குறிப்பு: இலங்கையின் தமிழ்த்தேசிய இன முரண்பாட்டை `அமைதி வழியில் தீர்க்க` முயல்வாதாகக் கூறி நோர்வே தலையிட்டு பாலசிங்கம் நடத்திய சமாதனப் பேச்சுவார்த்தை முள்ளிவாய்க்கால் இனப்படுகொலையில் முடிந்தது.இதனால் சர்வதேச அரங்கத்தில் நோர்வேயின் சமாதான முகம் மீண்டும் ஒரு தடவை கிழிந்து போனதால் கிலிகொண்டு இது குறித்த ஆய்வு ஒன்றை முன்வைக்குமாறு வெளிவிகாரத் திணைக்களம் கல்விமான்களையும், ஆராய்சியாளர்களையும் வேண்டியது.இதன் விளைவாக அமைக்கப்பட்ட ஆய்வுக்குழுவினரால் தயாரிக்கப்பட்ட, சுமார் 300 பக்கங்களுக்கு மேற்பட்ட ஆய்வறிக்கை வெளியிடப்பட்டது.இவ்வறிக்கையின் நான்காம்,ஐந்தாம்,ஆறாம் அத்தியாயங்கள் அடங்கிய சுமார் 60 பக்கங்கள் மிகுந்த முக்கியத்துவமுடையவை ஆகும்.இப்பகுதிகளில் காலவரிசைப்படி இக்கதை நடந்தேறிய வரலாறு தொகுக்கப்பட்டுள்ளது. திரைமறைவில் நடந்தேறிய பல சம்பவங்கள், பங்கு கொண்ட சக்திகள், நபர்கள், பரிமாறப்பட்ட கருத்துக்கள் என எண்ணற்ற விபரங்கள் முதல் தடவையாக, பகிரங்கமாக, துணுக்குத் தவல்கள், மற்றும் உளவுக் கிசுகிசுக்கள் போன்றல்லாமல் -பேச்சுவார்த்தைக் காலம் முழுவதும் தழுவிய ஒரு தொகுப்பாக முன்வைக்கப்பட்டுள்ளது.முப்பது ஆண்டுகால நமது வீர காவியம் முள்ளிவாய்க்காலில் எவ்வாறு வீழ்த்தப்பட்டது என விளக்கி நாம் வெளியிட்டு வந்த அரசியல் பிரச்சார இலக்கியங்களில் உள்ள பல அனுமானங்களுக்கு இவை ஆதாரங்களை வழங்கியுள்ளன.அதற்கு மேலும் பல வெளிச்சங்களைப் பாய்ச்சியுள்ளன!
இதன்பொருட்டு இந்த மூன்று அத்தியாயங்களையும் மூன்று தனித்தனியான பகுதிகளாக மறுபிரசுரம் செய்கின்றோம்.
நன்றி: Pawns of Peace – Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997-2009 ஆய்வுக் குழுவினர்.
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Pawns of Peace – Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997-2009
Part II:
இதன்பொருட்டு இந்த மூன்று அத்தியாயங்களையும் மூன்று தனித்தனியான பகுதிகளாக மறுபிரசுரம் செய்கின்றோம்.
நன்றி: Pawns of Peace – Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997-2009 ஆய்வுக் குழுவினர்.
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Pawns of Peace – Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997-2009
Part II:
The Story
4. First Explorations, a Ceasefire and Peace Talks
(1990s–2003)
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The following three chapters provide an empirical narrative of the Sri Lankan peace process: its long run-up and its short-lived progress (this chapter), the fragmentation and tensions that it brought about (chapter 5) and the war that followed (chapter 6). Much of this chronology has been described elsewhere (Balasingham,
2004, Fernando, 2008; Goodhand and Klem, 2005; Goodhand et al., 2011 a and b; Goodhand, Korf and Spencer, 2011; Gooneratne, 2007; Rupesinghe, 2006; Sahadevan, 2006; Stokke, and Uyangoda, 2011), but our discussion of Norway’s strategies and activities adds empirical detail and insight to the literature. We use key turning points (the headings) in the sequence of events to scrutinize Norwegian responses in relation to the knowledge and opportunities that were available at the time.
First explorations
Norwegian efforts to help bring about peace in Sri Lanka start long before the 2002 ceasefire. As early as January 1991, following the Indian Peace Keeping Force, Norway offers its service to the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE and it keeps the door open throughout the 1990s. In this period, Norwegian efforts hinge on informal personal relationships and they occur in parallel to a host of other initiatives.
Countries including the UK, France, the US, Australia, Canada, as well as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the UN, the non-aligned movement,the Commonwealth Secretariat and the Catholic Church are considered as third parties in one way or the other.
When the talks between the administration of President Premadasa and the LTTE founder in June 1990, ACS Hameed, Foreign Minister and close confidant of the president approaches Arne Fjørtoft, a former Norwegian politician, Secretary General of the Worldview International Foundation and long-time resident of Sri Lanka. Fjørtoft who also has contacts with LTTE associates, is asked to explore whether Norway can establish a back-channel with the insurgents while the war is going on.
He contacts Norwegian Foreign Minister Kjell Magne Bondevik who concurs with an informal, secret exploration of dialogue (Fjørtoft, 2007). The ministry deliberately keeps a low profile so as to protect the fragile process.
No major progress is made, but Fjørtoft continues to serve as the communication channel to the Norwegian government (Follerås, 2002). A new government is installed in Norway and incoming State Secretary28 Jan Egeland (1992-97) is eager 28 We use the term State Secretary for the Norwegian term ‘statssekretær’ (equivalent to Deputy Minister). 30 Pawns of Peace – Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997-2009 to promote a Norwegian role in a possible peace process, conditional on a direct
request from both the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE. Norway’s profile as a peace broker meanwhile receives a boost in the Middle East, with the Oslo Accord in 1993, and there is increasing pressure on Norway from the Tamil diaspora.
Progress in Sri Lanka is more modest: a secret meeting between Hameed and LTTE representatives is held in Geneva, but the parties are unable to move forward. During the 1995 peace talks, Norway is asked to head a ceasefire monitoring mission (joined by Canada and the Netherlands). The Norwegians interpret this as recognition of their efforts,29 but the war resumes and the mission is never fielded. In the shadow of full-blown war, both parties continue to explore different possible channels for future negotiations. Several potential third parties explore their chances.
Norway also decides to ‘keep the door open’30 and appeals are made to Norway by different persons and organizations to engage. However, no full-time diplomats are assigned to the effort at this point. Soon after the collapse of the 1995 talks, the LTTE communicates – through the Norwegian NGO FORUT – that it considers Norway as the preferred third party, but there is uncertainty about the reliability of the
source.31 Contact with the LTTE is established through the ICRC, and Egeland meets the LTTE’s negotiator Anton Balasingham. An attempt is made to foster dialogue between government representatives and LTTE proxies at the margins of a seminar at the Chr. Michelsen Institute in Bergen in February 1996, which sparks protest from Sinhala critics. In the same period, Catholic bishops in Sri Lanka develop a dialogue channel with both parties and look around for a state actor to take their efforts to a higher level. In letters to both sides they suggest Norway as a suitable third party.32
In line with this trend, the newly installed ambassador Jon Westborg consults with a wide range of players. Westborg is familiar with the country due to his earlier (1978-1982) work for Norwegian Save the Children. In contrast to their efforts in other countries, the Norwegians decide not to work through NGO proxies in Sri Lanka33 and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs takes direct responsibility. In January 1997, MFA Assistant Director General Knut Vollebæk and Ambassador Westborg hold exploratory meetings with the Sri Lankan government and opposition. Good rapport is established with key officials and advisors including Neelan Tiruchelvam, GL Peiris, Jehan Perera and Lakshman Kadirgamar. The latter – coincidentally Westborg’s
neighbour in Colombo – remains suspicious and critical. Meanwhile, new guidelines are made for Norwegian development cooperation with Sri Lanka, requiring that all cooperation should contribute to a cessation of the conflict, reconciliation and the search for lasting peace. Officials and confidantes reiterate their request for Norway to broker ‘low level contact’ with the LTTE.34 The Norwegian embassy, however, feels they do not have a ‘relevant contact’ with the rebels.35 It requests the embassy in Paris to explore ties with LTTE representatives in the diaspora, but this produces no useful results.
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29 Interview 008A.
30 MFA 307. 30/442, 1995/01171, 1-18, Colombo to Oslo, September 21, 1995.
31 MFA 307. 30/442, 1995/01171, 1-18, Colombo to Oslo, September 21, 1995.
32 MFA 307.30/442 (1995/05350) and interview with former President Kumaratunga (London, 9 June 2011).
33 While Arne Fjørtoft had helped secure the entry of Norway into the peace process, he was regarded as too Tamil friendly by the Sri Lankan government. FORUT and Norwegian Save the Children (with long experience in Sri Lanka) felt that a peace engagement might adversely affect the implementation of their projects (Interview 015A)
34 MFA. 302.77 (1997/02601, 1-15).
35 MFA 302.77 (1997/02601, 1-15).
Pawns of Peace – Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997-2009 31
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Meanwhile Erik Solheim, a Norwegian MP, resigns as chair of the Socialist Left Party and spends two months (January-February 1998) at Fjørtoft’s house in Colombo writing his autobiography. Through Fjørtoft he meets a number of prominent politicians and develops a personal interest in the conflict. After returning to
Oslo, Solheim gets in touch with Tamils living in Norway and also goes to Paris to meet with the LTTE. In October 1998, LTTE representatives approach Solheim with a request to help Anton Balasingham out of Sri Lanka for an essential kidney operation, explicitly linking foreign treatment with his potential role as a lead negotiator in exile. After lengthy, top secret explorations with Sri Lankan officials, this is achieved
and it is on this occasion that Norway is asked by Balasingham to take on the role as facilitator. The Norwegian team is upgraded and now includes Erik Solheim and Special Adviser (later State Secretary) Wegger Chr. Strømmen. Contact with the LTTE is mainly left to Solheim who is not part of the Foreign Ministry bureaucracy, because it would not be ‘comfortable’ for a Norwegian government representative
to do that.36
May 1999: Kumaratunga formally invites Norway
In May 1999, the Kumaratunga government confidentially provides Norway with a formal mandate to initiate a dialogue with the LTTE, still a banned organisation under Sri Lankan law. The army has managed to push back the LTTE. Firming up the military advance with humanitarian gestures, the government approaches ICRC to negotiate a checkpoint arrangement on the front lines to deliver aid into the LTTE controlled areas.37 The idea, in Kumaratunga’s words38, is to ‘win the Tamil people over,’ to show the Tamil youth ‘that a Sinhala government was doing things for them. To make them wonder “why should we kill ourselves for Prabhakaran?”’ On the political front, the government considers the time ripe to promote its ‘devolution
package’ as the solution to the conflict. The selection of Norway – as a third party without overriding interests or leverage – is significant. Unlike India, Norway is unthreatening enough to the government to be acceptable, despite the possible bias resulting from Tamil diaspora pressure in Norway. The LTTE on the other hand wants a powerful mediator, not just a facilitator.39 The choice of Norway comes about through mutual dialogue through the Catholic Church. President Kumaratunga requests the LTTE to clarify which third parties would be acceptable to them and they provide a list of five countries, of which Norway is one. Kumaratunga then selects Norway, because other countries (the UK and Canada were on the list as
well) may have stronger interests and leverage.40 Norway is acceptable to the rebels because they are a state actor – and thus more powerful than an informal mediator or an NGO – willing to engage with them.41 Norway makes it clear to both parties that it sees its role as supportive and is not in a position to force anything on either party.
Norway is thus invited by the Kumaratunga administration as a low-profile third party at a time when the government feels it has the upper hand (militarily) and concrete plans for negotiations (the devolution package), and is under some political time
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36 Interview 036A.
37 Interview 060B.
38 Interview with the authors.
39 MFA. 307.30 (1997/00547).
40 Interview 078E.
41 MFA. 302.77 (1999/00768).
32 Pawns of Peace – Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997-2009
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pressure (Kumaratunga’s presidential term is about to come to an end). The government loses the upper hand rapidly, however. In the following months, the LTTE assassinates the prominent Tamil academic and politician Neelan Tiruchelvam (July1999)42 and nearly succeeds in killing Kumaratunga (December 1999) and Prime Minister Wickremanayake (January 2000). The movement goes on to capture the strategic Elephant Pass military base (April 2000) and makes inroads into the Jaffna peninsula (May 2000), an offensive only warded off with tremendous lastminute military procurement and major losses by the government.
Throughout 1999, the Norwegian team holds several secret meetings with Kadirgamar (as well as GL Peiris), mostly in Switzerland, as well as with President Kumaratunga. Substantive issues regarding possible devolution of powers to the north-east are discussed and Kadirgamar makes it clear that the government will only talk to the LTTE if they commit themselves to finding a negotiated solution within a unitary state. The Norwegian team concurs that a separate state is ‘out of the question’.43
The secluded time and space to confidentially explore these matters soon comes to an end, though. Having just lost an eye in the LTTE bomb attack during the last days of her presidential election campaign in December 1999, Kumaratunga takes Norway by surprise when she publicly (in a televised interview with the BBC) announces the mandate she has given Norway. Her statement that she attempted to approach the very people who just tried to kill her carries great political symbolism,but the Norwegian team is unhappy with the disclosure, since it cuts short their time to establish relations, agree on ground rules and explore substantive
issues. Vollebæk and Solheim go to Colombo in February 2000 for a formal meeting with Kumaratunga. A formal request also comes from Prabhakaran, followed by meetings with Balasingham in London, and the Norwegians visit Delhi to seek Indian acceptance for its new role. The main question asked by the Indian Foreign Secretary is: ‘are you patient?’44
Within months, the first controversy arises in Colombo with anti-Norwegian statements from the press and parliamentarians and demonstrations outside the Norwegian embassy. The deadlock is complete when the United National Party (UNP) led by Ranil Wickremesinghe revokes its earlier support and torpedoes the devolution proposal. ‘Ranil was our worst critic,’ says a Norwegian diplomat looking back on the early phase.45 In the absence of the required two-thirds parliamentary majority,the constitutional reform proposal is postponed indefinitely in August 2000. Kumaratunga, now in her second (and final) presidential term, struggles to sustain her political support faced with war fatigue and economic downturn.
The LTTE on the other hand feels it is in a good position to bargain, having forced a military stalemate on the government. The Norwegians meet LTTE leader Prabhakaran for the first time in Malavi (in the Vanni46) in November 2000 for discussions on 42 This incident is a shock for the Norwegians. Solheim and Strømmen visit Balasingham in London to demand an explanation, but he clearly indicates that this is the fate that awaits people challenging the LTTE. The Norwegians were ‘shattered’ by this way of thinking
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(Interview 036A).
43 Interview 036A. See also 307.3 (2000/00522-38).
44 Interview 026A.
45 Interview 015A.
46 The Vanni comprises the scrubby plains just south of the Jaffna Peninsula. It is in this area that the LTTE established its main stronghold in the late 1990s.
33 Pawns of Peace – Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997-2009
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humanitarian needs and confidence building measures.47 The Norwegian delegation makes it clear that a solution needs to be sought within a united Sri Lanka. The LTTE insists on their de-proscription48 by the government and a ceasefire prior to commencing talks, but President Kumaratunga argues these measures must be conditional on actual progress during peace talks. In her own account49, the president tells the LTTE: ‘I will only give you a ceasefire when talks proceed effectively.
Not like before [1995], when you made me look like a fool.’ On the humanitarian front progress is made, however, with the signing of an ‘Agreement following an understanding on humanitarian measures’.50 The document’s preamble formalises the willingness of both parties to search for a negotiated solution and acknowledges Norway’s role in that process. The measures themselves comprise the easing of government restrictions on the transport of non-military items to the Vanni, the proclaimed cessation of targeting civilians, and the request towards Norway to establish a Humanitarian Monitoring Group (Gooneratne, 2007: appendix 2).51 The latter does not materialise, but large parts of the agreement will later be used as building
blocks for the Ceasefire Agreement and the creation of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) in 2002. Sinhala nationalist forces continue to oppose the peace process and on 17 November, 2000, they burn an effigy of Erik Solheim outside the Norwegian embassy.
In the subsequent annual “Heroes’ Day” speech, Prabhakaran calls for unconditional talks and on 24 December 2000, the movement surprises everyone by declaring a unilateral ceasefire. This, however, runs directly counter to the strategy of the Kumaratunga administration of cornering the LTTE and pushing through the devolution package. While Norway in April 2001 tries to convince the president to accept a bilateral cessation of hostilities, the government interprets the truce as a sign of weakness, keeps up the pressure and launches a lightning attack on the moment the armistice expires.52 This however becomes a painful defeat. Soon after, the rebels show their military capabilities with a devastating attack on the country’s only international airport in June 2001.
Norway’s progress in initiating a dialogue and arranging humanitarian measures is thus quickly reversed. Aware of its limited leverage, the Norwegian team tries to establish a supportive international ‘group of friends’.53 It identifies India and the US as the main players and gets their concurrence. In meetings in Delhi with the Indian Foreign Secretary, the National Security Advisor and the intelligence agency (RAW), it becomes clear that India will keep an arm’s length approach and will not take an active role in the process. The US is slightly more amenable, but with the American designation of the LTTE as a terrorist group, Washington’s role in bringing about constructive dialogue is limited. In the same period, Solheim incurs the wrath of the
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47 MFA 302.77 (2000/00132, 1-15) and MFA 307.3(2000/00522-32). See also Balasingham (2004: 341). The delegation arrives on 31 October, 2000. It was apparently the first time since 1985 that Prabhakaran met with a foreign delegation.
48 The lifting of the ban by the Sri Lankan government on the LTTE was not a formal recognition of the movement (though it was symbolically important for the Tigers), but it was necessary to make it legal for government officers to engange with LTTE representatives.
49 Interview with former President Kumaratunga (London 9 June, 2011).
50 The agreement partly builds on the existing arrangement (mentioned above) brokered by the ICRC, which has operated as a gatekeeper on the front lines to channel government and international aid into the Vanni region since 1999. In an earlier instance, Prabhakaran called off the signing of the agreement on the last minute (interview with former President Kumaratunga, London, 9 June 2011).
51 In fact, Norway suggests that the parties should make this request. MFA 307.3 (2000700132-9).
52 It is also in this period that the UK proscribes the LTTE (28 February 2001).
53 MFA 307.3 (2000/00522-36).
34 Pawns of Peace – Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997-2009
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Sri Lankan government. Kumaratunga is annoyed by Solheim’s ‘one-up-manship’: in her view, he makes statements in press conferences and liaises with the opposition without keeping her informed. ‘He had ambitions for himself, he was in a hurry, and he went against etiquette.’54 Kadirgamar writes a firm letter in June 2001 demanding the team is upgraded. Foreign Minister Thorbjørn Jagland is drawn in. He meets
Kumaratunga in Colombo (for an eight hour meeting) and agrees to take Solheim off the job. However, the LTTE dislikes the government’s attempt to dictate the terms and opposes Solheim’s removal. A compromise is found: Solheim remains, but the team is headed by State Secretary Raymond Johansen, who is soon
replaced by Vidar Helgesen following the September 2001 elections in Norway. The changes damage Norway’s relationship with both parties. It takes months to reestablish rapport with Anton Balasingham and the standoff with Kumaratunga will remain a challenge in the coming years.
Norway’s peace efforts are thus off to a difficult start. It enters Sri Lanka as a lightweight mediator walking a thin tightrope, buffeted by strong winds from different sides. Firstly, with ongoing hostilities and a rapidly shifting military power balance, there is limited space for talks. Secondly, political rivalry in Colombo wrecks the devolution package, the core substantive input for talks. Thirdly, both parties ignore Norway when taking key steps: Kumaratunga’s public announcement of Norway’s role and the LTTE’s ceasefire. Fourthly, the composition of the Norwegian team becomes a contentious issue and harms a key asset: good relations with both parties.
Norway’s first experiences also highlight the challenges ahead: deeply entrenched positions; public unrest about its involvement; the large number of parties involved; the tension between humanitarian issues and pragmatic diplomacy; sympathetic, but tentative international support; and the asymmetry between insurgents
and the government.
5 December 2001: New government
Kumaratunga’s position is further weakened when she starts losing support from her coalition partner, the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC). The Muslim party suffers a heavy blow when its founding father MHM Ashraff dies in a helicopter crash on 16 September 2000, causing intra-party rifts and disagreements for years to come. Rauff Hakeem emerges as the new leader, but does not mend fences with the president. In the ensuing power struggle, Kumaratunga takes Hakeem’s ministerial portfolio, which in turn sparks the cross-over of six Muslim members of parliament and a No Confidence motion. The President declares a state of emergency, prorogues parliament, and schedules a referendum for constitutional reform that in
the end is never held. A new government is formed, comprising an alliance between the President’s People’s Alliance55 (PA) and the Janatha Vimukhti Peramuna (JVP), which has re-emerged as a significant player in electoral politics. However, another crossover of GL Peiris and seven other members of parliament from the People’s Alliance leads to a new No Confidence motion. Elections are scheduled for December 5, 2001. Despite his earlier opposition to the devolution package (which was strongly driven by party interests), Ranil Wickremesinghe’s United National Front
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54 Interview with former President Kumaratunga (London, 9 June 2011).
55 The PA was itself an alliance of the SLFP and a number of smaller, mostly Leftist parties.
Pawns of Peace – Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997-2009 35
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(UNF)56 makes a volte-face and campaigns on an agenda of peace and economic prosperity. President Kumaratunga makes a turn in the opposite direction and casts doubt on Wickremesinghe’s patriotic credentials. The state newspaper Daily News quotes her as saying: ‘If UNP wins, Prabhakaran will be President.’57 However, Wickremesinghe prevails, owing his victory in equal measure to dissent within the
fledgling alliance of the president and the arithmetic of the electoral system which allows him to win with 45% of the vote. As prime minister, he has to put up with a cohabitation arrangement, as Kumaratunga retains the more powerful executive presidency.
On the Norwegian side, a new government is formed on October 19, 2001. The new Minister of Foreign Affairs Jan Petersen is initially quite sceptical about a continued Norwegian role in Sri Lanka, but changes his mind after meeting members of the US administration who show more interest in talking to him about Sri Lanka than about developments in Norway’s European neighbourhood.58 Petersen meets Kadirgamar who welcomes a continued Norwegian involvement, but wants the process to be upgraded on the Norwegian side. In response, Norway continues with State Secretary Vidar Helgesen as head of the team59 and Erik Solheim in charge of the daily running of the process. In the ministry, the new team commissions an
internal report summarizing the Norwegian experiences in the area of peace and reconciliation elsewhere in the world and a new Peace and Reconciliation Unit is established.
The Norwegian team is aware of, and worried about the fragile power balance caused by political cohabitation in Colombo and the struggles it is likely to bring about, but the UNP victory also creates a much-needed breakthrough in the deadlocked process. The UNP is seen to be more flexible and pragmatic when it comes to the peace process.60 Building on the earlier back-channel dialogue with both Norway and the LTTE, Wickremesinghe moves quickly. On the night of his election, he calls Ambassador Westborg61 and preparations resume. Wickremesinghe’s victory clears the way to proceed as the LTTE had advocated: start with a ceasefire,normalisation and confidence building measures, while pushing the core substantive
political issues backwards. The American and global response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks three months earlier does not cause an immediately discernable change in the LTTE position, but it is to have a major impact on their room for manoeuvre in the years to come.
Unilateral armistices are in place within a month (24 December 2001) and negotiations for a more comprehensive, mutual Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) are underway.62 The agreement is drafted on the basis of ‘position papers’ from both parties. On the government side, negotiations are supported by the peace secretariat (Secretariat for Coordination of the Peace Process, SCOPP), which is created in February 2002.
Norwegian shuttle diplomacy – with Westborg in Colombo and Solheim in close
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56 The UNF is a coalition of the UNP and the Ceylon Worker’s Congress (CWC), the Upcountry People’s Front (UPF) and some members of the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC). Both CWC and UPF represent upcountry Tamils.
57 Daily News, 5 November 2001.
58 Interview 028A.
59 Helgesen will spend 25% of his time on Sri Lanka in 2002 and 2003.
60 Interview 014A.
61 Interview 014A.
62 Actual negotiation started after a visit to Delhi by a delegation led by Wickremesinghe (Interview 069E).
36 Pawns of Peace – Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997-2009
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contact with Balasingham – evens out issues of disagreement.63 Norwegian military experts help work out the military technicalities of de-escalation, advanced positions and front lines. Both Norway and the UNP government check with India for concurrence, but on Wickremesinghe’s insistence, they isolate President Kumaratunga (who is also the Commander-in-Chief) and the Sri Lankan military from substantive
negotiations.64 One of the officials close to the negotiations recalls the Prime Minister saying: ‘I would rather meet with Prabhakaran than with the President.’65 The feeling was that including Kumaratunga could only lead to a ‘loss of face for her.’66
The Ceasefire Agreement (CFA), signed on 22 February 2002, stipulates the following measures:
•• Article 1 declares an end to offensive military operations, detailed arrangements for the separation of forces and the freedom of movements for (unarmed) combatants.The lines of control are not geographically defined on a map, however.
•• Article 2 comprises measures to restore normalcy. This includes respect for international law by ceasing torture, intimidation, abduction, extortion and harassment of the civilian population. Specific mention is also made of the vacation of schools, places of worship (including those in High Security Zones) and other
public buildings. Roads and railway lines are to be opened, checkpoints reconsidered67, and restrictions on fishery are (partly) to be removed.
•• Article 3 arranges for the creation of a Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), which is to ‘conduct international verification through on-site monitoring’. The monitors are to be provided by the five Nordic countries and advised by several ‘local monitoring committees’.
•• Article 4 describes how the agreement will enter into force, may be amended or terminated.
The Ceasefire Agreement thus merges preceding humanitarian measures with detailed military arrangements and covers a wide range of issues. Compromises are made on naval issues and the nature of the monitoring mission. The agreement bans offensive naval operations, but does not acknowledge the existence of the
Sea Tigers, neither does it regulate vessel positions and movements or modalities for monitoring them. The Sea Tigers and maritime shipments are vital for the LTTE, but it is difficult for the government to accept a compromise on the sea. Moreover, the navy, Kumaratunga and India are very sceptical about this issue, so the clause on this is deliberately kept woolly. After the agreement is signed, the parties nonetheless agree to introduce naval monitoring teams.
63 Interviews 014A, 026A. See also Balasingham (2004: 360). There are divergent perceptions on these negotiations by the people involved. One of the government officials close to the negotiations has the perception that the Norwegian team tended to negotiate with Balasingham first and then present the government with little space to change the terms and the time pressure was high: ‘they told us, don’t try to unravel this.’ The Prime Minister’s team had concerns about the ability of LTTE cadres doing ‘political work’ in government territory and their plea to formally include a clause banning child soldiers was not taken up (interview 069E).64 In Wickremesinghe’s first written communication to the Norwegian Prime Minister, he asks his government to keep Kumaratunga (aswell as the Indian government) briefed (Gooneratne, 2007: 3), but it is clear that this does not imply a substantive role for the President.
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65 Interview 069E.
66 Interview 069E.
67 The CFA arranged for a remaining seventeen checkpoints to cross the frontline. Most are in the east. Peculiarly, the stipulated access to the Vanni is from the south (Omanthai). The northern checkpoint (to Jaffna: Muhumalai) is not mentioned in the agreement, but is put up anyway.
Pawns of Peace – Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997-2009 37
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The parties and India insist that the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) should be a small, unarmed mission with a weak mandate. They oppose the involvement of any major regional player or an EU or (a second) NATO member and prefer a solely Norwegian mission. Norway, however, sees the dangers of becoming both the sole mediator and the sole monitor. It keeps the leading role, but manages to broaden
the mission first to Iceland68, and eventually to the five Nordic countries.69 It is deployed very quickly. Just over a week after the signing of the Ceasefire Agreement, Head of Mission retired Major General Trond Furuhovde arrives, with twentytwo Nordic monitors following him days after (7 March 2002). The mission initially operates from a hotel in Colombo and sets up six district offices throughout the north-east and an LTTE liaison office in Kilinochchi by 8 April (SLMM, 2010).
Despite its shortcomings, the Ceasefire Agreement is unprecedented in the Sri Lankan context. It is quite comprehensive and overcomes some of the sticking points that caused trouble during the 1995 truce and the LTTE unilateral ceasefire in 2000-2001. It encompasses a large number of civilian and human rights related
issues. Unsurprisingly, however, it is these clauses that remain largely unimplemented.
Many people directly affected by normalisation measures embrace the agreement, though there is fierce criticism from the JVP and Sinhala Urumaya from the beginning. The domestic media propagate a similar array of opinions, ranging from upbeat optimism (‘ray of hope for peace’70), to caution about unresolved political issues (‘President surprised and concerned’71), outright criticism (‘This agreement would make Sri Lanka kneel down in front of Prabhakaran’72), and angst about Norway’s involvement (‘Expel Norwegian Ambassador – National Bhikku Front’73).
President Kumaratunga is highly annoyed by the whole process. According to her account74, Wickremesinghe calls her at short notice on his return from the signing ceremony, enters her office, tells her ‘I have signed’ and casually throws the document onto her desk. She voices her discontent with the Norwegian ambassador, saying: ‘you should remember I’m the President. I invited Norway, despite a lot of risks.’ The Norwegians, however, underline that Wickremesinghe has legitimacy having won the last elections. Kumaratunga expresses her dismay in a letter to Wickremesinghe, in which she also disapproves of the Norwegians overstepping their mandate by adopting a mediator role and introducing a monitoring mission.75 She also releases a press statement arguing that the CFA signed without her consent is undemocratic and unconstitutional (Fernando 2008: 77).76 In the assessment of both the UNP and the Norwegians, however, it will cause more trouble at this point to bring the president on board and risk scuttling the agreement, than to keep her at bay.77 The Norwegians hope that ‘Ranil [Wickremesinghe]’s willingness to move quickly would counteract the issue of the President.’78 Norway and the parties thus exploit the window of opportunity and feel that maintaining momentum trumps the
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68 Interview 014A.
69 Interviews 012A, 013A, 014A, 016A, 017A, 026A and MFA 307.3 (2002/00136-12).
70 Thinakkural, 26 February 2002.
71 The Island, 23 February 2002.
72 Divaina, 25 February 2002.
73 Divaina, 4 March 2002. Bhikkus are Buddhist monks.
74 Interview with former President Kumaratunga (London, 9 June 2011).
75 MFA 307.3 (2002/00136-28).
76 On the day of the CFA signing (22 February 2002), the Island newspaper ran the heading: ‘Kept away as nothing important to be discussed – President did not attend meeting at which Prime Minister secured cabinet approval to finalize agreement with LTTE’.
77 MFA 307.3 (2002.00136-21). Interview 014A.
78 Interview 014A.
38 Pawns of Peace – Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997-2009
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need for a broader support base. Also, it is decided to take an incremental approach with a ceasefire and an initial focus on humanitarian needs and normalisation, rather than integrating those steps in some form of comprehensive framework or a roadmap right from the start. We return to this issue in chapter 8.
The Ceasefire Agreement has an immediate impact, in the north and east in particular.
Checkpoints are lifted, roads open, Jaffna and the Vanni are reconnected to the rest of the country and aid provisions flow more or less freely. Internally displaced persons (IDPs) start returning home, everyday life is no longer affected by curfews and the sound of shelling, and previously inaccessible lands and fishery
areas are put back into use again. Countrywide, the economy picks up and the prospects improve for key sectors such as tourism. The agreement also enables the LTTE to expand its de facto statebuilding project and strengthen its grip on the region. Unarmed LTTE cadres move about freely; its ‘political’ offices mushroom in government-controlled areas. The movement sets up ‘customs’ checkpoints, levying
‘import’ tax at the two entrances to the Vanni, and intensifies its media operations with a new FM station and a satellite channel (Nadarajah, 2005). In the north-east, the raising of the LTTE flag at public rallies or sports events, and public video screenings of LTTE propaganda at schools become common. At a later stage, the
balance will decisively turn the other way, but initially, the Ceasefire Agreement benefits the LTTE, whose violations of article 2 (e.g. extortion, abduction, harassment) soar almost right from the start. Meanwhile the army is confined to its barracks.
Primary resistance to the LTTE consolidating its influence therefore does not come from the government, but from the third ethnic community, the Muslims. Tamil-Muslim clashes, in and around Muslim pockets in the east, become a periodic occurrence (Fernando, 2008: 245-259). The government on the other hand is slow
in following up on some parts of the agreement, particularly the vacating of public buildings by the armed forces. The sea proves to be an explosive issue early on.
The navy attacks suspected LTTE shipments, and in July 2002, two SLMM monitors are taken hostage for a few hours while inspecting an LTTE ship (SLMM, 2010: 95-96). While violations of the Ceasefire Agreement raise serious questions about the commitment of the parties, overall, a positive atmosphere prevails and expectations about the forthcoming peace talks are high.
The Norwegian plan, drafted by Solheim and Westborg prior to Wickremesinghe’s election, hinges on facilitating monthly meetings between the parties. Both sides are to present their proposals for an interim solution along with a timeline for further negotiations in about half a year’s time. Meanwhile, international aid is to buttress the progress made.79 Though the time line is ambitious, the incremental strategy suggested by Norway is broadly aligned with the approach preferred by both parties.
The underlying principles and logistical details for talks are settled during a meeting between Balasingham and Milinda Morogoda in London (June 2002). The LTTE insists on de-proscription (to which the government agrees in September 2002) and prioritizes the addressing of wartime conditions and people’s immediate needs. While this may further the movement’s statebuilding goals, it could also be interpreted as a genuine interest in exploring a political solution. Prime Minister Wickremesinghe
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79 MFA 307.3 (2000/00522-36).
Pawns of Peace – Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997-2009 39
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develops an economic reform programme and travels around the world in the summer of 2002 to muster international support and security guarantees from India and the US (Goodhand and Klem, 2005). The substantive political issues receive less attention, though he makes it clear to the Norwegians that devolution – on which he pulled the plug less than two years earlier – should be the general principle.80
The first set of formal negotiations is scheduled for September in Thailand. The talks proceed roughly in line with the Norwegian plan. To a large extent, the sessions –which take place in various locations in Asia and Europe and are the focus of great domestic and international interest – serve symbolic and public diplomacy purposes.
The atmosphere is relaxed and amicable; much of the actual bargaining occurs through Norwegian shuttle diplomacy between the meetings, involving the two parties and a range of other actors, including the opposition, civil society, private sector, and international actors. During the talks, Norway mainly tries to ‘keep up the good spirit,’ one of the attendants recalls.81 The first round of talks in particular, constitutes a form of ‘necessary theatre’. But the ‘cosiness’, the mediators realise, also reflects the lack of hard political issues on the table.82 Table 2 provides an overview of the main meetings.
Table 2: Overview of peace talks
When, Where Who
15 April 2002, Vanni, Sri Lanka Meeting between
Hakeem Stri Lanka
Muslim Congress
(SLMC) and LTTE
leader Prabhakaran,
without Norwegian
involvement
The two leaders discuss Muslim issues and
Substance and outcomes reach a groundbreaking agreement,
which is never implemented.
21 May 2002, Kilinochchi, Sri Lanka Government and LTTE representatives
Substance and outcomes In their first meeting, the approach to the peace talks is discussed.
June 27, 2002, London, UK Milinda Morogoda and Anton Balasingham(and his wife Adele)
Substance and outcomes CFA implementation and modalities for forthcoming peace talks.
14 August 2002, Oslo, Norway Government and LTTE representatives
Substance and outcomes The parties agree on modalities for talks. The government agreesto to deproscribe the LTTE.
16-18 September 2002, Sattahip,ThailandFirst round of formal talks between government and LTTE
representatives Main points of discussion:
1. Implementation of CFA
2. Economic development and normalisation
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80 MFA 307.3 (2002/00136-40).
81 Interviews 002B.
82 Interview 014A.
40 Pawns of Peace – Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997-2009
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When, where Who Substance and outcomes
31 October – 3 November 2002, Nakhon Pathom,Thailand Second round of formal talks between government and LTTE representatives
The parties establish three sub-committees:
1. Sub-committee on Political Affairs (SPA), to engage with the core political issues.
2. Sub-committee on De-escalation and Normalization (SDN).
3. Sub-committee on Immediate Humanitarian
Rehabilitation Needs (SIHRN). None of the committees produce lasting results. The most significant one (SPA) in fact never meets.
25 November 2002, Oslo,Norway Donors’ conference with the two parties.
Donors pledge US$ 70 million for immediate humanitarian aid.
2-5 December 2002, Oslo, Norway Third round of formal talks between government and LTTE
representatives
The parties agree to develop an ‘Action Plan for Children Affected by War’ and discuss substantive political issues. The meeting ends with a press statement that the parties agree to explore a federal solution. Meanwhile, Hakeem rushes back to Colombo to resolve an internal Stri Lanka Muslim Congress
(SLMC) revolt.
6-9 January, 2003, Rose Garden Resort, Thailand
Fourth round of formal talks between government and LTTE representatives
High Security Zones, military issues and the malfunctioning of Sub-committee on Immediate Humanitarian
Rehabilitation Needs (SIHRN) are discussed, but without agreemen The Sub-committee on De-escalation
and Normalization (SDN) becomes defunct. The parties agree to create a gender subcommittee.
27-29 January,2003, Tokyo,Japan
Meeting between Solheim and the Japanese government
Prepare a donor conference in Tokyo.
7-8 February,2003, Berlin, Germany
Fifth round of formal talks between government and LTTE representatives
Problems with Sub-committee on Immediate Humanitarian Rehabilitation Needs (SIHRN),
LTTE child recruitment, and a naval clash that coincides with the talks.
18-21 March, Hakone, Japan
Sixth round of formal talks between government and LTTE representatives
Naval issue, Sub-committee on Immediate Humanitarian Rehabilitation Needs (SIHRN),
Tamil-Muslim relations in the east. With the help of Ian Martin, a session is held on human rights. The main accomplishments during the talks listed in Table 2 concern humanitarian issues and normalisation. Firstly, the Sub-committee on Immediate Humanitarian Rehabilitation Needs (SIHRN), created during the second round, is an innovative joint government-LTTE structure to administer rehabilitation efforts. It enables collaboration in a field that is symbolically important for the LTTE, yet limited enough for the government to agree to a form of joint governance. The funds are to be proPawns of Peace – Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997-2009 41 vided by foreign donors and administered by the World Bank through a newly created North East Reconstruction Fund (NERF). However, legal and bureaucratic
obstacles prevent the actual channelling of foreign funds to the committee, much to the annoyance of the LTTE (see more in Chapter 10).
Secondly, the parties support the ‘Action Plan for Children Affected by War’. This involves the LTTE’s collaboration with UNICEF in releasing its under-age recruits. The insurgents take with one hand what they give with the other, though. The number of children released by the LTTE increases, but does not make up for the continued recruitment of children by the movement.83
Thirdly, the parties engage in dialogue with human rights advisor Ian Martin who develops a road map outlining the key issues. They agree that the seventh round of talks (scheduled for April-May 2003 in Thailand) is to focus on drafting a joint declaration on human rights and humanitarian principles, but the talks collapse before that stage is reached.
Fourthly, there are intensive negotiations on the High Security Zones, which form a vital defensive for the government military, but are an important humanitarian issue for the populations displaced by them. Particularly on Jaffna peninsula, large swathes of land are occupied by the forces to protect their compounds, the harbour and the airport. The LTTE plays the humanitarian card, but obviously also has a military
interest in dismantling the zones. During discussions in the Sub-committee for De-escalation and Normalisation (SDN), the parties agree to an integrated approach, thus acknowledging both security and humanitarian concerns. General Fonseka (then commander of Jaffna) draws up a phased ‘de-escalation plan’, which links the easing of the High Security Zones to LTTE disarmament and decommissioning
of long-range weapons. The terms and phrasing of Fonseka’s plan – persistently calling the LTTE ‘terrorists’ – meet an angry LTTE response and the insurgents terminate the SDN.84 To keep the discussion moving, help is sought from Satish Nambiar, a retired Indian general, who drafts a revised plan, suggesting a phased
dismantling of High Security Zones matched by simultaneous dismantling of LTTE operational capacities. Both are to be subject to international monitoring, be it a new mission or a strengthened version of the SLMM (Gooneratne, 2007: appendix
3). The plan, however, is shelved, and the tensions over high security zones continue. The incremental approach thus bears some fruit in the field of humanitarian issues and de-escalation, but actual implementation remains a concern. Discussions on the core political issues reach a rapid climax with the third round of talks in Oslo. Canadian experts on federalism85 provide inputs for the discussion and both parties agree to ‘explore a solution founded on the principle of internal self-determination in areas of historical habitation of the Tamil-speaking peoples, based on a federal structure within a united Sri Lanka’. This commitment is highlighted in the press statement released after the talks and soon becomes known as the
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Interview 065B.
84 The LTTE actually withdraws from the SDN after the SLMM has issued a statement in response to Fonseka’s plan underlining the importance of preserving a balance of forces (implying not to dismantle High Security Zones, without any reciprocation from the LTTE) (Balasingham, 2004: 408-414).
85 Including Bob Rae, former Prime Minister of Ontario, Canada.
42 Pawns of Peace – Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997-2009
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‘Oslo Communiqué’. It reflects the symbolically charged language of both the LTTE (‘self-determination’,
‘historical habitation’, ‘Tamil-speaking people’ [thus including the Muslims as well]) and the government (‘united Sri Lanka’), but it is the term connecting both worlds that captures the attention: federalism. With federalism on paper, Norway’s mediation efforts may move to a whole new level. Successive Sri Lankan governments had invested large amounts of symbolic and political capital in the ‘unitary state’. Prabhakaran was known to have told his bodyguard to shoot him the moment he gave up a separate ‘Tamil Eelam’. India had unsuccessfully mounted all the leverage it had to enforce a political solution short of federalism. The Oslo
communiqué thus generates long awaited hope for some, but causes anxiety and anger for others and before the ink is dry, doubt arises as to who exactly agreed to explore what in the Oslo meeting. Sri Lankan media responses reflect these doubts and report divergent readings of the statement.86 Though both parties reiterate their commitment to federalism at the sixth round of talks in Japan, it has become clear that the government – still stifled by the co-habitation with Kumaratunga – has little clout and substantive views to back up its ‘federal commitment’.
On the LTTE side,the team headed by Balasingham proves to have overstepped the mark.87 According
to later accounts of both Balasingham and eastern leader Karuna, Prabhakaran is unhappy (if not outraged) with the Oslo statement, which in the words of a Norwegian diplomat was ‘a wake-up call for Prabhakaran in the wrong way’.88 Talks dwindle from this point onwards, Balasingham’s status as the spokesperson of the movement erodes and Karuna starts drifting away from the Vanni leadership.
Ironically,it is only in this phase that the LTTE Peace Secretariat is set up (14 January 2003).Rather than a springboard, the Oslo communiqué thus proves to be a bridge too far.Three more sessions are held, but the key political issue – exploring federalism – remains untouched.
Meanwhile, in parallel to the talks, minor clashes and outright military encounters become a source of instability. During the fifth round of talks (Berlin, February 2003), a major incident occurs at sea. Nordic monitors board an LTTE ship and discover an arms shipment. The Tigers commit suicide by detonating
the ship. The monitors narrowly escape, jumping into the sea (Gooneratne, 2007:31; SLMM, 2010: 103; Solnes, 2010: 58-59). That same month, a group of LTTE cadres are surrounded by government troops north of Trincomalee, both parties claiming they are in their own territory. The SLMM manages to defuse the situation (Fernando, 2008: 203-215).89 More naval incidents follow in March. An LTTE shipment
with eleven Sea Tigers is sunk by the navy. Ten days later, suspected Sea Tigers attack a Chinese fishing trawler, sinking the ship and killing seventeen of the crew; some of those jumping into the sea are shot at close range while floating in their life jackets.90 On land, the LTTE steps up its campaign of assassinating people 86 Newspaper headings from this period included: ‘LTTE agrees to united Lanka concept’ (Daily Mirror, 5 December 2002); ‘Self rule with the right for internal self determination will be the basis for resolving Conflict’ (Sudar Oli, 5 December 2002); ‘Inclination towards federalism, victory of the peace process’ (Ravaya, 8 December 2002); ‘Step by step to Eelam, faster and faster’ (The Island, 8 December 2002); ‘Tigers aim for a federal state close to Eelam’ (Lankadeepa, 15 December 2002); ‘SLFP: is it a separate state by a friendlier name?’ (Sunday Times, 15 December 2002).87 In the Norwegians’ view, Balasingham knew all along that a separate state was not a feasible objective, and from his perspective the
Oslo talks were a logical step (Interview 026A). In his memoirs, Balasingham (2004: 403-408) attempts to reconcile his signature to the record of decisions in Oslo with the annual speech of his leader Prabhakharan in November 2002, arguing they both pivoted on ‘internal self-determination’ and his agreement to ‘explore’ federalism was merely a response to the suggestion of the Canadian federalism experts to translate the LTTE’s stance into commonly used terminology.
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88 Interview 014A.
89 Interview 066B.
90 SLMM report quoted in Weerakoon (2004: 352-354).
Pawns of Peace – Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997-2009 43
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providing intelligence to the military. Cadres of the Tamil government aligned party Eelam People’s Democratic Party (EPDP) are also taken out one by one (Fernando,2008: 162-168).
Whilst most of the mainstream media, including the government-controlled outlets,remain broadly positive of the peace efforts, there is a persistently critical perspective on the LTTE and this coverage intensifies with skirmishes around ceasefire violations and Kumaratunga’s criticism of them. One of the headings in Lankadeepa is illustrative: ‘Tigers prepare for war while speaking nice words about peace.’91 Controversy
about the provision of radio equipment to the LTTE fuels these sentiments.92 Damning statements in the media and monks or activists protesting in front of the Norwegian embassy become a common occurrence.93 Public opinion polls show that popular support for peace talks, for Norway’s role and for the SLMM starts to dwindle.94 Incidents at sea cause particular concern and Prime Minister Wickremesinghe has difficulty dealing with them, as the navy tends to align itself with President Kumaratunga. As the Commander-in-Chief, she starts showing her muscle. When Muslim leaders file a complaint with the SLMM of a newly established LTTE camp in Manirasakulam (near Trincomalee) in June 2003, the President
takes the incident as proof that the LTTE is taking the UNP and the Norwegians for a ride. Opposition leader Mahinda Rajapaksa Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) and other Sinhala politicians voice their concern as well. The SLMM leader, retired Major General Trygve Tellefsen, adds fuel to the fire when trying to resolve the continued naval tension. His discussions with the LTTE to create a firing practice zone for the
Sea Tigers off the north-eastern coast causes severe irritation with the government.
When a subsequent leakage of Sri Lankan Navy intelligence by the monitors enables the escape of an LTTE shipment, President Kumaratunga has Tellefsen removed from his post.
Muslim anxiety about the peace talks continues.95 Though there are some efforts to create a Muslim-LTTE dialogue in additional bilateral sessions during the peace talks, the role of Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) leader and government delegate Rauff Hakeem is weak. The perception of his constituency is that ‘he wants to be a good boy’96 and is more susceptible to the views of Norwegian Ambassador
Westborg than to those of religious and political leaders in the Muslim community.97 Meanwhile, dissatisfaction with continued LTTE mistreatment of the Muslims in the north and east gathers momentum and peaks with a demonstration at the university in Oluvil on the east coast. An estimated 30,000 to 35,000 Muslims gather to demonstrate and announce the ‘Oluvil Declaration’ which spells out Muslim demands and rights and calls on their leaders to act on them.
=============
91 Lankadeepa, 9 December 2002.
92 The Norwegian shipment of radio equipment for the LTTE was in fact sanctioned by the government peace secretariat. On 1 January 2003, the President filed a formal complaint in a letter to Norwegian Prime Minister Bondevik (MFA 307.3, 2003/0002703). The Daily Mirror newspaper, for example, covers political opposition to the incident in an article titled: ‘Throw him out or we’ll get Westborg, says JVP’ (14 January 2003).
93 Interview 029A.
94 Public Confidence Index, Centre for Policy Alternatives, Colombo.
95 These sentiments and concerns were in the public sphere right from the start of the CFA. See for example: ‘Muslims protest LTTE terror acts’ (The Island, 21 March 2002) and ‘Include Muslims to alleviate fears’ (Nawamani, 7 April 2002).
96 Interview 002B.
97 The Island, for example, quoted a rival Muslim politician in an article titled: ‘Hakeem most concerned about post rather than issue of Muslims – Athaulla’ (10 December 2002).
44 Pawns of Peace – Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997-2009
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Chapter:
