Residents of Mullivaikkal provide support and show solidarity to Rohingya asylum seekers
Daily Mirror 11 January 2025
Mullivaikkal is a remote coastal village in the Northern district of Mullaitivu in Sri Lanka and its ethnic composition is predominantly Tamil. It has become significant as it’s where Sri Lanka’s three-decade long civil war came to a bloody end in 2009, with hundreds of thousands still unaccounted. Those who surrendered to the Army in Mullivaikkal on the last days of the war are alleged to have been killed or disappeared. The whole of Mullivaikkal village and Mullaitivu district were displaced for several months and were detained behind barbed wired detention camps. Mullivaikkal is also where Tamils gather in large numbers every year on the 18th May (the day the war ended) remembering, grieving and demanding justice for wartime atrocities they suffered. It has led to terms such as “Mullivaikkal Tamil Genocide remembrance week” etc., by some Tamils.
It is near the shores of Mullivaikkal that a boat with Rohingya asylum seekers fleeing persecution from Myanmar had turned up on the 19th December 2024. Theepan and other fishermen in Mullivaikkal were amongst the first to sight the boat and assist them. They had gone to the boat using Theepan’s small fishing boat and noticed lots of people on the boat, including children. Only a few men were standing and the others were lying down. They had also noticed vomit and blood. They could not understand each other due to language barriers, but several in the boat had shouted the word “hospital”.
The boat of Rohingya asylum seekers fleeing persecution from Myanmar had turned up on the 19th of December 2024 near the shores of Mullivaikkal
Theepan says he felt those on the boat, especially children, wanted him to bring them ashore. He also said he and most villagers wanted to bring those on the boat ashore and take care of them. He said he could have brought them all ashore in his boat, about 10 at a time. But he was worried about legal consequences. Baskaran was another fisherman from Mullaitivu who had visited the Rohingyas in the boat and both he and Theepan had asked the Navy to bring the people ashore, but that Navy officers said they didn’t have permission from their seniors and relevant authorities to do so. However, Theepan had taken a doctor, two Public Health Inspectors and Navy officers in their boat to visit the boat with asylum seekers. An ambulance had come to the site, but was never used as no one on the boat was brought ashore.
The fishermen had also taken glucose, food and drinking water for those in the boat. According to them, these were gratefully accepted by those on the boat who appeared to be starving. Theepan, with some others, had made about 20 trips from the shore to the boat with Rohingyas. As the news spread, people from afar also started to bring food. A group from Puthukkudiyiruppu had brought food and Theepan had taken these by boat and handed them over even after the Navy had started to escort the boat towards Trincomalee in the evening.
Theepan and Baskaran had reservations about Indian trawlers which were disrupting their livelihoods, but were exceptionally welcoming and supportive towards Rohingyas who had come by boat, based on belief they were fleeing persecution and in need of help.
Trincomalee
The Rohingya asylum seekers who had already been at sea for more than 2 weeks were kept at sea for most of 19th December. That evening, they were escorted by the Navy through the sea to Trincomalee and were finally allowed to disembark there on the 20th December morning. Government officials and civil society groups in Trincomalee had provided health care, food and clothes.
Amadoru Amarajeewa, a local journalist, had managed to briefly interview a few asylum seekers and had described them as hungry and weary. Some of the children and women were dehydrated and unable to walk. They had been at sea for 16 days without minimal sanitary facilities. A refugee had stated that they had left in three boats, two had broken down and that people in those boats had also boarded the boat that reached Sri Lanka. Six had died during the journey and their bodies were thrown into the sea. One refugee had said he had left his home due to the ongoing ethnic conflict in Myanmar and that he had to bribe the country’s security forces and flee illegally. Another refugee said his village was being bombed, forcing him to leave the country in search of safety. Another had said communication links with his village had been cut off, and he feared for his life.
Their stories tally with stories I have heard from Rohingya friends in exile in different countries and some of the Rohingya refugees living temporarily in Sri Lanka for about two years after they were rescued from the seas off Jaffna by the Navy. There were about 100 Rohingya refugees in Sri Lanka before the latest arrivals while about a million are being hosted in Bangladesh. The persecution of the Rohingya is now the subject of a genocide case at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), brought by Gambia against Myanmar.
Detention and potential deportation
After being kept in Trincomalee for 3 days, the asylum seekers were brought back to Mullaitivu on 23rd December and have been detained there in an Air Force camp. Theepan said he and the other villagers were very keen to visit the asylum seekers being detained, but that he is waiting until authorities allow such visits. He said some of the asylum seekers may remember him from his many visits to the boat. An officer at the local Red Cross who had provided emergency assistance said local traders in Mullaitivu had also helped contribute emergency supplies. Some local residents had visited the detention centre to inquire about needs, but were turned back. When I and a group of journalists visited the detention centre, Air Force officials stated they couldn’t allow us to meet the asylum seekers without permission of Immigration officials. But Immigration officials were not present there and calls to numbers on the official website went unanswered. We had informed the Controller of Immigration and Ministry of Public Security in writing several days before and also made many phone calls, but there was no response. On 26th of December, officials from the Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka were also barred from visiting the detention facility. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is also waiting for access to register the boat arrivals and examine their asylum claims.
The Navy spokesman had indicated to the media that the destination of the Rohingya may have been Malaysia or Indonesia and weather conditions may have pushed the boat towards Sri Lanka. One of the asylum seekers had told journalist Amadoru in Trincomalee that they had no idea where they were headed but wanted to get to safety.
However, the Minister of Public Security was quoted in the media on 3rd January 2025 as saying the Rohingya’s arrival is considered as a case of human trafficking and there was no basis to consider them as refugees (or asylum seekers) as of then. The Minister had said they may be deported to Myanmar, and that the government had even shared details of the persons with the Myanmar government and was having discussions with them.
The Minister’s statement had led to criticism and questioning, including by the Opposition leader and other opposition MPs. In the morning of 9th January 2025, The North-East Coordinating Committee (NECC) together with civil society groups and residents from North and East held a protest outside the Mullaitivu district secretariat, calling on Sri Lankan government not to deport Rohingyas and treat them in line with international law. They had also pointed out that it’s better to keep the Rohingya under supervision of civilian administration rather than in an Air Force camp. A protest was also held in Colombo on 10th January against deportation and detention in a military camp.
On 10th January, when the case was taken up at Trincomalee Magistrate Court, the police had asked for more time for investigations. Lawyers had requested access to the people being detained and the Magistrate had summoned officials from the Air Force and the Immigration to the next hearing scheduled for 31st January 2024.
Detention and deportation vs. humanitarian care and support
Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights guarantees everyone the right to seek asylum and international customary law principles prohibit returning of those having a well-founded fear of persecution to their place of origin.
Theepan, Baskaran and local people see the Rohingya as people fleeing persecution and seeking protection. They categorically state that the government should take care of them. When asked about the government minister’s fears about 100,000 people coming, Baskaran replied that those who come to protect their lives from anywhere must be helped. Theepan said Mullivaikkal villagers could accommodate and feed them, but the government will have to attend to other needs including health care. They recalled their own painful wartime experiences of trying to escape bombing, shelling, being in bunkers, displacement, starvation and said their experiences help them understand the plight of Rohingyas and motivates them to empathise and help the Rohingyas who have come to Sri Lanka. Local journalists who had visited the boat and gave sympathetic coverage also remembered their own wartime experiences.
Mullivaikkal people’s sensitivity, kindness and willingness to welcome and help strangers fleeing persecution who have come to their shoes could be an example for government politicians, state officials and all citizens to follow. ⍐
Why Greenland Is Of Growing Strategic Significance
Donald Trump seems more insistent than ever on controlling Greenland, but regardless of his controversial intentions, the island is of real strategic importance
Thomas Newdick THE WAR ZONE
Donald Trump wouldn’t categorically rule out using the U.S. military to take control of Greenland, saying that America needs it —as well as the Panama Canal— for “economic security.” Amid intensekickback from Denmark— a NATO ally of which Greenland is an autonomous territory —and other countries, it’s worth looking in more detail at the significance of the island, which is one of the world’s largest, in economic, geostrategic, and, above all, military terms.
Trump’s interest in Greenland has made headlines in recent days, although his designs on the territory are far from new. Back in 2019, TWZreported on then President Trump’s claim that his administration was considering attempting to purchase Greenland from Denmark, the U.S. leader noting at the time that the idea was “strategically interesting.”
Since then, Trump’s territorial ambitions for Greenland (and elsewhere) have been ramped up several notches.
U.S. President-elect Donald Trump arrives to speak to members of the media during a press conference at the Mar-a-Lago Club on Jan. 7, 2025, in Palm Beach, Florida. Photo by Scott Olson/Getty Images Scott Olson
Speaking at a press conference yesterday, the incoming U.S. president refused to rule out military or economic coercion to bring Greenland and the Panama Canal under U.S. control.
“I can’t assure you on either of those two,” Trump told reporters. “But I can say this, we need them for economic security.”
The same day, Trump’s son, Donald Trump Jr., touched down in Greenland for what was described as a tourist visit, during which he reportedly handed out hats bearing the slogan ‘Make Greenland Great Again.’
Donald Trump Jr. leaves Nuuk, Greenland, on Jan. 7, 2025. Trump Jr. made a private visit to Greenland, a Danish autonomous territory coveted by his father. Photo by Emil Stach / Ritzau Scanpix / AFP EMIL STACH
Talking about Greenland specifically, Trump threatened economic retaliation against Denmark, should the Scandinavian country — a NATO member — stand in the way of his territorial ambitions. Faced with such resistance, the United States “would tariff Denmark at a very high level,” Trump said.
Similar threats were leveled at Canada, too, where Trump said he would not rule out using “economic force” to turn America’s northern neighbor into a U.S. state.
In Denmark, Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen yesterday ruled out the possibility of coming to a deal with the United States that would see Greenland handed over. Instead, the future of the territory would be decided by its people. “Greenland is not for sale,” Frederiksen said.
As to what the United States would be acquiring, should it somehow take control of Greenland, by whatever means, this territory is undoubtedly unique, and it’s also at the center of an increasingly strategic race to expand control and military influence across the Arctic region.
With Russia actively building up its military footprint in the wider region, it’s worth recalling that the United States already operates one of its most strategic military outposts in Greenland. Indeed, the U.S. military has for the better part of a century had a major military presence in Greenland, with the permission of the Danish government.
A satellite view of Pituffik Space Force Base in Greenland. Google Earth
As we’ve explored in the past, the current relationship dates back to the early years of the Cold War, driven by the standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union and the enduring military significance of Greenland.
A U.S. military presence in Greenland can be traced back to before the superpower standoff, however. During World War II, when Denmark was under Nazi German occupation, an agreement was made with the Danish Ambassador to the United States that would allow the U.S. military to defend Danish settlements in Greenland from German forces, if required. After the German defeat, Denmark made efforts to remove the U.S. military presence but gave up once it joined NATO as a founding member in 1949.
From this point onward, the relatively short distance between Greenland and the communist foe meant that the territory was an ideal springboard for launching U.S. nuclear strikes on the Soviet Union, as well as for basing early warning radars and interceptor fighters that, in turn, could help counter a Soviet attack.
A year after the Alliance was established, the U.S. Air Force secretly began work on Thule Air Base in Greenland, which became the most significant military installation in the territory. Commencing operations in 1952, Thule Air Base was a critical installation during the Cold War, hosting Strategic Air Command bomber and reconnaissance aircraft, as well as interceptors and Nike nuclear-tipped surface-to-air missiles.
74th Fighter-Interceptor Squadron’s F-89s at Thule Air Base, Greenland, in 1955. U.S. Air Force via Wikicommons
The Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) came to Greenland in 1961, when the BMEWS-Site 1 was established there, initially designated as the 12th Missile Warning Squadron and later the 12th Missile Warning Group. Air Force Space Command assumed control of Thule Air Base in 1983 and the unit was re-designated as the 12th Space Warning Squadron in 1992. In 1987, the BMEWS mechanical radar was upgraded to the more efficient and capable solid-state, phased-array system used today, the Upgraded Early Warning Radar (UEWR).
A satellite view of Site J, or J-Site, the sprawling radar station that sits on a bluff northeast of what is now Pituffik Air Base. Google Earth
The Cold War years were turbulent ones for Greenland and Thule Air Base, and the outlying facilities saw more than their fair share of bizarre endeavors — as well as at least one incident that could have ended in nuclear catastrophe.
Between 1959 and 1967, the secretive Camp Century research facility, 150 miles east of Thule Air Base, conducted experiments in running military operations on the Greenland Ice Cap, which included a nuclear reactor below the ice. This also fed into Project Iceworm, a plan to construct a system of tunnels 2,500 miles in length, that could be used to launch 600 ‘Iceman’ missiles, modified two-stage Minuteman Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), providing a ‘second-strike’ capability against the Soviet Union. You can read more about this outlandish unrealized scheme here.
Camp Century left a toxic legacy of buried weapons, sewage, fuel, and pollutants under the ice and there are potentially even more hazardous pollutants hidden here too, after Thule Air Base became the site of one of America’s worst nuclear accidents. In 1968, a cabin fire broke out in a B-52G bomber carrying four thermonuclear gravity bombs. The B-52 crashed onto sea ice in North Star Bay just west of the air base, with at least three of the weapons likely exploding on impact. Seven of the eight crewmembers survived the crash.
Staff Sgt. Calvin Snapp, one of the crew in the B-52 accident in 1968, being rescued after ejecting onto the Greenland ice sheet. Public domain
No nuclear detonations resulted, but the surrounding area was nonetheless covered with radioactive materials, while burning fuel and explosives melted the ice sheet, meaning that significant quantities of debris fell to the ocean floor. Project Crested Ice was launched to try and clean up the nuclear mess, although at least one of the thermonuclear weapons may still be unaccounted for. Until today, there are conflicting accounts of whether the entire bomb went missing, or whether it was a part of one of the fissile cores.
These incidents were somewhat forgotten after the end of the Cold War but have been brought back into focus as the Arctic ice continues to retreat under the effects of climate change.
Meanwhile, following its formal transfer to the U.S. Space Force in 2020, Thule Air Base was renamed Pituffik (pronounced bee-doo-FEEK) Space Base in 2023.
U.S. Space Force
While the strategic significance of the air base waned after the end of the Cold War, the developing geopolitical situation in the Arctic has seen it become much more important again.
What hasn’t changed is the inhospitable nature of this remote operating environment, located well above the Arctic Circle and just 947 miles from the North Pole. In winter, temperatures here fall to as low as -47 degrees Fahrenheit while winds of up to 100 knots whip across the facility. Between November and February, the base is in constant darkness, while the sun never sets during the summer months of May to August.
Different storm conditions are depicted in an orientation document for personnel arriving at the base formerly known as Thule, now Pituffik. Pentagon document
Today, operations at Pituffik Space Base are overseen by the Space Force’s 821st Space Base Group, the mission of which is “to enable force projection, space superiority, and scientific research in the Arctic region for our nation and allies through integrated base support and defense operations,” according to the Space Force.
With Pituffik Space Base, the 821st Space Base Group is responsible for the U.S. military’s northernmost installation but also the world’s northernmost deep-water seaport, and a number of subordinate squadrons, as follows:
821st Support Squadron: provides mission support in the form of engineering, medical, communication, logistics, services, and airfield operations in support of the 821 Space Base Group and tenant organizations.
821st Security Forces Squadron: handles security of the 254-square-mile defense area in and around Pituffik. The area includes a ballistic missile early warning system, satellite control and tracking facilities, the air base, and the seaport that is only accessible for a short period during the summer. An annual sealift operation to support the base during this period is called Operation Pace Goose.
12th Space Warning Squadron: responsible for the AN/FPS-132 Upgraded Early Warning Radar (UEWR) system, a phased-array radar that detects and reports attack assessments of sea-launched and intercontinental ballistic missile threats heading toward North America. A secondary mission of the squadron is providing space surveillance data on satellites and other near-Earth objects like asteroids.
The AN/FPS-120 in Greenland. www.bcpowersys.com
23rd Space Operations Squadron, Detachment 1: one of seven Remote Tracking Stations in the Satellite Control Network. Located approximately 3.5 miles northeast of the Pituffik main base, Det 1 provides telemetry, tracking, and command and control operations to the United States and allied government satellite programs.
While Pituffik is now primarily host to these various space and missile warning missions, fighter detachments are also making a comeback, reflecting one of the core Cold War missions for what was then still known as Thule Air Base.
Regular flying operations include Vigilant Shield, an annual, binational air defense training event staged with the Canadian military. In 2023, while it was still named Thule Air Base, the facility welcomed for the first time a detachment of U.S. Air Force F-35A stealth fighters, where they took part in a North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) exercise that you can read more about here.
Pilots and ground crew prepare F-35As deployed to Thule Air Base, Greenland, to take off on sorties during Operation Noble Defender 23-2.1 on Jan. 16, 2023. Department of Defense photo by Master Sgt. Benjamin Wiseman
Canadian search and rescue team members assigned to the 41st Expeditionary Operations Group practice rescue operations in Arctic conditions at Thule Air Base, Greenland, Jan. 22, 2023. A CH-149 Cormorant helicopter is in the background. Department of Defense photo by Master Sgt. Benjamin Wiseman
The strategic value of Pituffik Space Base and its early warning mission means that it would be one of the first U.S. military installations to be targeted in the event of a nuclear exchange with Russia.
While such a scenario was part of the everyday Cold War reality, it’s something that appears more possible as Greenland again finds itself in the middle of another standoff between East and West.
In some respects, Trump’s preoccupation with Greenland reflects the degree to which the United States has, in recent years, lagged far behind Russia when it comes to establishing a more permanent footprint above the Arctic Circle — let alone in terms of more temporary operations in the region.
For some years now, Russia has enjoyed access to more than 50 airfields and ports in the Arctic region, from where it is able to project air and naval power that could deny the United States and its allies access to the Arctic. Russian maritime activity in the region is also enabled to a significant degree by a large and growing fleet of icebreakers, which dwarfs those used by the United States and its allies combined.
If anything, the strategic importance of the Arctic region as a whole has the potential to be a good deal greater than it was during the decades of superpower standoff, driven by climate change opening up new shipping routes as well as providing access to natural resources that were previously inaccessible, or at least much harder to exploit.
A Russian MiG-31BM Foxhound interceptor at Rogachevo Air Base in the Novaya Zemlya archipelago, above the Arctic Circle. Russian Ministry of Defense
The importance of new shipping routes shouldn’t be underestimated. After all, whoever is able to control new lanes for commercial shipping and maritime traffic between Asian markets and Europe and North America will be able to dictate the terms of international trade in the Arctic.
While the Cold War rendered the Arctic a critical zone in terms of military strategy, the continued retreat of the sea ice in the region means that it is becoming increasingly important for economic development. Having maritime commerce traverse the Arctic will slash the journey times and costs of moving goods around the northern hemisphere. Meanwhile, resources in the wider region should provide new opportunities for undersea oil drilling, the mining of rare earth metals from the sea floor, and access to lucrative fisheries, to name just a few.
It’s therefore no surprise that the leading powers are now jostling for a position in the Arctic, with a military presence seen as vital to secure strategic access and natural resources.
NATO — including the United States, Canada, and Denmark — has long identified the Arctic as a region of “great power competition.” This rivalry now includes not only NATO and Russia but increasingly China, too.
The Chinese icebreaker Xue Long lowers equipment to the Arctic ice. Public domain
The Pentagon is also increasingly worried that, despite the potential for competition between them, China and Russia could cooperate on an Arctic strategy to the detriment of the United States. Indeed, major military cooperation already exists between China and Russia, especially in the naval space — and with a unique emphasis on the Arctic.
There’s little doubt that the geopolitical importance of the Arctic — and with it, Greenland — is only set to increase.
Thanks to its geographic location, Greenland is already of critical importance to the United States. Not only does the country’s security rely to a significant degree on missile detection and tracking capabilities in Greenland, but having a military foothold here provides unrivaled access to the Arctic, in the sea and air domains.
Were the United States to control Greenland or at least have greater freedom to expand its military presence there, it would be a logical outpost from which it could challenge Russia and China in the region. At the very least, its potential as a major logistics hub could be further enhanced, allowing the U.S. military to extend its reach further over the Arctic.
The ramp at what was then known as Thule Air Base. U.S. Air Force
Alongside its support and surveillance functions, Greenland already provides the U.S. military with a logistics staging post, but it could also accommodate new command and control capabilities. Potentially, it could see a return to the basing of U.S. Air Force bombers and fighters, even on a permanent basis, if this is judged necessary. Echoing the previous practices, it could be used once again to station air defenses, to provide a forward line of defense against Russian bombers and missiles, although these could now include ballistic ones. There is even the possibility that the United States might choose to have long-range ground-based strike capabilities in Greenland, a Cold War throwback that is already poised to return to Western Europe, albeit in the form of conventional and not nuclear-armed missiles. Expanded port access in Greenland would also provide valuable and highly strategic maritime power projection points into the Arctic, as well as the North Atlantic. Those ports could be especially useful as operating locations for icebreakers.
A U.S. Navy Mk 70-series launch system — capable of accommodating SM-6 multi-purpose missiles — mounted on a trailer deployed during an exercise in Denmark in September 2023. U.S. Navy A US Navy Mk 70-series launch system mounted on a trailer deployed during an exercise in Denmark in September 2023. USN
A reinforced U.S. military presence in Greenland would very likely also address capabilities for a potential land war with Russia here and in the wider region. Due to its geographical position and its extremely limited means of repelling a ground invasion, Greenland is today considered a soft target by some. This is compounded by the fact that, while the U.S. Army is only slowly returning to more robust preparations for warfare in Arctic conditions, Russia is far more capable of fighting in northern latitudes and is introducing a variety of weapons systems that are optimized for this kind of environment.
Russian troops test a Chaborz M-3 combat buggy modified for Arctic operations. Russian Ministry of Defense screencap
One more legacy of the Cold War that has made a resurgence in recent years is Russian submarine operations, with a focus on the Arctic and North Atlantic, with Greenland in a highly strategic position. The vital Greenland, Iceland, United Kingdom Gap, better known as the GIUK Gap, is a critical bottleneck through which Russian (and before them Soviet) submarines need to pass to effectively patrol the North Atlantic. During the Cold War, a significant portion of NATO naval power in Europe was dedicated to closely monitoring the GIUK Gap, and hunting submarines would have been a top priority in wartime. With Russia operating increasingly capable submarines, the GIUK Gap is once again of fundamental importance, and having anti-submarine warfare capabilities in Greenland would further bolster this effort.
Dating from the Cold War but still relevant today, a map of the GIUK Gap. CIA.gov
So far, the United States has relied on cooperation with the Danish government to ensure that it retains a significant foothold in Greenland. Although this hasn’t always been entirely without problems, Denmark and the United States — as NATO members — have broadly aligned interests in the region, officially at least. Conceivably, the United States could potentially accomplish most of its strategic aims in Greenland via this same relationship, rather than taking over the island and claiming ownership of it.
Already today, it seems the Pentagon was seeking to distance itself from a potential seizure of Greenland. At a press conference, U.S. Department of Defense spokesperson Sabrina Singh said she was not aware of any draft of military plans for a Greenland invasion, and said that the department is focused on more immediate matters. “We’re concerned with the real national security concerns that confront this building every single day,” she said.
The view from the flight deck of a Royal Danish Air Force C-130J transport during a mission over Greenland. Royal Danish Air Force
It remains to be seen whether the looming military competition in the Arctic region and the drive to compete with Russia and China in this remote corner of the world means that Greenland remains in Trump’s sights during his second term in office. Regardless, the potential for Greenland as a cornerstone of America’s military strategy in the Arctic is clear, whatever form that takes.
