Why the Franco-German engine that powered the EU is currently kaput

Michel Barnier hands over the reins to the new prime minister, François Bayrou.
Photograph: Anadolu/Getty Images

Why the Franco-German engine that powered the EU is currently kaput

Beset by political crises and economic turmoil, the bloc’s two biggest countries are both at a crossroads

“When France and Germany advance, all Europe advances. When they don’t, it grinds to a halt” was how former French president Jacques Chirac put it almost a quarter of a century ago at one of the periodic love-ins between the EU’s two biggest member states.

So what would Chirac, who died in 2019, make of the current condition of the famed Franco-German engine which, since the bloc’s inception, has powered so much of the postwar European project? It looks not so much faltering as comprehensively bust.

Emmanuel Macron on Friday appointed a new prime minister, his loyal centrist ally François Bayrou, who becomes France’s fourth premier this year and will have the daunting task of trying to assemble a stable government after the collapse last week of the country’s shortest-lived administration since 1958.

 《Jon Henley in Paris and Deborah Cole in Berlin Sun 15 Dec 2024 The Obsever UK》

Meanwhile France’s public-sector deficit is on track to exceed 6.1% of GDP this year, more than double the eurozone limit; public debt is 110% of GDP and rising; and the bond markets this month rated France as marginally less creditworthy than Greece.

In Germany, the fractious centre left-led coalition in power for the past three years collapsed last month under the weight of its own ideological contradictions and the pressure of multiple crises triggered by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Whoever becomes chancellor after the 23 February elections will have to tackle the world’s worst-performing big economy, beset by high energy and labour costs as well as bureaucracy, crumbling infrastructure and plodding digital expansion.

The slowdown with key trade partner China has also dealt a blow to German exports, a traditional strength, while the all-important car industry has been slow to develop attractive electric vehicles (EVs) and now faces the threat of swingeing US tariffs under Donald Trump.

With France unable to hold fresh parliamentary elections until July and Germany possibly without a new government until June, the political febrility at the top of the EU’s two most influential countries will inevitably hobble EU decision-making.

Paris and Berlin are seen as the EU’s core power axis, driving policy and defining the main contours of its agenda. With both capitals unable to make big policy decisions for want of strong governments, the bloc could face months or more in the mire.

The two powerhouses’ parallel economic and fiscal woes will also weigh heavily on the EU. Some analysts believe the bloc’s two largest economies – accounting for 41% of the 27-member EU’s entire GDP – would both contract economically in 2025.

The timing could not be worse, with Europe facing the return of America-first policies under Trump’s second presidency, with German industry (in particular) in crisis.

The embattled Emmanuel Macron with chancellor
Olaf Scholz. Photograph: Nadja Wohlleben/Reuters

Quite how it came to this is not too hard to understand. Figuring out how France and Germany might be able to pull themselves out of their ongoing political and economic doom spirals, however, is not so easy.

When the German government imploded last month, observers were less surprised by its demise than astonished that it had limped on for so long.

When chancellor Olaf Scholz fired his obstreperous finance minister, Christian Lindner, on 6 November over a bitter months-long budget dispute, he set in motion a chain of events that optimists say give the country a vital shot at renewal.

“Do we dare to powerfully invest in our future as a strong country? Will we secure jobs and modernise our industry? Are we ensuring stable pensions, reliable healthcare and good nursing care?” a defiant Scholz said on Wednesday.

Lindner’s sacking left Germany with a rump minority alliance of Scholz’s Social Democrats (SPD) and the ecologist Greens capable of only the most perfunctory policy-making from now until a new government is in place.

On Monday, Scholz, historically unpopular but nonetheless standing as his party’s candidate for re-election, will face a confidence vote he has called to trigger the new election.

Marine Le Pen’s far right party joined forces with the left to oust French PM Michel Barnier.
Photograph: Alain Jocard/AFP/Getty Images

If Scholz loses the MPs’ ballot, President Frank-Walter Steinmeier will dissolve parliament and Germany will officially embark on an intensely truncated campaign broken up by the Christmas holidays.

A recent poll put the centre-right CDU/CSU on 31%, followed by the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) on 18%, Scholz’s SPD on 17% and the Greens on 13%. The FDP and new leftwing conservative Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance are both scoring right around the 5% threshold for parliamentary representation.

The smart money as Germany’s next leader is therefore on Friedrich Merz, a longtime rival of his more moderate fellow Christian Democrat Angela Merkel, whose 16-year tenure as chancellor largely left Merz in the political wilderness.

He used the time to build a small fortune in business, notably at the German unit of multinational investment firm BlackRock. Merz, whose notoriously hot temper has reputedly mellowed slightly with age, has vowed to pull Germany out of a deep economic slump while taking a harder line on defence, Russia and migration.

But because Merz’s centre-right CDU/CSU alliance, assuming it comes in first, has little chance of winning an absolute majority, its choice of coalition partner will inevitably water down his economic reform plans. All major parties have ruled out cooperating with the far right. 

“Germany’s current economic model, in which the supply of cheap fossil fuels and the production of cars with combustion engines play a central role, seems outdated – but politicians rarely dare to say this openly,” said Kai Arzheimer, a political scientist at the University of Mainz. “I’m at least sceptical that there will be a genuine fresh start in the near future.”

Friedrich Merz, in a suit and tie and wearing glasses, frowns as he holds his hands up to clap

Friedrich Merz at the Bundestag in Berlin, on 5 December. Photograph: dts News Agency Germany/Rex/Shutterstock

If the new government fails to turn things around quickly, it is the anti-migration AfD, backed particularly by eastern voters, that stands to benefit the most.

Ursula Münch, director of the Academy for Political Education thinktank in Bavaria, said that with the SPD likely to become Merz’s partner, creating a middle-of-the-road government, disappointed hopes and disillusionment could prove to be a toxic mix.

“The expectations of the electorate, corporations and the media are very high – too high,” she said, given the years-long dodging of pressing structural problems as Germany has fallen behind. “That will overtax any government.”

But Münch said the emerging consensus that Germany needs to tackle its weaknesses head on could offer a compelling mandate to a straight-talking chancellor with a sufficient majority. “That would make me pretty confident that the Germans could become more optimistic again and develop more trust in democracy,” she said.

France’s current political problems – the country is undergoing its worst period of political volatility since the second world war – stem largely from Macron’s decision to dissolve ­parliament after his centrist forces were heavily defeated by Marine Le Pen’s far-right National Rally (RN) in this spring’s European elections.

In the parliamentary election, the New Popular Front (NFP), a coalition of left-leaning parties ranging from the mainstream Socialist party (PS) to the radical-left France Unbowed (LFI), headed by the political firebrand Jean-Luc Mélenchon, won the largest number of seats.

Macron’s alliance was beaten into second place and the RN (although it finished as the largest single party) placed third. Parliament was divided into three roughly equal and opposing blocs – broad left, centre and right/far right – none of which, crucially, enjoyed anything approaching a parliamentary majority.

After weeks of dithering and refusing to appoint a prime minister from the left, Macron tapped Michel Barnier, a veteran conservative and the EU’s chief Brexit negotiator, backed by a fragile minority alliance of centrist and centre-right MPs.

This month, the far-right RN joined forces with the left-leaning NFP to topple Barnier’s government in a no-confidence vote over the 2025 budget, which included about €20bn (£16.5bn) in tax increases and €40bn in public spending cuts.

Bayrou, his replacement, must try to cobble together a more solid ruling majority, possibly involving some of the centre left – or at least to secure a “non-aggression pact” that would not leave the new government prone to exactly the same threat, a no-confidence vote backed by both left and far right, as Barnier’s.

The parliamentary arithmetic, however, remains the same. Macron “seems to be getting ready to build a more stable governing pact with Conservatives, Socialists, Communists, and Greens”, who “seem ready to make compromises and avoid another government at the mercy of the RN”, said Rym Momtaz of the Carnegie Europe thinktank.

“But that’s only a temporary fix. He still doesn’t have a solution to reverse the surge in popularity Le Pen has enjoyed since 2017, and her significant chances of being elected president in 2027.”

It hardly bodes well for France’s fiscal problems, meanwhile, that the trigger for the outgoing government’s collapse was a belt-tightening budget whose central objective was the partial restoration of France’s ailing state finances.

At least, though, France seems to have “learned the lesson” that it needs “a credible, slow, fiscal tightening”, said economist John Springford of the Centre for European Reform. Germany, which needs tax and labour market reforms and public investment to raise spending, has yet to make that step, he said.

From an EU perspective, however, some analysts are cautiously optimistic. “It’s a premature view that France and Germany are down and out,” said Mujtaba Rahman of the Eurasia Group consultancy. “By the second half of next year, we should see a re-energised Franco-German engine.”

Germany’s elections being brought forward to February was “very positive”, Rahman said: “We’ll have clarity earlier in the year, a more coherent coalition and a more Russia-sceptical chancellor. And Merz and Macron will be much more aligned on the big issues than were Macron and Scholz.”

Macron’s domestic woes will not vanish overnight. “But there does seem to be a sense of the national responsibility to form a government, pass a budget and provide the minimum stability that France needs – and that Europe needs from France,” he said.

Most importantly, Trump 2.0 “has given weight and credence to everything Macron has been saying on security, defence and strategic autonomy”, Rahman said. The Paris-Berlin tandem “will be reinvigorated – and with a new, improved EU leadership, these people will give Europe its best shot at mitigating the worst of what might be to come”.⍐

 

German Chancellor Scholz loses no-confidence vote, paving way for election

BERLIN, Dec 16 (Reuters) - The German parliament accepted Chancellor Olaf Scholz's invitation to withdraw its confidence in him and his government on Monday, clearing the way for an early election on Feb. 23 necessitated by the collapse of his government.

Scholz's three-party coalition fell apart last month after the pro-market Free Democrats quit in a row over debt, leaving his Social Democrats (SPD) and the Greens without a parliamentary majority just as Germany faces a deepening economic crisis.

Under rules designed to prevent the instability that facilitated the rise of fascism in the 1930s, President Frank-Walter Steinmeier can only dissolve parliament and call an election if the chancellor calls, and loses, a confidence vote.

The debate preceding the vote also opened serious campaigning for the election, with party leaders trading ill-tempered barbs.

The chancellor and his conservative challenger Friedrich Merz, who surveys suggest is likely to replace him, charged each other with incompetence and lack of vision.

Scholz, who will head a caretaker government until a new one can be formed, defended his record as a crisis leader who had dealt with the economic and security emergency triggered by Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

If given a second term, he said, he would invest heavily in Germany's creaking infrastructure rather than making the spending cuts he said the conservatives wanted.

"Shortsightedness might save money in the short term, but the mortgage on our future is unaffordable," said Scholz, who served four years as finance minister under a previous coalition with the conservatives before becoming chancellor in 2021.

Merz told Scholz his spending plans would burden future generations and accused him of failing to deliver on promises of rearmament after the start of the Ukraine war.

"Taking on debt at the cost of the young generation, spending money - and you didn't say the word 'competitiveness' once," said Merz.

Neither mentioned the constitutional spending cap, a measure designed to ensure fiscal responsibility that many economists blame for the fraying state of Germany's infrastructure.

CONSERVATIVES IN CLEAR LEAD IN OPINION POLLS

The conservatives have a comfortable, albeit narrowing lead of more than 10 points over the SPD in most polls. The far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) is slightly ahead of Scholz's party, while the Greens are in fourth place.

The mainstream parties have refused to govern with the AfD, but its presence complicates the parliamentary arithmetic, making unwieldy coalitions more likely.

Scholz has outlined a list of measures that could pass with opposition support before the election, including 11 billion euros ($11 billion) in tax cuts and an increase in child benefits already agreed on by former coalition partners.

The conservatives have also hinted they could back measures to better protect the Constitutional Court from the machinations of a future populist or anti-democratic government and to extend a popular subsidised transport ticket.

Measures to ease unintended burdens on taxpayers could also pass if regional governments agree, but Merz rejected a Green proposal to cut energy prices, saying he wanted a totally new energy policy.

Robert Habeck, the Greens' chancellor candidate, said that was a worrying sign for German democracy, given the growing likelihood in a fractured political landscape that very different parties would again have to govern together.

"It's very unlikely the next government will have it easier," Habeck said.

India, Sri Lanka agree to enhance INR-LKR trade settlements

 

இந்தியாவில் இலங்கை ஜனாதிபதி

 

ஜனாதிபதி மற்றும் இந்திய இராஜதந்திரிகளுக்கு இடையில் பேச்சுவார்தை ஆரம்பம்

இலங்கையில் பொருளாதார மறுமலர்ச்சியை ஏற்படுத்த இந்தியாவின் மிகப்பெரிய சந்தையை பயன்படுத்திக்கொள்வது குறித்து கவனம்

இந்தியாவுக்கான மூன்று நாள் உத்தியோகபூர்வ விஜயம் மேற்கொண்டிருக்கும் ஜனாதிபதி அநுரகுமார திசாநாயக்க தங்கியிருக்கும் புதுடில்லி ITC MAURYA ஹோட்டலுக்கு வருகைத் தந்த இந்திய நிதி மற்றும் நிறுவன அலுவல்கள் அமைச்சர் நிர்மலா சீதாராமன், வெளிவிவகார அமைச்சர் கலாநிதி எஸ்.ஜெய்சங்கர், (Dr.S.jayashankar) மற்றும் இந்திய பாதுகாப்பு ஆலோசகர் ஸ்ரீ அஜித் தோவால் ஆகியோர் ஜனாதிபதியை சந்தித்து கலந்துரையாடினர்.

இந்தியா – இலங்கை பொருளாதார ஒத்துழைப்புக்களை பலப்படுத்திக்கொள்ளல் மற்றும் இருநாடுகளுக்கும் இடையிலான முதலீட்டு வாய்ப்புக்களை விரிவுபடுத்திக்கொள்வது தொடர்பில் ஜனாதிபதி மற்றும் இந்திய நிதி, நிறுவன அலுவல்கள் அமைச்சர் நிர்மலா சீதாராமன் ஆகியோருக்கு இடையிலான சந்திப்பில் விரிவாக கலந்துரையாடப்பட்டது.
அதேநேரம் இந்திய சுற்றுலாப் பயணிகளை இலங்கைக்கு அதிகளவில் அழைத்து வருவது மற்றும் இலங்கையின் விவசாய நவீனமயமாக்கல், டிஜிட்டல் உட்கட்டமைப்பு வசதிகள் அபிவிருத்தி குறித்தும் கலந்துரையாடப்பட்டது.

ஜனாதிபதி மற்றும் இந்திய வெளிவிவகார அமைச்சர் கலாநிதி எஸ்.ஜெய்சங்கர் ஆகியோருக்கு இடையிலான சந்திப்பு சிநேகபூர்வமாக இடம்பெற்றதோடு, இலங்கையின் பொருளாதார மறுமலர்ச்சிக்கு இந்தியாவின் மிகப்பெரிய சந்தையை பயன்படுத்திக்கொள்வது குறித்தும் இதன்போது கவனம் செலுத்தப்பட்டது.

மேலும், இந்நாட்டின் சுற்றுலா, முதலீடு மற்றும் வலுசக்தி துறைகளில் ஒத்துழைப்பு வழங்குவற்கும் கலாநிதி எஸ்.ஜெய்சங்கர் இதன்போது இணக்கம் தெரிவித்தார்.

மீன்பிடித்துறை மற்றும் தேசிய ஒற்றுமை மேம்பாடு உள்ளிட்ட இருநாடுகளுக்கும் அன்னியோன்யமான விடயங்கள் குறித்தும் இதன்போது கவனம் செலுத்தப்பட்டது.

அதனையடுத்து இந்திய பாதுகாப்பு ஆலோசகர் ஸ்ரீ அஜித் தோவால் (Shri Ajith Doval) ஜனாதிபதி அநுரகுமார திசாநாயக்கவை சந்தித்து வலயத்தின் பாதுகாப்பு குறித்து கலந்துரையாடினார்.

வெளிநாட்டு அலுவல்கள், வெளிநாட்டு வேலைவாய்ப்பு மற்றும் சுற்றுலாத்துறை அமைச்சர் விஜித ஹேரத், தொழில் அமைச்சர் மற்றும் பொருளாதார அபிவிருத்தி பிரதி அமைச்சர் பேராசிரியர் அனில் ஜயந்த பெர்னாண்டோ உள்ளிட்டோரும் இதன்போது கலந்துகொண்டனர்.

ஜனாதிபதி அநுரவிற்கு இந்தியாவில் ஆரவாரமான வரவேற்பு

ஜனாதிபதி அநுரகுமார திசாநாயக்க இன்று (15) பிற்பகல் 5.30 மணியளவில் புதுடில்லி இந்திராகாந்தி விமான நிலையத்தை சென்றடைந்தார்.

இந்திய தகவல் தொழில்நுட்ப அமைச்சர் கலாநிதி எஸ்.முருகன் (Dr S.Murugan) , இந்திய உயர்ஸ்தானிகர் சந்தோஷ் ஜா, (Santosh Jha), இந்து சமுத்திர வலயத்தின் மேலதிகச் செயலாளர் புனித் அகர்வால் (Puneet Agrawal), இந்திய உபசரணைப் பிரதானி அன்ஷுமன் கவூர் (Anshuman Gaur) உள்ளிட்ட இராஜதந்திரிகள் ஜனாதிபதிக்கு விமான நிலையத்தில் சிறப்பு வரவேற்பளித்தனர்.

ஜனாதிபதி அநுரகுமார திசாநாயக்கவின் விஜயம் தொடர்பில் இந்திய ஊடகங்கள் சிறப்பாக பிரசாரம் செய்திருந்ததுடன், புதுடில்லி நகரின் பிரதான சுற்றுவட்டாரத்தில் ஜனாதிபதி மற்றும் பிரதமர் நரேந்திர மோடியின் புகைப்படங்கள் அடங்கிய பதாகைகளும் காட்சிப்படுத்தப்பட்டிருந்தன.

ஜனாதிபதி அநுரகுமார திசாநாயக்க, இந்திய வெளிவிவகார அமைச்சர் கலாநிதி எஸ்.ஜெய்சங்கர் (Dr. S. Jayashankar), இந்திய பாதுகாப்பு ஆலோசகர் ஸ்ரீ அஜித் தோவால் (Shri Ajith Doval) உள்ளிட்டவர்களை இன்று (15) இரவு சந்தித்து கலந்துரையாடவுள்ளார்.

வெளிநாட்டு அலுவல்கள், வெளிநாட்டு வேலைவாய்ப்பு மற்றும் சுற்றுலாத்துறை அமைச்சர் விஜித ஹேரத், தொழில் அமைச்சர் மற்றும் பொருளாதார அபிவிருத்தி பிரதி அமைச்சர் பேராசிரியர் அனில் ஜயந்த பெர்னாண்டோ உள்ளிட்டோரும் இந்த சுற்றுப்பயணத்தில் கலந்துகொண்டுள்ளனர்.

ஜனாதிபதி இந்தியாவிற்கு சுற்றுப்பயணம்

ஜனாதிபதி அநுரகுமார திசாநாயக்க பதவியேற்றுக் கொண்டதன் பின்னர் மேற்கொள்ளும் முதல் சுற்றுப்பயணமாக இன்று (15) பிற்பகல் நாட்டிலிருந்து இந்தியா புறப்பட்டுச் சென்றார்.

இந்திய ஜனாதிபதி திரௌபதி முர்முவின் அழைப்பின் பேரில் சுற்றுப்பயணம் மேற்கொள்ளவிருக்கும் ஜனாதிபதி அநுரகுமார திசாநாயக்க 17 ஆம் திகதி வரையில் இந்தியாவில் தங்கியிருப்பார்.

இந்தச் சுற்றுப் பயணத்தின் போது இந்திய பிரதமர் நரேந்திர மோடியுடனான இருதரப்பு சந்திப்பில் முக்கிய விடயங்கள் குறித்தும் கலந்துரையாடப்படவுள்ளது.

ஜனாதிபதி அநுரகுமார திசாநாயக்க, இந்தியாவின் துணை ஜனாதிபதி ஸ்ரீ ஜக்தீப் தன்கர், (Vice President Of India Shri Jagdeep Dhankhar), இந்திய வெளிவிவகார அமைச்சர் கலாநிதி எஸ். ஜெயசங்கர் (Dr.S.Jayashankar – Minister of External Affairs of India), இந்திய சுகாதார அமைச்சர் ஜே.பி. நந்தா (J.P. Nanda – Minister of Health), இந்தியாவின் தேசிய பாதுகாப்பு ஆலோசகர் ஸ்ரீ அஜித் தோவல்(Shri Ajith Doval – National Security Advisor of India) உள்ளிட்ட இராஜதந்திரிகள் பலருடனும் கலந்துரையாட தீர்மானிக்கப்பட்டுள்ளது.

இருநாடுகளுக்கும் இடையில் முதலீடு மற்றும் வணிகம் தொடர்புகளை பலப்படுத்தும் நோக்கில் புதுடில்லியில் நடைபெறவிருக்கும் வர்த்தகர்களுடனான சந்திப்பிலும் ஜனாதிபதி கலந்துகொள்ளவுள்ளார்.

அடுத்தபடியாக ஜனாதிபதி புத்தகாயாவிற்கான சுற்றுப்பயணம் ஒன்றையும் மேற்கொள்ளவுள்ளார்.

வெளிநாட்டு அலுவல்கள், வெளிநாட்டு வேலைவாய்ப்பு மற்றும் சுற்றுலாத்துறை அமைச்சர் விஜித ஹேரத், தொழில் அமைச்சர் மற்றும் பொருளாதார அபிவிருத்தி பிரதி அமைச்சர் பேராசிரியர் அனில் ஜயந்த பெர்னாண்டோ உள்ளிட்டோரும் இந்த சுற்றுப்பயணத்தில் கலந்துகொள்வர்.

மூலம்; ஜனாதிபதி ஊடகப் பிரிவு.

தினப்பொறி 23- போபால் விசவாயு படுகொலை 40 ஆண்டுகள்

AKD arrives in India, to visit Bodh Gaya on Tuesday.

 

அநுரா அரசே இந்தியப் பயணத்தில் `மீனவர் பிரச்சனைக்கு` தீர்வு காண்!

ENB Poster-Anura's State visit to India

The Indian government described Sri Lanka as the country’s closest maritime neighbour in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and said it holds a central place in Prime Minister Modi’s vision of ‘SAGAR’ (Security and Growth for All in the Region) and India’s ‘Neighbourhood First’ policy 

அண்டை அயல் நாடுகளுடனான தனது வெளி விவகாரக் கொள்கையை இவ்வாறு தான் இந்திய அரசு விளக்கம் செய்கின்றது. இந்த தங்கமுலாம் எல்லாவற்றையும் அடியோடு அகற்றி விட்டால் அதன் உண்மை முகம் தெரியும்.

இந்தியாவின் பாதுகாப்பே இந்து சமுத்திரப் பிராந்தியத்தின் பாதுகாப்பு!

இந்தியாவின் வளர்ச்சியே   இந்து சமுத்திரப் பிராந்தியத்தின் வளர்ச்சி!!

என்றே இந்தியா அதை ஆங்கிலேயன் உருவாக்கிய காலம் முதல் கூறி வருகின்றது.

அண்மைய கால் நூற்றாண்டில் குறிப்பாக கடந்த பத்து ஆண்டுகளில் Make In India உலகமய பொருளாதாரப் பாதையில் இந்தியா கணிசமான வளர்ச்சி கண்டுள்ளது.

இரண்டாம் உலகப் போருக்கு பிந்திய உலக ஒழுங்கமைப்பு தகர்ந்து ஒரு மாற்று அமைப்பை நோக்கி நகரும் சர்வதேச அரசியல் போக்கில் இந்தியா தன்னை ஒரு சர்வதேச சமூக சக்தியாக கட்டியமைக்கும் பாதையில் நகர்ந்துவருகின்றது.

அதாவது இந்திய பிராந்திய விரிவாதிக்கம் சர்வதேச உலகமேலாதிக்கத்துடன் அணிசேருகின்றது.

இந்தச் சூழலில்;

இந்தியாவின் பாதுகாப்பே இந்து சமுத்திரப் பிராந்தியத்தின் பாதுகாப்பு!

இந்தியாவின் வளர்ச்சியே   இந்து சமுத்திரப் பிராந்தியத்தின் வளர்ச்சி!!

என்பது இந்தியா அணிசேரும் சர்வதேச ஏகாதிபத்திய முகாமின் குடையின் கீழ் இந்து சமுத்திரப் பிராந்திய நாடுகளை அடக்குவது தவிர வேறெதுவுமில்லை.

இலங்கை ஒரு சிறிய நாடு.இந்தியா தனக்கு விரும்பியபடியெல்லாம் `அந்தக் களி மண்ணில் உருவம் செய்து வருகின்றது.இதன் ஒரு பகுதி தான் இலங்கையின் புதிய ஜனாதிபதி அரசும், 70 % நாடாளமன்ற பெரும்பான்மை கொண்ட அரசாங்கமும்!

துல்லியமாக ஆராய்ந்தால் நாடளாவிய வகையில் இது 50 வீத வாக்காளர்களின் வாக்குகளையும், ஈழத்தில் 25% வாக்காளர்களின் வாக்குகளையும் கொண்டு அமையப் பெற்ற அதிகாரக் கைமாற்றமே ஆகும்.இதனால் எல்லாவற்றுக்கும் மேலாக தனது சுய பாதுகாப்புக்கு இந்தியாவுடனான நேச உறவு அவசியமாகும்.

இவ்வாறு இந்தியா சார்ந்த ஒரு ஏகாதிபத்திய-அமெரிக்க முகாமுடன் அணி சேர்ந்து கொண்டு, அனுரா அரசு அணி சேராக் கொள்கை என்று பிதற்றுகின்றது.

அணி சேராக் கொள்கை

1917 ஒக்ரோபர் சோசலிசப் புரட்சியைத் தொடர்ந்து உலகம் சித்தாந்த ரீதியாக பிளவுபட்ட இரு துருவ உலகங்களாக பிளவுண்டன.சோசலிச சோவியத் முகாமும், ஏகாதிபத்திய அமெரிக்க முகாமுமாக இவை அமைந்தன. சோசலிச முகாமின் வளர்ச்சி மற்றும் தாக்கம் காரணமாக தமது காலனியாதிக்கத்தை தொடர இயலாத நெருக்கடிக்கு காலனியாதிக்கவாதிகள் உள்ளாகினர்.

இதன் விளைவாக குறிப்பாக `சூரியன் அஸ்தமிக்காத` பெரும் காலனியாதிக்க வாதிகளான ஆங்கிலேய மற்றும் பிரெஞ்சு ஏகாதிபத்தியவாதிகள் தமது காலனிய ஆதிக்கத்தில் தளர்வை ஏற்படுத்தத் தள்ளப்பட்டனர்.

காலனி ஆதிக்கத்தத்தை தொடரவும் அதேவேளை அது அகன்று விட்டது போலக் காட்டவும் ஆன வடிவமாக `சுதந்திரம்` என்பதைக் கண்டு பிடித்தனர். இந்த ஏற்பாட்டில் அதிகாரம் பகுதியாக, உள்ளூரில் தத்தெடுத்து தாம் பாலூட்டி வளர்த்த தரகர்களின் நம்பிக்கையான கைகளுக்கு மாற்றப்பட்டன.

40 களின் பிற்பகுதியில் இருந்து 70பது 80பதுகள் வரை இந்தக் கைமாற்றம் உலகக் காலனிகள் எங்கிலும் நடந்தேறின.

புதிதாக அதிகாரத்தை பெற்றுக் கொண்ட உள்ளூர் தரகு வர்க்கங்களுக்கு தாம் `சுதந்திரமானவர்கள்` என்று காட்டவேண்டிய தேவை இயல்பாகவே எழுந்தது. அதே வேளை அன்றைய  சூழலைச் சார்ந்து `சோசலிசம்`,ஜனநாயகம்` குடியரசு` என்று பேசவேண்டிய தேவையும் இருந்தது.

கொம்ஜூனிச அகிலத்தின் வழிகாட்டுதலுக்கு மாறாக இக் காலனியத் தரகர்களால் முன்னெடுக்கப்பட்ட கிளர்சிகளும் அவை கடைப்பிடித்த கொள்கை கோட்பாடுகளும் அந்நாடுகளின் இலட்சோபம் அடிமை மக்களுக்கு சுதந்திரத்தையோ விடுதலையையோ வழங்கவில்லை.

இந்தக் கைமாற்ற அரை நூற்றாண்டு காலத்தில் தான் இந் நாடுகளில் அந்தந்த நாடுகளின் வரலாற்று ரீதியான வளர்ச்சி மட்டத்துக்கு இயைந்த `நாடாளமன்ற` ஆட்சிவடிவமும் தேர்தல் முறையும் கொண்டுவரப்பட்டன.

மத்திய ஆசியாவில் `பாத் இயக்கம்`, ஆபிரிக்காவில் கிறீஸ்தவ தேசியம், லத்தீன் அமெரிக்காவில் `விடுதலை இறையியல்`, ஆசியாவில் `காந்தியம்` எல்லாம்  இந்த இனக் குழுமங்கள் தான்.

இதை எழுதிக் கொண்டிருக்கும்போது ஆட்சிக் கவிழ்ப்புக்கு உள்ளாகி அல்கைடா அரசாங்கம் அமைக்கும் சிரியாவும், 1946-1961 சுதந்திரக் கட்டங்களுக்கூடாக இறுதியில் 1970இல் அசாத் வம்ச ஆட்சிக்குள்ளான நாடுதான். சிரியாவில் அல்கைடா கிளர்ச்சியின் விளைவாக, 54 ஆண்டுகள் அசாத் வம்சம் ஒரு அரக்க ஆட்சி நடத்தியிருப்பதாக கண்டுபிடித்துள்ளார்கள்!

இவ்வாறாகத்தானே ``சுதந்திரம்`` பெற்ற தொடர்காலனிய நாடுகள் 1950 களில் ஜூக்கோசிலாவியாவினதும்,இந்தியாவினதும் முன் முயற்சியில் உருவாகியது அணிசேரா இயக்கம்.நூற்றுக்கு மேற்பட்ட நாடுகள் இதில் அங்கம் வகிப்பதாகக் கூறப்பட்டது.

எனினும் நடைமுறையில் இந்த நாடுகள் ஏதோ ஒரு முகாமைச் சார்ந்துதான் அப்போதுகூட இயங்கி வந்தன.இந்தியா 1991 இல் ரசிய சமூக ஏகாதிபத்தியம் தகரும் வரை அரசியல் ரீதியாக ரசியாவையே சார்ந்திருந்தது.இப்போது அமெரிக்காவின் யுத்த தந்திரக் கூட்டாளியாக இருந்த வண்ணம் சீனாவோடும்,ரசியாவோடும் பேரம் பேசி வருகின்றாது.

அணிசேரா இயக்கம் ஆரம்பிக்கப்பட்ட உலகச் சூழல் அல்ல இன்று நிலவுவது. அந்த இயக்கக் கோட்பாடுகளை இன்று கடைப்பிடிக்க முடியாது. அல்லாமல் செய்வதானால் முதலில் இன்றைய உலக மறுபங்கீட்டு-மூன்றாம் உலகப் போர் சூழல் பற்றிய ஒரு சர்வதேச மதிப்பீட்டை முன் வைக்க வேண்டும். அதிலிருந்து புதிய அணிசேராக் கொள்கையை வகுக்கவேண்டும்.

அல்லாமால் அணிசேராக் கொள்கை பேசுவது அப்பட்டமான ஏமாற்றே ஆகும்.இந்தியச் சார்பு நிலைக்கு போடும் திரையே ஆகும். இதையே அனுரா ஆட்சி செய்ய முற்படுகின்றது.

பல தேர்தல் வாக்குறுதிகளில் தன் ஆரம்ப நாட்களிலேயே அடி சறுக்கி நிற்கின்றது அனுரா ஆட்சி.விளையும் பயிரை முளையில் தெரியும். எனினும் 100 நாட்கள் பொறுமை காப்போம்!

இலங்கை- ஈழ மீனவர் பிரச்சனை

ஆனால் இலங்கை- ஈழ மீனவர் பிரச்சனை 2009 இல் ஆரம்பித்து 15 வருடங்களாகத் தொடர்கின்றது. எந்தத் தீர்வும் எட்டப்படவில்லை.அதற்கான அறிகுறிகளும் தென்படவில்லை.

அனுராவின் இந்தியப் பயணம் குறித்த அதிகார பூர்வத் தகவல்களில் இப்பிரச்சனை நிகழ்ச்சி நிரலில் இருப்பது போலவும் தெரியவில்லை. 

இலங்கையரின் அரசுத் தலைவராக, முதல் வெளிநாட்டு அரசுமுறைப் பயணமாக இந்தியா செல்லும் அநுரா புத்த கஜா செல்வது ஏன்?

இதற்கு கொடுக்கப்பட்ட முக்கியத்துவம் கூட கடற் தொழிலாளர் பிரச்சனைக்கு கொடுக்கப்படவில்லை!

இலங்கையில் இந்தியக் கடற்கொள்ளை தொடர்வதற்கு ஒரே ஒரு காரணம் தான் உண்டு.

இலங்கை ஈழக் கடற்பரப்பின் மீது இந்தியா எழுதப்படாத உரிமையை நிலைநாட்டுகின்றது. அத்துமீறி ஆதிக்கம் செலுத்துகின்றது. தன் நாட்டு தொழிலாளர்களை கடற் கொள்ளைக்குத் தூண்டுகின்றது.அவர்கள் மீது சட்ட நடவடிக்கை எடுக்க இலங்கை அரசுக்கு உரிமை இல்லை என்று கருதுகின்றது.

 Security and Growth for All in the Region என்று பசப்பிக் கொண்டு இலங்கையின் இறையாண்மையை மீறுகின்றது.

இது தொழில் தகராறு அல்ல அரசியல் முரண்பாடு. இதை அரசுகள் தான் தீர்க்க வேண்டும்.

அதனால் இந்தத் தடவை அநுரா தனது இந்தியப் பயணத்தில் இதற்கு தீர்வு காண வேண்டும். அத்தகைய ஒரு தீர்வோடு மட்டுமே நாடு திரும்ப வேண்டும்.

நாடாளமன்றத்துக்கு Vacuum பிடிப்பது, பன்றித் தொழுவம் மேய்ப்பதற்கு படிப்புத் தகுதி பற்றிய சர்ச்சைகளை கிளப்புவது போன்ற அதே நாடாளமன்ற அசுத்த தந்திரங்களைக் கைவிட்டு, தனது 100 நாள் ஆட்சியின் சாதனையாக மீனவர் பிரச்சனைக்கு தீர்வு காணவேண்டும். 

இல்லையேல் அவர் புத்த காயாவின் ஒரு மரக்கிளையின் கீழ் அமர்ந்து `இந்திய புத்தே` ஆக ஞானம் பெறுவதுதான் அவருக்கும் நல்லது, நாட்டின் மறுமலர்ச்சிக்கும் நல்லது .

புதிய ஈழப் புரட்சியாளர்கள்.

ஈழம் 15-12-2024

Syria: The Regime Changes, but the Crisis Remains

 

Syria: The Regime Changes, but the Crisis Remains

Alexandr Svaranc, December 14, 2024

The swift fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime has sparked a mixed reaction: some are filled with admiration and joy, others with surprise and astonishment, while yet others feel saddened and disheartened. However, stability in Syria remains a distant prospect.

The swift fall of Bashar al-Assad's regime

What are the main reasons for the fall of Assad’s regime, and what is set to replace it?

In a matter of days, the Assad family clan’s regime, which had ruled the country for 54 years, was overthrown. Of course, such an event cannot be considered coincidental, given that the last 13 years have seen fierce civil conflict between a diverse opposition and the ruling regime.

Turkey had been aware of the armed opposition’s plans to advance in Syria six months prior

Is the primary reason for the overthrow of President Bashar al-Assad the lack of political democracy and the autocratic nature of the ruling clan for over half a century? Formally, it is hard to argue against this, as society desires change and freedom. However, the Middle East, with rare exceptions such as Israel, continues to embody autocracy as a principle of political governance. Can Saudi Arabia, Iran, or even Turkey be held up as models of democracy?

Should the intraconfessional and interethnic tensions within Syrian society be considered the catalyst for the regime’s downfall? Clearly, the answer here is also affirmative, as for decades, the country grappled with the issue of ethnic rights, particularly for the Kurds. Religious tensions between Sunnis, Shias, and Alawites persisted unresolved. Christian minorities (such as the Armenian community) perhaps integrated relatively smoothly into Syria’s political system, as they did not present significant demands to the authorities.

Yet will Assad’s resignation and departure from Syria, whether in the short or long term, eliminate the inter-ethnic and intra-confessional tensions within Syrian society? Will the new authorities, whether interim or elected, renounce repression as a method of governance and suppression of dissent? Can the leader of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham* (HTS), Muhammad al-Jolani, resolve the unending disputes between Sunnis and Shias or address the Kurdish issue? Especially with Turkey no longer lurking in the shadows but visibly present on the scene. Consequently, the problems that existed under Assad are likely to persist under other leaders as well.

It appears that President Bashar al-Assad made a poor geopolitical choice, entering into conflict with major centres of global and regional power (such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Israel, and Turkey). Assad overestimated his capacities — political, economic, military, and financial. In this regard, his rejection of the Qatar pipeline project — transiting gas from Qatar through Syria to Turkey and Europe — was a key warning signal, triggering a series of domestic and international problems with a tragic outcome for him.

This is why the United States claims that it needed oil from Syria, and they obtained it, albeit by occupying the eastern and north-eastern provinces of the Syrian Arab Republic (SAR). So, how are the Turks any worse, considering Turkey has already become a key logistical hub for energy transit to Europe? With the regime change in Damascus and the rise of HTS to replace the Ba’ath Party, Ankara will likely be able to reach an agreement with Doha regarding the Qatari gas pipeline—a crucial matter for Europe, which is suffering from a gas crisis due to anti-Russian sanctions.

However, the issue of oil and gas was not the only reason for the swift fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime. Geopolitical challenges related to Israel and its confrontation with Iran also came to the fore. For Tel Aviv, Syria is a neighbouring country and a security concern, particularly regarding the Golan Heights, occupied since 1967. In other words, even after the 1973 war and the 1974 disengagement agreement, Israel planned to legitimise the occupied territories and expand its security buffer zone deeper into Syria. Another security issue for Israel is connected to the strategic alliance between Damascus and Tehran, where Assad transformed Syria into a key ally of Iran and the forces of Shia Islam. Syria became the main transit corridor for the supply of weapons and military equipment to Hezbollah.

Thus, Israel’s objective in Syria became the destruction of the Iranian supply corridor, preventing Hezbollah from using locations in Lebanon targeted by Israeli airstrikes, and securing direct access to the borders of a weakened Iran. For this reason, during the advance of Turkey-backed proxies such as Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) on Hama, Homs, and Damascus, Israel carried out airstrikes on Syrian bridges and other communication infrastructure. These strikes aimed to facilitate the proxies’ operations and block the redeployment of Shia and Iranian groups to the front lines.

Turkey, while publicly distancing itself from involvement in the military operations of HTS* and the Syrian National Army* (SNA), actively supported them. Reuters reported, following Assad’s departure, that Turkey had been aware of the armed opposition’s plans—a coalition of Salafists (HTS*) and Turkmen (SNA*)—to advance in Syria six months prior. Allegedly, these groups requested Ankara to refrain from interference.

However, the high level of military equipment and preparedness of these Turkey-backed proxy forces indicates external (read: Turkish) support. The synchronicity of their offensive in Syria immediately following the ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon, the focal point of the offensive in Idlib (a zone under Turkey’s responsibility), and the high frequency of meetings between Western and Eastern foreign ministers and Turkey’s foreign minister Hakan Fidan during the radicals’ advance all point to Ankara’s involvement in the forceful overthrow of Bashar al-Assad’s regime. Turkey was undoubtedly informed about the planned offensive on Damascus six months in advance but failed to notify its Astana Process partners (Russia and Iran) in time.

In other words, Turkey, hoping to restore full relations with the United States under President Donald Trump’s administration, became the principal executor of the US-Israeli plan to overthrow Assad and contain Iran and Russia in the region. It turns out that President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s more than year-long anti-Israeli rhetoric, including elements of a trade embargo, was merely a part of a joint operation by the US, Israel, and Turkey. Ankara never banned the transit of Azerbaijani oil through its territory to Israel, and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev has already expressed support for Turkey’s actions in overthrowing Assad.

Nevertheless, the primary reason for the fall of Assad’s regime lies within the regime itself and its leader. The Syrian authorities failed to strengthen their own army and intelligence services, continued a policy of repression against dissenting forces, and relied heavily on external support from Russia and Iran. As a result, the regime lost trust and control, while the army disgracefully surrendered its positions.

At the same time, Iranian sources report that President Bashar al-Assad refused direct military assistance from Iran (notably during a meeting with Dr. Larijani). The Iranian side now accuses Assad of collaborating with Israel, citing HTS*-released documents from Syrian intelligence.

Assad, in effect, acted in line with the will of the newly elected US President Trump by abandoning his alliance with Iran and heeding the threats of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

But who is replacing Bashar al-Assad’s regime? The new figure is Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham* (HTS) leader Muhammad al-Jolani—a Salafist and a former terrorist. Can he, as the head of a transitional government, ensure civil peace in Syria and maintain the borders of the Syrian Arab Republic (SAR)?

It is curious that HTS* has not yet officially taken charge of the interim transitional government in Syria. Yet, in several countries (including the United Kingdom, Turkey, and Russia) official Syrian diplomatic missions have replaced the SAR* flag with HTS* insignia.

It is understandable that Erdoğan will initially temper HTS’s stance towards Russia and may even temporarily maintain the loyalty of HTS and the Syrian National Army (SNA) to the presence of Russian military bases in Tartus and Khmeimim. But will Turkey always take responsibility for these forces? Likely not.

What conflicts could undermine stability within and beyond Syria?

Turkey is currently celebrating what it considers a victory—the fall of Assad’s regime. From Turkey’s perspective, Assad deserved his fate for refusing Erdoğan’s conditions to recognise realities on the ground and jointly eliminate Kurdish forces. Turkey now sees the localisation of the Kurdish issue in Rojava as feasible and is opening border crossings for the return of numerous Syrian refugees. However, Erdoğan’s overconfidence in addressing the Kurdish question — specifically in eliminating Kurdish resistance — and his focus on strengthening the Sunni factor in former Syria may backfire. The United States and Israel are unlikely to abandon their support for the Kurds; instead, they are likely to leverage this factor for their own interests, including restraining Turkey.

The next challenge to Syria’s stability involves Israel and its plans for the Golan Heights and the surrounding security zone.

Tel Aviv recognises that the vacuum left after Assad’s fall will be filled by Islamic (more precisely, Sunni) radicals, some of whom are already speaking about fully restoring SAR’s borders, including reclaiming the Golan Heights—incidentally, the region of al-Jolani’s origin. So far, however, the HTS* leader has made no similar statements regarding the north-western provinces and territories occupied by Turkey.

For the first time since the occupation of the Golan Heights, Israel has, with Assad’s fall, redeployed its forces deeper into Syrian territory and occupied the buffer zone, including strategic highlands. Benjamin Netanyahu welcomed the collapse of Assad’s regime, stating: “This is a historic day for the Middle East. The fall of Assad’s regime, the tyranny in Damascus, opens up significant opportunities but also carries considerable dangers. This collapse is a direct result of our decisive actions against Hezbollah and Iran, Assad’s main supporters. It has triggered a chain reaction among all those seeking freedom from this tyranny and oppression”.

The Syrian Crisis Is Far From Over

At the same time, Netanyahu emphasised that the fall of Assad’s regime is “fraught with serious dangers”. Specifically, it risks violating the 1974 disengagement agreement between Israel and Syria. On the night of 8–9 December 1924, the Syrian army abandoned its positions, prompting the Israeli army to enter the buffer zone. Tel Aviv will not tolerate new threats to Israel’s security interests from radical (and uncontrollable) religious groups. In other words, Israel has no intention of accepting a Syrian version of Hamas or Hezbollah in the form of HTS*( * terrorist organisation banned in Russia).

Presumably, this is why IDF tank brigades marched towards Damascus and, along with air support, destroyed military arsenals and equipment belonging to the former Syrian army, ensuring that the new militants are not tempted to reclaim the Golan Heights for Syria.

The third unresolved problem is the sharp antagonism between Sunnis, Shias, and Alawites. HTS is already conducting mass executions of its opponents, which only deepens the hostile divisions within the Islamic community. Iran, for now, is focusing its attention on what might be called “accounting” for the losses incurred during the destruction of its embassy in Damascus. However, this does not mean Tehran will abandon Syria or its commitment to Shia Islam.

Finally, one must not discount Russia. The regime change in Damascus is unlikely to please Moscow, which has already classified the insurgents’ military offensive as an act of aggression and a violation of sovereignty. If Syria does not establish an inclusive government with a friendly attitude towards Russia, the strategic purpose of maintaining the naval and air bases there will diminish. However, this does not mean Russia cannot establish new military bases in the Middle East or North Africa.

While Recep Tayyip Erdoğan might idealise the strength of modern Turkey, he must understand that his country is currently too economically dependent on Russia for gas, oil, nuclear energy, tourism, the construction industry, and ambitions for a systemic breakthrough into Turan via Armenia’s Zangezur region. Militarily, Turkey also cannot compare with Russia. Moscow’s silence in response to Ankara’s periodic missteps — from Nagorno-Karabakh to Kyiv and Damascus — is unlikely to continue indefinitely. Russia could temporarily adopt a passive observer stance, recognise Kurdish autonomy in Rojava alongside the United States, and block Turkey’s eastward ambitions in the Caucasus. As we can see, the Syrian crisis is far from over.

__________________

Alexander SVARANTS — Doctor of Political Sciences, Professor

Abu Mohammad al-Julani: Putting lipstick on a pig

Abu Mohammad al-Julani: Putting lipstick on a pig

Julani's rise from Al-Qaeda affiliate to a western-recognized ‘moderate’ leader exemplifies how geopolitics trumps ideology. For years, the west has pretended to fight terrorism while leveraging Julani and his vast Al-Qaeda and ISIS-linked terror network to destabilize Syria.

A Cradle Correspondent DEC 13, 2024

Just in time for the Al-Qaeda offshoot Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s (HTS) lightning conquest of Syria, a western PR campaign was launched to rebrand the terror group’s leader, Abu Mohammad al-Julani. 

The BBC assured their readers that Julani, now commonly referred to as Ahmed al-Sharaa – which is his real name – had “reinvented himself,” while the Telegraph insisted that the former deputy to ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi is now “diversity friendly.”

On 6 December, just days before entering the capital Damascus, Julani sat down with CNN journalist Jomana Karadsheh for an exclusive interview to explain his past.

“Julani says he has gone through episodes of transformation through the years,” CNN wrote, after he assured Karadsheh “no one has the right to eliminate” Syria’s Alawites, Christians, and Druze.

But why was Julani so eager to convince the American public that he had no plans to exterminate Syria’s religious minorities? This question looms larger when recalling the massacre of 190 Alawites in Latakia on 4 August 2013, and the taking of hundreds more as captives. 

Back then, militants from HTS (then the Nusra Front), ISIS, and the Free Syrian Army (FSA) attacked 10 villages, slaughtering civilians in ways documented by Human Rights Watch: gunshot wounds, stabbings, decapitations, and charred remains. “Some corpses were found in a state of complete charring, and others had their feet tied,” the report stated.

Another useful US asset 

Fast forward to recent years, and Julani’s “transformation” seems less about repentance and more about utility. Despite HTS remaining on the US terror list – and an American bounty of $10 million reserved for Julani himself – former US special envoy to Syria, James Jeffrey, described the group as a strategic “asset” for US operations in Syria. 

Under the guise of countering extremism, Washington pursued a dual strategy: enforcing crushing economic sanctions on Syria – of the sort that killed 500,000 Iraqi children in the 1990s –  while ensuring its wheat-abundant and oil-rich regions remain under US control. 

Ambassador Jeffrey admitted to PBS in March 2021 that Julani’s HTS was the “least bad option of the various options on Idlib, and Idlib is one of the most important places in Syria, which is one of the most important places right now in the Middle East.”

But how did Julani ascend to power in Idlib, which US official Brett McGurk described as “the largest Al-Qaeda safe haven since 9/11,” while failing to mention the critical US role in bringing it about? His Nusra Front spearheaded the 2015 conquest under the banner of Jaish al-Fatah (the Army of Conquest), a coalition that combined Nusra suicide bombers with Free Syrian Army (FSA) fighters equipped with CIA-supplied TOW missiles. Foreign Policy hailed the campaign’s swift progress, crediting this synergy of jihadists and western arms.

Years later, US official Brett McGurk would label Idlib “the largest Al-Qaeda safe haven since 9/11.” Yet, the crucial role of US weapons and strategic aid in this outcome went unmentioned. 

Assistance from Tel Aviv and Brussels too 

This assistance extended beyond arms: the Financial Times (FT) reported that in response, EU foreign ministers “lifted an oil embargo against Syria to allow rebels to sell crude to fund their operation.” 

While the FSA claimed control of the oil fields, activists openly acknowledged that the Nusra Front was the true beneficiary, trucking barrels to Turkiye for refining or export to Europe. The arrangement netted Nusra millions before ISIS seized the fields a year later.

Academic and Syria expert Joshua Landis noted the importance of controlling the oil fields, explaining that “Whoever gets their hands on the oil, water, and agriculture holds Sunni Syria by the throat” and that “the logical conclusion from this craziness is that Europe will be funding Al-Qaeda.”

Behind the scenes, western and regional powers facilitated Julani’s ascent. Israeli airstrikes supported Nusra during clashes with Syrian forces, while outgoing Israeli Army Chief Gadi Eisenkot admitted to supplying “light weapons” to rebel groups – essentially acknowledging what the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) had been reporting for years to “discredit the rebels as stooges of the Zionists.”

Previous reports in the Wall Street Journal showed that Israel had for years provided humanitarian and medical aid to “rebels” in southern Syria, including by bringing Nusra fighters across the border into Israel for treatment. 

In an interview with The American Conservative in border village Beit Jinn, militants revealed that Israel had been paying salaries – to the tune of $200,000 per month – for the entire year before HTS troops were expelled from the area by the SAA and fled to Idlib.

Meanwhile, the US oversaw a “cataract of weaponry” to Syria’s opposition, as described by the New York Times. Though publicly earmarked for the FSA, these arms frequently ended up in Nusra’s hands.

Julani’s meteoric rise began years earlier, seeded by his ties to Al-Qaeda in Iraq and its Jordanian leader, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. The latter, whose activities conveniently justified the US invasion of Iraq, operated with tacit US acknowledgment. 

Julani followed a similar trajectory, emerging as a key player in the Nusra Front, which conducted bombings in Damascus and other cities in 2011 and 2012, with attacks initially misattributed to the Syrian government.

A salafist principality

Why did the EU choose to “fund Al-Qaeda” by dropping oil sanctions? Why did the US provide a “cataract of weaponry” to Nusra?

An August 2012 Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) report revealed that the US and its regional allies supported the establishment of a “Salafist principality” in eastern Syria and western Iraq as part of the effort to depose president Bashar al-Assad and divide the country.

The DIA report said a radical religious mini-state exactly of the sort later established by ISIS as its “caliphate” was the US goal, even while admitting that the so-called Syrian revolution seeking to topple Assad’s government was being driven by “Salafists, the Muslim Brotherhood, and al-Qaeda.”

The seeds of the Salafist principality were planted when late ISIS leader Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi dispatched Julani to Syria in August 2011 – at that time, Baghdadi’s group was known as the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI).

Prominent Lebanese journalist Radwan Mortada, who was embedded with Al-Qaeda fighters from Lebanon in Syria, met Julani in the central Syrian city of Homs at this time. Mortada informs The Cradle that Julani was being hosted by the Farouq Brigades, an FSA faction based in the city.

Contrary to media reports, Farouq commanders insisted the group was not comprised of defectors from the Syrian army. Instead, they said Farouq was a sectarian Salafist group that included fighters who had fought for Zarqawi’s Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) after the 2003 US invasion. 

A few months later, Julani and his fighters secretly entered the war against the Syrian government by carrying out multiple terror attacks. In Damascus on 23 December 2011, Julani sent suicide bombers to target the General Security Directorate in Damascus, killing 44, including civilians and security personnel.

Two weeks later, on 6 January 2012, Julani sent another suicide bomber to detonate explosives near a bus in the Midan district of Damascus, killing some 26 people.

The establishment of the “Support Front for the People of the Levant,” or the Nusra Front, was revealed after a videotape was provided to journalist Mortada showing Julani and other masked men announcing the group’s existence and claiming responsibility for the attacks, which opposition activists had blamed on the Syrian government itself.

The great prison release

Julani’s rise, however, was facilitated years earlier. In what has been dubbed the “Great Prison Release of 2009,” the US military freed 5,700 high-security detainees from Bucca Prison in Iraq. Among these was Julani, alongside future ISIS leaders like Baghdadi. Craig Whiteside of the US Naval War College described Camp Bucca as “America’s Jihadi University,” emphasizing the role of these releases in revitalizing the Islamic State of Iraq – which had been nearly defeated by Sunni tribal uprisings.

“The United States is often unjustly blamed for many things that are wrong in this world, but the revitalization of ISIL [ISIS] and its incubation in our own Camp Bucca is something that Americans truly own,” Whiteside wrote. 

“The Iraqi government has many enemies, and the United States helped put many of them out on the street in 2009. Why?” Whiteside wondered, not realizing they would be sent to Syria as part of the US’s covert war to topple Bashar al-Assad.

More alarming today is the prospect of HTS releasing thousands of ISIS fighters from US–Kurdish prisons in Syria's north to expand their ranks. It wouldn't be the first time. This past July, American-backed Kurds released around 1,500 ISIS prisoners from detention camps, which the US military describes as an ISIS “army in waiting.”

The question of who Abu Mohammad al-Julani is – his motivations, ideologies, and transformations – is ultimately less important than what he represents. Over the past two decades, one fact remains consistent: Julani is a tool of US and Israeli strategy.

From his early days in Iraq to his rise as the leader of the Nusra Front and later HTS, Julani has played a pivotal role in advancing the geopolitical interests of his benefactors. Whether branded a terrorist or a “blazer-wearing” moderate, his actions have consistently served as a means to destabilize Syria and the wider West Asian region. 

Julani’s “reinvention” is no more than a veneer designed to mask the enduring reality of his role: a strategic asset in a game where ideology is secondary to power.

The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of The Cradle. 

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