shortly after the tsunami, is ‘devastated’, ‘shattered’, and ‘clearly at a different level emotionally than previously’.153
===========================
150 MFA 307.3 (2004/00007-198).
151 MFA 307.3 (2004/02485-17).
152 A suicide cadre attempts to kill EPDP leader Devananda, but fails.
153 Interview 014A.

Pawns of Peace – Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997-2009 53
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By mid-January 2005, both parties show willingness to develop a ‘Joint Mechanism’ (later branded more neutrally: Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure, P-TOMS). Though this is technically a limited arrangement for tsunami aid – and presented as such to reduce controversy – it is very clear that both parties and their mediator see P-TOMS as a stepping stone for new negotiations by providing ‘the contours for a political solution.’154 Prabhakaran indicates his willingness to develop a joint mechanism when the Norwegian ministers Petersen (Foreign Affairs) and Frafjord Johnson (International Development) visit the Vanni on 22 January.155 Norwegian shuttle diplomacy156 and direct negotiations between Pulidevan (head of the LTTE Peace Secretariat) and Kumaratunga’s team (Lakshman Kadirgamar, Harim Peiris and Ram Manikkalingam) result in a first government draft by 26 February.157 Government officials keep the Indian High Commission closely involved,158 while the Norwegians talk to now opposition leader Wickremesinghe.159 Texts keep moving back and forth and the Norwegian team tries to even out contentious issues. Tamilselvan insists there should be a clause on the sea – tensions between the navy and
the Sea Tigers continue to cause trouble – but Solheim manages to convince him to drop that demand. Prabhakaran and Kumaratunga are directly involved in the process and go over it ‘word by word’.160 The jointly supported (but confidential) proposal emerges on 22 March.161 It comprises a revised version of SIHRN (the aid sub-committee agreed during the peace talks) and steers clear from the ISGA. The apex
body is to consist of government, LTTE and Muslim representation. Ethnically balanced district committees are responsible for everyday decisions and allocations. NERF (the World Bank administered aid trust fund created for SIHRN) will provide the money.

Both parties claim that the peace talks and the joint mechanism negotiations are de-linked. However, in parallel to the P-TOMS negotiations, they develop closer daily communication on other issues. Confidential agreements are made on the practical implementation of aid projects and reconstruction efforts. Looking back, a government official explains: ‘We managed to get a lot more stuff done in the Vanni than the UNP had done. The World Bank would have money for roads and the Road Development Authority would make a plan. We would sit down with the LTTE and talk concretely: this road ok, why not this one, shall we make this one broader and so on. In detail. And it would be done.’162 Similar channels are used to discuss security issues when killings and attacks occur. ‘We would check our information against each other. Who had killed whom and why. And sometimes we would call it even’.Meanwhile, however, the agreement on Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure (P-TOMS) remains unsigned. The President needs to convince Muslim leaders, whose community is most heavily affected by the tsunami and deeply anxious
about exclusion from the peace process. And she needs to preserve her fragile
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154 Interview 057E.
155 MFA. 307.3 (2005/00092-22) and communication with the Norwegian MFA 071F.
156 MFA. 307.3 (2005/00520-1), MFA. 307.3 (2005/00520-2), and MFA. 307.3 (2005/00520-3).
157 MFA. 307.3 (2005/01004-1).
158 Interview 003B.
159 MFA. 307.3 (2005/00092-28).
160 Interview 003B.
161 MFA. 307.3 (2005/00520-4).
162 Interview 003B.

54 Pans of Peace – Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997-2009
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alliance with the JVP which is strongly opposed to lending any legitimacy to the LTTE. The political configuration is further complicated by the widespread belief thatKumaratunga will use the opportunity to extend her political future beyond her second (and constitutionally last) term in office.163 Norway expresses its concern about the JVP scuttling the agreement, but Kumaratunga tells them not to worry,she will take care of them.164 Time keeps passing, however, and the scheme starts losing its operational relevance. The co-chairs encourage the mechanism early on165 and when donors pledge another US$ 3 billion at the 16 May donor conference in Kandy, Kumaratunga presents an inspiring and politically daring speech. Meanwhile
the LTTE makes another tour across Europe to argue their case. With time, however,the paralysis around P-TOMS becomes a source of distrust and irritation rather than a nucleus for further collaboration. Eventually, the JVP breaks the political gridlock and walks out of government. The agreement is signed (24 June 2005),166 but subsequently when the JHU files a case to the Supreme Court, which eventually rules the mechanism unconstitutional. By that time, the ground situation has changed significantly. The massive influx of
foreign aid creates tensions between communities. Political actors and the bureaucracy jockey for control and local and foreign aid agencies fall prey to ‘competitive humanitarianism’.167 Soon after the tsunami, ambushes and assassinations resume. Kaushalyan (the LTTE’s political leader in the east) is ambushed in
government-controlled territory on 8 February. The LTTE has trouble moving its cadres between the north and east as becomes clear when forty cadres (including the political leader of Ampara) narrowly escape an ambush on 5 June in government area. The LTTE’s crackdown on suspected Karuna loyalists resumes as well. In parallel to these strings of retaliatory violence, both sides build up their militaries. LTTE child recruitment increases and they develop a rudimentary air wing. The government discovers their airstrip in the Vanni and voices alarm. President Kumaratunga formally raises the issue in a letter to Norwegian Prime Minister Bondevik,168 but verification is prevented by the insurgents who do not allow the SLMM to access
the area. In India, where the Congress Party has come back to power in 2004, there is concern too and Delhi offers its radar services to Sri Lanka. The government’s own arms build-up continues unimpeded by the tsunami. International policies increasingly reinforce the asymmetry between the government and the rebels.

Various Asian countries sell weapons to Sri Lanka, while criticism of the LTTE is stepped up. The US government periodically reminds the insurgents that it will face a capable and determined Sri Lankan military if they opt for a return to war. When the LTTE expands the tit-for-tat killings to Colombo and a suspected LTTE sniper kills Foreign Minister Kadirgamar on 12 August 2005, there is widespread condemnation from all foreign players. Norwegian Foreign Minister Petersen writes a letter warning Prabhakaran: ‘If the LTTE does not take a positive step forward at
======================
163 Kumaratunga strongly denied to the authors that she wished to go for a third term.
164 Interview 029A.
165 MFA. 307.3 (2005-00092-23).
166 Kumaratunga faces intra-party opposition as well. Two of her main political allies, Mangala Samaraweera and Lakshman Kadirgamar,do not support P-TOMS. Avoiding an open rift, they evade the parliamentary vote on the agreement by travelling abroad.
167 There is a lot of literature on this. See for example: Fernando and Hilhorst (2006), Fraser (2005), Frerks and Klem (2011), Kaldor (2005), Korf (2005), Korf (2006), Korf et al (2010), McGilvray (2006), Ruwanpura (2008), Shanmugaratnam (2005), Stirrat (2006), and Telford, Cosgrave and Houghton (2006).
168 MFA. 307.3 (2005/00812-4).

Pawns of Peace – Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997-2009 55
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this critical juncture, the international reaction could be severe.’169 A month later,the EU announces it is considering LTTE proscription and suspends receiving their delegations with immediate effect. The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs reviews the possible consequences and concludes a European ban would not be conducive to possibilities for peace and would impair their role as facilitator.170 They also review their own strategy and identify seven lines of action: 1) strategize with either outcome of the forthcoming presidential elections; 2) re-launch Norway as a third party after the forthcoming presidential elections in Sri Lanka; 3) broaden international support, for example through a Group of Friends; 4) engage with influential (non-NGO) civil society; 5) attempt to broaden countries participating in SLMM and install a non-Norwegian Head of Mission; 6) implement a more offensive media strategy; and 7) replace Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure (P-TOMS) with a less complicated, more pragmatic mechanism for aid delivery in north-east.171 Among Muslim and Sinhala constituencies, already upset about P-TOMS, Kadirgamar’s death strengthens criticism of perceived Norwegian appeasement of the LTTE. There is a flurry of rumours and theories, some of which are propagated in the state media, about Norway trying to cut off aid to Sri Lanka and blackmailing the government to collaborate with the LTTE. Written protests and street demonstrations occur from early 2005 onwards.172 With a faltering President Kumaratunga and the UNP firmly associated with the Norwegian peace efforts, neither mainstream party can capitalize on these sentiments. The JVP and JHU sense victory.

Their walk out from government (JVP) and the court case against P-TOMS (JHU) are well received by their constituencies, but neither party can capture the political centre ground. Mahinda Rajapaksa – an experienced southern politician, but relatively inconspicuous as an opposition leader and Prime Minister – manages to step into this political vacuum and becomes a ‘repository’173 for public dissent and frustration.

In October 2005, the Norwegian team again reviews their own role in the peace process and the prospects following the presidential election. Among the points discussed are (a) the need for better access to Prabhakaran; (b) the possibility for ‘freezing’ the Norwegian facilitation or pulling back for a period; (c) the terms for continued Norwegian engagement; (d) the need for a broader cooperation with the international community and Sri Lankan civil society, including Buddhist monastic orders; (e) a more offensive information strategy; and (f) a less exclusive peace process.174

19 November 2005: Rajapaksa’s presidential victory

The campaign for the presidential elections becomes a neck-and-neck race between Rajapaksa, who runs on an SLFP ticket, and UNP candidate Wickremesinghe. Not implicated by the controversies of the Ceasefire Agreement and the peace talks, Rajapaksa presents himself as an advocate of peace with dignity. The Norwegians,the SLMM, and Solheim get slammed in milder or harsher terms on various
========================
169 MFA 307.3 (2005/010004-10).
170 MFA 307.3 (2005/010004-22).
171 MFA. 307.3 (2005/01004-34).
172 MFA. 307.3 (2005/00092-8).
173 Interview 033E.
174 MFA. 307.3 (2005/01004-34).

56 Pawns of Peace – Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997-2009
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occasions during the campaign. Rajapaksa makes it clear he is willing to resume negotiations with the LTTE, but only on his terms. Wickremesinghe, however, manages to secure the UNP block votes and makes overtures to the Muslim and Tamil electorates. Ironically, his defeat is determined in the Vanni. The LTTE decides to enforce a boycott among Tamil voters175, thus tipping the balance to Rajapaksa, who wins with a margin of less than two percent.176 The narrow margin underlines the political divisions in Sri Lanka. Wickremesinghe’s substantive support, both from the minorities and the Sinhala majority, shows there is still a constituency for his approach to the peace process despite all the turmoil. Rajapaksa’s victory is significant, however, because it signifies a more fundamental and enduring shift in Sri Lankan politics. First, the revival of modern Buddhism and Sinhala nationalism – predating the peace process, but reinforced by it – moves
back to the political centre. Second, the elections are won with a nearly exclusive Sinhala vote, thus breaking the pattern of ethnic minorities serving as kingmakers.

Third, and most importantly, Rajapaksa’s success in reaching Sri Lanka’s highest position ends the uninterrupted dominance of Colombo elite dynasties since late colonial times. He represents an established ‘political family’, but comes from a non-Anglicised, non-Colombo background and is widely perceived to be more conversant with the concerns of the common Sinhala people. His political manifesto and overall plan ‘Mahinda Chinthanaya’ bears some resemblance to Premadasa’s style and policies.177 It propagates a strong, protective state, investment in visible infrastructure, and glorifies Sri Lanka’s traditions and culture,
unspoiled village life in particular.

Foreign media inadequately contrast the two candidates as a hawk (Rajapaksa) and a dove(Wickremesinghe). Norway’s initial assessment is that Sri Lanka’s new president is a pragmatist without a pronounced vision or strategy. They have regularly kept him informed in his preceding years as opposition leader and Prime Minister.178 He avoided taking a clear position then, but was open to discussing a federal solution to the conflict.179 Having assumed office, Rajapaksa’s first speech to parliament on 25 November states that the government will start a new peace process through direct talks with the LTTE. He rejects federalism and P-TOMS, avoids mentioning Norway, and instead suggests facilitation by the UN, India or another regional power. Two days later, Prabhakaran broadcasts his annual “Heroes’ Day” speech
and tells the government to offer a reasonable solution or face the consequences of the LTTE establishing a separate state unilaterally. To show their teeth, they initiate an unprecedented spree of attacks and assaults, concentrated in the north this time. Many attacks directly target government forces and troops die day by day in December 2005.175 There is no firm evidence on the LTTE’s motivation, but going by media reports and interviews (see also Jeyarai 2005a), it plausibly includes: 1) revenge on Wickremesinghe’s international peace trap, 2) the realisation that only a hardliner can enforce change in southern politics, and 3) a possible financial or other arrangement with Rajapaksa prior to the polls. In January 2006 in a meeting between President Rajapaksa and Erik Solheim, the President in a jocular mood instructed Solheim to thank Prabhakaran for helping him to win the election. Solheim passed this message on when he met the LTTE leader a few days later (MFA.307.3 (2006/00085-27).
====================
176 Rajapaksa gets 50 percent, Wickremesinghe 48 percent.
177 Ranasinghe Premadasa, president from 1989 until his assassination by the LTTE in 1993, was known for his nationalist outlook,powerful political rhetoric, cunning strong-arm politics, and pro-poor, pro-rural, populist measures, mainly in the form of large-scale development patronage.
178 Interview 030A.
179 Interview 014A.

Pawns of Peace – Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997-2009 57
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Amidst these opening salvos, Solheim receives a confidential report from ArneFjørtoft, who is familiar with the Rajapaksa family and has explored the new government’s attitudes. A close confidant of Mahinda Rajapaksa explains that his government distrusts Norway and believes they supported the UNP during the election campaign, but there is scope to set the record straight. Fjørtoft reports: ‘Mahinda is balancing on a thin rope and has little room for manoeuvre. But he has the direction ready and wants to continue with Norway (for pragmatic reasons) if it can be done in an acceptable way.’180 The Norwegians realize prospects are bleak, but feel that they should try to keep up their efforts. From US sources, the Norwegians
are told that Rajapaksa probably wants to have it both ways: to use Norway in the peace process, and as a buffer in the domestic political game.181 Ambassador Brattskar visits both parties to clarify their stance on Norway’s role. Two meetings are also held between Basil Rajapaksa, Solheim and Fjørtoft.182 Despite all the killings, the LTTE welcomes continued Norwegian involvement and so does Rajapaksa– realising there is no feasible scope for replacing the Norwegians given the absence of alternatives and international support for them playing this role.183 The rhetorical commitment to peace is not matched by developments on the ground. There is no let up in the fighting and the military and their proxy the TMVP184 (the new name for Karuna’s cadres) retaliate with guerrilla style attacks. Tamil MP Joseph Pararajasingham is killed in the middle of Christmas Mass in Batticaloa and on 2 January the security forces abuse and execute five Tamil students in the heart of Trincomalee town.

Fearing it runs the risk of being manipulated in these turbulent times, Norway poses three conditions for its continued involvement: 1) a direct meeting with Prabhakaran every three months; 2) the government is to stop undermining Norwegian involvement; and 3) the parties have to commit themselves to carrying the peace process forward.185 There are also changes within the Norwegian team following the October
2005 change of government in Oslo. Helgesen leaves office, Solheim becomes Minister of International Development, and in March 2006 Jon Hanssen-Bauer takes his place as Special Envoy for Sri Lanka.

Despite the near continuous sequence of ambushes, grenade throwing and assassinations, neither party is ready to formally abrogate the Ceasefire Agreement and start war. It is unclear, however, whether this is for strategic reasons (prefer a political settlement), tactical considerations (e.g. reputational damage, build up strength for next attack, attempt to test military power balance), or some combination of both. The Norwegian team manages to bring about resumed talks on 22-23 February

2006. Rajapaksa opposes a Norwegian venue, the LTTE prefers a European

location, but with the EU travel ban, most of the continent is off-limits to the movement.

The Swiss government takes an active role and Geneva is selected as the

location for new talks.186 This also creates scope for discussions with ICRC on

humanitarian concerns.187 The talks are premised on reviewing the Ceasefire Agree-
===========================
180 MFA 307.3 (2005/00812-243).
181 MFA 307.3 (2005/01004-35).
182 Interview 043A.
183 Interview 029A.
184 TMVP stand for Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (Tamil People’s Liberation Tigers).
185 MFA 307.3 (2006/00083-6).
186 Interview 061B.
187 Interview 058B.

58 Pawns of Peace – Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997-2009
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ment and possibly proceeding to more substantive political discussions later. However,they result in mutual accusations and public pronouncements rather than constructive dialogue. The government delegation covers the entire political spectrum and thus includes obstructive hardliners.188 Instead of trying to actually turn the tide, both parties extract unrealistic promises from their opponent in an apparent attempt to call their bluff: the LTTE is to stop recruitment – child recruitment in particular – and infringements on civilian life and the government agrees to curb ‘paramilitary groups’ (Karuna’s TMVP). The SLMM is requested to report on compliance, but soon concludes neither promise is met.189 The next meeting, originally scheduled for April 2006, is called off by the LTTE quoting government non-compliance as the reason. Persistent Norwegian efforts to persuade them to come fail. Following a brief time of relative quiet in the north east in the run-up to Geneva,hostilities resume with increasing forcefulness. The attempted suicide attack on army chief Sarath Fonseka (25 April 2006) at the army headquarters in central Colombo marks a new level of violence. The government responds with air raids on LTTE controlled area. An attack on a navy personnel carrier (11 May 2006) killing seventeen troops provokes retaliation. Buses get ambushed and the death toll rises quickly. Despite these skirmishes, the Norwegian team manages to make some progress with SCOPP (the government peace secretariat). During secret discussions in Barcelona190, a joint plan is made to move to more substantive political discussions in three phases: 1) strengthen the Ceasefire Agreement and start negotiations (May – September 2006); 2) devise interim arrangements to facilitate the return of normalcy (October 2006 – April 2007); and 3) reach agreement on a permanent solution (May 2007 – December 2007).191 SCOPP, however, proves to have drifted apart from its political leaders and it soon becomes clear that the government does not buy into the plan. The Norwegians are frustrated with the government, which is consumed by ‘all tactics, no strategy’ in their view.192 On 6 April, 2006 Hanssen-Bauer and Brattskar have a tense meeting with Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa. In response to a question about whether the ethnic and political problems in Sri Lanka could be solved by military means Gotabaya answers, ‘yes’.193 In the same period, international actors close ranks against the LTTE. Canada bans
the LTTE on 10 April 2006 and the Council of the EU follows suit on 30 May 2006.

Norway is now the only of the four co-chairs (Norway, EU, US, and Japan) still willing to meet with the LTTE. Though the co-chairs continue to release critical statements towards both parties condemning the violence and urging them to resume negotiations, Japan is hesitant to criticise the government. More importantly, Indian opposition to the LTTE starts to translate into firmer backing for the Sri Lankan government. Faced with diverse interests (geo-political dominance, regional security, Tamil Nadu politics) the Indian government has persistently struck a
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188 Interview 030A.
189 Reports by SLMM Head of Mission Ulf Henricsson, titled ‘Geneva Report 24 February – 28 May 2006’ and ‘Geneva Report 29 May– 31 August 2006’.
190 Communication with the Norwegian MFA 070F.
191 MFA 306.3 (2006/00109-18).
192 Interview 030A.
193 MFA.307.3 (2006/00109-8).

Pawns of Peace – Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997-2009 59
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balance between advocating Tamil rights while opposing separatism. However, crushing the LTTE has become the overriding concern after the disasters of the Indo-Lankan Accord in 1987 and the subsequent LTTE assassination of former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in May 1991. The return to power of the Indian National Congress (now headed by his widow Sonia Gandhi) in 2004 and declining influence of Sri Lanka on Tamil Nadu politics (see chapter 7) mean that there are fewer inhibitions on a military solution to the conflict. India thus continues to advocate for the accommodation of Tamil aspirations in Sri Lanka, but does not apply any pressure against the Rajapaksa government in relation to the military option. On the political
track, Rajapaksa initiates an All Party Conference (APC, January 2006) and the All Parties Representative Committee (APRC, July 2006) to foster dialogue with a wide range of political actors in pursuit of exploring a home-grown, constitutional solution to the conflict. The initiative is criticised by domestic and foreign observers as a time-buying, window-dressing exercise.

The SLMM continues to grapple with the sea issue. Its newly installed Head of Mission Ulf Henricsson takes a bold step by formally declaring naval movements as a government prerogative, thus suggesting the Sea Tigers have no right – under the Ceasefire Agreement or otherwise – to operate.194 LTTE political leader Tamilselvan reacts furiously. India nevertheless criticizes Norway in private meetings for being too‘LTTE friendly’ and underlines the need to ‘put the LTTE in its place’.195 Concerned with the LTTE’s military build up, particularly at sea and even in the air, India provides vital radar and intelligence information to the Sri Lanka forces. Delhi maintains it will not provide offensive military assets – due to the political sensitivity of Indian weapons being used against Tamils – but off the record, it does not object to Sri Lanka purchasing weaponry elsewhere. The Rajapaksa government expands the arms deals that were already in the pipeline under previous administrations (see chapter 9 for more detail). With new aircrafts, drones, radar, tanks, artillery and patrol vessels, and the ability to use Karuna’s cadres and intelligence, the military
regains confidence. The government feels it can dictate its terms to the LTTE and launch an attack if the rebels do not give in.
============
194 This is in fact a spur of the moment decision. On the way from Jaffna to Mannar, Henricsson learns that his monitors have come under LTTE attack at sea and he has to respond quickly.
195 MFA 307.3 (2006/00083-10)

Pawns of Peace – Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997-2009
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6. War, Victory and Humanitarian Disaster
 (2006-2009)
(தொடரும்)