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பேச்சுவார்த்தை!

பிரபாகரனின் கொலைகாரத் திட்டங்களை முறியடிக்க சர்வதேச சமூகம் அவருக்கு நெருக்கடி கொடுக்க வேண்டும்- அன்ரன் பாலசிங்கம்

பாலசிங்கத்தின் பிரபாகரன் பற்றிய கூற்றை இரகசியமாக வைக்கவேண்டும்- சொல்ஹெய்ம்

Solheim asked Lunstead to keep B’singham comment on Prabha confidential
The Island (SL) January 23, 2011, 9:44 pm

US Amb felt Tigers would come up with new conditions even if SLG agreed for talks on ISGA


One-time LTTE Chief Negotiator, Anton Balasingham, secretly expressed satisfaction over growing international pressure on LTTE leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran, for assassinations carried on his orders.


The former British High Commission employee (in Colombo) had felt that international pressure could force Prabhakaran to stop his murderous campaign. According to a leaked US diplomatic missive authored by the then US Ambassador in Colombo, Jeffrey Lunstead, in April 2004, the Chief Norwegian Peacemaker, Erik Solheim, had told him of Balasingham’s opinion, while insisting this shouldn’t be shared with other peace co-chairs. The US cable revealed that Solheim wanted Balasingham’s comment kept strictly private and confidential.


Balasingham had expressed the belief that the then US Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage, had put pressure on Prabhakaran by a making a strongly worded statement in mid August 2004.


Solheim, addressing the Sri Lanka donor group in Colombo at the end of a four-day visit to Sri Lanka, had asserted that bold steps should have been taken by both parties to re-start talks. Solheim had believed talks could be resumed if the wording of the agenda regarding an Interim Self Governing Authority (ISGA) could be
resolved.


Solheim also noted that he saw no signal that either side wanted to go back to war. Obviously hostilities could resume through some inadvertent incident, but, Solheim had believed, there was no deliberate plan by either side to resume fighting. According to him, the bottom line was that the "no war/no permanent peace" situation was certainly preferable to a resumed war.


Solheim asserted that the ISGA was a ‘small issue’, though the government and the LTTE had been bogged down over it. The US cable quoted Solheim as having said that Thmailselvan told him (Solheim) the LTTE couldn’t be flexible on the formulation for talks. But once the talks began, the LTTE could be flexible flexible on the ISGA proposal, and were ready to discuss alternate proposals.


Interestingly, Thamilchelvan had felt that the government was now in a better position to enter talks based on the ISGA because of the entrance into the ruling coalition of the Ceylon Workers Congress, and because of statements by the opposition United National Party (UNP) that it would support the government if it entered negotiations based on the ISGA. The LTTE, Thamilchelvan said, would not put forward any further conditions.

The Tigers, Solheim said, were in no particular hurry, and saw no need to help any particular Southern political party.


On the status of the cease-fire, Solheim said that both parties were broadly adhering to it, but neither party was strictly following it. The government had tried to use Karuna to weaken the LTTE, while the LTTE continued its campaign of assassinations of its opponents. Hence both sides were playing with fire.


Ambassador Lunstead told Solheim that his (Solheim´s) emphasis seemed to be on resolving the agenda issue as the roadblock to resumed talks. However, many in the South were saying that the Tigers would not come back to the table until they were able to reassert their control in the East. Did he think that was the case? Solheim said he did not agree. If the President met the LTTE demands on the agenda and ISGA, he said, the Tigers will come to the table. Solheim also said that Balasingham would resume his role as chief negotiator for the Tigers.


Lunstead said that though the Tigers seemed to be feeling some international pressure, but it was not clear if it had actually changed their behavior in any way.


Solheim’s assessment that neither side wants or is planning for a return to war was hopeful —if it was accurate, the UN envoy said adding that the Norwegian’s assessment that only the ISGA formulation remained as a roadblock to new talks could only be tested if the Government came around on that point. The US official
went on to assert that it was quite possible that the Tigers would just come up with new conditions.
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மே 18 2009

இத்தனை பக்கபலத்தோடும், கே. பத்மநாதன் உருத்திரகுமாரன் கும்பலின் காட்டிக்கொடுப்போடும், களமுனையில் நின்ற கருணாவுக்காதரவான தளபதிகளின் தகவல்களைத் திரட்டியும், அன்ரன் பாலசிங்கத்தைக் கொண்டு போராட்டத்தலைமையின் சிறுமுதலாளித்துவ ஊசலாட்டங்களின் விளைவான அரசியல் பலவீனங்களைப் பயன்படுத்தியும், ஒரு இனப்படுகொலையை நடத்தி விடுதலைப் புலிகளின் தனிநாட்டுக் கிளர்ச்சியை வெற்றி கொண்டுவிட்டதாக சிங்கள இனவெறிப் பாசிச சிறீலங்கா அரசு பிரகடனம் செய்திட்ட நாளாகும்.

முள்ளிவாய்க்கால் வீரகாவியம் படியுங்கள்! பரப்புங்கள்!
http://senthanal.blogspot.com/2010/05/18.html