Syria: The Regime Changes, but the Crisis Remains

 

Syria: The Regime Changes, but the Crisis Remains

Alexandr Svaranc, December 14, 2024

The swift fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime has sparked a mixed reaction: some are filled with admiration and joy, others with surprise and astonishment, while yet others feel saddened and disheartened. However, stability in Syria remains a distant prospect.

The swift fall of Bashar al-Assad's regime

What are the main reasons for the fall of Assad’s regime, and what is set to replace it?

In a matter of days, the Assad family clan’s regime, which had ruled the country for 54 years, was overthrown. Of course, such an event cannot be considered coincidental, given that the last 13 years have seen fierce civil conflict between a diverse opposition and the ruling regime.

Turkey had been aware of the armed opposition’s plans to advance in Syria six months prior

Is the primary reason for the overthrow of President Bashar al-Assad the lack of political democracy and the autocratic nature of the ruling clan for over half a century? Formally, it is hard to argue against this, as society desires change and freedom. However, the Middle East, with rare exceptions such as Israel, continues to embody autocracy as a principle of political governance. Can Saudi Arabia, Iran, or even Turkey be held up as models of democracy?

Should the intraconfessional and interethnic tensions within Syrian society be considered the catalyst for the regime’s downfall? Clearly, the answer here is also affirmative, as for decades, the country grappled with the issue of ethnic rights, particularly for the Kurds. Religious tensions between Sunnis, Shias, and Alawites persisted unresolved. Christian minorities (such as the Armenian community) perhaps integrated relatively smoothly into Syria’s political system, as they did not present significant demands to the authorities.

Yet will Assad’s resignation and departure from Syria, whether in the short or long term, eliminate the inter-ethnic and intra-confessional tensions within Syrian society? Will the new authorities, whether interim or elected, renounce repression as a method of governance and suppression of dissent? Can the leader of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham* (HTS), Muhammad al-Jolani, resolve the unending disputes between Sunnis and Shias or address the Kurdish issue? Especially with Turkey no longer lurking in the shadows but visibly present on the scene. Consequently, the problems that existed under Assad are likely to persist under other leaders as well.

It appears that President Bashar al-Assad made a poor geopolitical choice, entering into conflict with major centres of global and regional power (such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Israel, and Turkey). Assad overestimated his capacities — political, economic, military, and financial. In this regard, his rejection of the Qatar pipeline project — transiting gas from Qatar through Syria to Turkey and Europe — was a key warning signal, triggering a series of domestic and international problems with a tragic outcome for him.

This is why the United States claims that it needed oil from Syria, and they obtained it, albeit by occupying the eastern and north-eastern provinces of the Syrian Arab Republic (SAR). So, how are the Turks any worse, considering Turkey has already become a key logistical hub for energy transit to Europe? With the regime change in Damascus and the rise of HTS to replace the Ba’ath Party, Ankara will likely be able to reach an agreement with Doha regarding the Qatari gas pipeline—a crucial matter for Europe, which is suffering from a gas crisis due to anti-Russian sanctions.

However, the issue of oil and gas was not the only reason for the swift fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime. Geopolitical challenges related to Israel and its confrontation with Iran also came to the fore. For Tel Aviv, Syria is a neighbouring country and a security concern, particularly regarding the Golan Heights, occupied since 1967. In other words, even after the 1973 war and the 1974 disengagement agreement, Israel planned to legitimise the occupied territories and expand its security buffer zone deeper into Syria. Another security issue for Israel is connected to the strategic alliance between Damascus and Tehran, where Assad transformed Syria into a key ally of Iran and the forces of Shia Islam. Syria became the main transit corridor for the supply of weapons and military equipment to Hezbollah.

Thus, Israel’s objective in Syria became the destruction of the Iranian supply corridor, preventing Hezbollah from using locations in Lebanon targeted by Israeli airstrikes, and securing direct access to the borders of a weakened Iran. For this reason, during the advance of Turkey-backed proxies such as Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) on Hama, Homs, and Damascus, Israel carried out airstrikes on Syrian bridges and other communication infrastructure. These strikes aimed to facilitate the proxies’ operations and block the redeployment of Shia and Iranian groups to the front lines.

Turkey, while publicly distancing itself from involvement in the military operations of HTS* and the Syrian National Army* (SNA), actively supported them. Reuters reported, following Assad’s departure, that Turkey had been aware of the armed opposition’s plans—a coalition of Salafists (HTS*) and Turkmen (SNA*)—to advance in Syria six months prior. Allegedly, these groups requested Ankara to refrain from interference.

However, the high level of military equipment and preparedness of these Turkey-backed proxy forces indicates external (read: Turkish) support. The synchronicity of their offensive in Syria immediately following the ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon, the focal point of the offensive in Idlib (a zone under Turkey’s responsibility), and the high frequency of meetings between Western and Eastern foreign ministers and Turkey’s foreign minister Hakan Fidan during the radicals’ advance all point to Ankara’s involvement in the forceful overthrow of Bashar al-Assad’s regime. Turkey was undoubtedly informed about the planned offensive on Damascus six months in advance but failed to notify its Astana Process partners (Russia and Iran) in time.

In other words, Turkey, hoping to restore full relations with the United States under President Donald Trump’s administration, became the principal executor of the US-Israeli plan to overthrow Assad and contain Iran and Russia in the region. It turns out that President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s more than year-long anti-Israeli rhetoric, including elements of a trade embargo, was merely a part of a joint operation by the US, Israel, and Turkey. Ankara never banned the transit of Azerbaijani oil through its territory to Israel, and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev has already expressed support for Turkey’s actions in overthrowing Assad.

Nevertheless, the primary reason for the fall of Assad’s regime lies within the regime itself and its leader. The Syrian authorities failed to strengthen their own army and intelligence services, continued a policy of repression against dissenting forces, and relied heavily on external support from Russia and Iran. As a result, the regime lost trust and control, while the army disgracefully surrendered its positions.

At the same time, Iranian sources report that President Bashar al-Assad refused direct military assistance from Iran (notably during a meeting with Dr. Larijani). The Iranian side now accuses Assad of collaborating with Israel, citing HTS*-released documents from Syrian intelligence.

Assad, in effect, acted in line with the will of the newly elected US President Trump by abandoning his alliance with Iran and heeding the threats of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

But who is replacing Bashar al-Assad’s regime? The new figure is Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham* (HTS) leader Muhammad al-Jolani—a Salafist and a former terrorist. Can he, as the head of a transitional government, ensure civil peace in Syria and maintain the borders of the Syrian Arab Republic (SAR)?

It is curious that HTS* has not yet officially taken charge of the interim transitional government in Syria. Yet, in several countries (including the United Kingdom, Turkey, and Russia) official Syrian diplomatic missions have replaced the SAR* flag with HTS* insignia.

It is understandable that Erdoğan will initially temper HTS’s stance towards Russia and may even temporarily maintain the loyalty of HTS and the Syrian National Army (SNA) to the presence of Russian military bases in Tartus and Khmeimim. But will Turkey always take responsibility for these forces? Likely not.

What conflicts could undermine stability within and beyond Syria?

Turkey is currently celebrating what it considers a victory—the fall of Assad’s regime. From Turkey’s perspective, Assad deserved his fate for refusing Erdoğan’s conditions to recognise realities on the ground and jointly eliminate Kurdish forces. Turkey now sees the localisation of the Kurdish issue in Rojava as feasible and is opening border crossings for the return of numerous Syrian refugees. However, Erdoğan’s overconfidence in addressing the Kurdish question — specifically in eliminating Kurdish resistance — and his focus on strengthening the Sunni factor in former Syria may backfire. The United States and Israel are unlikely to abandon their support for the Kurds; instead, they are likely to leverage this factor for their own interests, including restraining Turkey.

The next challenge to Syria’s stability involves Israel and its plans for the Golan Heights and the surrounding security zone.

Tel Aviv recognises that the vacuum left after Assad’s fall will be filled by Islamic (more precisely, Sunni) radicals, some of whom are already speaking about fully restoring SAR’s borders, including reclaiming the Golan Heights—incidentally, the region of al-Jolani’s origin. So far, however, the HTS* leader has made no similar statements regarding the north-western provinces and territories occupied by Turkey.

For the first time since the occupation of the Golan Heights, Israel has, with Assad’s fall, redeployed its forces deeper into Syrian territory and occupied the buffer zone, including strategic highlands. Benjamin Netanyahu welcomed the collapse of Assad’s regime, stating: “This is a historic day for the Middle East. The fall of Assad’s regime, the tyranny in Damascus, opens up significant opportunities but also carries considerable dangers. This collapse is a direct result of our decisive actions against Hezbollah and Iran, Assad’s main supporters. It has triggered a chain reaction among all those seeking freedom from this tyranny and oppression”.

The Syrian Crisis Is Far From Over

At the same time, Netanyahu emphasised that the fall of Assad’s regime is “fraught with serious dangers”. Specifically, it risks violating the 1974 disengagement agreement between Israel and Syria. On the night of 8–9 December 1924, the Syrian army abandoned its positions, prompting the Israeli army to enter the buffer zone. Tel Aviv will not tolerate new threats to Israel’s security interests from radical (and uncontrollable) religious groups. In other words, Israel has no intention of accepting a Syrian version of Hamas or Hezbollah in the form of HTS*( * terrorist organisation banned in Russia).

Presumably, this is why IDF tank brigades marched towards Damascus and, along with air support, destroyed military arsenals and equipment belonging to the former Syrian army, ensuring that the new militants are not tempted to reclaim the Golan Heights for Syria.

The third unresolved problem is the sharp antagonism between Sunnis, Shias, and Alawites. HTS is already conducting mass executions of its opponents, which only deepens the hostile divisions within the Islamic community. Iran, for now, is focusing its attention on what might be called “accounting” for the losses incurred during the destruction of its embassy in Damascus. However, this does not mean Tehran will abandon Syria or its commitment to Shia Islam.

Finally, one must not discount Russia. The regime change in Damascus is unlikely to please Moscow, which has already classified the insurgents’ military offensive as an act of aggression and a violation of sovereignty. If Syria does not establish an inclusive government with a friendly attitude towards Russia, the strategic purpose of maintaining the naval and air bases there will diminish. However, this does not mean Russia cannot establish new military bases in the Middle East or North Africa.

While Recep Tayyip Erdoğan might idealise the strength of modern Turkey, he must understand that his country is currently too economically dependent on Russia for gas, oil, nuclear energy, tourism, the construction industry, and ambitions for a systemic breakthrough into Turan via Armenia’s Zangezur region. Militarily, Turkey also cannot compare with Russia. Moscow’s silence in response to Ankara’s periodic missteps — from Nagorno-Karabakh to Kyiv and Damascus — is unlikely to continue indefinitely. Russia could temporarily adopt a passive observer stance, recognise Kurdish autonomy in Rojava alongside the United States, and block Turkey’s eastward ambitions in the Caucasus. As we can see, the Syrian crisis is far from over.

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Alexander SVARANTS — Doctor of Political Sciences, Professor

Abu Mohammad al-Julani: Putting lipstick on a pig

Abu Mohammad al-Julani: Putting lipstick on a pig

Julani's rise from Al-Qaeda affiliate to a western-recognized ‘moderate’ leader exemplifies how geopolitics trumps ideology. For years, the west has pretended to fight terrorism while leveraging Julani and his vast Al-Qaeda and ISIS-linked terror network to destabilize Syria.

A Cradle Correspondent DEC 13, 2024

Just in time for the Al-Qaeda offshoot Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s (HTS) lightning conquest of Syria, a western PR campaign was launched to rebrand the terror group’s leader, Abu Mohammad al-Julani. 

The BBC assured their readers that Julani, now commonly referred to as Ahmed al-Sharaa – which is his real name – had “reinvented himself,” while the Telegraph insisted that the former deputy to ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi is now “diversity friendly.”

On 6 December, just days before entering the capital Damascus, Julani sat down with CNN journalist Jomana Karadsheh for an exclusive interview to explain his past.

“Julani says he has gone through episodes of transformation through the years,” CNN wrote, after he assured Karadsheh “no one has the right to eliminate” Syria’s Alawites, Christians, and Druze.

But why was Julani so eager to convince the American public that he had no plans to exterminate Syria’s religious minorities? This question looms larger when recalling the massacre of 190 Alawites in Latakia on 4 August 2013, and the taking of hundreds more as captives. 

Back then, militants from HTS (then the Nusra Front), ISIS, and the Free Syrian Army (FSA) attacked 10 villages, slaughtering civilians in ways documented by Human Rights Watch: gunshot wounds, stabbings, decapitations, and charred remains. “Some corpses were found in a state of complete charring, and others had their feet tied,” the report stated.

Another useful US asset 

Fast forward to recent years, and Julani’s “transformation” seems less about repentance and more about utility. Despite HTS remaining on the US terror list – and an American bounty of $10 million reserved for Julani himself – former US special envoy to Syria, James Jeffrey, described the group as a strategic “asset” for US operations in Syria. 

Under the guise of countering extremism, Washington pursued a dual strategy: enforcing crushing economic sanctions on Syria – of the sort that killed 500,000 Iraqi children in the 1990s –  while ensuring its wheat-abundant and oil-rich regions remain under US control. 

Ambassador Jeffrey admitted to PBS in March 2021 that Julani’s HTS was the “least bad option of the various options on Idlib, and Idlib is one of the most important places in Syria, which is one of the most important places right now in the Middle East.”

But how did Julani ascend to power in Idlib, which US official Brett McGurk described as “the largest Al-Qaeda safe haven since 9/11,” while failing to mention the critical US role in bringing it about? His Nusra Front spearheaded the 2015 conquest under the banner of Jaish al-Fatah (the Army of Conquest), a coalition that combined Nusra suicide bombers with Free Syrian Army (FSA) fighters equipped with CIA-supplied TOW missiles. Foreign Policy hailed the campaign’s swift progress, crediting this synergy of jihadists and western arms.

Years later, US official Brett McGurk would label Idlib “the largest Al-Qaeda safe haven since 9/11.” Yet, the crucial role of US weapons and strategic aid in this outcome went unmentioned. 

Assistance from Tel Aviv and Brussels too 

This assistance extended beyond arms: the Financial Times (FT) reported that in response, EU foreign ministers “lifted an oil embargo against Syria to allow rebels to sell crude to fund their operation.” 

While the FSA claimed control of the oil fields, activists openly acknowledged that the Nusra Front was the true beneficiary, trucking barrels to Turkiye for refining or export to Europe. The arrangement netted Nusra millions before ISIS seized the fields a year later.

Academic and Syria expert Joshua Landis noted the importance of controlling the oil fields, explaining that “Whoever gets their hands on the oil, water, and agriculture holds Sunni Syria by the throat” and that “the logical conclusion from this craziness is that Europe will be funding Al-Qaeda.”

Behind the scenes, western and regional powers facilitated Julani’s ascent. Israeli airstrikes supported Nusra during clashes with Syrian forces, while outgoing Israeli Army Chief Gadi Eisenkot admitted to supplying “light weapons” to rebel groups – essentially acknowledging what the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) had been reporting for years to “discredit the rebels as stooges of the Zionists.”

Previous reports in the Wall Street Journal showed that Israel had for years provided humanitarian and medical aid to “rebels” in southern Syria, including by bringing Nusra fighters across the border into Israel for treatment. 

In an interview with The American Conservative in border village Beit Jinn, militants revealed that Israel had been paying salaries – to the tune of $200,000 per month – for the entire year before HTS troops were expelled from the area by the SAA and fled to Idlib.

Meanwhile, the US oversaw a “cataract of weaponry” to Syria’s opposition, as described by the New York Times. Though publicly earmarked for the FSA, these arms frequently ended up in Nusra’s hands.

Julani’s meteoric rise began years earlier, seeded by his ties to Al-Qaeda in Iraq and its Jordanian leader, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. The latter, whose activities conveniently justified the US invasion of Iraq, operated with tacit US acknowledgment. 

Julani followed a similar trajectory, emerging as a key player in the Nusra Front, which conducted bombings in Damascus and other cities in 2011 and 2012, with attacks initially misattributed to the Syrian government.

A salafist principality

Why did the EU choose to “fund Al-Qaeda” by dropping oil sanctions? Why did the US provide a “cataract of weaponry” to Nusra?

An August 2012 Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) report revealed that the US and its regional allies supported the establishment of a “Salafist principality” in eastern Syria and western Iraq as part of the effort to depose president Bashar al-Assad and divide the country.

The DIA report said a radical religious mini-state exactly of the sort later established by ISIS as its “caliphate” was the US goal, even while admitting that the so-called Syrian revolution seeking to topple Assad’s government was being driven by “Salafists, the Muslim Brotherhood, and al-Qaeda.”

The seeds of the Salafist principality were planted when late ISIS leader Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi dispatched Julani to Syria in August 2011 – at that time, Baghdadi’s group was known as the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI).

Prominent Lebanese journalist Radwan Mortada, who was embedded with Al-Qaeda fighters from Lebanon in Syria, met Julani in the central Syrian city of Homs at this time. Mortada informs The Cradle that Julani was being hosted by the Farouq Brigades, an FSA faction based in the city.

Contrary to media reports, Farouq commanders insisted the group was not comprised of defectors from the Syrian army. Instead, they said Farouq was a sectarian Salafist group that included fighters who had fought for Zarqawi’s Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) after the 2003 US invasion. 

A few months later, Julani and his fighters secretly entered the war against the Syrian government by carrying out multiple terror attacks. In Damascus on 23 December 2011, Julani sent suicide bombers to target the General Security Directorate in Damascus, killing 44, including civilians and security personnel.

Two weeks later, on 6 January 2012, Julani sent another suicide bomber to detonate explosives near a bus in the Midan district of Damascus, killing some 26 people.

The establishment of the “Support Front for the People of the Levant,” or the Nusra Front, was revealed after a videotape was provided to journalist Mortada showing Julani and other masked men announcing the group’s existence and claiming responsibility for the attacks, which opposition activists had blamed on the Syrian government itself.

The great prison release

Julani’s rise, however, was facilitated years earlier. In what has been dubbed the “Great Prison Release of 2009,” the US military freed 5,700 high-security detainees from Bucca Prison in Iraq. Among these was Julani, alongside future ISIS leaders like Baghdadi. Craig Whiteside of the US Naval War College described Camp Bucca as “America’s Jihadi University,” emphasizing the role of these releases in revitalizing the Islamic State of Iraq – which had been nearly defeated by Sunni tribal uprisings.

“The United States is often unjustly blamed for many things that are wrong in this world, but the revitalization of ISIL [ISIS] and its incubation in our own Camp Bucca is something that Americans truly own,” Whiteside wrote. 

“The Iraqi government has many enemies, and the United States helped put many of them out on the street in 2009. Why?” Whiteside wondered, not realizing they would be sent to Syria as part of the US’s covert war to topple Bashar al-Assad.

More alarming today is the prospect of HTS releasing thousands of ISIS fighters from US–Kurdish prisons in Syria's north to expand their ranks. It wouldn't be the first time. This past July, American-backed Kurds released around 1,500 ISIS prisoners from detention camps, which the US military describes as an ISIS “army in waiting.”

The question of who Abu Mohammad al-Julani is – his motivations, ideologies, and transformations – is ultimately less important than what he represents. Over the past two decades, one fact remains consistent: Julani is a tool of US and Israeli strategy.

From his early days in Iraq to his rise as the leader of the Nusra Front and later HTS, Julani has played a pivotal role in advancing the geopolitical interests of his benefactors. Whether branded a terrorist or a “blazer-wearing” moderate, his actions have consistently served as a means to destabilize Syria and the wider West Asian region. 

Julani’s “reinvention” is no more than a veneer designed to mask the enduring reality of his role: a strategic asset in a game where ideology is secondary to power.

The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of The Cradle. 

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