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Tuesday, February 25, 2014

TEXT- HRC 2014 Report- Promoting reconciliation and accountability in Sri Lanka



A/HRC/25/23
Advance Edited Version
Distr.: General
24 February 2014

Original: English
Human Rights Council
Twenty-fifth session
Agenda item 2
Annual report of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights and reports of the Office of the
High Commissioner and the Secretary-General

Promoting reconciliation and accountability in Sri Lanka
          
Report of the Office of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Human Rights*
Summary
       In the present report, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights acknowledges the progress made in reconstruction and the implementation of some of the recommendations made by the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission. The Government of Sri Lanka has, however, failed to ensure independent and credible investigations into past violations of international human rights and humanitarian law. The report also contains updates on the ongoing attacks on religious minorities, and the harassment and intimidation of human rights defenders, lawyers and journalists.

The Government has not responded to the offers of technical assistance made by the High Commissioner and the special procedures. Meanwhile, new evidence continues to emerge on the events that took place in the final stages of the armed conflict. Against this background, the High Commissioner recommends the establishment of an independent, international inquiry mechanism, which would contribute to establishing the truth where domestic inquiry mechanisms have failed.

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Contents
                                                                                                                                                                             Paragraphs        Page
      I.      Introduction....................................................................................................... 1–2              3
     II.   Engagement of the Office of the High Commissioner and the special procedures....  3–11            3
    III.   Recent human rights developments...................................................................... 12–26            5
            A.     Former combatants and detainees............................................................... 16–19           6
            B.      Attacks on religious minorities, human rights defenders and freedom of
                      opinion and expression.............................................................................. 20–22           6
             C.      Extrajudicial, summary and arbitrary killings............................................... 23–24          7
             D.     Mass graves............................................................................ ................. 25–26          8
     IV.      Implementation of the recommendations of the Lessons Learnt and
                Reconciliation Commission............................................................ ................. 27–35           8
     V.      Progress in accountability issues...................................................... ................. 36–64           10
              A.     Domestic initiatives.................................................................................   36–46           10
              B.      Emblematic cases..................................................................................   47–64           12
   VI.      Conclusions and recommendations...................................................................  65–75           16
                         A.     Conclusions.................................................................................. 65–73           16
                         B.      Recommendations........................................................................ 74-75           18
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I.     Introduction

1.    The present report is submitted pursuant to Human Rights Council resolution 22/1, in which the Council encouraged the Government of Sri Lanka to implement the constructive recommendations of the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission,[1] as well as those made by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in her report,[2] and to conduct an independent and credible investigation into allegations of violations of international human rights and humanitarian law.[3]

2.    In resolution 22/1, the Human Rights Council also encouraged the Government of Sri Lanka to take all necessary additional steps to fulfil its relevant legal obligations and commitment to initiate credible and independent actions to ensure justice, equity, accountability and reconciliation for all Sri Lankans, and to cooperate with the special procedures. It also encouraged the Office of the High Commissioner (OHCHR) and relevant special procedures mandate holders to provide advice and technical assistance on implementing the above-mentioned steps. Lastly, the Council requested OHCHR to present a comprehensive report on the implementation of the resolution at its twenty-fifth session, with input from relevant special procedures.

        II.    Engagement by the Office of the High Commissioner and the special procedures

3.    At the invitation of the Government, the High Commissioner visited Sri Lanka from 25 to 31 August 2013. In accordance with the request made by the Human Rights Council in resolution 21/1, she presented an oral update on the situation to the Council at its twenty-fourth session (A/HRC/24/CRP.3/Rev.1), in which she suggested concrete steps that the Government could take that could help the Council to assess progress made in the areas identified by the Council in resolution 22/1 by the time of its twenty-fifth session. These included inviting the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances and the Independent Expert on minority issues; demonstrating a credible national investigation process with tangible results, including the successful prosecution of individual perpetrators; and setting a clear timeline for disengagement of the military from activities that are meant to be civilian. Regrettably, none of these steps had been taken by the end of the period of review.

4.    The Government of Sri Lanka did not respond positively to the offer of technical assistance made by the High Commissioner following an OHCHR technical mission to Sri Lanka in November 2012. On 31 October 2013, following her visit to Sri Lanka, the High Commissioner again addressed a letter to the Minister for External Affairs and other officials in which she reiterated the readiness of her Office to provide technical assistance. The areas of possible assistance highlighted by the High Commissioner were in line with some of the recommendations accepted by the Government during its universal periodic review and with those made by the Secretary-General’s Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka.[4] The High Commissioner regrets that she has received no response.

5.    With regard to the issue of disappearances, the High Commissioner urged the Government to invite the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, to ratify the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, and to finalize measures to criminalize disappearances in national law.

6.    With regard to criminal justice and accountability, the High Commissioner offered technical assistance in various areas, including draft legislation on hate speech and witness and victim protection, to ensure compliance with relevant international standards. In relation to some long outstanding criminal investigations, the High Commissioner offered to identify international experts who could assist the national inquiries.

7.    Furthermore, the High Commissioner offered to provide technical advice on how truth-seeking mechanisms and reparations policies could be developed in accordance with international standards.

8.    On 17 December 2013, the Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights met with the Secretary of Defence of Sri Lanka, in New York, and reiterated the High Commissioner’s offer of technical cooperation. Subsequently, on 20 January 2014, the High Commissioner met with the Secretary to the President, Lalith Weerathunga, in Geneva.

9.    There are currently nine outstanding requests to visit Sri Lanka by special procedures: on minority issues; freedom of peaceful assembly and of association; freedom of opinion and expression; extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions; enforced or involuntary disappearances; human rights defenders; independence of judges and lawyers; discrimination against women in law and practice; and truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence. In October 2013, the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances and the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association followed up on their requests to visit or made specific offers of technical assistance. These requests remain pending. Since January 2012, the Government has transmitted responses on 842 cases to the Working Group dating back to the 1990s.

10.  At the invitation of the Government, the Special Rapporteur on the rights of internally displaced persons visited Sri Lanka from 2 to 6 December 2013 (see also para. 14 below). In August 2013, the Special Rapporteur on the right to education received an invitation from the Government, but had to defer his visit owing to conflicting engagements. The Government has since extended an invitation to the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants to visit the country in May 2014.

11.  The High Commissioner welcomes the Government’s engagement in these important issues, but reiterates her calls to invite the special procedures on enforced or involuntary disappearances and minority issues as a matter of priority, considering that these issues featured prominently in the recommendations made by the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission and have also been identified by the Human Rights Council as key concerns.

      III.    Recent human rights developments

12.  In her oral update to the Human Rights Council at its twenty-fourth session, the High Commissioner acknowledged the achievements made by the Government, with the help of the international community, in demining, resettlement, reconstruction and rehabilitation since 2009. She welcomed the elections to the Northern Provincial Council in September 2013, and recommended that the Government should work with new provincial authorities to promote meaningful community participation in reconstruction and development programmes. She however also highlighted pressing concerns, including the lack of progress in accountability for serious human rights violations; the situation of detainees and former combatants, with regard to extrajudicial, summary and arbitrary killings; continued militarization[5] and compulsory land acquisition[6] (particularly in the north and east of the country); shrinking space for civil society and the media; rising religious intolerance; and the undermining of independent institutions, including the judiciary.

13.  Following his visit in December 2013, the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced persons also acknowledged the reconstruction effort, but emphasized the need to promote durable solutions and to address the protection of women and girls, access to land, and the withdrawal of the military from all civilian functions.[7]

14.  In its comments on a draft version of the present report, the Government of Sri Lanka stated that, since 2009, the total strength of the military had been reduced by approximately 30 per cent in the Northern Province, and by 26 per cent in the Eastern Province, and the vast majority of checkpoints had been removed. It added that a total of 20,011 acres of private land and 5,740 acres of State land had been released in the two provinces. The High Commissioner noted, however, reports that more than 6,000 acres of private land had been acquired by the State in Jaffna around the Palaly cantonement, and that more than 2,000 petitioners had taken legal action to reclaim their land.[8] The Government stated that steps were being taken to compensate the owners.

15.  The High Commissioner remains concerned that non-governmental organizations are still required to register and report through a secretariat under the Ministry of Defence. She also draws attention to concerns that women are vulnerable to sexual harassment and violence when there is a heavy military presence.[9] For instance, in May 2013, a soldier attached to an army camp in Nedunkerny reportedly confessed to raping a 6-year-old child. In its comments on the present report, the Government reported that the military had taken strict action in such cases.

           A.     Former combatants and detainees

16.  During the visit of the High Commissioner, the Government informed her that more than 11,758 former combatants had been rehabilitated and reintegrated into society, 234 detainees were undergoing rehabilitation, and 91 detainees were facing legal proceedings. The Government also reported that the files of 977 detainees who had been held for long periods of time without charge had been opened, and that 160 files were pending a decision by the end of January 2014.[10]

17.  The High Commissioner welcomes such progress and urges the Government to expedite decision-making on pending cases by bringing charges, releasing or sending individuals for rehabilitation, and to ensure that lawyers have access to their clients.

18.  The High Commissioner again urges the Government to repeal the Prevention of Terrorism Act and the regulations promulgated under it, which allow for arbitrary detention.

19.  The High Commissioner notes with appreciation the Government’s report that all former child combatants had been reintegrated by May 2010 and been provided with formal education.[11] At the same time, she reminds the Government that, as highlighted in Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission recommendation 9.79, there has yet to be any prosecutions or trials for the war crime of child recruitment, including against former cadres of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and former paramilitary leaders now serving in the Government.

           B.     Attacks on religious minorities, human rights defenders and freedom of opinion and expression

20.  The High Commissioner remains deeply disturbed by the significant surge in attacks against religious minorities and the incitement of violence by Sinhala Buddhist nationalist groups, led predominantly by certain extremist Buddhist monks. She received reports from the Secretariat for Muslims, a non-governmental organization, according to which there were some 280 incidents of threats and violence against Muslims in 2013,[12] as well as attacks on mosques and places of business. Christian groups also reported more than 103 incidents of attacks on churches and Christians in 2013. After a lull prior to the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, five violent attacks led by Buddhist monks were reported against multiple churches in December 2013 and January 2014. In its comments on the present report, the Government cited 182 incidents affecting all religions, of which only 147 were reported to police. Although the Government stated that, the police had taken necessary action, in many cases perpetrators were readily identifiable in video footage, where police are seen standing as onlookers to the violence. The Government also reported that amending legislation to enhance existing provisions of the Penal Code and ICCPR Act with regard to hate speech had been prepared.

21.  OHCHR continues to receive complaints of widespread harassment and intimidation targeting human rights defenders, activists, lawyers and journalists, including reprisals against those who engage with the United Nations human rights mechanisms and OHCHR. The High Commissioner expressed grave concern at the harassment and intimidation against individuals or groups who met or attempted to meet with her, even months after her visit. OHCHR received reports of at least 10 serious cases involving targeting individuals and groups between the end of October and November 2013 in the run-up to and during the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting hosted by Sri Lanka. These included the case of a prominent human rights defender who, on 4 November, was the target of threats and derogatory remarks during a radio broadcast hosted by the State-owned Sri Lankan Broadcasting Corporation. In another instance, on 13 November, the police blocked buses carrying members of families of the disappeared as they were travelling to Colombo to participate in a human rights event and in a demonstration calling for accountability for enforced disappearances.

22.  Attacks against journalist and media outlets continued in 2013. Several incidents targeted the Tamil newspaper Uthayan: on 10 January, two distributers were attacked and copies of newspapers burned; on 13 April, armed men attacked employees and set fire to printing machines in the Jaffna office; and, on 11 July, armed men attacked the newsroom. On 24 August, an associate editor of the Sunday Leader was attacked by masked men at her home, and her computer was stolen in a subsequent break-in, on 8 September.

           C.     Extrajudicial, summary and arbitrary killings

23.  The High Commissioner and several special procedures mandate holders continued to follow developments in recent cases in which the apparent excessive use of force led to the death of unarmed protesters or of prison inmates. On 1 August 2013, approximately 6,000 residents of Weliweriya, a small suburb of Colombo, protested against the State’s failure to address community concerns about the contamination of their drinking water supply by a local factory. Army personnel were deployed in support of the police to control the protest, which had turned violent and reportedly used excessive force, leaving three people dead and many others with critical injuries.[13] On 2 August 2013, the Army Commander appointed a military court of inquiry into the incident. The court submitted its report on 21 August, but it has not been made public. On 30 August 2013, the Army announced that four senior officers had been relieved of their duties with immediate effect, although no court martial has been initiated.[14] The factory has since been relocated and compensation offered to the families of those killed.

24.  On 12 November 2012, the Ministry of Rehabilitation and Prison Reforms appointed a committee to inquire into events in Welikada prison on 9 November 2012, when Special Task Force personnel conducted a search operation and army personnel subsequently intervened to control a riot; at least 27 inmates were killed and 43 injured.[15] The committee handed over its report to the Ministry of Rehabilitation and Prison Reforms on 15 January 2014, but it has not been published. According to media reports, it concludes that the prisoners shot each other. The Government informed the High Commissioner that a similar inquiry had been carried out into custodial deaths when security forces had stormed Vavuniya prison to free officials taken hostage by prisoners in June 2012, which was highlighted in her previous report,[16] but to date no report has been made public.

          D.     Mass graves

25.  On 26 November 2012, a mass grave with approximately 155 skeletal remains was uncovered in Matale, central Sri Lanka. In June 2013, a presidential commission of inquiry was appointed to probe the circumstances surrounding the gravesite, despite the initiation of a judicial process in the Matale Magistrate’s Court. There are concerns regarding the manner in which the remains are being preserved, the protection of the site and the investigation process.[17] In December 2013, it was reported that another gravesite with 52 skeletal remains, including of children, was discovered in Mannar, northern Sri Lanka.

26.  It is vital that the integrity of the sites, and exhumation and identification procedures, be given due attention. The rights of families to know the fate of their missing loved ones is critical, and they must be actively involved in the legal and humanitarian efforts to locate, exhume, rebury and memorialize the dead. In this context, an uncompromised exhumation and investigation process is essential, and could benefit from international assistance.

      IV.    Implementation of the recommendations of the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission

27.  In May 2012, the Cabinet appointed a presidential task force to monitor the implementation of the recommendations made by the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission. In July 2012, the task force issued a national plan of action for the implementation of some of the recommendations. The Government released its latest update on the implementation of the plan of action in January 2014.[18] The High Commissioner had the opportunity to discuss progress with the Secretary to the President on 20 January 2014.

28.  The High Commissioner welcomes the progress reported in implementing a number of recommendations made by the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission, for instance giving effect to the trilingual policy, promoting the official use of the Tamil language, the upgrading of schools in the northern and eastern provinces, and measures to promote ethnic diversity in schools and equity of access to higher education.

29.  Noting the breadth and depth of the full range of recommendations made by the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission, the High Commissioner has questioned the process and rationale for the Government’s selectivity in implementing only some of the recommendations. In some instances, as discussed below, she also observed that certain recommendations had been watered down in the national plan of action or during various stages of implementation.

30.  The Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission made approximately 285 recommendations. In the national plan of action, the Government pledged to support the implementation of 92 recommendations. In August 2013, it announced that it would implement an additional 53 recommendations,[19] bringing the total to 145 recommendations. At the universal periodic review of Sri Lanka in November 2012, the Government stated that some of the remaining Commission recommendations fell under the ambit and scope of the national plan of action for the protection and promotion of human rights (2011-2016), progress reports on which are not available in the public domain.

31.  In many instances, however, the specified activity in the national plan of action does not fully correspond to or address the recommendations made by the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission, or the activity has been only partially completed. For instance, while recommendation 9.73 calls for the investigation of allegations against illegal armed groups, the corresponding activity is the disarming of armed groups.[20]

32.  In other examples, recommendation 9.46 called upon the Government to direct law enforcement authorities to take immediate steps to ensure that allegations of abductions, enforced disappearances and arbitrary detention are properly investigated and perpetrators brought to justice. The corresponding activity identified by the Government does not respond to the call for investigations, but focuses on the capacity-building of police and community policing.[21] Recommendation 9.270 called for the establishment of interfaith mechanisms to facilitate early warning and prevention of communal or religious violence, but this is being implemented by civil defence committees established by the Ministry of Defence during the war.[22]

33.  Little progress has been made with other key recommendations relating to justice and accountability issues, a core concern for the Human Rights Council; for instance, recommendation 9.120 urged the Government to implement the recommendations of the report of the presidential commission of inquiry (the Udalagama Commission) appointed in 2006 to investigate alleged serious violations of human rights committed since August 2005,[23] particularly the killing of five students in Trincomalee, in January 2006, and of 17 aid workers of Action contre la Faim, in August 2006. Limited progress has been reported under the national plan of action on these two cases (see paras. 47 – 64 below); furthermore, the plan does not address any of the other 13 high-profile cases investigated by the Udalagama Commission, including the murder of a former Minister for Foreign Affairs and of other parliamentarians, and the disappearance of a Catholic priest.

34.  Recommendation 9.213 called upon the Government to investigate the serious allegations against illegal armed groups (some of which had operated as paramilitaries), and to prosecute and punish perpetrators irrespective of their political links. In the national plan of action, the Government reported that, as at January 2014, 76 suspects were being detained by the Terrorist Investigation Division, and that an investigation concerning some of them was ongoing.[24]

35.  While the paramilitary groups have largely been disbanded, no action has been taken to date in relation to two senior paramilitary leaders now serving in ministerial positions, Douglas Devananda and Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan (alias Karuna), or the former Chief Minister of the Eastern Province, Sivanesathurai Chandrakanthan (alias Pillaiyan), all of whom are linked to numerous allegations of serious crimes during the armed conflict.[25] Both Karuna and Pillaiyan were former LTTE commanders who subsequently formed the breakaway Karuna faction named in the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission as well as successive reports of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict as being responsible for child recruitment, a war crime.[26]

        V.    Progress in accountability issues
           
A.     Domestic initiatives

36.  In its resolution 22/1, the Human Rights Council called upon the Government to conduct an independent and credible investigation into allegations of violations of international human rights and humanitarian law and to take all necessary additional steps to fulfil its relevant legal obligations and commitment to initiate credible and independent actions to ensure justice, equity, accountability and reconciliation for all Sri Lankans. A number of the recommendations made by the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission also called for further investigation into specific cases and issues, in particular allegations of the indiscriminate killing of civilians and the summary execution of prisoners. To date, the Government has taken limited and piecemeal steps towards investigating serious allegations of violations of international human rights and humanitarian law, and none of these have had the independence or credibility required.

37.  The Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission recommended further investigations into, inter alia, the circumstances under which specific instances of death or injury to civilians could have occurred, and, that, if such investigations disclosed wrongful conduct, that perpetrators be prosecuted and punished, as well as into the Channel 4 video recordings to establish the truth of the allegations arising from them. The Commander of the Army convened a military court of inquiry in February 2012 to investigate and submit a report on the observations made by the Commission. Little, however, is known about the proceedings, as the court has been closed to the public and it has not issued any report.

38.  In its update of the national plan of action of January 2014, the Government reported that the court of inquiry of the Sri Lanka Army completed in February 2013 its investigation into the allegation of killings of civilians, and concluded that instances of shelling referred to in the report of the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission had not been caused by the Army, and that civilian causalities might have been due to unlawful acts by the LTTE. The Government reported that the second part of the investigation into allegations made in the Channel 4 video was under way.

39.  The High Commissioner has observed that military courts of inquiry do not have the necessary impartiality and independence to inspire confidence. The Commander of the Army who established the courts was also the commander of the security forces in the main battle zone of the conflict, and was actively engaged in the overall military planning and operations there. In cases of alleged human rights violations by the military or armed forces, investigations should be carried out by civilian authorities, not by the armed forces themselves.[27]

40.  According to the Government, the Census on Human and Property Damages due to Conflict, completed in December 2013, will shed light on the number of civilian deaths and injuries during the war, as well as on the fate of missing persons. The results are reportedly being analysed. The outcome of the census will not, however, provide a total picture of all those who have died or disappeared since 1982; for instance, data were collected only from the immediate family members of those dead or missing, thereby missing those cases where all family members had died, disappeared or left the country.

41.  Other issues for which the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission recommended further investigation remain unaddressed by the courts of inquiry or any other process. For instance, in paragraph 9.114 of its report, the Commission expressed deep concern at the persistent reports concerning the killing of journalists and other forms of attacks on journalists and media institutions, and the fact that these incidents still had to be conclusively investigated and perpetrators brought to justice.

42.  The High Commissioner is also concerned that legal proceedings have not begun against any LTTE suspect for alleged war crimes or other human rights abuses.

43.  In August 2013, the Government announced the appointment, by the President, of the new Commission of Inquiry on Disappearances. The Commission, which conducted its first public sittings from 18 to 21 January 2014, in Kilinochchi District, received approximately 13,700 complaints from all parts of the country.[28] The Government has also sought information from other countries concerning Sri Lankans who may now be abroad. The High Commissioner welcomes this effort, but notes that the Commission will only cover disappearances in the northern and eastern provinces between 1990 and 2009. Many disappearances reported in Colombo and other parts of the country in recent years will therefore not fall within its scope.

44.  In November 2013, the Government announced that the Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka would conduct a national inquiry into allegations of torture committed between 2009 and 2013, with the support of the Human Rights Division of the Commonwealth Secretariat. In early December 2013, the Commission announced that the inquiry had been postponed indefinitely.[29]

45.  In her previous report,[30] the High Commissioner recommended that Sri Lanka should establish a more comprehensive truth-seeking mechanism, which would build upon the recommendations of the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission. It is important to stress that any truth-seeking mechanism must fully comply with the State’s international legal obligations, and must be fully independent, including the selection of its members and budgetary considerations. It should enjoy the broadest possible mandate covering the entire period of the conflict and the whole territory. It should be based on a broad national consultation process, which should include the views of victims and survivors and of civil society organizations from all parts of the country. Lessons must be learned from the failure of past commissions of inquiry to ensure that any new mechanism enjoys the independence and powers necessary to be effective. For instance, any comprehensive truth mechanism should be established on a specific legislation meant for the mechanism, not under the currently flawed Commission of Inquiries Act.

46.  The High Commissioner notes that it would not be permissible for any truth mechanism to grant amnesties that prevent the prosecution of individuals who may be criminally responsible for war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity or gross violations of human rights, including gender-specific violations. A truth commission should consider seeking international support, for example special technical, legal and policy assistance, as well as the involvement of international investigators to assist the process. Lastly, any such truth commissions should be complemented by comprehensive and coherent transitional justice mechanisms and processes that include prosecution, reparations, vetting and other accountability or reform programmes.

           B.     Emblematic cases

47.  The failure of the Government to make any significant progress towards accountability is illustrated by the lack of independent and credible investigations into allegations of serious human rights violations in several emblematic cases. These cases have been repeatedly been drawn to the attention of the Human Rights Council by the High Commissioner and international human rights mechanisms. The Secretary-General’s Panel of Experts highlighted in its report many of these cases (paras. 149, 170 and 414), which were investigated by previous national commissions of inquiry and for which the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission also recommended further investigations. In some cases, the Government has repeatedly reported to the Council that progress had been made in investigations. None of these cases has, however, resulted in the perpetrators being brought to justice. These cases are only a small but representative sample of the grave allegations of serious human rights violations committed by the Government and the LTTE during the conflict that have yet to be investigated or remain unresolved.

                1.      The Trincomalee five

48.  On 2 January 2006, five students were allegedly beaten and executed by Sri Lankan security forces at the Trincomalee sea-front. The Trincomalee Magistrate’s Court concluded in its inquest that the deaths had been due to gunshot injuries, and directed the police to conduct further investigations and to bring the suspects to court. A number of special task force members at the scene were detained as suspects soon after the incident, but released the same year. Since then, the magistrate in Trincomalee has postponed the case on a monthly basis, requesting the Criminal Investigation Division to produce reports of its investigations. The Division has failed to do so and has not provided justifiable reasons for the delay. Several witnesses and their family members fled the country after receiving threats.[31]

49.  In 2006 and 2007, the Trincomalee case was investigated by the Udalagama Commission, which was observed by an international independent group of eminent persons. The Government has never published the Commission’s report. The case was also investigated by the Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka at the time; its report, which concluded that security forces had been involved, first appeared in the public domain in January 2014.[32] The Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission had expressed dismay at the lack of follow-up to the findings of the Udalagama Commission, and recommended that the Government investigate the killings further.

50.  In 2013, the Government informed the Human Rights Council that the Attorney-General had instructed the police to commence a non-summary inquiry before judicial authorities. At the time, the Government noted that the matter “may be brought to a conclusion and is concrete evidence of our commitment to accountability”.[33]

51.  In June 2013, 12 Special Task Force officers were arrested and remanded in connection with the murders. The Senior Superintendent of Police, who was in command at the time, was not among them (he has since been promoted to Deputy Inspector General and returned to Trincomalee). The Attorney-General informed the High Commissioner in August 2013 that the anticipated time frame for proceedings of this kind was three months, but pointed out the difficulties in convincing witnesses to come forward. The officers were released on bail in October 2013. On 20 January 2014, during a meeting with the Secretary to the President, the Attorney-General’s Office informed the High Commissioner that evidence had been recorded from 14 witnesses, and affidavits examined from another seven. The Attorney-General’s Office has summonsed a further 14 witnesses, although had had difficulties contacting those outside the country. After eight years of investigations, commissions of inquiry and repeated commitments by the Government, it is of great concern that this case has not been brought to a conclusion.

                2.      Action contre la Faim

52.  On 4 August 2006, 17 aid workers from Action contre la Faim were executed at their office premises in Muttur, when the Government and LTTE were fighting for control of the town.[34]

53.  An inquest into the killings began in the Muttur Magistrate’s Court on 15 August 2006. In subsequent months, however, the case was transferred to Anuradhapura then to Kantale, and then back to Anuradhapura. In November 2007, the magistrate of Anuradhapura was transferred to another location and the case was sent back to the magistrate in Muttur (a different magistrate to the one who initially heard the case in August 2006), where it has since ground to a halt. Action contre la Faim lodged a complaint with the Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka, later complaining of its total ineffectiveness and lack of cooperation.[35]

54.  Credible and independent local and international organizations have conducted substantial inquiries into the case and made serious allegations about its mishandling by the Attorney-General’s Department, the police, the Judicial Medical Officer and the Ministry of Justice. They noted that officials had destroyed, removed and otherwise tampered with evidence. The families of the victims had been intimidated, threatened and, in some cases, encouraged to sign statements of withdrawal.[36]

55.  The case was also among those investigated by the Udalagama Commission in 2007/08, although its report has never been published. The Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission recommended that the Government should complete the investigation and prosecute those responsible. During the High Commissioner’s visit to Sri Lanka, the Attorney-General informed her that he had instructed his staff to re-examine archived files, while pointing out that the investigation was proceeding slowly. In its comments on the present report, the Government stated that a team of senior prosecutors continued to pursue various lines of inquiry, although it has not been possible to establish the identity of those responsible.

                3.      Executions of prisoners and those who surrendered

56.  Since the end of the armed conflict in 2009, video and photographic material have emerged depicting scenes from the last phase of the war, in which prisoners appear to have been killed upon their surrender or while in the custody of the security forces.

57.  In June 2011, the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions presented a technical report to the Human Rights Council that demonstrated the authenticity of portions of the video footage first broadcast by Channel 4 in August 2009.[37] On 10 September 2009, the Government had announced the outcome of its own technical analysis on the basis of which it disputed the previous findings of the Special Rapporteur. In response, the Special Rapporteur commissioned independent experts to undertake a technical analysis, which confirmed his initial conclusion. While the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission did not reach a firm conclusion on the authenticity of the material, it recommended that the Government should conduct further investigations. According to the Government, this is now the subject of a second stage of proceedings by the military court of inquiry, yet to be concluded.[38]

(a)               Balachandran Prabhakaran

58.  In February 2013, a series of photographs emerged depicting Balachandran Prabhakaran, the 12-year-old son of LTTE leader Villupillai Prabhakaran, sitting in a bunker, alive and apparently in the custody of Sri Lankan troops, then his apparently dead body lying on the ground, his chest pierced by bullets. The photographs were taken in May 2009, a few hours apart and with the same camera. The authorities have maintained that the boy was killed in cross-fire.

(b)               T. Thurairajasingham (alias Colonel Ramesh)

59.  Video and photographic material obtained by Channel 4 and other sources depict LTTE commander Colonel Ramesh being interrogated by Sri Lankan security forces, followed by still images of his mutilated dead body. According to several witness testimonies to the events surrounding the fate of Colonel Ramesh, he was in the custody of the security forces at the time of his death.

(c)               Shoba (alias Isaipriya)

60.  The analysis by the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions of the Channel 4 photographic and video material of the death of a high-profile member of the LTTE press and communications wing, Isaipriya, revealed the likelihood of summary execution by the army. The video and pictures showed that her clothing had been pulled away to reveal her bare body.[39] In November 2013, Channel 4 released new footage that shows her being captured alive by the army.

61.  With regard to each of the above three cases, the Government stated the authenticity of the footage and photographs remained unsubstantiated and unverified. Whether this has been the subject of any further investigation is unknown.

(d)               “White flag” incident

62.  The Secretary-General’s Panel of Experts examined allegations of extrajudicial executions of high-level LTTE leaders on 18 May 2009, despite assurances from the Government that they could safely surrender. High-ranking government and military officials have provided conflicting accounts of the events in rallies and international forums.[40] While the circumstances surrounding the incident remain uncertain, the Panel concluded that the LTTE leadership intended to surrender. Evidence of this incident continues to emerge through non-governmental sources from witnesses now located outside the country. In its report, the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission failed to critically analyse or investigate the “white flag” incident, but it cited testimonies from an army general and a government agent, who dismissed these allegations. In its comments on the present report, the Government stated that no further inquiries were being conducted into the incident owing to lack of credible evidence.

                4.      Prageeth Ekneligoda

63.  On 24 January 2010, a Sri Lankan journalist and cartoonist, Prageeth Ekneligoda, disappeared shortly after leaving work. A few days earlier, he had published an article critical of President Rajapaksa. Local residents told the Sri Lankan press that they had seen a white van without numbered plates close to his house around the time of his disappearance. In August 2009, Prageeth had already been abducted, then released the following day, with his abductors saying that they had made a mistake. This case is emblematic of the tens of thousands of cases of disappearance witnessed over the past 30 years in Sri Lanka and remain unresolved. The Ekneligoda case has been raised by the High Commissioner, the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, the Committee against Torture and the Secretary-General’s Panel of Experts. While the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission did not investigate this case, it made general recommendations that the Government investigate abductions, enforced disappearances and attacks on journalists.

64.  In June 2011, former Attorney-General (now Chief Justice) Mohan Peiris was ordered to appear at a habeas corpus hearing in the case after telling the Committee against Torture, in 2011, that Ekneligoda was living in a foreign country. At the hearing, Mohan Peiris admitted that he did not know Prageeth Ekneligoda’s whereabouts and said that his statement to the Committee had been based on the instructions received. Ekneligoda’s wife faced hostile questioning from State counsel over her activities at the Human Rights Council side event held in March 2012, in Geneva.[41] The Government has reported that a magisterial inquiry is in progress. This case, together with many of this kind, will not fall within the mandate of the new Commission of Inquiry on Disappearances, which is mandated to examine cases of disappearances only in the northern and eastern provinces.

      VI.    Conclusions and recommendations

        A.     Conclusions

65.  Despite the significant progress achieved in the physical aspects of resettlement and recovery, and the implementation of some of the recommendations made by the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission, the Government of Sri Lanka has yet to satisfy the call made by the Human Rights Council for a credible and independent investigation into the allegations of serious human rights violations that persist or to take the necessary steps to fulfil its legal obligations to ensure justice and redress.

66.  It is important for the Human Rights Council to recall the magnitude and gravity of the violations alleged to have been committed by the Government and the LTTE, which left many thousands of civilians killed, injured or missing. In its report, the Secretary-General’s Panel of Experts concluded that, if proven, some of these acts would amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity. During her visit to Sri Lanka in August 2013, the High Commissioner was struck by the overwhelming sense of grief and trauma among victims and survivors that, if left unaddressed, will continue to undermine confidence in the State and reconciliation.

67.  The Government has launched initiatives and established mechanisms, such as the military courts of inquiry and the Commission of Inquiry on Disappearances, but none of these have the independence to be effective or to inspire confidence among victims and witnesses. The military courts of inquiry lack independence and transparency and are limited in scope. Past commissions of inquiry have not always completed their mandate, their reports have not been published and their recommendations have not been implemented or followed by prosecutions. The Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka, although handling many routine cases, has a poor record in responding credibly to serious violations committed by the military and security forces.[42]

68.  For the past several years, Sri Lankan courts have been compromised by politicization and interference by the executive.[43] Cases or presiding magistrates and judges are often transferred from one court to other, thereby delaying judicial proceedings.[44] The High Commissioner heard from lawyers about large numbers of fundamental rights applications, including in cases of arbitrary detention and torture, that are discouraged or not given leave to proceed by the Supreme Court.[45]

69.  One consequence of this situation is the understandable reluctance of victims and witnesses to come forward in the absence of any effective system for their protection. In many cases, witnesses have been intimidated to discourage their giving testimony, and even killed. This has been a major constraint on criminal investigations, as well as on the work of previous commissions of inquiry and the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission. The Attorney-General himself informed the High Commissioner that the reluctance of witnesses to come forward was the main reason for the lack of progress in such emblematic cases as the ones concerning Trincomalee and Action contre la Faim.

70.  A bill on assistance and protection for victims of crime has been in preparation since 2007, and was tabled in Parliament in June 2008. The previous drafts contained many provisions that were not compliant with international human rights law. Although the Supreme Court recommended several amendments, it is not clear whether they were incorporated. According to the Government, the legislation is being finalized, even though the final version has yet to be released for public consultation.

71.  At the same time, new evidence -- including witness testimony, video and photographic material -- continues to emerge on the events that took place in the final stages of the armed conflict. Human remains are also still being discovered, for instance in Matale, in November 2012, and Mannar, in December 2013.

72.  As the emblematic cases highlighted above show, national mechanisms have consistently failed to establish the truth and achieve justice. The High Commissioner believes this can no longer be explained as a function of time or technical capacity, but that it is fundamentally a question of political will. The Secretary-General’s Panel of Experts and the initiatives taken by international non-governmental organizations have shown that witnesses are willing to come forward to testify to international inquiry mechanisms that they trust and can guarantee their protection. For this reason, the High Commissioner remains convinced that an independent, international inquiry would play a positive role in eliciting new information and establishing the truth where domestic inquiry mechanisms have failed. In the absence of a credible national process, she believes the international community has a duty to take further steps, which will advance the right to truth for all in Sri Lanka and create further opportunities for justice, accountability and redress.

73.  The High Commissioner reiterates her concern at the continuing trend of attacks on freedom of expression, peaceful assembly and association, particularly against human rights defenders, journalists and families of victims, the rising levels of religious intolerance, and continued militarization, which continue to undermine the environment where accountability and reconciliation can be achieved. She therefore reiterates and updates the recommendations made in her previous report to the Human Rights Council, most of which remain unimplemented.

           B.     Recommendations

74.  The High Commissioner recommends that the Human Rights Council establish an international inquiry mechanism to further investigate the alleged violations of international human rights and humanitarian law and monitor any domestic accountability processes. OHCHR stands ready to assist in such a process.

75.  The High Commissioner recommends that the Government of Sri Lanka:

            (a)        Finalize laws dealing with incitement to hatred, witness and victim protection, the right to information and the criminalization of enforced disappearances, and revise existing laws in accordance with international standards;

(b)      Repeal the Prevention of Terrorism Act and lift the regulations promulgated under it that allow for arbitrary detention;

(c)      Arrest, prosecute and punish perpetrators of attacks on minority communities, media and human rights defenders, and ensure protection of victims;

(d)      Undertake independent and credible criminal and forensic investigations with international assistance into all alleged violations of human rights and humanitarian law, including recently discovered mass graves;

(e)      Establish a truth-seeking mechanism and national reparations policy in accordance with international standards as an integral part of a more comprehensive and inclusive approach to transitional justice;

(f)      Broaden the scope and tenure of the Commission of Inquiry on Disappearances to encompass cases from all parts of the island and all periods of the history of disappearances;

(g)     Publish the final report of the military courts of inquiry, the presidential commission of inquiry of 2006 and the more recent commissions of inquiry to allow the evidence gathered to be evaluated;

(h)     Take further steps in demilitarization, ensure military disengagement from activities that are meant to be civilian, resolve land disputes and promote meaningful community participation in reconstruction and development;

(i)      Engage civil society and minority community representatives more fully in an inclusive and consultative process to support the implementation of the recommendations made by the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission;

(j)      Implement the Commission’s recommendation for a national day of commemoration, allow all citizens their right to hold individual or group commemorations, and hold national consultations on the design of appropriate memorialization for the victims of the war;

(k)     Give positive consideration to the offers of technical assistance made by the Office of the High Commissioner;

(l)      Invite special procedures mandate holders with outstanding requests to visit the country in 2014, particularly the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances and the Independent Expert on minority issues.
                                      

குறிப்பு: உருமாற்றத்தால் ஏற்பட்ட சில நுட்பப் பிறழ்வுகளுக்கு வருந்துகின்றோம் enb


                     [1]   The Commission was appointed in May 2010 by the President of Sri Lanka to investigate the facts and circumstances that led to the failure of the 2002 ceasefire agreement, the lessons to be learned from those events, and to suggest institutional, administrative and legislative measures to prevent any recurrence of such events, and to promote national unity and reconciliation among all communities. The report of the Commission is available from www.llrcaction.gov.lk/reports/en/Final_LLRC_Report_en.pdf.
                     [2]   A/HRC/22/38.
                     [3]   For the comments of the Government of Sri Lanka on the draft version of the present report, see A/HRC/25/G/9.
                     [4]   See www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/Sri_Lanka/POE_Report_Full.pdf.
                     [5]   See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), A Protection Assessment of Sri Lankan Internally Displaced Persons who have Returned, Relocated or are Locally Integrating (“Tool Three”), June 2013 (available from http://unhcr.lk/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Tool-Three-Final-Report-July-12-2013.pdf )figures 1.5, 1.6. & 1.7.
                     [6]   See case studies on Jaffna, Sampur and Weli Oya in Centre for Policy Alternatives, Politics, Policies and Practices with Land Acquisitions and Related Issues in the North and East of Sri Lanka, November 2013, available from www.cpalanka.org/policy-brief-politics-policies-and-practices-with-land-acquisitions-and-related-issues-in-the-north-and-east-of-sri-lanka/.
                     [7]   See the press release of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced persons after his visit to Sri Lanka from 2 to 6 December 2013, atwww.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=14086&LangID=E.
                     [9]   See UNHCR, A Protection Assessment of Sri Lankan Internally Displaced Persons (see footnote 5), figures 1.14, 1.15, 1.16 and 1.17.
                    [10]   See the National Plan of Action for the Implementation of LLRC Recommendations (available from www.llrcaction.gov.lk/npoa.html), IR (1a), p. 7.
                    [11]   Ibid., p. 11.
                    [12]   Statistics provided by the Secretariat for Muslims.
                    [13]   See Human Rights Watch, “Sri Lanka: Investigate ‘Clean Water’ Protest Deaths”, 9 August 2013, available from www.hrw.org/news/2013/08/09/sri-lanka-investigate-clean-water-protest-deaths; and Ministry of Defence and Urban Development, press communiqué, 30 August 2013, available from www.defence.lk/new.asp?fname=Press_Communique_Weliweriya_Incident_20130830_03.
                    [14]   See Ministry of Defence press communiqué (see footnote 13).
                    [15]   Centre for Policy Alternatives, A List of Commissions of Inquiry and Committees Appointed by the Government of Sri Lanka (2006-2012)”, 12 March 2012, available from www.cpalanka.org/a-list-of-commissions-of-inquiry-and-committees-appointed-by-the-government-of-sri-lanka-2006-2012/.
                    [16]   A/HRC/22/38, para. 21.
                    [17]   For instance, the Matale magistrate overseeing the inquiry was subsequently transferred – according to the Government, on disciplinary grounds – to Colombo.
                    [18]   Available from www.llrcaction.gov.lk/npoa.html.
                    [19]   See the press release of the Presidential Secretariat of Sri Lanka, 15 July 2013, at www.presidentsoffice.gov.lk/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=120:cabinet-approves-action-on-53-more-llrc-recommendations.
                    [20]   Other examples include recommendations 9.57 and 9.81.
                    [21]   There are similar issues with recommendations 9.73, 9.285 and 9.213.
                    [22]   The Government announced the reactivation of civil defence committees in August 2011; see www.defence.lk/new.asp?fname=20110824_01.
                    [23]   See Centre for Policy Alternatives, A List of Commissions of Inquiry and Committees” (see footnote 15).
                    [24]   See National Plan of Action (see footnote 10), p. 30.
                    [25]   See Human Rights Watch, “Sri Lanka: Probe into LTTE Crimes Should Start with Karuna”, 28 March 2013 (www.hrw.org/news/2013/03/28/sri-lanka-probe-ltte-crimes-should-start-karuna), and Amnesty International, Sri Lanka report, available from www.amnesty.org/en/region/sri-lanka/report-2010.
                    [26]   S/AC.51/2007/9. See also Human Rights Watch, Sri Lanka: Karuna Group Abducts Children for Combat”, 25 January 2007, available from www.hrw.org/news/2007/01/23/sri-lanka-karuna-group-abducts-children-combat.
                              [27]   See for example CCPR/C/79/Add.76, CCPR/CO/71/VEN, CCPR/CO/69/KGZ, CCPR/C/79/Add.104, CCPR/C/79/Add.86, para. 9, CCPR/C/79/Add.96, CCPR/C/79/Add.80, Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 40 (A/35/40), para. 249, and CAT/C/CR/31/1, para. 9 (d) (iii).
                    [28]   Ministry of Defence and Urban Development, “Commission probing disappearances receives 13,700 complaints”, 27 January 2014, available from www.defence.lk/new.asp?fname=Commission_probing_disappearances_receives_13700_complaints_20140127_07.
                    [29]   Ramanathan Ahilan, HRC Postpones Set Up Of Torture Commission On Alleged Requests By CSOs – Rights Now Asks Chairman To Name The Orgs”, Rights Now, 14 December 2013, available from www.rightsnow.net/?p=4347.
                    [30]   A/HRC/22/38.
                    [31]   See University Teachers for Human Rights (Jaffna), special report No. 30, 1 April 2008. Available from www.uthr.org/SpecialReports/Spreport30.htm.
                    [32]   Available from www.colombotelegraph.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/report-by-the-HRC-appointed-Special-Rapporteur.pdf.
                    [33]   Statement by the leader of the Sri Lanka delegation, Mahinda Samarasinghe, at the high-level segment of the twenty-second session of the Human Rights Council, available from https://extranet.ohchr.org/sites/hrc/HRCSessions/RegularSessions/22ndSession/OralStatements/Sri%20Lanka%20mtg%206.pdf.
       [34]   In its ruling addressed to the Sri Lankan Secretariat for Coordinating the Peace Process on 29 August 2006, the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission concluded that the Army was in control of the town at the time of the death of the aid workers.
                              [35]   Action contre la Faim, The Muttur massacre: a struggle for justice, study report, June 2008, available from www.actionagainsthunger.org/sites/default/files/publications/ACF-IN-Sri-Lanka-Advocacy-Report-6-18-08.pdf.
                    [36]   See University Teachers for Human Rights, special report No. 33, 4 August 2009, available from http://uthr.org/SpecialReports/spreport33.htm#_Toc237059512.
                    [37]   A/HRC/17/28/Add.1, appendix.
                    [38]   See National Plan of Action (see footnote 10), p. 2.
                    [39]   See Amnesty International, Sri Lanka: Briefing to Committee against Torture, October 2011 (available from www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ASA37/016/2011/si/2bb1bbe4-8ba5-4f37-82d0-70cbfec5bb2d/asa370162011en.pdf), p. 20,
                    [40]   See Frederica Jansz, “‘Gota ordered them to be shot’- General Sarath Fonseka”, Sunday Leader, 12 December 2010, available from www.thesundayleader.lk/2009/12/13/%E2%80%9Cgota-ordered-them-to-be-shot%E2%80%9D-%E2%80%93-general-sarath-fonseka/.
                    [41]   See A/HRC/21/18.
                    [42]   For example, the attack on the Vavuniya prisoners and subsequent custodial deaths, in June 2012; the prison riot and subsequent custodial deaths in Welikada prison, in November 2012; and excessive use of force and subsequent deaths in Weliweriya, in August 2013.
                    [43]   In her oral update to the Human Rights Council (A/HRC/24/CRP.3/Rev.1), the High Commissioner highlighted concerns about the degree to which the rule of law and independence of the judiciary had been undermined in Sri Lanka, notably by the 18th amendment and controversial impeachment of the 43rd Chief Justice in January 2013. The 18th amendment abolished the Constitutional Council, which once recommended appointments to the independent bodies, such as the Elections Commission, the Police Commission and the Human Rights Commission.
                    [44]   As seen, for example, in the transfer of the magistrate overseeing the case of the Matale mass graves.
                    [45]   For example, the Fundamental Rights application (SCFR115/2011) submitted by the parents of Ganeshan Nimalaruban, who died in custody following the attack on the prisoners in Vavuniya in June 2012.

Monday, February 24, 2014

எழு தமிழ் உயிர் காக்க, எழு தமிழ் உயிரே எழு!



மக்கள் ஜனநாயக இளைஞர் கழகம்

2011 செப்ரெம்பர் 12 தியாகிகள் தின ஆர்ப்பாட்டத்தில் ம.ஜ.இ.கழக மாநில அமைப்பாளர் தோழர் ஞானம் ஆற்றிய எழுவர் விடுதலை உரை.


மே 17 இயக்கம்.

தொடர்ச்சியாக 7 தமிழர்களை விடுதலை செய்ய,  இந்திய அரசு தடை செய்து வருகின்றது.பேரறிவாளன்,முருகன்,சாந்தன் ஆகிய மூவரையும் தூக்கிலிடக் கோரும் நபர்கள், ஊடகங்கள், கட்சிகள் அதிகமாக குரலை உயர்த்திக் கொண்டிருக்கின்றன. மூவரையும் தூக்கிலிட்டுக் கொலை செய்யவேண்டுமென்கிற வெறியை ஊட்டிக்கொண்டிருக்கிறார்கள். 

இவர்களை நாம் 
தடுத்தாக வேண்டும், 
எதிர்த்தாக வேண்டும், 
வென்றாக வேண்டும். 

இந்தப் போரில் தமிழர்கள் நாம் என்றும் தோற்கக் கூடாது. ஒருமுறை நாம் வலுவற்றவர்கள் என்று எதிரிக்கு உணர்த்திவிட்டோமென்றால், பின் ஒருபொழுதும் உலகம் நம்மை மதியாது. நாம் மேன்மேலும் மிதிக்கப்படுவோம், ஒடுக்கப்படுவோம். 

பெரும் திரளாக திரண்டு நின்று அடுத்த நீதிமன்ற அமர்விற்கு முன்பாக தமிழர்களின் ஆதரவினை திரட்டி காட்ட வேண்டும். மனித குலத்திற்கு எதிரான கும்பலுடன் நமக்கு நடக்கும் போரில் நாம் வெற்றி பெற்றாக வேண்டும். 

வரும் மார்ச் 2, ஞாயிற்றுக் கிழமை மாலை 4 மணிக்கு அற்புதம் அம்மாள் போராட்டத்தினை வெற்றிபெறச் செய்யவும் மற்றும் நமது ”தோழர்களின் விடுதலையை உடனே செய்” எனக் கோரி சென்னை மெரினாவில் ஒன்று கூடுவோம். 

ஏழு நிரபராதித் தமிழரை விடுதலை செய்!


தமிழகத்தின் உரிமையில் தலையிடாதே!


ராஜீவ் கொலையில் குற்றம் சாட்டப்பட்ட மக்கள் விரோத சுப்ரமணிய சாமியை கைது செய்து விசாரி!

கைகோர்ப்போம். 
அற்புதம் அம்மாளின் கண்ணீரை துடைப்போம். 
வெல்வோம் விடுதலையை. 
தமிழரை தலை நிமிரச் செய்வோம். 
”இந்திய அரசின் துரோகத்தினை மறக்க மாட்டோம்” என்போம். 

துரோகங்களை வெல்ல, தலை நிமிர்வோம். 
மார்ச் 2இல் அச்சமின்றி கைகோர்ப்போம்.

Thirumurugan Gandhi: 


நாம் தமிழர் கட்சி














தண்டனை குறைப்பை எதிர்த்து மத்திய அரசு சீராய்வு மனு தாக்கல் பதிவு செய்த நாள் - பெப்ரவரி 20, 2014, 9:34:47 PM மாற்றம் செய்த நாள் - பெப்ரவரி 20, 2014, 10:29:26 PM

ராஜிவ் காந்தி கொலை வழக்கில் பேரறிவாளன் உள்ளிட்ட 3 பேரின் தூக்கு தண்டனை ரத்து செய்யப்பட்டதை எதிர்த்து மத்திய அரசு உச்ச நீதிமன்றத்தில் மறு சீராய்வு மனு தாக்கல் செய்துள்ளது.
பேரறிவாளன், சாந்தன், முருகன் ஆகியோரை விடுவிக்கும் தமிழக அரசின் முடிவிற்கு தடை பெற்ற சில மணி நேரங்களிலேயே மறு ஆய்வு மனு தாக்கல் செய்யப்பட்டுள்ளது. அவசர அவசரமாக தாக்கல் செய்யப்பட்டுள்ள மனுவில், உச்சநீதிமன்றம் வழக்கின் அம்சங்களை கருத்தில் கொள்ள தவறிவிட்டதாக தெரிவிக்கப்பட்டுள்ளது.

மரண தண்டனையை ரத்து செய்ததன் மூலம் நீதிமன்றம் அரசின் அதிகார வரம்பில் தலையிட்டுள்ளதாகவும் மனுவில் குறிப்பிடப்பட்டுள்ளது. ஐந்து நபர் அமர்வு அளிக்க வேண்டிய தீர்ப்பை மூன்று நபர் அமர்வு அளித்துள்ளது சட்டவிரோதமானது என்றும் மத்திய அரசின் மறு சீராய்வு மனுவில் தெரிவிக்கப்பட்டுள்ளது.

ராஜிவ் காந்தி கொலை வழக்கில் பேரறிவாளன், சாந்தன், முருகன் ஆகியோரது மரண தண்டனையை ரத்து செய்து உச்சநீதிமன்றம் கடந்த 18ம் தேதி உத்தரவிட்டிருந்தது.
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Tamil Nadu government cannot take a unilateral decision

Legal experts are unanimous that the Tamil Nadu government cannot take a unilateral decision to order the release of seven convicts in the Rajiv Gandhi assassination case without the “effective consultation” of the Union government.

Eminent constitutional lawyer P.P. Rao said, “The case was investigated by the CBI under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, making consultation with the Centre mandatory.”

A top government law officer said the State would have to set up an advisory board to consider remission. There cannot be an automatic release.

Senior counsel K.T.S. Tulsi said the prisoners were entitled to be released “if their behaviour in jail has been good and there is nothing adverse”.
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``Ms.Jeyalalithaa's announcement was seen by many analysts as a strategic move to shore up local pro-Tamil sentiment before elections for the lower house of Parliament.``New York Times

Indian State Says it Will Release 7 convicted in Assassination plot

Sunday, February 23, 2014

ராஜீவ் கொலை ``விசாரணை``: விடையில்லா வினாக்கள்!



இராஜிவ் கொலை விசாரணை: விசாரிக்காத  விடயங்கள்!

1. 1991 ம் வருடம் மே மாதம் 21 ம் தேதி டெல்லியிலிருந்து தேர்தல் பிரச்சாரத்திற்குக் கிளம்பினார் ராஜீவ் காந்தி. அவர் ஒரிசா, ஆந்திரா வழியாக சென்னை வந்தார். தமிழ்நாடு காங்கிரஸ் கமிட்டியின் தலைவராக இருந்த வாழப்பாடி இராமமூர்த்தி அந்த இடத்தில் கூட்டம் நடத்த வேண்டாம் என சொல்லியும் ; ஏன் அங்கு கூட்டம் நடத்தப்பட்டது . ஸ்ரீபெரும்புதூருக்கு ராஜீவை எப்படியாவது வரவழைத்துவிட வேண்டும் என்று எங்காவது திட்டம் தீட்டப்பட்டதா?

2. புவனேஷ்வர், விசாகப்பட்டினம் ஆகிய இடங்களில் ராஜீவ் பிரச்சாரத்திற்கு சென்றபோது அவருடன் இருந்தவர் பாதுகாப்பு அதிகாரி ஓ.பி. சாகர். ஆனால் அவர் சென்னைக்கு ராஜீவுடன் வரவில்லை ஏன்?

3. பல்கேரிய நாட்டைச் சேர்ந்த தொலைக்காட்சிப் பத்திரிகையாளர்கள் ராஜீவ்காந்தியின் சுற்றுப் பயணத்தில் உடன் வந்தார்கள். அவர்களுடைய வேலை, ராஜீவ் பிரச்சாரத்தை வீடியோவில் பதிவு செய்வது. ஒரிஸாவிலும், ஆந்திராவிலும் ராஜீவ் செய்த முதல்கட்ட சுற்றுப் பயணத்தில் கலந்துகொண்ட அவர்கள், ராஜீவ் கலந்து கொள்ளும் பொதுக் கூட்டங்களுக்கு செல்லவில்லை. அவர்கள் பயணம் செய்த விசேஷ விமானத்தின் பைலட்டுடன் விசாகப்பட்டினத்தில் ஒரு ஆடம்பர ஹோட்டலில் தங்கியிருந்தார்கள். அப்படியானால் அவர்கள் உடன் வந்த காரணம் என்ன?

4. ராஜீவ் கிளம்புகிற விமானத்தில் கோளாறு ஏற்பட்டது. உடனே விமான நிலையத்திலிருந்து சர்க்யூட் ஹவுசுக்குத் திரும்பினார் ராஜீவ். கோளாறு சரிசெய்யப்பட்டுவிட்டது என்கிற தகவல் அப்போதைய ஆந்திர முதல்வர் விஜயபாஸ்கர ரெட்டி மூலமாக கிடைத்தவுடன் விமான நிலையம் திரும்பினார் ராஜீவ். இந்தக் குழப்பத்தில் இந்த இரண்டு பல்கேரிய நாட்டு பத்திரிகையாளர்கள், பாதுகாப்பு அதிகாரி சாகரை தங்கள் காரில் ஏற்றிக் கொண்டு தாமதமாக விமான நிலையத்துக்கு வந்தார்கள். இதனால் ராஜீவுடன் விமானத்தில் பயணம் செய்ய சாகரால் முடியவில்லை. அனுபவம் மிக்க அந்தப் பாதுகாப்பு அதிகாரியை ராஜீவுடன் போகவிடாமல் செய்தது ஏன்?

5. சென்னையில் ராஜீவின் பாதுகாப்பு அதிகாரியாக செல்லவேண்டிய பி.சி.குப்தா, சென்னை விமான நிலையத்தில் ராஜீவுக்காக காத்திருந்தார். அதே விமானத்தில் வந்திருக்க வேண்டிய சாகரிடமிருந்து கைத்துப்பாக்கியை அவர் பெற்றுக் கொள்ள வேண்டும். ஆனால் சாகர் வராததால் கைத்துப்பாக்கி இல்லாமலேயே குப்தா, ராஜீவுடன் செல்ல நேர்ந்தது. இதற்கு ஏதாவது உள்நோக்கம் உண்டா?

6. ராஜீவ் மீனம்பாக்கத்திலிருந்து கிளம்பியவுடன் ராமாவரம் அருகே பத்திரிகையாளர்கள் என்ற பெயரில் இரண்டு பெண்கள் அவர் காரில் ஏறினார்கள். அவர்களுடைய அடையாளங்கள் சோதனைக்குள்ளானதா? இன்றுவரை அவர்களை ஏன் விசேஷப் புலனாய்வுத்துறை விசாரிக்கவில்லை?

7. யார் அந்த பல்கேரியர்கள்? அவர்கள் எங்கு சென்றார்கள்? யார் அந்த இரண்டு அயல்நாட்டு பெண் பத்திரிகையாளர்கள்? அவர்கள் எங்கு சென்றார்கள்?

8. அந்த இரண்டு பத்திரிகையாளர்களும் ராஜீவை பேட்டி கண்டார்கள். ஆனால் தா .பாண்டியனும், மரகதம் சந்திரசேகரும் அவர்கள் என்ன பேசினார்கள் என்பது தெரியாது என்றார்கள். இவர்கள் எதை மறைக்க முயலுகிறார்கள்? ஏன்?

9. மூன்றாவது உலக நாடுகளின் தலைவர்களை அப்புறப்படுத்துவதில் அமெரிக்க உளவு நிறுவனமான சி.ஐ.ஏ. வுக்கு அதிக அக்கறை உண்டு. அந்த எண்ணம் ராஜீவ் விஷயத்தில் இருந்ததா?

10. தான் கொலை செய்யப்படுவதற்கு ஒரு மணி நேரத்திற்கு முன்பு, பாகிஸ்தான் ஜனாதிபதி ஜியா-உல்-ஹக்கை கொன்றது சி.ஐ.ஏ.தான் என்றார் ராஜீவ். அவர் ஏன் அப்படிச் சொல்ல வேண்டும்? அவரை சொல்லத் தூண்டிய காரணம் என்ன? தனக்கெதிராகவும் இப்படி ஒரு திட்டம் இருக்கலாம் என்பது அவருக்கு முன்கூட்டியே தெரியுமா?

11. 1991 ஜுலை மாதம் அன்றைய மத்திய உள்துறை அமைச்சர் எஸ்.பி. சவான், எல்.டி.டி.ஈ.யைத் தவிர வேறு சில சர்வதேச நிறுவனங்களும், பலம் வாய்ந்த வெளிநாட்டு சக்திகளும் ராஜீவ் கொலையின் பின்னணியில் இருக்கிறார்கள் என்றார். உள்துறை அமைச்சர் அப்படி சொல்லக்காரணம் என்ன என்பதை விசேஷ புலனாய்வுத்துறை ஏன் விசாரிக்கவில்லை?

12. வளைகுடா போரின்போது அமெரிக்க விமானங்களுக்கு இந்தியா எரிபொருள் கொடுத்து உதவியது. இந்த உதவியைச் செய்த சந்திரசேகர் அரசைக் கடுமையாகக் கண்டித்தார் ராஜீவ் காந்தி. அமெரிக்காவிற்கு இதனால் ராஜீவ் மீது ஏற்பட்ட கோபத்தையும், இந்தக் கொலையின் பின்னணியில் சி.ஐ.ஏ.வுக்கு பங்கு உண்டா என்பதையும் ஏன் புலனாய்வுத்துறை விசாரிக்கவில்லை?

13. பாலஸ்தீன விடுதலை இயக்கத் தலைவர் அராபத், 'ராஜீவ் உயிருக்கு ஆபத்து இருக்கிறது' என்று அன்றைய பிரதமர் சந்திரசேகரிடம் தெரிவித்தார். 'அவருக்கு இந்தத் தகவல் எங்கிருந்து கிடைத்தது? யார் மூலமாக ராஜீவுக்கு மிரட்டல்?' என்பதை ஏன் புலனாய்வுத் துறை விசாரிக்கவில்லை?

14. மேற்கு ஐரோப்பா, மத்திய கிழக்கு நாடுகளில் கொலைக்கான திட்டம் தீட்டப்பட்டிருந்தால் மட்டுமே அரபாத்திற்கு இந்தப் பின்னணி தெரிய வாய்ப்புண்டு!

15. மரகதம் சந்திரசேகர் ராஜீவ் காந்தியுடன் கூட்டம் நடந்த இடத்திற்கு வந்தார். அவருடைய மகள் லதா பிரியகுமார் அரக்கோணத்திலிருந்து வந்தார். அவரது மகன் லலித் சந்திரசேகர் மனைவி வினோதினியுடன் எங்கிருந்து வந்தார் என்பதை விளக்கவேயில்லை. வினோதினி இலங்கையைச் சேர்ந்த ஜூனியஸ் ஜெயவர்த்தனாவின் மகள் என்பது தெரிந்தும் அவரை ஏன் விசாரிக்கவில்லை? சம்பவ இடத்தில் அந்தக் குடும்பத்தினர் இருந்தும் அவர்களை ஏன் விசாரிக்கவில்லை?சிவராசனும்,தாணுவும் இராஜீவ் வளையத்தில்

செல்ல யார் உதவினார்கள் ? என்பது பற்றியும் இதுவரை தெரியவில்லை.

16. சிவராசனின் தாயாரும், வினோதினியின் தந்தையும் சிங்களவர்கள் தான். சம்பவ இடத்தில் அவர்கள் இருந்தார்கள். அவர்கள் இலங்கை ஜனாதிபதி பிரேமதாஸாவின் தூதுவர்களாக இருக்க வாய்ப்புண்டு. இந்திய அமைதிப்படை விவகாரத்தில் பிரேமதாஸாவுக்கு ராஜீவ் மீது கோபம் உண்டு. அந்தக் கோணத்தில் ஏன் விசாரணை செய்யப்படவில்லை?

17. விடுதலைப் புலிகள், இலங்கை அரசு இரண்டுக்கும் ஒரு விஷயத்தில் ஒற்றுமை உண்டு. இந்திய அமைதிப்படை இலங்கையில் நுழையக் காரணமாக இருந்த ராஜீவ் மீது இரு தரப்பினருக்கும் கோபமுண்டு. இந்த விஷயத்தில் எதிர்தரப்பு வழக்கறிஞர் சந்திரசேகர் விசேஷப் புலனாய்வுத் துறைக்கு ஒரு சவால் விட்டார். 'வினோதினியின் பூர்வீகம் என்ன? அவரும், அவர் குடும்பத்தினரும் அப்பாவிகள் என்பதை நிரூபித்தால் குற்றம் சாட்டப்பட்டவர்கள் அனைவருமே தானாகவே தங்கள் குற்றத்தை ஒப்புக் கொள்வார்கள் என்றார். இறுதிவரை அவர் சவால் ஏற்றுக் கொள்ளப்படவில்லை. சம்பந்தப்பட்டவர்கள் விசாரிக்கப்படவும் இல்லை.

18. காமினி திசநாயகா, அத்துலத்முதலி, விக்கிரமசிங்கே இவர்கள் எல்லாம் இலங்கையின் முக்கிய அரசியல்வாதிகள். இவர்கள் கொலை செய்யப்பட்ட போது அந்தப் பழி இலங்கை அதிபர் பிரேமதாஸாவின் மீது சுமத்தப்பட்டது. ராஜீவ் விஷயத்தில் ஏன் அந்தக் கோணத்தில் விசாரணை இல்லை?

19. புலிகளையும், அதன் தலைவர் பிரபாகரனையும் சம்பந்தப்படுத்த என்ன பலத்த ஆதாரம் புலனாய்வுத் துறையிடம் உள்ளது?

20. பொட்டுவும், சிவராசனும் ரேடியோ மூலம் பேசியதை விசேஷப் புலனாய்வுத்துறை கேட்டதாகச் சொல்லப்படுவது ஏன் ஒரு கற்பனையான ஆதாரமாக இருக்கக்கூடாது?

21. பல்வேறு நாட்டு ஆயுத வியாபாரிகள், பிரதமர் என்கிற முறையில் ராஜீவுடன் தொடர்பு வைத்திருந்தார்கள். கூலிப்படைகள் மூலமாக அவர்கள் ஏன் இந்தக் காரியத்தை செய்திருக்கக்கூடாது?

22. சிறப்பு விசாரணைக் குழு அமைத்து சந்திரா சுவாமி, சுப்பிரமணிய சுவாமி, சந்திரசேகர், ஆயுத விற்பனையாளர் கசோகி ஆகிய மூவரையும் ராஜீவ் கொலை வழக்கில் விசாரிக்க வேண்டும் என ஜெயின் கமிஷன் கூறியுள்ளதே? விசாரணை நடைபெற்றதா? அதன் முடிவு என்ன?

23. அரசாங்கமே ஏதும் ஒரு முடிவுக்கு வராத போது சுப்பிரமணிய சுவாமி மட்டும் விடுதலைப் புலிகள் தான் ராஜிவை கொன்றார்கள் என கூறியதன் மர்மம் என்ன? பல கோணங்களில் விசாரிக்கப்பட வேண்டிய ஒரு கொலைப் பின்னணியை விடுதலைப் புலிகள் கொன்றார்கள் என்ற ஒற்றை கோணத்தில் மட்டும் நடத்த வற்புறுத்திய கார்த்திகேயனின் நோக்கம் என்ன?

24. சிறப்பு விசாரணை அதிகாரி ரகோத்தமன் "இந்திய புலனாய்வு துறையின் இயக்குனராக இருந்த எம்.கே. நாராயணன் ராஜீவ் கொல்லப்பட்ட அந்த இடத்தில் பிடிக்கப்பட்ட வீடியோ டேப்பை தராமல் மறைக்கிறார்" என்ற பகிரங்கக் குற்றச்சாட்டுக்கு பதில் என்ன?

24-எ ).திருச்சி வேலுசாமி கூற்றுபடி சுப்ரமணிய சாமி இராஜீவ் படுகொலைக்கு ஒரு சில நிமிடங்களுக்கு முன்பே இராஜீவ் கொலைசெய்யப்பட்டார் என்று கூறியதை பற்றி ஏன் இதுவரை விசாரிக்கவில்லை.

25. ராஜீவ் கொலை வழக்கில் ஜெயின் மற்றும் வர்மா கமிஷன் அரசாங்கத்துக்கு கொடுத்த முக்கிய கோப்புகள் அடங்கிய (File No. 1/12014/5/91-IAS/DIII) எங்கே? சந்திராசாமியின் நெருங்கிய நண்பரும் அன்றைய பிரதம மந்திரியுமான நரசிம்ம ராவ் அந்த முக்கியக் கோப்புகளை அழித்ததின் மர்மம் என்ன? எந்த முக்கிய நாடுகளையும், நபரையும் காப்பதற்காக அந்த கோப்புகள் அழிக்கப்பட்டது?

26. வாழப்பாடி ஏற்றுக் கொள்ளவில்லை. மூப்பனார் அக்கறை காட்டவில்லை. ஆனால் மரகதம் சந்திரசேகர் மட்டும் டெல்லி சென்று ஏன் ஸ்ரீ பெரும்புதூருக்கு வரவேண்டும் என்று ராஜீவை வற்புறுத்தினார்?

27. மறுபடியும் அமைதிப்படை தங்கள் நாட்டில் நுழையலாம் என்கிற எண்ணத்தில் இந்தியாவுக்கு வலுவான தலைவர் இருக்கக்கூடாது என்று இலங்கை அரசு ஏன் நினைத்திருக்கக்கூடாது?

28. விமான நிலையத்தில் ராஜீவை சந்தித்தார் கவிஞர் காசி ஆனந்தன். அவர் பிரபாகரனிடமிருந்து ராஜீவுக்கு கொண்டு வந்த தகவல் என்ன? 'ஈழ விடுதலைக்கு ராஜீவின் உதவி தேவை” என்று பிரபாகரன் காசி ஆனந்தன் மூலமாக வேண்டுகோள் விடுத்திருந்தால் ஏன் அவரை பிரபாகரன் கொலை செய்ய வேண்டும்?

29. இந்தியா மற்றும் தமிழகத்தில்தான் தனக்கு அனுதாபமும், ஆதரவும் கிடைக்கும் என்பது பிரபாகரனுக்கு தெரியும். அப்படியிருக்கும்போது இந்த மக்களின் வெறுப்பை சம்பாதிக்கிற தவறைச் செய்து, நாட்டைவிட்டே துரத்தப்பட்டு தடை செய்யப்படுகிற அளவுக்கான முட்டாள் தனத்தையா பிரபாகரன் செய்தார்?

30. லதா கண்ணன், ராஜீவ் காந்தியை நிறுத்தி கவிதை படித்தார். அதுவே பக்கத்திலிருந்த தனு என்கிற மனிதகுண்டு வெடிக்கக் காரணமாக இருந்தது. ஏன் அவர் பெயர் குற்றவாளிப் பட்டியலில் இல்லை? லதா கண்ணனை பயன்படுத்தித்தான் தனு உள்ளே வந்தார்.

இறந்து போன ஹரிபாபு குற்றவாளி என்றால் லதா கண்ணனை ஏன் சேர்க்கவில்லை? இது சம்பந்தப்பட்டவர்கள் மீது புலனாய்வுத்துறைக்கு ஏன் இத்தனை பரிவு?

31. தனு, சுபா, சிவராசன் மூவரையும் ஸ்ரீ பெரும்புதூருக்கு அழைத்து வந்தவர் லதா பிரியகுமார் என்று கருதப்படுகிறது. குறிப்பாக பெண்கள் பகுதிக்கு அழைத்து வந்து லதா கண்ணனிடம் அவர்களுக்கு உதவும்படி சொன்னார். அவர் மீது ஏன் குற்றம் சுமத்தப்படவில்லை?

32. ராஜிவின் பயணத் திட்டத்தை தீட்டிய காங்கிரஸ் கட்சியை சேர்ந்த மார்கரெட் ஆல்வாவின் வேண்டுகோளுக்கிணங்கத்தான் சிவராசனுக்கு பெங்களூரில் வீட்டை வாடகைக்குக் கொடுத்ததாக ரெங்கநாதன் வாக்குமூலம் அளித்தார். இதில் உண்மை உண்டா என்பதை விசாரித்தார்களா?

33. வெளிநாட்டு உளவு நிறுவனத்தை சேர்ந்தவர்கள் சங்கேத மொழியில் சந்திராசாமி மற்றும் சுப்ரமணிய சாமியிடம் ராஜீவ் கொலை பற்றி நடத்திய உரையாடல் என்று பதிவு செய்து வைத்திருந்த முக்கிய ஆதாரம் ஒன்று பிரதமர் அலுவலக உயர் அதிகாரி தொலைத்துவிட்டதாக கூறுவது எப்படி?

34)தமிழ்நாடு காங்கிரஸ் கமிட்டி அந்த இடத்தில் கூட்டம் வேண்டாம் என்று மறுத்தபோதும் ,டெல்லி மேலிடத்தில் இருந்த மார்கிரெட் ஆல்வா அங்குதான் நடத்தியாகவேண்டும் என கூறியது,எப்படி என்று விசாரிக்கப்பட்டதா?

35. பெல்ட் பாம்(வெடிகுண்டு) தயாரிக்கப்பட்டது எங்கே, யார் தயாரித்தது, என்று இதுவரையில் விசாரிக்கவேயில்லை என சிறப்பு விசாரணை அதிகாரி ரகோத்தமன் தெரிவித்திருக்க வெடிகுண்டுக்கு பயன்படுத்தப்பட்ட பேட்டரி வாங்கிக்கொடுத்ததாக சொல்லி பேரறிவாளனுக்கு தூக்கு தண்டனை அறிவித்து 22 ஆண்டுகள் சிறையில் அடைத்திருப்பது எதனால்?

via: Thanigai Velan

Friday, February 21, 2014

A Report: Shocking revelation of Rajiv’s assassination

A Report on Shocking Revelations

File Photo: Rajiv Gandhi
Shocking revelation of Rajiv’s assassination

It is with the tragic assassination of former Prime Minister of India Mr. Rajiv Gandhi that the real face of the deep seated threat to the national security posed by long term and wider conspiracy came to lime light. But unfortunately, the reputed investigation agencies of the nation along with judiciary, succumbing to the acutely misguided public opinion and shoddily influenced by a long hatched conspiracy ended up naming few innocent individuals as being solely responsible for an unprecedented event demeaning national security.
This carefully orchestrated exercise in the guise of an investigation on the behest of the real murderers is trying to execute a few innocent civilians to sidetrack the attention of the entire nation away from the real conspirators of the murder. The initial actions from judiciary went on with the summary execution of all the 26 accused until it was stopped from doing so by the Supreme court of India following heavy criticism from legal experts terming it as ‘Judiciary’s Genocide’. Yet we are not far from a haze, biased and unfair investigation climate.

It is with great pain that we witness the greatest tragedy of our century that a great nation is being deceived that the hanging of a few innocents will save the nation from the clutches of cold-blooded anti-national conspirators and keep it safe and secure. The question remains, if the civilized society will ever wake up to the hard facts which are being hidden from public view with strenuous effort, only to save the real conspirators?

If the responsible and respected media of the nation reduce itself to a silent spectator, the nation will witness a judicial nightmare by hanging innocent civilians and saving real culprits, thus letting an anti-national conspiracy gain momentum posing a bigger threat to the security of the nation. The society and media will have to regret their inaction deeply in a day when the real conspirators go about executing their plan of destabilizing this nation of a billion people. We sincerely hope this does not become the situation.

There have been examples from the past for the media stepping in to bring a de-railed investigation back to track. Yet a daring reinvestigation by the media in this issue will be celebrated for ages as an unprecedented achievement by media in uncovering a massiveAnti-national conspiracy. Hence we sincerely urge the reputed media of this nation to roll up their sleeves and get into action by reinvestigating the bigger conspiracy and save the nation from its toughest threat till date by identifying the real conspirators behind the murder. There is no doubt that the entire nation will stand with the media in every step of its attempt to open up the deeper conspiracy spiraling the nation Key questions that raise suspicion on the fairness of SIT’s trial

1. The first natural question that comes to anyone who has been following Rajiv’s case is the strange unexplained reason as to why the entire investigation which ran for years need to be held under top secrecy. Most of the politically important cases of our time have been conducted in an open court letting the public and media witness the way in which the trial is being carried out. This becomes very important, given the fact that this trial is not about the killing of an individual but is about the threat against our national security.

2. The 50-day long opposition arguments blasted the SIT’s so-called evidences to ground demonstrating that they all are ‘cooked up’ storied to fit the prejudices of SIT. The SIT never bothered to respond to such a serious and substantiated claim against them. Instead they chose to intimidate and silence the opposition.

3. The unorthodox and unplanned visit by Rajiv to Sriperumbudur which was not in Tamilnadu Congress’s plan books was never investigated.

4. Rajiv’s experienced Security Officer O.P.Sagar gave a strange ‘miss’ to the flight with Rajiv to Chennai. This is stranger considering the long delay introduced by the flight’s technical snag which forced Rajiv to turn back to Circuit house and come back later to take his flight.

5. Unidentified Bulgarians claiming to be TV reporters accompanied Rajiv all along his campaign but ensured at all instances to ‘not-attend’ any of his public meetings. Isn’t it strange that TV reports who travelled so far missed the chance to records videos of a top leader’s public meetings. They later disappeared to nowhere, never to be seen again or to be interrogated.

6. Two unidentified women boarded Rajiv’s car near Ramapuram (enroute Sriperumbudur from airport) and they too disappear into thin air after the assassination, never to be found or interrogated. What forced the SIT ignore these strange events?

7. Except for the fact that some of the assassins are born in Yarlpanam and one of them had taken a photograph with Prabhakaran once upon a time, what made SIT believe they are/were LTTE operatives? Except for the promise that SIT did hear a telephonic conversation between Sivarasan and Pottu Amman (which again was not produced as a recorded evidence), what links Prabhakaran to this murder?

8. The assassination of Padhmanaba which happened in the same period as that of Rajiv’s, did not enroll Prabhakaran even as one of the accused while in Rajiv’s case he is the prime accused. Why would SIT add him to this case except to inject a ‘life’ to their allegations or to appease their controllers?

9. Why did SIT not consider the clearly reported facts that the assassins were heavily aided by Congress leaders in their entire process starting with Margaret Alwa (former General Secretary of Congress) forcing Renganathan to rent the house to Sivarasan and Latha Priyakumar breaking Security barriers for Dhanu and taking her to the most comfortable position to kill Rajiv and then ask Latha Kannan to help her further?

a. Marakatham Chandrasekar, mother of Latha Priyakumar who helped Dhanu and who declined to comment on Rajiv’s discussion with the foreigners though having travelled in the same car was never enquired

b. Vinothini who is Marakatham Chandrasekar’s daughter in law and the daughter of Jayawardene was at the site of assassination was not enquired even once. This is one of the key challenges posed by against SIT by opposition’s senior lawyers

c. Latha Kannan who stopped Rajiv from was walking towards the dais and created the necessary time delay for Dhanu to perform the assassination was never interrogated

d. Not even a single Congress leader was near Rajiv during the blast, though they have been fighting to stick around closer to him in all other public meetings.

10. Why SIT was never able to consider the fact that the Sinhalese & Srilankan government are pitched sharply against Rajiv for India’s involvement in their internal affairs through IPKF?

a. Congress peers could have seen him as a clear hurdle to their growth for having landed directly at PM’s seat only because of being Indira’s son

b. BJP could never come back to power as long as he is alive. Why they were not considered as a possible conspirator while the assassins had a place of origin with strong affinity to Hinduism?

Verma Commission’s Findings

1. Verma commission heavily criticized serious security lapses introduced by police & intelligence wings of state, central governments and also by Congress leaders

2. Ministerial committee which was instituted to review findings of Verma commission did not analyze any such aspects but quickly winded up after blaming four officers. Much to the demise of legal experts, the investigation against those officers was started long after they retired from service (when they enjoy impunity from any such investigation). The officers as if things have been pre-planned, did not panic. Instead they approached proper legal bodies and got the exceptions from enquiry

3. Credibility of M.K.Narayanan as IB director was questioned in length by Justice Verma for he
a. Rejected to produce original video recordings of the bomb explosion
b. Rejected to agree in writing that he attended the meeting that discussed Rajiv’s security immediately following the announcement of Parliament elections

4. Karthikeyan, the head of SIT also exhibited a suspicious behavior
a. He too rejected to show the original video recordings of the bomb blast even in the last sitting of Verma commission
b. A version presented by him had the last few critical minutes being heavily tampered with making it very haze to arrive at any conclusion
c. He is also reported for having rejected the existence of such a video initially even to an enquiry commission

Jain commission’s Findings

1. Jain commission shared the shock and disbelief of the entire nation when it got a response from the Home Ministry that the file containing original documents related to Verma commission is MISSING
a. A similar disappearance of important documents happened with CBI officer Kumar losing his briefcase full of internationally collected documents in London’s Heathrow airport. He did nothing but file a complaint with London police and was put to no disciplinary action.

2. The obstacles put up by the Congress to the proper working of the Jain commission is multi pronged
a. Attorney General filed a suit that the Jain commission does not have any AUTHORITY to enquire anyone who has been enquired by SIT before
b. It cannot accuse anyone else apart from those accused by SIT as per his claim
c. Law ministry from its part delayed the process by taking a whole year to send a response to Jain’s request for clarification
d. It also tried its best to limit Jain commission’s fair trial process by supporting the claim made by Attorney General

3. But the best of moves from Congress was with the filing of a case in Delhi high court against the validity of the G.O which installed the Jain commission
a. This prompted the HC to bring an interim stay to any enquiry by the Jain commission
b. This only lead to a delay as the HC reassured the powers of Jain commission to operate with independence and anyone it finds fit shall be called for enquiry
c. The Congress in a knee jerk reaction escalated the case to Supreme Court of India. It was rightly caught with the SC questioning its interest in promoting a PIL filed by a so-called individual Delhi Lawyer Mustaq.
d. Congress ended up withdrawing the case showing everyone that it is the Congress that acted as the real hand behind the PIL file by Mustaq. Why would Congress try to stall a legally established enquiry commission?

4. The most successful move by Congress against the Jain commission was with the threat to withdraw the support to IK Gujral government if Jain commission was left to exist anymore.
a. The minority government forced by Congress pulled the plug off the only fair trial mechanism
b. Jain commission was forced to submit a final report in 7 days
c. A minister called up Jain and asked him to present only a high level report and asked him not to present any Action Taken Report (ATR). This would mean that the report is not presented in Parliament and sent to the Secretariat of the respective ministries instead

5. Jain commission withstood the enormous pressure exerted by Congress and presented a detailed 2000 page report explaining the clear links that Chandraswami had with the assassination and SubramanianSwamy’s links with the assassination

6. Justice Jain also wrote to Home ministry about the threat received from various parties and the way SIT tried to intimidate the works of Jain commission

7. Later it came to light that Narasimha Rao in order to save his close friend Chandraswami made the files to disappear

8. The one who performed all these activities on the behest of Narasimha Rao is none other the Home minister P. Chidambaram

The entire process leads to greater suspicions on the activities of the SIT. These questions do remain!

1. Why only sympathizers of Tamil cause alone were interrogated, accused and convicted?
a. All 26 of the accused were Tamils or sympathizers of Tamils, 13 from India and 13 from Srilanka. Yet Tamils who had an anti-Tamil affinity were excused.

b. All 4 of the accused who were condemned to death were Tamils and sympathizers of Tamil cause

c. For example, Perarivalan who was convicted to death was charged that he bought a 9v battery for the assassin. The only evidence was the cash bill (to be retained safely in his pocket when police arrested his months later!) that was supposed to have been given by a road side petty shop. Does any roadside shop in India give a receipt even now for a 5 Rs purchase? How about 20 years before (in 1991), before the invent of computerized billing? While Perarivalan who was watching movie at the time of Rajiv’s death was enquired and finally convicted, Marakatham Chandrasekar and her daughter who helped the assassin to approach Rajiv and were present at the site of assassination left to go free?

2. People who played definite roles were never convicted, accused or even interrogated

3. Apart from the vicious intention in the SIT’s approach, there are also serious human right violations in the way the enquiry was done. SIT’s officer Thiyagarajan infamously indicated by the Kerala HC for turning Sister Abaya’s rape and murder case in to a suicide case was heavily criticized for his credibility as an investigation officer.

a. It is shocking to believe that the Supreme Court’s verdict to hang the accused was based on the confessional statements obtained through brutal tortures by this tainted officer

b. There are lot of evidences to believe that the SIT has been heavily biased by those who were in power

c. This is strengthened by the way in which SIT tried to substantiate a charge against life convict Robert Pias only by quoting that he had intentions to murder Rajiv since IPKF killed his 13 days old child by smashing the infant to the wall. The fact remained that the harmless Pias was taking refuge in India in an attempt to save his other kid

Rajiv Gandhi Assassination - Unanswered questions & unresolved puzzles

At a time when a great nation of a billion people is lead to believe that it has laid its hand on Rajiv’s murderers, we, as dutiful citizens of this country are heavily disturbed by the sheer negligence shown by all sections of the society in trying to understand the highly biased nature and the consequential intricacies of the trial carried on by CBI’s Special Investigation Team (SIT).

Winding the clocks back a little to 1990s and starting our reasoning process from the key deliberations of the opposition arguments in this case that ran for over 50 days, we attempt to portray some of the most shocking and revealing facts that were carefully hidden from the public attention until this very day.

In the hearings starting from the year 1993, this case ran for 50 months with 288 witnesses, 3000 documents from the Public prosecutor and 1000 documents supporting the opposition were presented in the court. The opposition arguments were delivered with a heavy presence of the officers from the Special Investigation Team and the Public prosecutors while the Tamilnadu Police stood guard for the proceedings but all through the investigation a completely secrecy was maintained.

Many of the questions raised during the opposition’s arguments remained unanswered. The way in which the investigation was done by the SIT leads to a suspicion that the investigation has been carefully mended to appease those in power.

Rajiv’s death is not just the murder of a VIP but is a bitter conspiracy that shattered the nation. It is the clear symptom of the deeper plans from the international powers which try to dominate the polity of this nation. That is precisely why these shocking events and the shortcomings in the investigation are very important and need to be analyzed.

The opposition arguments in this case were initiated by senior lawyer Mr. Duraisamy. He, in his initial argument, reportedly blew up all the ‘cooked up stories’ of the SIT before an intently listening court room. In a similar fashion, Mr. Ramadass in his 11 day opposition argument, brought to light many of the ‘made up stories’ in the SIT’s investigation report.

However the climax of the opposition argument came from the harsh elicitations from Mr. Chandrasekar. He, with highly convincing evidences and with a fully emotional flow of statements, blamed the SIT for having cooked the report to fit their preconceived ideas and notions. He went on even to challenge the SIT that, “If the SIT can prove the evidences against my questions, all my accused party men will accept all the claims made against them”. Thus the 50 day opposition argument has raised so many questions, most of the unanswered till date.

For a better understanding of the shortcomings in this investigation, the various strange happenings around the time of Rajiv’s murder have been grouped under few major categories.

1. The unorthodox circumstances leading to Rajiv’s appearance in the Sriperumbudur meeting pops up naturally as the first question.

a. Rajiv started his propaganda from Delhi and reached Chennai through Orissa and Andhra Pradesh. Yet the question remains as to why Rajiv would agree to attend the Sriperumbudur meeting which was not at all in the agenda of Tamilnadu Congress Party?

b. While other Senior Leaders of Tamilnadu Congress like Vazhappadi Ramamurthy and G.K.Mooppanaar showed no interest in bringing Rajiv for propaganda in Sriperumbudur, what made Mrs.Maragadham Chandrasekar to travel to Delhi to invite him? Did she fall prey to a larger conspiracy, unknowingly?

2. The second was with a ‘no-show’ from Rajiv’s security guard at a time when there was a definite threat to Rajiv’s life and the so-called reporters who popped up from nowhere and disappeared to nowhere but have always kept themselves at a safe distance from Rajiv during his Sriperumbudur visit.

a. When Rajiv was making his propaganda rounds in Bhuvaneshwar and Vishakapattinam, it was his Security officer O.P.Sagar who stood guard. Why did not he turn up for Chennai?

b. Unidentified television reporters from Bulgaria accompanied Rajiv in his propaganda. Their primary job was to make video recordings of Rajiv’s propaganda. Though they participated in the initial propaganda rounds of Rajiv in Orissa and Andhra, they chose to skip all of his public meetings. Instead they stayed back in their luxury hotel with the pilot of their special flight in Vishakapattinam. What could be the purpose of their visit if they are not covering his public meetings, which is supposed to be their key job?

c. In Vizag, Rajiv had to turn back to his Circuit House due to a technical snag in his flight. Rajiv returned to the flight after receiving the news through the then Andhra Pradesh Chief Minister Vijaya Baskara Reddy that the problem has been solved. In the midst of this mess, the two Bulgarian reporters reached the airport very late along with Rajiv’s Security Officer O.P.Sagar and consequentially missed the flight. Thus the security officer did not fly with Rajiv. What circumstances led an experienced officer like Sagar to miss the flight with Rajiv?

d. Meanwhile Rajiv reached Chennai without his security officer. The security officer who takes charge in Chennai P.C.Gupta who was waiting to receive Rajiv could not receive the Pistol from O.P.Sagar as the later did not come in that flight. As a result, Gupta traveled along with Rajiv with out the pistol.

e. After Rajiv left the Chennai Meenabakkam airport in his motorcade two so-called women journalists boarded Rajiv’s car near Ramavaram. Whether their identity was ever verified by SIT is still a question. Why they were not subjected to any kind of investigation is a bigger question.

f. Where are the Bulgarians? Who are the two foreign journalists and where did they go after the incident?

3. How Pirabaharan and LTTE were linked to this case without any acceptable evidence?

a. Except for the fact that Dhanu, Subha and Sivarasan all hail from Yalpanam(Jaffna), what made the SIT believe that they acted only on the behest of LTTE. Why they couldn’t have been hired by any other foreign power for this assassination? Why the SIT investigation around them was concluded only by linking them with LTTE and excluding any other possibility?

b. The SIT’s claim for having overheard a radio conversation between PottuAmman and Sivarasan seems to be an imaginary story built to sustain their stand. What is the proof for this claim?

c. There are many facts that can be derived by comparing Rajiv’s murder with that of Padhmanaba. While the latter’s murder was investigated by the Tamilnadu Q branch police, the SIT investigated Rajiv’s murder. Both the teams point the place of origin of the conspiracy to Yalpanam(Jaffna). While Sivarasan was a prime accused in both the cases, Pirabaharan was not an accused at all in Padhmanaba’s murder. It only leads us to a conclusion that the inclusion of Pirabahran’s name in Rajiv’s murder is not a consequence of any findings of investigation rather it seems to be truly politically motivated. The inclusion was done only with a cruel intention to add ‘life’ to this case.

d. India and especially Tamilnadu are well known vocal supporters and sympathizers of the liberation struggle of Tamils. Given this obvious fact, it will be a historical blunder to kill Rajiv in Tamilnadu and get themselves kicked out of India and face a legal ban, if ever they had such an intention. Will Pirabaharan, the leader of a liberation struggle of its stature be stupid enough to take such a decision?

e. How come an old photograph where Pirabaharan posed alongside Sivarasan is the only solid evidence to prove that Pirabaharan had a hand in this murder?

f. Even if Dhanu, Subha and Sivarasan had been with the LTTE earlier. What proves that they were associated with the LTTE at the time of assassination? Why they can’t have moved out of LTTE and acted as paid-assassins for any other Western, European or Indian mafia?

4. The most important question is with the strangest circumstances under which Congress leaders and their family members cleared all the security hurdles and lead the assassins and their aides gain such a close proximity with a former Prime Minister and the running Prime Ministerial candidate Rajiv. (In fact Dhanu was only at arm’s reach when the bomb exploded). This won’t have been possible even for long time Congress workers. This is accompanied by the unnatural silence maintained by Congress leaders about the questions lingering around the strange circumstances of the murder

a. The two so-called women foreign journalists interviewed Rajiv in the car, but Marakatham Chandrasekar who accompanied Rajiv in his car declined to comment stating that she did not know anything about the discussion. Why this strange behavior was not put to any investigation?

b. Maragadham Chandrasekar came to the venue of the Sriperumbudur Public meeting. Her daughter Latha Priyakumar came from Arakkonam along with her husband Lawyer Magendiran. Her son Lalith Chandrasekar came to the venue with his wife Vinothini. But they never revealed where they started from. Given the fact that Vinothini is the very daughter of Julius Jayewardene, why she was never interrogated? When the entire family was at the venue, why no one was ever interrogated?

c. Sivarasan’s mother and Vinothini’s father are Sinhalese. Both of them were at the murder site, why they can’t have acted on the behest of Srilankan Supremo Premadasa who has an apparent apprehension against Rajiv for having sent the IPKF to Srilanka.

d. Rajiv was intercepted on his way to the podium was interrupted for a while by Latha Kannan who read out a poem. It this timeframe, that was utilized by the assassin Dhanu to trigger the bomb. Why she was never included in the list of accused? Dhanu entered the security ring and got so close to Rajiv only using Latha Kannan. If Haribabu could be accused, why not Latha Kannan? Why should the SIT show such a blatantly kind attitude towards people who had a Congress connection?

e. Vazhappadi Ramamurthy, who accompanied Rajiv to the stage in the two street-corner meetings just preceding the Sriperumudur meeting, was too far from Rajiv in this meeting alone. Why is that?

f. Many innocent civilians and security personnel died alongside Rajiv but it is too strange to observe that not even a single Congress worker died or even had a minor injury in this incident?

g. It was considered that Latha Priyakumar brought Dhanu, Subha and Sivarasan to Sriperumbudur. More importantly Latha Priyakumar(Daughter of Maragadham Chandrasekar) brought them to the Women’s section and asked Latha Kannan to help them. Why she was never interrogated as to the purpose of letting them have access to former PM?

h. Renganathan testified that he rented the house out to Sivarasan only at the instance of Margaret Alwa. How was she related to Sivarasan? Was the validity of this claim ever verified by SIT?

5. Based on various statements by notable leaders, evidences and prevalent circumstances there are many possible conspirators. It is very strange that the Congress who should have had the biggest interest in uncovering this conspiracy never questioned the SIT for not considering those more probable alternatives?

a. Chandraswamy, Subramania Swamy (both accused by the Jain commission) and arms dealer Kasoki were all possible candidates for interrogation. Was any investigation done considering them?

b. During the Gulf war, India under leadership of Mr.Chandrasekar supplied fuel to the American fighter crafts. Rajiv heavily criticized this and there is every reason for America to be angry at Rajiv. Why there is no investigation done considering the possibility of a CIA hand behind the assassination?

c. Before being killed, Rajiv told that the CIA is responsible for the assassination of then Pakistani Prime Minister Zia-Ul-Huq. What forced him make such a statement? Did he suspect a similar attempt at his life as well by CIA?

d. In the aftermath during July 1991 the then Home Minister S.P.Chavan opined that there are other foreign groups and powers which are behind Rajiv’s assassination. Was any investigation done to assess the reason behind the Home Minister’s statement?

e. CIA, notorious for its interest in the departures of many of the third world leaders was never considered a possible conspirator. Why was that?

f. The leader of Palestinian liberation struggle Mr. Yasar Arafat warned the then PM Mr.Chandrasekar that there is a threat to Rajiv’s life. What was the source of this warning? Was there any investigation done in that direction? Considering the fact that the possibility of Mr.Yasar Arafat receiving any intelligence is possible only if the conspiracy was hatched in the Middle East or the Western Europe, did the SIT investigate such a possibility?

g. If there is one thing that the Srilankan government would share with the LTTE, it is the hatred towards Rajiv for messing up their lives in Srilanka by sending the IPKF. Considering this fact, the opposition lawyer Chandrasekar challenged the SIT that his party would accept all the claims against them if the SIT could prove that Vinothini and her family are innocent and they did not have anything to do in the murder. The SIT safely chose to skip this very important challenge from opposition and hence no one from that family was ever interrogated

h. The Srilankan government would have obviously been threatened by Rajiv’s statement that IPKF will make another visit to Srilanka if he came back to power. Why the possibility that they had an interest in his death, was never considered?

i. Premadasa was popularly blamed for the assassination of many of the political leaders of his time including Kamini Thissanayaka, Adhulath Mudhali and Vikrama Singhe. Why there was no investigation done considering this possibility?

j. Politicians with vested interest or even his party leaders who may find him as a hurdle in their political career could have used assassins to execute Rajiv out of political enmity. Why this angle was never considered?

k. Rajiv as a Prime Minister had close links with so many international weapon dealers. Why they couldn’t have had a hand in this assassination?

We don’t need reputed agencies like the CBI or SIT to conduct the investigation if the end result is only to file a report blaming a few individuals without considering any of the obvious possibilities.

Though we all agree that “not every question turns out to be a fact” But if these strong suspicious circumstances are not investigated there is every chance that the real conspirators protected by powerful groups get away easily. Those real culprits who go uncaught will turn out to be a true threat to the safety of the leaders of this nation.

Did the SIT ever perform an investigation or did they just prepare a report based on mere assumptions?

Verma Commission:

The Verma commission report strongly condemned the Security and Intelligence wings of both the Central and State governments of the time for the serious lapses in the security provided to Rajiv Gandhi.
Both Chandrasekar’s central government and the governor’s rule in Tamilnadu state are popularly considered to be Dummy governments run from under by Congress. The Verma commission blamed not just the Intelligence Bureau, Tamilnadu state government and its Police department but also the Congress party members for their sheer negligence of duty and lack of responsibility. The Verma commission made it very clear that the life of Rajiv could have been saved if they have done their duty properly.

The Ministerial Committee, established to review the Verma commission’s findings, winded up after they recommended disciplinary action against some senior officers who have failed to carry out their duty. The committee conducted face-to-face enquiry with four erring senior officers namely Head of Intelligence Bureau M.K. Narayanan, Home secretary G. Mani Sharma, Defense Secretary Vajpayee and Cabinet Secretary Vinod Pandey.

But the entire exercise is a big eye wash as anyone could understand. These officers were in service when the Verma commission submitted its recommendations, but the enquiry by the Congress Ministerial Committee was conducted after they retired from their service. It is a well managed drama in the guise of an enquiry where the involved Congress leaders are well aware of the fact that no disciplinary action can be taken against a public servant when they are not in service. As expected the involved officers approached legal bodies and got clear exceptions for omitting them for any sort of enquiry. Thus the Congress has clearly, with a meticulous plan, made sure none of Verma commission’s recommendations were implemented and also ensured that the involved officers are not subject to any disciplinary action.

The Verma commission raised very strong suspicions against the credibility of M.K.Narayanan as the Director of IB.

This claim is not without substance. In 1991 after the Parliament election was announced, a meeting was organized by Mr.Bargava –Home Secretary. MK Narayanan also participated in that meeting in which security of Rajiv Gandhi was discussed. Asst. Home Secretary NK Singh told the Verma Commission that MK Narayanan knows the details of Rajiv Gandhi‘s security. But MK Narayanan refused his presence in the meeting. When Verma commission asked both of them to give it in writing about their participation NK Singh gave it in writing confirming his participation, but MK Narayanan refused to give it in writing.
A copy of the original video taken exactly at time of the blast was with the IB director Mr.M.K.Narayanan apart from the one with SIT. Both Narayanan and SIT declined to submit the original video to the Verma commission. The SIT head Mr.Karthikeyan even claimed that no such video recording ever existed, as per the statements recorded in the Verma commission’s reports. Then the commission was reported by Karthikeyan that the video is being investigated by international experts to see if there are any deletions in the video. It is a shocking fact that the original version of the video was never submitted to the commission. Even in the last sitting of the commission’s enquiry process, Mr. Verma insisted on the missing original video. Mr.Karthikeyan maintained the same response that the video is still being investigated by foreign experts.
Verma in his report made it very clear that the video clippings of the final moments of assassination, shown later, where Rajiv was garlanded by Dhanu and when the bomb was detonated have been intentionally highly distorted and tampered with. Justice Verma raised an obvious question as to why the last few seconds of the video alone were blurred.

On 20th May, a day before the execution of Rajiv, the then Joint Director of IB wrote a letter to the Chiefs of all Police departments of all states requesting them to increase the security provided to Rajiv. Did he know that the assassins are closing in on Rajiv? If so why there was no alarm raised to stop this assassination?

Jain commission

1. Justice Jain as a preparatory step for his enquiry decided to set the periphery of the investigation. To enable this, he requested the file containing the original reports from the government that established the Verma commission. In a reply that shocked the entire nation especially Justice Jain, the Home Ministry reported that the file is MISSING.

a. Parliament was engulfed with chaos as members came down heavily on the government for its sheer negligence. A Special team was installed for SEARCHING the file.

b. Probably this is the first event in independent India where a Special Team was formed only to search for a file. The special team after filtering through all possible layers of all the responsible departments of the government includingthe PMO, law ministry and Home ministry ended up with empty hands. The Narasimha Rao government declared that they were not able to find the file

c. This curious case of a critical file missing from the government’s racks stalled the entire enquiry process by a whole year.

2. Later the Congress tried it best to interrupt the operation of Jain commission when it resumed its operation with the Public opinion hearings for the first time.

a. Immediately, in an unbelievable move, the Attorney General of the central government raised questions about the AUTHORITY of the Jain commission. Justice Jain demanded a written clarification from the Law Ministry.

b. The law ministry showing a complete lack of responsibility took a whole year to respond to Justice Jain.

c. In its response the Law Ministry introduced clear hurdles to the commission by ruling that the commission cannot get involved in any of the areas in which the investigation has already been done by the CBI’s SIT. Also it declared that the Jain commission does not have any authority to call for hearing anyone who has appeared before the SIT earlier.

d. Justice Jain refused to accept the rulings of the law ministry and explained that the commission has the right to enquire all aspects of the case when it enquires about the possibility of an ‘external conspiracy’. In a 60 page response to the Law ministry, Justice Jain ruled that the commission has every right to monitor the operations of the CBI and also to enquire any possible shortcomings in the CBI’s operations.

e. The Central government in turn demanded the Jain commission to change its stance to meet the expectations set earlier in the Law Ministry’s response limiting the Jain commission. It also requested to freeze the enquiry for an interim period. Jain strongly rejected any such halting of enquiry.

3. Since the government was not able to contain Jain through intimidation, various legal blockades were created against the commission’s operation.

a. The most important one was with a ‘PIL’ filed by a Delhi Lawyer Mustaq Ahamed challenging to nullify the G.O which installed the Jain commission.

b. He argued that the Jain commission cannot do a reinvestigation of the case or re-enquire the witnesses since the CBI has already done the enquiry and has even submitted its report. He added that if there is anyone else accused apart from those accused by the CBI, it will hinder the course of the case and will have negative reactions.

c. The Delhi high court which accepted the case for further investigation, issued an interim order prohibiting the Jain commission from enquiring anyone who has been a witness or has been issued charge sheet by the SIT.

d. Though the High court which investigated the PIL further, after the detailed hearings, did not find any merit in the case filed by Mustaq and rejected the suit and re-confirmed the authority of the Jain commission to call on any of the witness for a re-enquiry.

4. The Congress, in an obvious knee jerk reaction, came out tearing its own mask in its rush against the Jain commission.

a. The Central Congress government sent the rejected appeal of the lawyer Mustaq to the Supreme Court of India. It was then that the nation was shook by the sheer double standards of the Congress. Congress became the subject to wide suspicion by escalating the PIL filed by an individual, thus stopping the re-assessment of the witnesses of Rajiv’s murder case. Now with this step, Congress ended up getting itself identified in public as the true hand behind the PIL filed by Mustaq.

b. A suspicious Supreme Court questioned the Congress as to why it is promoting the suit filed by an individual. Congress which felt cornered by the questions from Supreme Court decided to withdraw the case filed through an individual and did so proving beyond doubt that it is the central Congress government which led the show from behind the screens and ensured that the credibility of witnesses are not reviewed by the Jain commission.

5. The most obvious and important fact that we learn is that the Congress saw the Jain commission as a clear threat to concealed identity of the politicians who had a definitive role in Rajiv’s murder. The die-hard efforts made by Congress to impede the effective operation of the Jain commission raised serious questions in the minds of the citizens of this country about the interest Congress has against a fair and free trial in the Rajiv assassination case.

6. In spite of all these barriers raised by Congress, the Jain commission did a detailed investigation of the assassination and identified Chadraswami and SubramanianSwamy as people who had definite role in the assassination

a. It pulled up all the intelligence records indicating the international crime links that Chandraswami had since 1987 and also the financial transactions made in international bank accounts involving arms dealers

b. The Jain commission cites the strong apprehension that Chandraswami had motive against Rajiv which has been recorded through multiple eye witnesses. Chandraswami has reportedly vowed to kill Rajiv [``Main usko khatam kar doonga (I'll finish him off),'' ``Jaise uski maain ki maut huie, vaise he Rajiv Gandhi ko marunga (Rajiv Gandhi will be killed the same way his mother was”].

c. However second and more concrete evidence was provided by the Central Board of Direct Taxes which seized original payment drafts made totaling 11 million USD in favor of arms dealer Adnan Khashoggi from Chandraswami ashram.

d. It also opens up the links that SubramanianSwamy had with the assassination.

e. Those documents until then were kept secret by the IB without being submitted to the central government. For the first time in February 1998, the then Secretary of the Jain commission Luthra sent these documents to the central government’s Home Secretary Singh from their secret IB shelves.

7. Though the Jain commission which was setup in 1991 got its life extended for about 12 times, this time in the face of the shocking revelations it has achieved, requested for an extension only by another year to conclude its investigation on the role by Chandraswamy, SubramanianSwamy and other foreign powers.

a. The hung parliament headed by I.K.Gujral was very fragile with Congress being a key contributor to the coalition. The Congress threatened to withdraw support and topple the government if the Jain commission was allowed to continue any further.

b. The government under the heavy pressure from the Congress led its Home Secretariat to inform the commission on 27th February 1998 that the government does not want the Commission to be working anymore and also ordered the commission to submit its concluding report in 7 days’ time.

c. Justice Jain was obviously taken aback by this shocking step from the government in closing down the only avenue open for a fair trial.

8. A senior minister from the Central government made a telephone call to Justice Jain and informed that there is no need to present a detailed report and it is sufficient to submit a high level report. Since the report will be on a very high level it does not have to be submitted in the Parliament and can be sent directly to the respective Ministry’s office. The highlight of the notification from the minister was that the Jain commission does not have to submit an ATR (Action Taken Report)

9. CBI officers also intimidated the commission which was busy preparing the final report of the enquiry. But the key findings of the Jain commission reports have already leaked to the media and all the information available so far are pitched completely against the Congress.

10. The commission went on with compiling the findings of the enquiry in spite of the interferences from the CBI. This lead to serious and prolonged altercations between the CBI officers and the Jain commission members. Justice Jain himself received threatening telephonic calls from many power centers. Jain made a clear mention of these bullying phone calls in his letter to the Home ministry. Witnessed by a flooding media crowd, Justice Jain in his final push against all these odds, presented his 2000 page report to the then Home Minister Indrajit Gupta in 1997.

A week later, Justice Jain who went back to his home town Jodhpur was up for a total surprise. Sonia Gandhi visited him at his home and thanked his for presenting the report.

11. In the aftermath of the storm created by the Jain commission’s findings, Outlook magazine reported on 24.11.1997 that the IB and RAW officers accepted that Narasimha Rao destroyed all the documentary evidences to save his close friend Chadraswamy who was considered as the key conspirator in the Rajiv Gandhi assassination case.

12. The files were not just made to disappear; they were even edited for their content to fit the view expected by ruling powers. It is against Indian Penal Code to tamper with/edit legal evidences/documents. All these mess happened in Narasimha Rao’s rule.

13. A highly intriguing question arises as to who executed such orders from Narasimha Rao. Luckily we are not here without an answer to this key question. The one who corrected government document and files to fit Narasimha Rao’s wishes was none other than our very own Home Minister who is quite infamous for his recommendations to reject the mercy petitions of Murugan, Santhan and Perarivalan. Jain commission’s enquiry brought to light, his involvement in tampering with the evidence against Indian Law.

14. A CBI officer Kumar while travelling back from his trip abroad for collecting evidences ‘lost’ his briefcase containing highly critical documents related to the case in London’s Heathrow airport. Who could have possible stolen the briefcase with documentary evidences? Did this happen without his knowledge or was it otherwise? After all this, there is no action taken against this officer. All that he did was to file a complaint with the Heathrow Police before returning to India, empty handed.

Source:
http://realkillersofrajiv.blogspot.in/
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