Lanka Poll: Status Quo for India
By Satish Chandra
Published:
08th January 2015 06:00 AM Last Updated: 08th January 2015 12:21 PM
The Sri Lankan presidential elections on Thursday are likely to be a closely contested affair between president Mahinda Rajapaksa and Maithripala Sirisena, the main opposition candidate and until weeks ago the health minister and secretary general of the ruling Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP).
Rajpaksa’s decision to hold the elections nearly two years before they are due, for his third term, was taken in the hope of being able to cash in on a divided opposition and squeeze out the benefit still available from his spectacular victory over the LTTE in 2009 during his first term.
Rajapaksa’s calculations appear, however, to have gone awry as diverse elements have coalesced around Sirisena’s candidature. Not only has the main opposition party, the United National Party (UNP), under Ranil Wickremesinghe thrown its weight behind Sirisena, who has promised to make him prime minister if he wins, but Rajapaksa’s SLFP also has split. Sirisena apart, many members of the party have defected including the formidable former two-time president,
Chandrika Kumaratunga. Indeed, over two dozen members of parliament have defected from the ruling United People’s Freedom Alliance and rallied in support of Sirisena. In addition, the Tamil National Alliance representing Sri Lankan
Tamils, the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress representing the Muslims, the Janatha Vimukti Peramuna, a Marxist outfit, and the Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU), a Sinhala nationalist outfit with a heavy infusion of Buddhist monks, have come out in support of Sirisena.
The massive support for Sirisena emanating from opposition to Rajapaksa is due to many factors.
Firstly, the authoritarianism, nepotism, and venality characterising the Rajapaksa regime has, across the board, severely eroded support for it, amplified by the anti-incumbency factor.
Secondly, both the Sri Lankan Tamils and Muslims have come out against it. The former, because Rajapaksa failed to meet their grievances on a variety of issues like autonomy and human rights violations, and the latter because they have been at the receiving end of a series of attacks by the Bodu Bala Sena (BBS) or the Buddhist Power Force, which the president has not reined in as it is his staunch supporter.
Thirdly, opposing political forces, most notably the UNP and elements of the SLFP, have been able to bury the hatchet and come together on a single issue agenda of undoing the executive presidency.
Finally, Sirisena himself is a credible presidential candidate not only because he is a veteran politician who has been in mainstream politics since 1989 but also because, being a farmer’s son, he has a special appeal to the rural voter.
Notwithstanding this, defeating Rajapaksa will take some doing as he still enjoys considerable support among the Sinhala populace as borne out by the huge crowds being drawn to his election rallies. His defeat of the LTTE coupled with his development agenda are his main electoral assets.
Above all, he is a highly skilful politician and his control of all levers of power as the incumbent executive president provides him with an advantage over Sirisena.
A Rajapaksa win may well lead to increased authoritarianism. As pointed out by the International Crisis Group, “many fear the government may be tempted to launch a crackdown on the opposition and civil society... Activists worry that long-promised legislation restricting the work of NGOs and civil society organisations may finally be enacted, while Muslim community leaders fear the BBS, with which Gotabaya Rajapaksa is widely believed to maintain close links, could be unleashed again to continue its anti-Muslim campaign. The militarisation and Sinhalisation of the north and east would likely deepen”. A Sirisena win will lead to the establishment of a National Unity Alliance government under PM
Wickremesinghe, which would be required within 100 days to bring major structural reforms to curb the wide-ranging powers vested in the president. This will be extremely challenging and will face huge legal and political obstacles. In the unlikely eventuality that the new government is able to address this problem, it will have to deal anew with the following issues on which the country is divided: Devolution of powers to the Sri Lankan Tamils and addressing their concerns on human rights related issues; protecting the rights of religious and ethnic minorities, in particular the Muslims and Christians who have been under attack in the recent past by the Bodu Bala Sena; reducing the military’s size and role in civilian affairs which has expanded considerably under Rajapaksa.
As far as India is concerned, there is not much to choose between Rajapaksa and Sirisena.
We have already seen that not only has Rajapaksa reneged on implementing the 13th Amendment but he has also not hesitated from time to time in playing the China card as demonstrated by his allowing Chinese submarines to use Lankan port facilities and his support to China’s quest for SAARC membership. He has shown no interest in developing a privileged relationship with India. This is clearly reflected in his manifesto which talks of the pursuit of a non-aligned foreign policy with friendship towards all. Where India is specifically mentioned, it is balanced with other countries. Thus, his manifesto refers to the intent to further strengthen relationships with India, Pakistan and other SAARC nations and “to strengthen the political, economic and technical relationships with India, China, Russia and Japan who are among our key regional friends”. Sirisena’s manifesto reveals a similarly neutral approach towards India. It calls for “equal relations with India, China, Pakistan and Japan”. It goes on to add that Sri Lanka’s India policy will “take into due consideration the diversity of India... and would act to have closer relations with an attitude that would be neither anti-Indian nor dependent”.
Sirisena, too, is unlikely to be accommodating to Sri Lankan Tamils. If nothing else, the influence of the hard-line JHU will prevent a softer line. This is apparent from his manifesto which doesn’t specifically address this issue. Moreover, in talking of reform he makes it clear that he will not do anything that is “detrimental to the stability, security and sovereignty of the country”. On human rights, too, Sirisena has taken a hard line and his manifesto makes it clear that “no international power will be allowed to ill treat or touch a single citizen of this country on account of the campaign to defeat terrorism”.
In sum, whether or not Rajapaksa is re-elected, Sri Lanka is in for uncertainties but in either case it will be more of the same for India.
The writer is a former Deputy National Security Adviser, Government of India.
Email: satchand18@gmail.com
Published:
08th January 2015 06:00 AM Last Updated: 08th January 2015 12:21 PM
The Sri Lankan presidential elections on Thursday are likely to be a closely contested affair between president Mahinda Rajapaksa and Maithripala Sirisena, the main opposition candidate and until weeks ago the health minister and secretary general of the ruling Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP).
Rajpaksa’s decision to hold the elections nearly two years before they are due, for his third term, was taken in the hope of being able to cash in on a divided opposition and squeeze out the benefit still available from his spectacular victory over the LTTE in 2009 during his first term.
Rajapaksa’s calculations appear, however, to have gone awry as diverse elements have coalesced around Sirisena’s candidature. Not only has the main opposition party, the United National Party (UNP), under Ranil Wickremesinghe thrown its weight behind Sirisena, who has promised to make him prime minister if he wins, but Rajapaksa’s SLFP also has split. Sirisena apart, many members of the party have defected including the formidable former two-time president,
Chandrika Kumaratunga. Indeed, over two dozen members of parliament have defected from the ruling United People’s Freedom Alliance and rallied in support of Sirisena. In addition, the Tamil National Alliance representing Sri Lankan
Tamils, the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress representing the Muslims, the Janatha Vimukti Peramuna, a Marxist outfit, and the Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU), a Sinhala nationalist outfit with a heavy infusion of Buddhist monks, have come out in support of Sirisena.
The massive support for Sirisena emanating from opposition to Rajapaksa is due to many factors.
Firstly, the authoritarianism, nepotism, and venality characterising the Rajapaksa regime has, across the board, severely eroded support for it, amplified by the anti-incumbency factor.
Secondly, both the Sri Lankan Tamils and Muslims have come out against it. The former, because Rajapaksa failed to meet their grievances on a variety of issues like autonomy and human rights violations, and the latter because they have been at the receiving end of a series of attacks by the Bodu Bala Sena (BBS) or the Buddhist Power Force, which the president has not reined in as it is his staunch supporter.
Thirdly, opposing political forces, most notably the UNP and elements of the SLFP, have been able to bury the hatchet and come together on a single issue agenda of undoing the executive presidency.
Finally, Sirisena himself is a credible presidential candidate not only because he is a veteran politician who has been in mainstream politics since 1989 but also because, being a farmer’s son, he has a special appeal to the rural voter.
Notwithstanding this, defeating Rajapaksa will take some doing as he still enjoys considerable support among the Sinhala populace as borne out by the huge crowds being drawn to his election rallies. His defeat of the LTTE coupled with his development agenda are his main electoral assets.
Above all, he is a highly skilful politician and his control of all levers of power as the incumbent executive president provides him with an advantage over Sirisena.
A Rajapaksa win may well lead to increased authoritarianism. As pointed out by the International Crisis Group, “many fear the government may be tempted to launch a crackdown on the opposition and civil society... Activists worry that long-promised legislation restricting the work of NGOs and civil society organisations may finally be enacted, while Muslim community leaders fear the BBS, with which Gotabaya Rajapaksa is widely believed to maintain close links, could be unleashed again to continue its anti-Muslim campaign. The militarisation and Sinhalisation of the north and east would likely deepen”. A Sirisena win will lead to the establishment of a National Unity Alliance government under PM
Wickremesinghe, which would be required within 100 days to bring major structural reforms to curb the wide-ranging powers vested in the president. This will be extremely challenging and will face huge legal and political obstacles. In the unlikely eventuality that the new government is able to address this problem, it will have to deal anew with the following issues on which the country is divided: Devolution of powers to the Sri Lankan Tamils and addressing their concerns on human rights related issues; protecting the rights of religious and ethnic minorities, in particular the Muslims and Christians who have been under attack in the recent past by the Bodu Bala Sena; reducing the military’s size and role in civilian affairs which has expanded considerably under Rajapaksa.
As far as India is concerned, there is not much to choose between Rajapaksa and Sirisena.
We have already seen that not only has Rajapaksa reneged on implementing the 13th Amendment but he has also not hesitated from time to time in playing the China card as demonstrated by his allowing Chinese submarines to use Lankan port facilities and his support to China’s quest for SAARC membership. He has shown no interest in developing a privileged relationship with India. This is clearly reflected in his manifesto which talks of the pursuit of a non-aligned foreign policy with friendship towards all. Where India is specifically mentioned, it is balanced with other countries. Thus, his manifesto refers to the intent to further strengthen relationships with India, Pakistan and other SAARC nations and “to strengthen the political, economic and technical relationships with India, China, Russia and Japan who are among our key regional friends”. Sirisena’s manifesto reveals a similarly neutral approach towards India. It calls for “equal relations with India, China, Pakistan and Japan”. It goes on to add that Sri Lanka’s India policy will “take into due consideration the diversity of India... and would act to have closer relations with an attitude that would be neither anti-Indian nor dependent”.
Sirisena, too, is unlikely to be accommodating to Sri Lankan Tamils. If nothing else, the influence of the hard-line JHU will prevent a softer line. This is apparent from his manifesto which doesn’t specifically address this issue. Moreover, in talking of reform he makes it clear that he will not do anything that is “detrimental to the stability, security and sovereignty of the country”. On human rights, too, Sirisena has taken a hard line and his manifesto makes it clear that “no international power will be allowed to ill treat or touch a single citizen of this country on account of the campaign to defeat terrorism”.
In sum, whether or not Rajapaksa is re-elected, Sri Lanka is in for uncertainties but in either case it will be more of the same for India.
The writer is a former Deputy National Security Adviser, Government of India.
Email: satchand18@gmail.com
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