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Wednesday, October 23, 2024
Anti-Israeli fight to last until occupation ends,
Anti-Israeli fight to last until occupation ends,
Sayyed Hashem Safieddine, head of the Lebanese resistance movement Hezbollah's Executive Council |
Anti-Israeli fight to last until occupation ends, Foreign Ministry on senior Hezbollah leader’s martyrdom
Wednesday, 23 October 2024 Press TV
The Foreign Ministry offers its condolences and strong condemnation following the martyrdom of a senior Hezbollah leader as a result of Israeli aggression against Lebanon.
The ministry made the remarks in a statement published on its official website on Wednesday on the occasion of the martyrdom of Sayyed Hashem Safieddine, head of the Lebanese resistance movement's Executive Council and a group of his companions during the aggression.
It condoled with the martyrs’ survivors, the regional peoples and resistance groups, the world’s Muslim nations, and Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei.
The statement denounced the deadly aggression as “an unforgiveable crime,” while also lambasting “the direct complicity of the US government and other governments supporting the occupying regime in this crime.”
It, however, asserted that “without a doubt, the martyrdom of the leaders of the resistance will not weaken an iota the determination, faith, and will of their leaders, the zealous fighters of the resistance front, and the free Muslim nations of the region to fight against the occupation, oppression, and aggression of the Zionist regime.”
The struggle, the ministry added, would last “until the end of the sinister phenomenon of the Zionist occupation and the realization of the rights of the Palestinian people and the region's nations, especially the fundamental right to self-determination.”
It hailed Safieddine as one of Hezbollah’s leaders and founders, and a close and loyal companion to the movement’s Secretary General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, who was martyred during intense Israeli attacks against the Lebanese capital Beirut in late September.
The Hezbollah leader left behind a brilliant legacy of resistance in the path of Islam and the fight against oppression and tyranny, says President Pezeshkian.
Safieddine “spent his whole honorable life pursuing the freedom of holy al-Quds and the defense of Lebanon's honor and territorial integrity against the aggression and crimes of the Zionist occupation regime, and he was finally martyred on this holy path,” the statement noted.
Hezbollah confirmed the resistance official’s martyrdom in a statement earlier in the day, saying he had ascended to martyrdom in "a brutal and aggressive Zionist airstrike."
The Lebanese resistance movement Hezbollah has confirmed the martyrdom of the head of its Executive Council, Sayyed Hashem Safieddine.
Safieddine was widely expected to be formally elected as Hezbollah’s next secretary general after Nasrallah.
The Israeli regime has escalated its deadly attacks against Lebanon since last October after it launched a genocidal war on the Gaza Strip.
At least 2,574 Lebanese people have been killed as a result of the aggression.
Hezbollah has been responding to the atrocities by launching hundreds of retaliatory strikes against sensitive targets across the occupied Palestinian territories both in defense of Lebanon and support of war-hit Gazans.
Fighters from Hezbollah have carried out a series of operations, aiming at various Israeli military positions in the occupied territories.
The movement has vowed to keep up its retaliation until the regime ceases the aggression and genocide.
Confirming Safieddine’s martyrdom, the group likewise pledged “to our great martyr and his fellow martyrs to continue the path of Resistance and jihad until the goals of freedom and victory are achieved.⍐”
Highlights of Chinese President Xi Jinping's statement at the 16th BRICS Summit
Highlights of Chinese President Xi Jinping's statement at the 16th BRICS Summit
Cannot forcibly, illegally occupy our lands - SJB candidate tells Israelis
A fisherman throws his line in the morning in Arugam Bay, east of Colombo, Sri Lanka. REUTERS/Andrew Caballero-Reynolds/File Photo
Cannot forcibly, illegally occupy our lands - SJB candidate tells Israelis
23 October 2024
Samagi Jana Balawegaya (SJB) candidate Rehan Jayawickrama today cautioned against Israeli nationals running illegal business activities in some parts of Sri Lanka.
He said the following in his X message:
"The illegal activities of certain Israeli business owners have persisted for far too long. Despite numerous appeals to various governments to put an end to this and ensure fair play, these requests have been ignored. Now, we are facing a serious security threat that could derail Sri Lanka’s tourism recovery efforts.
"Authorities must address this situation with urgency. If these warnings continue to be dismissed, the repercussions for Sri Lanka could be more severe than we anticipate.
"As the Arugam Bay season winds down, the Southern season begins. However, the presence of heavy roadblocks in Weligama is already causing fear among tourists, casting a shadow over their sense of safety.
"To those Israelis fueling this instability, let me make one thing clear. You cannot forcibly or illegally occupy our lands as you have done elsewhere. You cannot conduct illegal business practices and ruin opportunities for others. Even though we have welcomed you to this beautiful island, this is not your country, and you must respect the laws of this land."
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Israel issues travel warning to parts of Sri Lanka over 'terrorism threat'
In the first eight months of this year, 1.5 million tourists arrived in Sri Lanka, including a total of 20,515 from Israel, government data showed.
இந்திய உயர்ஸ்தானிகருக்கும் ஜனாதிபதி செயலாளருக்குமிடையில் சந்திப்பு
இந்திய உயர்ஸ்தானிகருக்கும் ஜனாதிபதி செயலாளருக்கும் இடையில் சந்திப்பு
– வடக்குக் கடலில் மீன்பிடி தொடர்பான பிரச்சினைகள் மற்றும் இந்திய திட்டங்கள் குறித்து கலந்துரையாடல்
இலங்கைக்கான இந்திய உயர்ஸ்தானிகர் சந்தோஷ் ஜா (Santhosh Jha)ஜனாதிபதியின் செயலாளர் கலாநிதி நந்திக குமாநாயக்கவை இன்று (22) ஜனாதிபதி அலுவலகத்தில் சந்தித்தார்.
வடக்குக் கடலில் தற்போது நிலவும் கடற்றொழில் பிரச்சினைகளை தீர்ப்பது தொடர்பில் விசேட கவனம் செலுத்தப்பட்டது.
இதன்படி, ஒத்துழைப்பை மேம்படுத்துவதன் மூலம் இரு நாட்டு மீனவர்களின் பிரச்சினைகளுக்கு நீண்டகால தீர்வு காணப்பட வேண்டியதன் அவசியத்தை இரு தரப்பினரும் வலியுறுத்தினர்.
மேலும், இரு நாடுகளும் எதிர்கொள்ளும் பொதுவான சவால்களை வெற்றிகொள்வதற்கு எடுக்க வேண்டிய நடவடிக்கைகள் குறித்தும் ஆராயப்பட்டது.
இச்சந்திப்பில் இலங்கையில் தற்போது முன்னெடுக்கப்பட்டு வரும் இந்திய திட்டங்கள் தொடர்பிலும் மீளாய்வு நடத்தப்பட்டது.
இந்தியக் கடன்உதவிகள் மூலம் நிதியளிக்கப்பட்ட திட்டங்களின் தற்போதைய முன்னேற்றம் குறித்து மேலும் ஆராயப்பட்டதுடன், திட்டப்பணிகளை உரிய நேரத்தில் நிறைவுசெய்வதற்காக அந்தப் பணிகளை விரைவுபடுத்த வேண்டியதன் அவசியம் குறித்தும் ஆராயப்பட்டது⍐.
PMD அக்டோபர் 22, 2024
The Existence Of Israel’s Secret Stealth Drone Should Come As No Surprise
The Existence Of Israel’s Secret Stealth Drone Should Come As No Surprise
The apparent existence of such an aircraft points to a highly logical capability requirement, especially in regard to Israel's long stand-off with Iran.
Joseph Trevithick Posted on Oct 22, 2024 The War Zone
The existence of a secret Israeli drone, referred to as RA-01 and used for covert missions, has emerged from an unauthorized disclosure of U.S. intelligence documents which have now been posted all over social media. Israel’s possession of at least a pocket fleet of long-range stealth drones capable of gathering intelligence and possibly conducting strikes is extremely logical to the point of it being a bit odd if they never pursued such a capability. Israel is home to an extensive and often pioneering uncrewed aviation industry and drones of this kind would be very well suited to supporting the country’s ongoing stand-off with Iran. During a major Israeli operation to strike targets in that country, they would likely play an indispensable role, as well.
Mention of RA-01 is found in classified documents from the U.S. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), the authenticity of which U.S. officials have not disputed and that first emerged online last week via a pro-Iran channel on the Telegram social network. An investigation into whether this unapproved release was the product of a hack or a leak is ongoing. The documents could still be disinformation or feature inaccurate info by design, so we cannot indepedently confirm their authenticity, but at this time, there is no indication that they are not legitimate and there are many indications that they are.
The NGA documents center on observations from October 15-16 of an Israeli Air Force (IAF) large force exercise, which is viewed as part of preparations for retaliation primarily for Iran’s ballistic missile barrage at the beginning of this month. In addition to talk about RA-01, there is a discussion about Israel’s air-launched ballistic missile capabilities, including Rocks and the previously undisclosed Golden Horizon, which have been employed in previous Israeli retaliatory strikes on Iran, as you can read more about here. There is also talk of Israel’s nuclear arsenal, which the country has never publicly acknowledged, and that NGA does not expect to be used in any near-term operations against Iran, as well.
When it comes to the RA-01, no details are provided about its design or capabilities, or the size of the fleet, in the NGA documents. What significance the RA-01 nomenclature might have is unknown. “RA” could imply a reconnaissance and attack capability. Its basic structure is also in line with alpha-numeric designations Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI) has used for drone designs in the past. The designation could be one the U.S. Intelligence Community uses internally to refer to this platform and that does not reflect in any way what the Israelis call it, as well. One of the NGA documents also refers to the Rocks air-launched ballistic missile as the IS02, which could also be another internal U.S. designation.
NGA’s report also does not say any RA-01s were actually observed, just that there were signs that they were operating during the period in question from a restricted area at Ramon Airbase in the Negev desert in southern Israel. Ramon, which was among the targets of Iran’s missile and drone attacks on Israel back in April, primarily hosts F-16I Sufa fighters and AH-64 attack helicopters, but has also been home to various secretive and specialized units over the years.
Experts and observers have already identified a pair of secluded fence-off areas at the northeastern end of Ramon with shared direct access to one of the base’s two runways, which could house the RA-01s.
Work on this segregated area of the base dates back to at least the 2007-2008 timeframe from what can seen in available satellite imagery. A significant redevelopment and expansion of this section, including the construction of an entirely new taxiway, more hangars, and other facilities, occurred in the mid-2010s.
Each of the current fenced-off areas has a pair of semi-circular hangars that are approximately 80 feet long and 64 feet wide. One of the sections also has a rectangular hangar, which dates back to the original construction in this part of the base, and that is some 120 feet long and 60 feet wide. Both areas have 70-foot by 70-foot open-ended sunshade-style enclosures leading to the shared taxiway, which is just over 70 feet wide. This might point to the maximum length of the RA-01’s wingspan.
White triangles painted on the tarmac extending to one side of both of the sunshades look to be engine backblast warning areas, which could point to jet propulsion. This also points to these structures being scoot-and-hide shelters where ground personnel can load munitions and other stores, as well as conduct various other kinds of last-minute checks, away from prying eyes, including satellites above.
The presence of two distinct fenced-off areas may also point to one or more other secretive drone types being housed in this part of Ramon Airbase beyond the RA-01s. This, in turn, could mean the hangar and taxiway dimensions, as well as the triangles on the tarmac, and not reflective of the RA-01’s design, at least exclusively. Hangars can be used to hold multiple assets at once, too. The possibility remains that the RA-01s operate from elsewhere within the base, as well, and these facilities are used for other platforms entirely.
It is worth noting in this context that U.S. drones designed for covert and clandestine missions, including ones deep inside denied areas, dating back to the height of the Cold War and that have now emerged into the light, range widely in size, complexity and configuration. Prominent examples of this diversity of designs (and specific intended mission profiles) include the stealthy flying wing RQ-170 Sentinel and the RQ-29, a converted civilian light sport aircraft.
As noted earlier, Israel’s aerospace sector has an established history of pioneering uncrewed aviation developments. Furthermore, though Israeli companies have not publicly demonstrated a flying stealth aircraft, crewed or uncrewed, it should be within their technical grasp. IAI, specifically, is known to have reached at least the wind tunnel testing phase of development on one high-altitude long-endurance drone concept with radar and infrared signature-reducing features, called the HA-10, in the 1990s. The HA-10 has been linked to the Israeli Boost Intercept System (IBIS) missile defense project, which envisioned a missile-armed drone to shoot down enemy ballistic missiles in their initial boost phase of flight.
“The UAV [uncrewed air vehicle] would have cruised at between 7 and 15 km [approximately 23,000 to 49,000 feet] altitude, and would carry an IRST [infrared search and track system], laser range-finder, datalinks and two to four [Python-series air-to-air] missiles,” according to an archived digital edition of Jane’s Strategic Weapon Systems from 2002. “HA-10 was designed with low IR and radar signatures, and was planned to loiter for up to 24 hours on station with a payload of 1,000 kg [approximately 2,200 pounds].”
A paper that members of IAI presented at the 24th International Congress of the Aeronautical Sciences in 2004 describes the HA-10 as one of “a number of additional high altitude advanced configurations” the company had previously examined “within the framework of the advanced design activity.” IAI’s “HA” series does also include another non-stealthy design, the HA-13, that the company proposed together with TRW in the United States to meet the U.S. Air Force’s Tier II+ drone requirements that ultimately led to the fielding of the Global Hawk.
The possibility that the RA-01 is close in form and/or function to something like the HA-10 or the RQ-170, or even to a flying wing UCAV, would align well with the other details about the large force IAF exercise, as well as Israel’s general operational considerations, especially with regard to Iran. Though the current Iranian regime is prone to sometimes absurd hyperbole, it has air defense capabilities that present real threats. Iran’s shootdown of a U.S. Navy RQ-4 drone over the Strait of Hormuz in 2019 prompted notable discussions about the survivability of non-stealthy uncrewed aircraft in future conflicts that have had clear impacts on subsequent U.S. military planning. The RQ-170 has also notably been sent over Iran in the past, with authorities there recovering a largely intact example that went down inside the country in 2011.
It is also interesting to note here that initial work on the segregated section at Ramon airbase in the late 2000s came at a time when concerns about Iran getting more capable S-300 surface-to-air missile systems from Russia were growing. Those same concerns reportedly helped drive the IAF’s decision to purchase F-35 stealth fighters. Iran also finally sealed the deal to acquire S-300s around the time that the work was being done to revamp and expand the fenced-off areas of Ramon.
The construction of the initial segregated portion of Ramon also came around the time, broadly speaking, of Israel’s covert 2007 strike on a secret nuclear reactor in Syria that Bashar Al Assad’s regime had built with help from North Korea. F-16Is from Ramon were among the aircraft involved in that operation. The Syrian armed forces also have an air defense network that presents real threats, as exemplified by the shootdown of an Israeli F-16 in 2018.
Other incidents over the years, including strikes against Iranian-backed militias in Iraq in 2019, have raised questions about possible secret Israeli drone capabilities. Advanced uncrewed aircraft operated by Israel and others might also, in part, help explain claimed incidents involving unexplained aerial objects over Iran in recent decades, which also often come with reports of heavy electronic attacks on perusing fighters and radar stations.
Overall, for Israel, with its long and still expanding history of very long range and often covert and/or clandestine strikes on high-value targets in foreign countries, a drone just having the ability to persistently surveil far-flung and denied areas would be of great value. Stealthy uncrewed aircraft capable of conducting intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions could also provide important pre and post-strike intelligence.
A penetrating uncrewed ISR platform could also help provide early warning about potential threats and otherwise monitor areas of interest, all with a lower chance of an opponent like Iran even detecting their presence. As The War Zone has highlighted in the past, persistent surveillance that can help establish so-called ‘patterns of life’ in a target area from which various kinds of useful intelligence can be gleaned. Doing this while deep in denied airspace without the enemy even knowing they are being watched can result in much higher-fidelity intelligence products.
As relevant examples, the RQ-170 reportedly helped keep tabs on Osama Bin Laden’s compound in Pakistan before and during the U.S. raid that led to his death and the U.S. Air Force has at least explored using the Sentinel to help with bomb damage assessment. In the latter case, a test was conducted involving an RQ-170 assessing the impact of a GBU-57/B Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP) bunker buster, a weapon specifically designed to be employed against deeply buried facilities like those housing much of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure.
There is also a question to be raised here about whether Israel might be a partner of some kind when it comes to the RQ-170 and/or related developments. The Sentinel has had its own role in keeping tabs on Iranian, North Korean, and Pakistani nuclear and ballistic missile programs.
A true stealthy UCAV capable of prosecuting long-range kinetic strikes or launching non-kinetic attacks (such as electronic or cyber warfare ones) would give Israel further options for targeting high-value assets and penetrating into densely defended areas to get to them, as well as doing so in covert and clandestine ways. Even just having the ability to deliver a small munition for a ‘hammer toss’ against a singular high-value target would be a major capability for a platform of this kind.
In addition, UCAVs typically have combat radii that are multiple times greater than that of a fighter. For Israel, this could enable them to conduct entire missions into Iran and back without any need to refuel in mid-air. The IAF has notably limited aerial refueling capabilities to support long-range penetrating missions by its known crewed combat aircraft fleets. Israel does also have means of conducting long-range stand-off strikes, including with air-launched ballistic missiles like Rocks.
The War Zone has reported in detail in the past how there is evidence of the U.S. military and/or the U.S. Intelligence maintaining a pocket fleet of stealthy General Atomics Avenger drones for the same kinds of reasons.
In many ways, it is surprising that evidence like this that could point to an Israeli force of stealthy drones, and possibly UCAVs, has not emerged before now. The absence of such a capability within the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) would be equally curious in much the same way that it is odd that the U.S. military has abandoned interest, at least publicly, in stealthy flying wing UCAVs. The continues to be substantial work on developing and fielding UCAVs elsewhere in the world, from France to Turkey to Russia to India. China has made especially significant strides in this field in recent years.
So, while these documents certainly do offer some insights into what was previously an unconfirmed capability, their contents should be of little surprise⍐.
India, Sri Lanka head to a win-win relationship
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தமிழகம் வாழ் ஈழத்தமிழர்களை கழகக் கண்டனப் பொதுக்கூட்டத்தில் கலந்து கொள்ளக் கோருகின்றோம்!
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சமரன்: தோழர்கள் மீது எடப்பாடி கொலை வெறித்தாக்குதல், கழகம்...