அண்மைக்கால இலங்கை அரசின் பாதுகாப்பு செலவின உயர்வை எதைக் கொண்டு விளக்க முடியும்?
ஆசிய பசுபிக் பிராந்தியத்தை குறிப்பொருளாகக் கொண்டு இயங்கும் THE DIPLOMAT பத்திரிகைக்கு எழுதிய கட்டுரையில் Ana Pararajasingham இந்தக் கேள்வியை எழுப்பியுள்ளார்.ஈழத்தமிழ் அறிவிலிகளோடு ஒப்பிடுகையில் இந்தக் கேள்வியை எழுப்பியவர் உண்மையில் அதிகார பூர்வ தொண்டூழிய அறிவு ஜீவிதான்.
இதே காரணத்தினாலேயே அவர் எழுப்பிய காலத்தின் தேவையான நியாயமான கேள்விக்கு அவர் கண்டறியும் பதில் சற்றும் காலப் பொருத்தமற்று, தர்க்கமற்று அவரது அதிகார பூர்வ தொண்டூழிய அறிவு ஜீவித் தனத்தின் வங்குரோத்து நிலையையும் அம்பலப்படுத்தி நிற்கின்றது.
1) இலங்கையில் யுத்தம் ஓய்ந்த பின்னால் பாதுகாப்பு செலவினம் ஏறத்தாழ இருமடங்கு அதிகரித்துள்ளதாகவும்,
2) படைப்பெருக்கம் பெரு முதலீடுகளில் நடை பெறுவதாகவும்,
3) உலக விவகார கொள்கை சார்ந்து இலங்கையில் ஆட்சிக்கவிழ்ப்பு நடந்ததாகவும் இவர் ஆதாரங்களின் அடிப்படையில் நிரூபித்துள்ளார், மேலும் ஒத்துக் கொண்டுமுள்ளார், நன்றி!
ஆனால் இந்த அறிவு ஜீவி இலங்கையின் தற்காலப் படைப்பெருக்கம் இந்தியாவுக்கு எதிரான இலங்கையின் இராணுவ அணிவகுப்பு என அறுதியிட்டுக் கூறுகின்றார்.
இந்த அறியாமையை-திட்டமிட்ட புரட்டலை- திருத்திச் சொல்ல நாம் கடமைப்பட்டுள்ளோம்.
இந்த இலங்கையின் படைப்பெருக்கம் மூன்றாவது உலக மறுபங்கீட்டு போர்க்காலகட்டத்தில் `அமெரிக்க இந்திய முகாமின்` இராணுவக் காலனியாக இலங்கையைக் கட்டியெழுப்பும் ரணில் மைத்திரி பாசிசத்தின் பகிரங்க முயற்சியாகும் என புதிய ஈழப் புரட்சியாளர்களாகிய நாம் பிரகடனம் செய்கின்றோம்!
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Colombo’s Military Build-Up: A Strategy of Deterrence
What might explain the recent increase in defense spending?
December 30, 2015
Contrary to expectations that with the end of the civil war, Sri Lanka would reduce its spending on defense, Colombo has in fact increased its defense expenditure. Defense spending in 2009, the year the civil war ended with the comprehensive defeat of the Tamil Tigers, was Rs 175 billion ($1.2 billion). By 2011, this had risen to Rs 194 billion, and in 2013 it was Rs 235 billion. In late 2015, Colombo was looking to procure 18 to 24 new fighter aircraft to replace its obsolete fleet of MIG-21s by 2017. The budget allocation for defense in 2016 is Rs 307 billion.
Colombo’s 2009 victory over the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was achieved with heavy civilian casualties. Tens of thousands were killed and maimed. There was a purpose, to convince the survivors of the heavy price of war and remove the risk of any future uprising. Colombo was successful and knows it. Not only have thousands of Tamil Tiger soldiers been killed, but many thousands of former fighters and other young men and women have fled the country in fear of their lives Thousands of others are believed to be in government custody. Another uprising is highly unlikely.
Why then should Colombo spend a significant proportion of its GDP on defense, funds that could otherwise be spent on restoring the country’s war-ravaged economy? What exactly is the rationale for this exponential increase in defense spending?
If internal threats are non-existent, the threat must be external. From Colombo’s perspective, the major threat has always been its giant neighbour, India. It is a fear that has plagued Colombo since the late 1940s when Sri Lanka was about to be granted independence following Britain’s decision to relinquish India, the Jewel in the Crown. In 1947, Sri Lanka’s first Prime Minister, D. S. Senanayake, based the strategy of his country’s security on the assumption that the most likely threat to its independence would come from India. The British saw in these perceived fears a strategic advantage, linking the granting of independence to the island under a unitary constitution that gave the Sinhala majority enormous political power, while defense agreements gave Britain the use of naval and air bases in Trincomalee. The base in Trincomalee was of strategic significance to Britain, especially for securing links to Australia and New Zealand. D. S. Senanayake considered the unitary constitution as a safeguard against the Tamils federating with India, just as Ulster separated from the Irish Republic to federate with Britain, another of his fears and one that he shared with Lord Soulbury, the head of the commission appointed by the British to draft a constitution for the island.
Until the early 1980s, New Delhi sought to allay Sri Lanka’s fears through displays of generosity in bilateral relations. These included accepting in 1964 over half a million Tamils of Indian origin who had been disenfranchised by the Sri Lankan government in 1948; maintaining a cordial relationship with Sri Lanka despite the latter’s pro-Pakistan position during the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971; and conceding the disputed island of Kachatheevu to Sri Lanka in 1974.
By the early 1980s, however, India’s actions appeared to justify Sri Lanka’s suspicions when it armed and trained Tamil militants to exert pressure on Sri Lanka, which was showing clear signs of moving into the Western camp. These suspicions were only reinforced when India intervened directly in 1987 under the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord to deny the use of the Trincomalee Harbour to the U.S. and the setting up of a Voice of America broadcasting facility in Sri Lanka.
Although India provided Colombo with training and logistical support during Colombo’s final assault on the Tamil Tigers, this did not allay Colombo’s reservations about India. Colombo knows that New Delhi’s assistance to defeat the Tamil Tigers was to eliminate the organization that had assassinated Rajiv Gandhi, and was being made at the behest of Rajiv’s widow Sonia, who pledged full military support to Sri Lanka to achieve that goal.
Although Colombo’s war efforts had the support of New Delhi, it balanced that relationship by maintaining strong relationships with China and Pakistan. Without the help of the Chinese, who, in addition to their military aid, gave the Sri Lankan government diplomatic cover at the UN Security Council, Colombo could not have won the long-running civil war. Subsequently, when Colombo’s relationship with China grew stronger under President Mahinda Rajapaksa, Washington and New Delhi played a crucial role in bringing about a new government in Colombo. Sri Lanka’s new leader is decidedly pro-Western, but like all its predecessors, the new government has its reservations about New Delhi. A Crisis Group report in 2011 noted that with the LTTE gone, New Delhi’s capacity to influence Sri Lankan policy has been greatly reduced. Yet still Colombo mistrusts New Delhi. To many Sinhalese, India’s overt intervention in 1987, citing the plight of Tamils was a humiliating affair. At that time Sri Lanka’s armed forces were a fraction of their current strength, and were barely capable of dealing with the Tamil insurgency underway.
And so the victory over its internal foe, achieved with Chinese assistance, has provided Colombo with an opportunity to build up its forces as a deterrent against any future actions by what many Sinhalese perceive to be their external foe: India.
Ana Pararajasingham was Director-Programmes with the Centre for Just Peace and Democracy (CJPD) and is the author “Sri Lanka’s Endan gered Peace Process and the Way Forward” (2007).
The Joint Fighter-17 (JF-17) Thunder multi-role fighter was jointly developed by China and Pakistan. Development started in 1999. Most of the development was carried out in China by Chengdu, however development costs were split equally. It was reported that Russian Mikoyan design bureau provided some assistance in development of this aircraft. Aircraft made its maiden flight in 2003. Its official Chinese designation is the Fighter China-1 or FC-1 Xiaolong (Fiece Dragon). First 8 Chinese-built fighters were delivered to Pakistan in 2007 - 2008. In 2009 an order was signed for a further 42 fighters. These were license-produced locally by Pakistan Aeronautical Complex. By 2015 Pakistan Air Force operates 60 of these aircraft and production continues. It is estimated that total requirement of the Pakistani Air Force is for 250 new fighters. Currently Pakistan Air Force also operate a number of ageing A-5C, F-7P, Mirage 3 and Mirage 5 that a due to be replaced. This multi-role aircraft is also proposed for developing countries as a low-cost replacement for their ageing types. Recently Azerbaijan ordered 26 of these multi-role fighters.
It is worth mentioning that the FC-1 traces its origins to the Super-7 programme. It was a joint Chengdu-Grumman development project to upgrade the Chinese J-7 fighter. This programme was cancelled in 1990. China continued the Super-7 project and renamed the design as the FC-1.
The JF-17 Thunder has a conventional aerodynamic layout. Aircraft is fitted with Russian Klimov RD-93 turbofan engine with afterburner. It is a derivative of the RD-33, used on the MiG-29. In 2007 a contract was signed to supply 150 RD-93 engines for the JF-17, exported to Pakistan. China is also developing an indigenous turbofan engine, which is a copy of the RD-93, but has some modifications. It is designated as the WS-13 (Tianshan-21).
The Thunder multi-role fighters delivered to Pakistan are fitted with Italian Grifo S-7 multi-track, multi-mode pulse Doppler radar. It has look-down, shoot-down capability. Other radars can be fitted. Some sources claim, that aircraft are fitted with the Russian radars. Avionics systems will be gradually upgraded in later batches.
This aircraft is intended for air defense and ground attack missions. It is armed with a single 23-mm GSh-23 or 30-mm GSh-30 twin-barrel cannon. Maximum weapon payload is about 3.7 t. There are five hardpoints and two wingtips for missiles and fuel tanks. The JF-17 has beyond visual range attack capability. Its primary weapon are Chinese PL-12/SD-10 medium-range air-to-air missiles with active radar-homing. Aircraft also carries short-range Chinese PL-7, PL-8, PL-9 or US AIM-9P, mounted on wingtip rails. The JF-17 multi-role fighter can also carry general purpose of laser-guided bombs. Aircraft has no in-flight refueling capability.
In 2013 Pakistan began production of improved JF-17 Thunder (Block 2). It has improved countermeasures systems, in-flight refueling capability. Also this fighter aircraft can use more different weapons.
