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Thursday, January 09, 2025

Why Greenland Is Of Growing Strategic Significance

Why Greenland Is Of Growing Strategic Significance

Donald Trump seems more insistent than ever on controlling Greenland, but regardless of his controversial intentions, the island is of real strategic importance

Thomas Newdick THE WAR ZONE 

Donald Trump wouldn’t categorically rule out using the U.S. military to take control of Greenland, saying that America needs it — as well as the Panama Canal — for “economic security.” Amid intense kickback from Denmark — a NATO ally of which Greenland is an autonomous territory — and other countries, it’s worth looking in more detail at the significance of the island, which is one of the world’s largest, in economic, geostrategic, and, above all, military terms.

Trump’s interest in Greenland has made headlines in recent days, although his designs on the territory are far from new. Back in 2019, TWZ reported on then President Trump’s claim that his administration was considering attempting to purchase Greenland from Denmark, the U.S. leader noting at the time that the idea was “strategically interesting.”

Since then, Trump’s territorial ambitions for Greenland (and elsewhere) have been ramped up several notches.

PALM BEACH, FLORIDA - JANUARY 07: U.S. President-elect Donald Trump arrives to speak to members of the media during a press conference at the Mar-a-Lago Club on January 07, 2025 in Palm Beach, Florida. Trump will be sworn in as the 47th president of the United States on January 20, making him the only president other than Grover Cleveland to serve two non-consecutive terms in the office. (Photo by Scott Olson/Getty Images)
U.S. President-elect Donald Trump arrives to speak to members of the media during a press conference at the Mar-a-Lago Club on Jan. 7, 2025, in Palm Beach, Florida. Photo by Scott Olson/Getty Images Scott Olson

Speaking at a press conference yesterday, the incoming U.S. president refused to rule out military or economic coercion to bring Greenland and the Panama Canal under U.S. control.

“I can’t assure you on either of those two,” Trump told reporters. “But I can say this, we need them for economic security.”

The same day, Trump’s son, Donald Trump Jr., touched down in Greenland for what was described as a tourist visit, during which he reportedly handed out hats bearing the slogan ‘Make Greenland Great Again.’

US businessman Donald Trump Jr. leaves with his plane Nuuk, Greenland on January 7, 2025. Donald Trump Jr made a private visit to Greenland, a Danish autonomous territory coveted by Trump Sr and which hopes to one day be independent but remains dependent on Copenhagen for now. (Photo by Emil Stach / Ritzau Scanpix / AFP) / Denmark OUT (Photo by EMIL STACH/Ritzau Scanpix/AFP via Getty Images)
Donald Trump Jr. leaves Nuuk, Greenland, on Jan. 7, 2025. Trump Jr. made a private visit to Greenland, a Danish autonomous territory coveted by his father. Photo by Emil Stach / Ritzau Scanpix / AFP EMIL STACH

Talking about Greenland specifically, Trump threatened economic retaliation against Denmark, should the Scandinavian country — a NATO member — stand in the way of his territorial ambitions. Faced with such resistance, the United States “would tariff Denmark at a very high level,” Trump said.

Similar threats were leveled at Canada, too, where Trump said he would not rule out using “economic force” to turn America’s northern neighbor into a U.S. state.

In Denmark, Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen yesterday ruled out the possibility of coming to a deal with the United States that would see Greenland handed over. Instead, the future of the territory would be decided by its people. “Greenland is not for sale,” Frederiksen said.





As to what the United States would be acquiring, should it somehow take control of Greenland, by whatever means, this territory is undoubtedly unique, and it’s also at the center of an increasingly strategic race to expand control and military influence across the Arctic region.

With Russia actively building up its military footprint in the wider region, it’s worth recalling that the United States already operates one of its most strategic military outposts in Greenland. Indeed, the U.S. military has for the better part of a century had a major military presence in Greenland, with the permission of the Danish government.

A satellite view of Pituffik Space Force Base in Greenland. Google Earth

As we’ve explored in the past, the current relationship dates back to the early years of the Cold War, driven by the standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union and the enduring military significance of Greenland.

A U.S. military presence in Greenland can be traced back to before the superpower standoff, however. During World War II, when Denmark was under Nazi German occupation, an agreement was made with the Danish Ambassador to the United States that would allow the U.S. military to defend Danish settlements in Greenland from German forces, if required. After the German defeat, Denmark made efforts to remove the U.S. military presence but gave up once it joined NATO as a founding member in 1949.

From this point onward, the relatively short distance between Greenland and the communist foe meant that the territory was an ideal springboard for launching U.S. nuclear strikes on the Soviet Union, as well as for basing early warning radars and interceptor fighters that, in turn, could help counter a Soviet attack.

A year after the Alliance was established, the U.S. Air Force secretly began work on Thule Air Base in Greenland, which became the most significant military installation in the territory. Commencing operations in 1952, Thule Air Base was a critical installation during the Cold War, hosting Strategic Air Command bomber and reconnaissance aircraft, as well as interceptors and Nike nuclear-tipped surface-to-air missiles.

74th Fighter-Interceptor Squadron’s F-89s at Thule Air Base, Greenland, in 1955. U.S. Air Force via Wikicommons

The Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) came to Greenland in 1961, when the BMEWS-Site 1 was established there, initially designated as the 12th Missile Warning Squadron and later the 12th Missile Warning Group. Air Force Space Command assumed control of Thule Air Base in 1983 and the unit was re-designated as the 12th Space Warning Squadron in 1992. In 1987, the BMEWS mechanical radar was upgraded to the more efficient and capable solid-state, phased-array system used today, the Upgraded Early Warning Radar (UEWR).

A satellite view of Site J, or J-Site, the sprawling radar station that sits on a bluff northeast of what is now Pituffik Air Base. Google Earth

The Cold War years were turbulent ones for Greenland and Thule Air Base, and the outlying facilities saw more than their fair share of bizarre endeavors — as well as at least one incident that could have ended in nuclear catastrophe.

Between 1959 and 1967, the secretive Camp Century research facility, 150 miles east of Thule Air Base, conducted experiments in running military operations on the Greenland Ice Cap, which included a nuclear reactor below the ice. This also fed into Project Iceworm, a plan to construct a system of tunnels 2,500 miles in length, that could be used to launch 600 ‘Iceman’ missiles, modified two-stage Minuteman Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), providing a ‘second-strike’ capability against the Soviet Union. You can read more about this outlandish unrealized scheme here.

Camp Century left a toxic legacy of buried weapons, sewage, fuel, and pollutants under the ice and there are potentially even more hazardous pollutants hidden here too, after Thule Air Base became the site of one of America’s worst nuclear accidents. In 1968, a cabin fire broke out in a B-52G bomber carrying four thermonuclear gravity bombs. The B-52 crashed onto sea ice in North Star Bay just west of the air base, with at least three of the weapons likely exploding on impact. Seven of the eight crewmembers survived the crash.

Staff Sgt. Calvin Snapp, one of the crew in the B-52 accident in 1968, being rescued after ejecting onto the Greenland ice sheet. Public domain

No nuclear detonations resulted, but the surrounding area was nonetheless covered with radioactive materials, while burning fuel and explosives melted the ice sheet, meaning that significant quantities of debris fell to the ocean floor. Project Crested Ice was launched to try and clean up the nuclear mess, although at least one of the thermonuclear weapons may still be unaccounted for. Until today, there are conflicting accounts of whether the entire bomb went missing, or whether it was a part of one of the fissile cores.

These incidents were somewhat forgotten after the end of the Cold War but have been brought back into focus as the Arctic ice continues to retreat under the effects of climate change.

Meanwhile, following its formal transfer to the U.S. Space Force in 2020, Thule Air Base was renamed Pituffik (pronounced bee-doo-FEEK) Space Base in 2023.

U.S. Space Force

While the strategic significance of the air base waned after the end of the Cold War, the developing geopolitical situation in the Arctic has seen it become much more important again.

What hasn’t changed is the inhospitable nature of this remote operating environment, located well above the Arctic Circle and just 947 miles from the North Pole. In winter, temperatures here fall to as low as -47 degrees Fahrenheit while winds of up to 100 knots whip across the facility. Between November and February, the base is in constant darkness, while the sun never sets during the summer months of May to August.

Different storm conditions are depicted in an orientation document for personnel arriving at the base formerly known as Thule, now Pituffik. Pentagon document

Today, operations at Pituffik Space Base are overseen by the Space Force’s 821st Space Base Group, the mission of which is “to enable force projection, space superiority, and scientific research in the Arctic region for our nation and allies through integrated base support and defense operations,” according to the Space Force.

With Pituffik Space Base, the 821st Space Base Group is responsible for the U.S. military’s northernmost installation but also the world’s northernmost deep-water seaport, and a number of subordinate squadrons, as follows:

821st Support Squadron: provides mission support in the form of engineering, medical, communication, logistics, services, and airfield operations in support of the 821 Space Base Group and tenant organizations.

821st Security Forces Squadron: handles security of the 254-square-mile defense area in and around Pituffik. The area includes a ballistic missile early warning system, satellite control and tracking facilities, the air base, and the seaport that is only accessible for a short period during the summer. An annual sealift operation to support the base during this period is called Operation Pace Goose.

12th Space Warning Squadron: responsible for the AN/FPS-132 Upgraded Early Warning Radar (UEWR) system, a phased-array radar that detects and reports attack assessments of sea-launched and intercontinental ballistic missile threats heading toward North America. A secondary mission of the squadron is providing space surveillance data on satellites and other near-Earth objects like asteroids.

The AN/FPS-120 in Greenland. www.bcpowersys.com

23rd Space Operations Squadron, Detachment 1: one of seven Remote Tracking Stations in the Satellite Control Network. Located approximately 3.5 miles northeast of the Pituffik main base, Det 1 provides telemetry, tracking, and command and control operations to the United States and allied government satellite programs.

While Pituffik is now primarily host to these various space and missile warning missions, fighter detachments are also making a comeback, reflecting one of the core Cold War missions for what was then still known as Thule Air Base.

Regular flying operations include Vigilant Shield, an annual, binational air defense training event staged with the Canadian military. In 2023, while it was still named Thule Air Base, the facility welcomed for the first time a detachment of U.S. Air Force F-35A stealth fighters, where they took part in a North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) exercise that you can read more about here.

Pilots and ground crew prepare F-35As deployed to Thule Air Base, Greenland, to take off on sorties during Operation Noble Defender 23-2.1 on Jan. 16, 2023. Department of Defense photo by Master Sgt. Benjamin Wiseman

Pituffik also regularly hosts surveillance missions, and scientific data-gathering flights, and serves as a hub for transports and search and rescue aircraft. It has an associated port facility that serves as a key logistics node.

Canadian search and rescue team members assigned to the 41st Expeditionary Operations Group practice rescue operations in Arctic conditions at Thule Air Base, Greenland, Jan. 22, 2023. A CH-149 Cormorant helicopter is in the background. Department of Defense photo by Master Sgt. Benjamin Wiseman

The strategic value of Pituffik Space Base and its early warning mission means that it would be one of the first U.S. military installations to be targeted in the event of a nuclear exchange with Russia.

While such a scenario was part of the everyday Cold War reality, it’s something that appears more possible as Greenland again finds itself in the middle of another standoff between East and West.

In some respects, Trump’s preoccupation with Greenland reflects the degree to which the United States has, in recent years, lagged far behind Russia when it comes to establishing a more permanent footprint above the Arctic Circle — let alone in terms of more temporary operations in the region.

Thule Air Base in 2005. Public domain

Meanwhile, Russia has placed a huge strategic importance on the Arctic, with many investments in the region. In recent years, Moscow has been heavily committed to increasing its air and naval power in the Arctic Circle and has been establishing new bases in the region, as well as reactivating ones that fell into disuse after the Cold War.

For some years now, Russia has enjoyed access to more than 50 airfields and ports in the Arctic region, from where it is able to project air and naval power that could deny the United States and its allies access to the Arctic. Russian maritime activity in the region is also enabled to a significant degree by a large and growing fleet of icebreakers, which dwarfs those used by the United States and its allies combined.

If anything, the strategic importance of the Arctic region as a whole has the potential to be a good deal greater than it was during the decades of superpower standoff, driven by climate change opening up new shipping routes as well as providing access to natural resources that were previously inaccessible, or at least much harder to exploit.

A Russian MiG-31BM Foxhound interceptor at Rogachevo Air Base in the Novaya Zemlya archipelago, above the Arctic Circle. Russian Ministry of Defense

The importance of new shipping routes shouldn’t be underestimated. After all, whoever is able to control new lanes for commercial shipping and maritime traffic between Asian markets and Europe and North America will be able to dictate the terms of international trade in the Arctic.

While the Cold War rendered the Arctic a critical zone in terms of military strategy, the continued retreat of the sea ice in the region means that it is becoming increasingly important for economic development. Having maritime commerce traverse the Arctic will slash the journey times and costs of moving goods around the northern hemisphere. Meanwhile, resources in the wider region should provide new opportunities for undersea oil drilling, the mining of rare earth metals from the sea floor, and access to lucrative fisheries, to name just a few.

It’s therefore no surprise that the leading powers are now jostling for a position in the Arctic, with a military presence seen as vital to secure strategic access and natural resources.

NATO — including the United States, Canada, and Denmark — has long identified the Arctic as a region of “great power competition.” This rivalry now includes not only NATO and Russia but increasingly China, too.

With an eye on new shipping routes and natural resources, Beijing has been expanding its presence in the Arctic, and, in response to this, the Pentagon has defined the Arctic as “an increasingly competitive domain,” issuing specific warnings about China’s growing interest in the Arctic, including Greenland.

The Chinese icebreaker Xue Long lowers equipment to the Arctic ice. Public domain

The Pentagon is also increasingly worried that, despite the potential for competition between them, China and Russia could cooperate on an Arctic strategy to the detriment of the United States. Indeed, major military cooperation already exists between China and Russia, especially in the naval space — and with a unique emphasis on the Arctic.

There’s little doubt that the geopolitical importance of the Arctic — and with it, Greenland — is only set to increase.

Thanks to its geographic location, Greenland is already of critical importance to the United States. Not only does the country’s security rely to a significant degree on missile detection and tracking capabilities in Greenland, but having a military foothold here provides unrivaled access to the Arctic, in the sea and air domains.

Were the United States to control Greenland or at least have greater freedom to expand its military presence there, it would be a logical outpost from which it could challenge Russia and China in the region. At the very least, its potential as a major logistics hub could be further enhanced, allowing the U.S. military to extend its reach further over the Arctic.

The ramp at what was then known as Thule Air Base. U.S. Air Force

Alongside its support and surveillance functions, Greenland already provides the U.S. military with a logistics staging post, but it could also accommodate new command and control capabilities. Potentially, it could see a return to the basing of U.S. Air Force bombers and fighters, even on a permanent basis, if this is judged necessary. Echoing the previous practices, it could be used once again to station air defenses, to provide a forward line of defense against Russian bombers and missiles, although these could now include ballistic ones. There is even the possibility that the United States might choose to have long-range ground-based strike capabilities in Greenland, a Cold War throwback that is already poised to return to Western Europe, albeit in the form of conventional and not nuclear-armed missiles. Expanded port access in Greenland would also provide valuable and highly strategic maritime power projection points into the Arctic, as well as the North Atlantic. Those ports could be especially useful as operating locations for icebreakers.

A U.S. Navy Mk 70-series launch system — capable of accommodating SM-6 multi-purpose missiles — mounted on a trailer deployed during an exercise in Denmark in September 2023. U.S. Navy A US Navy Mk 70-series launch system mounted on a trailer deployed during an exercise in Denmark in September 2023. USN

A reinforced U.S. military presence in Greenland would very likely also address capabilities for a potential land war with Russia here and in the wider region. Due to its geographical position and its extremely limited means of repelling a ground invasion, Greenland is today considered a soft target by some. This is compounded by the fact that, while the U.S. Army is only slowly returning to more robust preparations for warfare in Arctic conditions, Russia is far more capable of fighting in northern latitudes and is introducing a variety of weapons systems that are optimized for this kind of environment.

Russian troops test a Chaborz M-3 combat buggy modified for Arctic operations. Russian Ministry of Defense screencap

One more legacy of the Cold War that has made a resurgence in recent years is Russian submarine operations, with a focus on the Arctic and North Atlantic, with Greenland in a highly strategic position. The vital Greenland, Iceland, United Kingdom Gap, better known as the GIUK Gap, is a critical bottleneck through which Russian (and before them Soviet) submarines need to pass to effectively patrol the North Atlantic. During the Cold War, a significant portion of NATO naval power in Europe was dedicated to closely monitoring the GIUK Gap, and hunting submarines would have been a top priority in wartime. With Russia operating increasingly capable submarines, the GIUK Gap is once again of fundamental importance, and having anti-submarine warfare capabilities in Greenland would further bolster this effort.

Dating from the Cold War but still relevant today, a map of the GIUK Gap. CIA.gov

So far, the United States has relied on cooperation with the Danish government to ensure that it retains a significant foothold in Greenland. Although this hasn’t always been entirely without problems, Denmark and the United States — as NATO members — have broadly aligned interests in the region, officially at least. Conceivably, the United States could potentially accomplish most of its strategic aims in Greenland via this same relationship, rather than taking over the island and claiming ownership of it.

Already today, it seems the Pentagon was seeking to distance itself from a potential seizure of Greenland. At a press conference, U.S. Department of Defense spokesperson Sabrina Singh said she was not aware of any draft of military plans for a Greenland invasion, and said that the department is focused on more immediate matters. “We’re concerned with the real national security concerns that confront this building every single day,” she said.

The view from the flight deck of a Royal Danish Air Force C-130J transport during a mission over Greenland. Royal Danish Air Force

It remains to be seen whether the looming military competition in the Arctic region and the drive to compete with Russia and China in this remote corner of the world means that Greenland remains in Trump’s sights during his second term in office. Regardless, the potential for Greenland as a cornerstone of America’s military strategy in the Arctic is clear, whatever form that takes.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

‘Completely Dry’: How Los Angeles Firefighters Ran Out of Water

Pic:New York Times

By Ian James, Matt Hamilton and Ruben Vives

Jan. 9, 2025 Los Angeles Times

As crews have fought the fast-spreading fires across the Los Angeles area, they have repeatedly been hampered by low water pressure and fire hydrants that have gone dry. These problems have exposed what experts say are vulnerabilities in city water-supply systems not built for wildfires on this scale.

The water system that supplies neighborhoods simply doesn’t have the capacity to deliver such large volumes of water over several hours, said Martin Adams, former general manager of the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power.

“The system has never been designed to fight a wildfire that then envelops a community,” Adams said in an interview with The Times.

The limitations of local water systems complicated firefighting efforts in Pacific Palisades, where scores of fire hydrants were left with little or no water, and in Altadena and Pasadena, which are served by different utilities and where firefighters say they have grappled with low water pressure.

The local water supply system in the Palisades area is designed to flow with enough gallons a minute to fight a house fire or a blaze in apartments or commercial buildings, Adams said. “Then you have a massive fire over the whole community and you have 10 times as many fire units, all pulling water out of the system at once.”

When a wildfire erupts, L.A. fire crews often turn to using aircraft to drop water and fire retardant.

But while the flames were spreading rapidly on Tuesday and Wednesday, officials temporarily grounded water-dropping helicopters because of the extraordinarily strong Santa Ana winds, making crews more dependent on the limited water systems on the ground.

To help, city officials sent tanker trucks to supply water for crews in areas where supplies were limited.

The firefighting efforts put the area’s water system under tremendous strain and “pushed the system to the extreme,” with four times the usual water demand for 15 hours, said Janisse Quiñones, DWP’s chief executive and chief engineer. She said the hydrants rely on three large water tanks with about 1 million gallons each. Hydrants functioned at lower elevations, but in hillier areas like the Palisades Highlands — where the storage tanks hold water that flows by gravity to communities below — they ran dry.

The DWP and city leaders have faced criticism from residents as well as Rick Caruso, the developer and former mayoral candidate, who blamed “mismanagement” and old infrastructure.

Water researchers said, however, that the infrastructure limitations are a common feature of many urban water systems.

“Local water systems are usually designed to fight local, small-scale fires over a limited time period,” said Kathryn Sorensen, director of research at Arizona State University’s Kyl Center for Water Policy. “They are not generally designed to fight large, long-lasting wildfires.”

The limitations raise several questions: As fires grow larger and more intense in the West, should storage tanks and other local water infrastructure be expanded to contend with them? Where? And at what cost?

Sorenson said that utilities need to consider how much water-storage capacity to develop in neighborhoods on the urban fringes.

“Given the known risk of wildfire in these hillsides, it is fair to question whether more water storage should have been added in previous years and months,” she said.

The existing water system in Los Angeles has “severe limits,” said Gregory Pierce, director of the UCLA Water Resources Group. “At least the way we’ve always built systems and wanted to pay for systems, you can’t really expect systems, even like DWP’s, to be prepared for this.”

The scale of the fires has surpassed previous L.A. fire disasters. The Palisades fire swelled rapidly and has destroyed more than 5,000 homes and other buildings, and the Eaton fire in Altadena and Pasadena has damaged or destroyed an additional 4,000-5,000 homes and other buildings.

The causes that sparked these and other fires are under investigation.

The fires erupted following a stark shift from wet weather to extremely dry weather, a bout of climate whiplash that scientists say increased wildfire risks. Research has shown that these abrupt wet-to-dry swings are growing more frequent and intense because of human-caused climate change. Scientists have found that global warming is contributing significantly to larger and more intense wildfires in the western U.S. in recent years.

DWP, which has sent water tanker trucks to help firefighters, said the intensity of the fires disrupted its contingency plans. The utility’s crews had limited access to the three storage tanks in the Palisades, and in one case DWP crews attempting to reroute water to refill a tank had to be evacuated, officials said.

DWP has urged all customers, especially those on the Westside, to conserve water to help in prioritizing supplies for firefighting.

In Altadena, firefighters encountered similar problems with low water pressure as they tried to slow the spread of the Eaton fire. Pasadena Fire Chief Chad Augustin said having dozens of fire engines battling multiple fires resulted in overuse of the water system.

“On top of that, we had a loss of power temporarily,” which affected the system, he told reporters Wednesday.

Even if the crews had had more water, however, “with those wind gusts, we were not stopping that fire last night,” Augustin said. “Those erratic wind gusts were throwing embers for multiple miles ahead of the fire, and that’s really what caused the rapid spread of the fire.”

He said such water constraints are to be expected when faced with such a major wildfire in an urban area.

“It’s very common in a city when you have that big of a fire with that many resources, we’re going to tax our water supply and water system,” Augustin said. “And if you have a loss of power which may impact the pressure, it’s going to make it even worse.”

Firefighters began communicating over the radio about fire hydrant problems Tuesday night, just hours after the Eaton fire erupted.

“I have some water issues pretty much east and west, and the entire north end of the fire,” one firefighter said over the radio.

“We’re getting water to work on it,” a dispatcher responded.

The problems that firefighters reported in parts of Altadena occurred in neighborhoods served by two small suppliers, Rubio Cañon Land and Water Assn. and Lincoln Avenue Water. Representatives of those suppliers couldn’t be reached for comment.

The Eaton fire broke out in an adjacent area supplied by Kinneloa Irrigation District, and the flames caused minor damage to a generator, which has since been fixed, said Tom Majich, the district’s general manager.

Despite that damage, the district supplied water for firefighters using backup generators and borrowing water from Pasadena Water and Power, Majich said.

“All of our pumps were operational,” he said. “We were pumping water throughout the entire event.”

He said the district’s success in keeping water flowing was due partly to lessons learned from the Kinneloa fire in 1993, when a lack of generators and power outages kept water from fire crews. This time, he said, his district had its system ready for the emergency. But he added that problems occurred in other areas due to the limitations of infrastructure.

“To fight a wildfire, you have to have Lake Havasu behind you,” he said. “You could fill a Rose Bowl with water and it wouldn’t be enough water.”

“There’s not a system that can do it,” he said.

Topography is also a factor in communities where water is pumped from the valley floor up to hilltop storage tanks.

Sorensen said any water utility that serves an area with large differences in elevation will have similar limitations. Engineers plan water systems with pressure zones in increments of 100 feet of elevation. A place like Pacific Palisades, for example, rises from sea level to over 1,500 feet.

In Phoenix, for comparison, the city supplies water in a vast territory with many hills and mountains, and has nearly 80 pressure zones, Sorensen said.

“Phoenix’s largest pressure zone is massive and the storage capacity in it is such that Phoenix could fight multiple fires for a very long period of time without running out of pressure for fire hydrants,” she said. “Other pressure zones are very small and serve only a few customers, sometimes less than a dozen. Storage in these pressure zones will be much smaller and there likely wouldn’t be enough stored water to fight more than one small house fire.”

Although decisions about infrastructure investments are often driven by population, wildfire risks in hillside zones are another factor for utilities to consider in building water-storing infrastructure, Sorensen said. In the L.A. area, she said, it would have been very expensive to develop additional storage “adequate to mitigate or even fight the wildfires in these higher-elevation pressure zones, but right now I’d imagine most people in L.A. would say it would’ve been worth the cost.”

Pierce said there could be ways of investing in the local infrastructure to expand water capacity for firefighting in Pacific Palisades if residents in the area were willing to pay the high cost of such investments.

“It’s going to come at great cost,” he said. And he added that such additional water storage might not have stopped a fire of this size and intensity anyway.

Pierce pointed out that these types of water problems have happened during previous fires in Malibu and other areas, where firefighters encountered dry hydrants and turned to using swimming pools or scooping water from the ocean.

“Whether there’s a near-term future where we could and should do more, and a long-term future where you could think about doing a lot more, at incredibly high cost, those things are on the table,” Pierce said.

Adams, DWP’s former general manager, said the gap is growing between what the L.A. water system was built for and the dangers of massive, fast-moving fires.

“The urban interface is changing and we’ve designed for classic fires, not a wildfire blowing through a community,” Adams said. “We need to think about fire protection and what firefighters really need if this is going to be the way of the future.”⍐

US House votes to sanction International Criminal Court over Israel

US House votes to sanction International Criminal Court over Israel

Patricia Zengerle Thomson Reuters

Patricia Zengerle has reported from more than 20 countries, including Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and China. An award-winning Washington-based national security and foreign policy reporter who also has worked as an editor, Patricia has appeared on NPR, C-Span and other programs, spoken at the National Press Club and attended the Hoover Institution Media Roundtable. She is a recipient of the Edwin M. Hood Award for Diplomatic Correspondence. 

No, Sri Lanka’s Tamil question has not been resolved

No, Sri Lanka’s Tamil question has not been resolved

The nationwide electoral success of the anti-establishment NPP does not mean Tamil nationalism is on the decline.

Parliamentary election in Sri Lanka
An election official holding a ballot box gets off the bus outside a vote counting centre after the voting ended for the parliamentary election in Colombo, Sri Lanka, November 14, 2024 [Thilina Kaluthotage/Reuters]

“They’re trampling on our graves with their boots,” said Kavitha, a young Tamil woman, as the torrential rain lashing our faces washed away her tears. Standing barefoot and ankle-deep in mud at the site of a former cemetery in Visuvamadu, Sri Lanka, she was lamenting the adjacent military base built on the graves of fallen Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) fighters, including that of her brother.

The LTTE was an armed group dominant in the Northern and Eastern Provinces of Sri Lanka that fought to establish an independent Tamil state for nearly three decades, until its definitive defeat and surrender to the Sri Lankan state in 2009. Through the war, the state bulldozed and repurposed many structures belonging to the LTTE, like the cemetery in which Kavitha’s brother was buried, as it recaptured territory from the armed group.

On that wet late November day, Kavitha and thousands of others were at the former site of the LTTE cemetery to mark “Maaveerar Naal”- an annual event to commemorate LTTE fighters who died in the decades-long war. And this was not an isolated show of nationalist dedication. According to government figures, the scene at the Visuvamadu cemetery was replicated at more than 200 sites – including universities, places of worship and other former cemeteries – across the entire northeast of Sri Lanka, with tens of thousands in attendance.

The level of interest in the 2024 Maaveerar Naal commemorations – equal if not higher than previous years – served as a strong rebuke to less-than-informed Sri Lanka observers who had declared the end of Tamil nationalism in the aftermath of the Sri Lankan elections held, two weeks earlier, on November 14.

The National People’s Power (NPP), a left-wing Sinhala coalition, secured a landslide victory, winning 159 seats in Parliament – more than any other party in Sri Lankan history. Importantly, they also won all bar one of the Tamil-majority voting districts in the North-East, leading many outside observers to conclude Tamil dreams for autonomy and independence are fully abandoned.

The real political situation in the claimed Tamil homeland, however, is much more nuanced.

The NPP rode to power a nationwide wave of anti-establishment sentiment stemming from frustration with persistent economic failings and endemic corruption.

The fall of the Rajapaksa family – who had dominated Sri Lankan politics since 2005 – has been stunning. They never received support from Tamils, who have accused former presidents and brothers Mahinda and Gotabaya Rajapaksa of genocide. However, in the Sinhala south, they were long perceived as heroes for winning the war against the LTTE.

Gotabaya Rajapaksa won the presidency with a landslide just five years ago, in 2019. However, less than three years later, in 2022, he was deposed by a popular uprising in the Sinhala south. Since then, the family rapidly lost all political power in Sri Lanka. In the November 2024 election, their party managed to secure just three seats in Parliament.

Gotabaya’s replacement didn’t bring the change that the public demanded either. As a result, this past November the anti-establishment NPP secured a victory that seemingly transcended deep-rooted ethnic divisions in the country. The left-wing coalition managed to win even the coveted Jaffna electoral district – a Tamil nationalist stronghold historically supportive of an independent Tamil state.

This came as a shock to many watching Tamil politics from outside and led to some commentators heralding the beginning of the end of Tamil nationalism. Indeed, even some NPP officials themselves interpreted their victory in Jaffna as a rejection of “racism” by Tamils.

However, equating the NPP victories in the North-East Province to a widespread rejection of Tamil nationalism is an obvious mistake rooted in laziness and a lack of serious engagement with Tamil politics common among external observers.

Anyone with their finger on the pulse of the Tamil street can see the change in the population’s voting preferences in this election had nothing to do with any disillusionment with Tamil nationalism but everything to do with their frustrations with Tamil politicians. The poll results simply showed that Tamils, like every constituency, are pragmatic and take into account both economic interests and political preferences when they cast their vote.

Many committed Tamil nationalists and supporters of independence voted for the NPP in the hope that it can deliver a better economy. Others simply wanted to punish established local politicians they perceived as corrupt and incompetent. Moves by the NPP to present itself as a coalition against corrupt political elites also helped move the Tamil vote. Their display at a popular Colombo hangout spot of luxury cars confiscated from various ministries, for example, was a yearned-for slap in the face of the elites. Their initial positive overtures towards Tamils, their messaging against racism and their promises to allow the Maaveerar Naal commemorations and repeal the draconian Prevention of Terrorism Act, under which many Tamil nationalists are persecuted, all contributed towards their appeal in the North-East.

Even Kavitha, a committed Tamil nationalist, admitted to having voted for the NPP. In our conversation at the Maaveerar Naal commemoration, she drew a clear line between her frustrations with the largest Tamil party ITAK, the need to address immediate economic needs, and her vote for the NPP.

But the support for the NPP from Tamils like Kavitha is contingent, and already showing cracks. The continuing arrests of Tamils under the Prevention of Terrorism Act for partaking in  Maaveerar Naal commemorations are causing frustration and anger. Meanwhile, the deadline for the removal of a military camp in a Tamil town, announced with much fanfare, passed without any indication of action. All this is sending a message to the already cynical Tamil electorate that positive overtures made during the campaign season were nothing but empty gestures.

The NPP has never held power and therefore did not have the same baggage as the rulers of the past. This doesn’t mean the NPP does not have baggage. Their main constituent party – The Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP, Peoples Liberation Front)- was also proscribed as a “terrorist group” due to their violent uprisings in the 1970s and again in the 1980s, which left tens of thousands of Sinhalese dead. They openly advocated against negotiations with the LTTE and played a significant part in the scuppering of the peace talks in the mid-2000s. While the leadership strikes a different tone now, their current actions indicate that they are either disingenuous or that they will find it difficult to overcome the chauvinist sentiments at the core of the party and their electorate. As has been proven time and time again, if a party in power is seen to be making concessions to the Tamils, this is mobilised against them by the opposition, which affects their performance in the following elections. All major Sinhala parties have engaged in this conduct, including the JVP.

All this raises an important point about politics in Sri Lanka and Tamil nationalism. Sri Lanka’s nation-building project is fundamentally rooted in giving primacy to Sinhala Buddhism. Tamils were never accepted as equal citizens, pushed to the periphery through a Colombo-centric approach not only by the state, but also by an unimaginative Tamil elite. Leading Tamil politicians repeatedly conceded longstanding political demands for mere scraps, in return for membership in the Colombo elite. While historically these parties continued to gain support among Tamils, and this election is more likely to be a blip than a wholesale change, Tamil political energy cannot be read solely through electoral politics. Maaveerar Naal, and related memorialisation and protest activities rooted in Tamil nationalist practices are more accurate representations of the political imaginary anchored deep in the Tamil psyche.

This Tamil Eelam-centric national life exists beyond the purview of not only the Sri Lankan state, but also Tamil politicians. It will continue to thrive, on and off the island, and pursue its aims through means outside the limitations placed on it by electoral politics. While this government now has the opportunity to take Tamil concerns seriously and address longstanding demands for self-rule, Tamils won’t hold their breath.

In order to make progress on these issues, the NPP needs to make use of every day in their five-year term to work, methodically addressing Tamil demands. Low-hanging fruit includes the release of political prisoners, the repeal of the PTA and the release of land occupied by the military. Efforts to change the demographic makeup in the North-East Province through landgrabs, the building of Buddhist temples and the expansion of Sinhala settlements must also be halted at once. Relatives of those forcibly disappeared continue their protests and rejection of state mechanisms that have no recourse to judiciary mechanism. Their concerns must also be treated with seriousness – many have refused to hold last rites for their kin that were handed over to the security forces at the end of the war. Sri Lanka must disclose what it did with the thousands of Tamils it took into custody.

Tamils have learned through repeated painful experiences that a political solution will not come from the state. It is because of this broken faith that Tamils look to the international community for justice and accountability. Disrupting this pattern will require that the new government take clear steps towards dismantling the ethnocratic nature of the state and delivering meaningful accountability. Without this, the country’s ongoing divisions will only persist.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

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