Syria: The Regime Changes, but the Crisis Remains

 

Syria: The Regime Changes, but the Crisis Remains

Alexandr Svaranc, December 14, 2024

The swift fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime has sparked a mixed reaction: some are filled with admiration and joy, others with surprise and astonishment, while yet others feel saddened and disheartened. However, stability in Syria remains a distant prospect.

The swift fall of Bashar al-Assad's regime

What are the main reasons for the fall of Assad’s regime, and what is set to replace it?

In a matter of days, the Assad family clan’s regime, which had ruled the country for 54 years, was overthrown. Of course, such an event cannot be considered coincidental, given that the last 13 years have seen fierce civil conflict between a diverse opposition and the ruling regime.

Turkey had been aware of the armed opposition’s plans to advance in Syria six months prior

Is the primary reason for the overthrow of President Bashar al-Assad the lack of political democracy and the autocratic nature of the ruling clan for over half a century? Formally, it is hard to argue against this, as society desires change and freedom. However, the Middle East, with rare exceptions such as Israel, continues to embody autocracy as a principle of political governance. Can Saudi Arabia, Iran, or even Turkey be held up as models of democracy?

Should the intraconfessional and interethnic tensions within Syrian society be considered the catalyst for the regime’s downfall? Clearly, the answer here is also affirmative, as for decades, the country grappled with the issue of ethnic rights, particularly for the Kurds. Religious tensions between Sunnis, Shias, and Alawites persisted unresolved. Christian minorities (such as the Armenian community) perhaps integrated relatively smoothly into Syria’s political system, as they did not present significant demands to the authorities.

Yet will Assad’s resignation and departure from Syria, whether in the short or long term, eliminate the inter-ethnic and intra-confessional tensions within Syrian society? Will the new authorities, whether interim or elected, renounce repression as a method of governance and suppression of dissent? Can the leader of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham* (HTS), Muhammad al-Jolani, resolve the unending disputes between Sunnis and Shias or address the Kurdish issue? Especially with Turkey no longer lurking in the shadows but visibly present on the scene. Consequently, the problems that existed under Assad are likely to persist under other leaders as well.

It appears that President Bashar al-Assad made a poor geopolitical choice, entering into conflict with major centres of global and regional power (such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Israel, and Turkey). Assad overestimated his capacities — political, economic, military, and financial. In this regard, his rejection of the Qatar pipeline project — transiting gas from Qatar through Syria to Turkey and Europe — was a key warning signal, triggering a series of domestic and international problems with a tragic outcome for him.

This is why the United States claims that it needed oil from Syria, and they obtained it, albeit by occupying the eastern and north-eastern provinces of the Syrian Arab Republic (SAR). So, how are the Turks any worse, considering Turkey has already become a key logistical hub for energy transit to Europe? With the regime change in Damascus and the rise of HTS to replace the Ba’ath Party, Ankara will likely be able to reach an agreement with Doha regarding the Qatari gas pipeline—a crucial matter for Europe, which is suffering from a gas crisis due to anti-Russian sanctions.

However, the issue of oil and gas was not the only reason for the swift fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime. Geopolitical challenges related to Israel and its confrontation with Iran also came to the fore. For Tel Aviv, Syria is a neighbouring country and a security concern, particularly regarding the Golan Heights, occupied since 1967. In other words, even after the 1973 war and the 1974 disengagement agreement, Israel planned to legitimise the occupied territories and expand its security buffer zone deeper into Syria. Another security issue for Israel is connected to the strategic alliance between Damascus and Tehran, where Assad transformed Syria into a key ally of Iran and the forces of Shia Islam. Syria became the main transit corridor for the supply of weapons and military equipment to Hezbollah.

Thus, Israel’s objective in Syria became the destruction of the Iranian supply corridor, preventing Hezbollah from using locations in Lebanon targeted by Israeli airstrikes, and securing direct access to the borders of a weakened Iran. For this reason, during the advance of Turkey-backed proxies such as Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) on Hama, Homs, and Damascus, Israel carried out airstrikes on Syrian bridges and other communication infrastructure. These strikes aimed to facilitate the proxies’ operations and block the redeployment of Shia and Iranian groups to the front lines.

Turkey, while publicly distancing itself from involvement in the military operations of HTS* and the Syrian National Army* (SNA), actively supported them. Reuters reported, following Assad’s departure, that Turkey had been aware of the armed opposition’s plans—a coalition of Salafists (HTS*) and Turkmen (SNA*)—to advance in Syria six months prior. Allegedly, these groups requested Ankara to refrain from interference.

However, the high level of military equipment and preparedness of these Turkey-backed proxy forces indicates external (read: Turkish) support. The synchronicity of their offensive in Syria immediately following the ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon, the focal point of the offensive in Idlib (a zone under Turkey’s responsibility), and the high frequency of meetings between Western and Eastern foreign ministers and Turkey’s foreign minister Hakan Fidan during the radicals’ advance all point to Ankara’s involvement in the forceful overthrow of Bashar al-Assad’s regime. Turkey was undoubtedly informed about the planned offensive on Damascus six months in advance but failed to notify its Astana Process partners (Russia and Iran) in time.

In other words, Turkey, hoping to restore full relations with the United States under President Donald Trump’s administration, became the principal executor of the US-Israeli plan to overthrow Assad and contain Iran and Russia in the region. It turns out that President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s more than year-long anti-Israeli rhetoric, including elements of a trade embargo, was merely a part of a joint operation by the US, Israel, and Turkey. Ankara never banned the transit of Azerbaijani oil through its territory to Israel, and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev has already expressed support for Turkey’s actions in overthrowing Assad.

Nevertheless, the primary reason for the fall of Assad’s regime lies within the regime itself and its leader. The Syrian authorities failed to strengthen their own army and intelligence services, continued a policy of repression against dissenting forces, and relied heavily on external support from Russia and Iran. As a result, the regime lost trust and control, while the army disgracefully surrendered its positions.

At the same time, Iranian sources report that President Bashar al-Assad refused direct military assistance from Iran (notably during a meeting with Dr. Larijani). The Iranian side now accuses Assad of collaborating with Israel, citing HTS*-released documents from Syrian intelligence.

Assad, in effect, acted in line with the will of the newly elected US President Trump by abandoning his alliance with Iran and heeding the threats of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

But who is replacing Bashar al-Assad’s regime? The new figure is Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham* (HTS) leader Muhammad al-Jolani—a Salafist and a former terrorist. Can he, as the head of a transitional government, ensure civil peace in Syria and maintain the borders of the Syrian Arab Republic (SAR)?

It is curious that HTS* has not yet officially taken charge of the interim transitional government in Syria. Yet, in several countries (including the United Kingdom, Turkey, and Russia) official Syrian diplomatic missions have replaced the SAR* flag with HTS* insignia.

It is understandable that Erdoğan will initially temper HTS’s stance towards Russia and may even temporarily maintain the loyalty of HTS and the Syrian National Army (SNA) to the presence of Russian military bases in Tartus and Khmeimim. But will Turkey always take responsibility for these forces? Likely not.

What conflicts could undermine stability within and beyond Syria?

Turkey is currently celebrating what it considers a victory—the fall of Assad’s regime. From Turkey’s perspective, Assad deserved his fate for refusing Erdoğan’s conditions to recognise realities on the ground and jointly eliminate Kurdish forces. Turkey now sees the localisation of the Kurdish issue in Rojava as feasible and is opening border crossings for the return of numerous Syrian refugees. However, Erdoğan’s overconfidence in addressing the Kurdish question — specifically in eliminating Kurdish resistance — and his focus on strengthening the Sunni factor in former Syria may backfire. The United States and Israel are unlikely to abandon their support for the Kurds; instead, they are likely to leverage this factor for their own interests, including restraining Turkey.

The next challenge to Syria’s stability involves Israel and its plans for the Golan Heights and the surrounding security zone.

Tel Aviv recognises that the vacuum left after Assad’s fall will be filled by Islamic (more precisely, Sunni) radicals, some of whom are already speaking about fully restoring SAR’s borders, including reclaiming the Golan Heights—incidentally, the region of al-Jolani’s origin. So far, however, the HTS* leader has made no similar statements regarding the north-western provinces and territories occupied by Turkey.

For the first time since the occupation of the Golan Heights, Israel has, with Assad’s fall, redeployed its forces deeper into Syrian territory and occupied the buffer zone, including strategic highlands. Benjamin Netanyahu welcomed the collapse of Assad’s regime, stating: “This is a historic day for the Middle East. The fall of Assad’s regime, the tyranny in Damascus, opens up significant opportunities but also carries considerable dangers. This collapse is a direct result of our decisive actions against Hezbollah and Iran, Assad’s main supporters. It has triggered a chain reaction among all those seeking freedom from this tyranny and oppression”.

The Syrian Crisis Is Far From Over

At the same time, Netanyahu emphasised that the fall of Assad’s regime is “fraught with serious dangers”. Specifically, it risks violating the 1974 disengagement agreement between Israel and Syria. On the night of 8–9 December 1924, the Syrian army abandoned its positions, prompting the Israeli army to enter the buffer zone. Tel Aviv will not tolerate new threats to Israel’s security interests from radical (and uncontrollable) religious groups. In other words, Israel has no intention of accepting a Syrian version of Hamas or Hezbollah in the form of HTS*( * terrorist organisation banned in Russia).

Presumably, this is why IDF tank brigades marched towards Damascus and, along with air support, destroyed military arsenals and equipment belonging to the former Syrian army, ensuring that the new militants are not tempted to reclaim the Golan Heights for Syria.

The third unresolved problem is the sharp antagonism between Sunnis, Shias, and Alawites. HTS is already conducting mass executions of its opponents, which only deepens the hostile divisions within the Islamic community. Iran, for now, is focusing its attention on what might be called “accounting” for the losses incurred during the destruction of its embassy in Damascus. However, this does not mean Tehran will abandon Syria or its commitment to Shia Islam.

Finally, one must not discount Russia. The regime change in Damascus is unlikely to please Moscow, which has already classified the insurgents’ military offensive as an act of aggression and a violation of sovereignty. If Syria does not establish an inclusive government with a friendly attitude towards Russia, the strategic purpose of maintaining the naval and air bases there will diminish. However, this does not mean Russia cannot establish new military bases in the Middle East or North Africa.

While Recep Tayyip Erdoğan might idealise the strength of modern Turkey, he must understand that his country is currently too economically dependent on Russia for gas, oil, nuclear energy, tourism, the construction industry, and ambitions for a systemic breakthrough into Turan via Armenia’s Zangezur region. Militarily, Turkey also cannot compare with Russia. Moscow’s silence in response to Ankara’s periodic missteps — from Nagorno-Karabakh to Kyiv and Damascus — is unlikely to continue indefinitely. Russia could temporarily adopt a passive observer stance, recognise Kurdish autonomy in Rojava alongside the United States, and block Turkey’s eastward ambitions in the Caucasus. As we can see, the Syrian crisis is far from over.

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Alexander SVARANTS — Doctor of Political Sciences, Professor