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Monday, October 03, 2016

சமஸ்டி நுளம்பு குத்தி சாகாது ஈழத் தமிழ் உடம்பு!



ஆகாவென்றெழுந்து முள்ளிவாய்க்காலுக்கு முந்திய பிணங்களுக்கெல்லாம் சமஸ்டி புது இரத்தம் பாச்சியது எழுக தமிழ்!   

 சமஸ்டி நுளம்பு குத்தி சாகாது ஈழத் தமிழ் உடம்பு! 

NGOs Do they Help?


NGOs - do they help?

Long read: 10 minutes 2 8 DECEMBER 2014

NGOs are no longer seen as the blameless agents of benevolence. Dinyar Godrej inspects the charge-sheet against them.

Witness the growth spurt in non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and you would be forgiven for thinking the world becomes a more caring place every day.

These legions of not-for-profit groupings that fan out across the world, intent on ‘capacity building’, ‘reducing poverty’ and ensuring that the ‘voices of the most marginalized’ are heard, surely reflect an acceptance that too many have suffered for too long, and the tide can turn with the right kind of wind behind it.

History, however, teaches us that the exact opposite may be true.

Whereas organized charities go back over 100 years, the term non-governmental organization is more recent, dating to the formation of the United Nations in 1945, when a select club of international non-state agencies were awarded observer status to some of its meetings. The common factor uniting this group, apart from the fact that they were neither government agencies nor businesses in the traditional sense, is that they would have an avowed mission to work for a social good – whether it was as torchbearers for human rights, the environment or just old-fashioned ‘development’ (a new-fangled idea back then).

Fast forward a few decades and we witness an explosion of NGOs. The spur was the rise of neoliberal ideology, eventually enshrined in the Reagan-Thatcher years. Predatory capitalism and the so-called free market were the answer; government needed to be hands-off with regard to all notions of public provision (healthcare, education, the lot).

Increasingly, governments began looking to NGOs to provide cheap services, a role that continues to grow with austerity policies. However, rarely does government funding to NGOs match the scale of the cuts. Aid to ‘developing’ nations also began increasingly to be funnelled via NGOs rather than through government organs – between 1975 and 1985 the amount of aid taking this NGO route shot up by 1,400 per cent.1

With the fragmentation of the Left under the neoliberal attack, much of the energy that could have gone into fighting the power went into forming the NGO – they became repositories of a residual idealism still reeling from the onslaught. Arundhati Roy describes the transformation achieved: ‘Armed with their billions, these NGOs have waded into the world, turning potential revolutionaries into salaried activists, funding artists, intellectuals and filmmakers, gently luring them away from radical confrontation.’2 Today, 30 new ones are formed every day in Britain; and there are 1.5 million in the US alone.3 Fully 90 per cent of currently existing NGOs have been launched since 1975.4 Roy
calls them ‘an indicator species’, saying: ‘It’s almost as though the greater the devastation caused by neoliberalism, the greater the outbreak of NGOs.’5Partnership or challenge?

Along with governments and corporations, the two torrents of power in the global landscape, NGOs are seen as a third force. Indeed, the big international ones – the BINGOs – with budgets of hundreds of millions of dollars are pretty powerful. But are they a countervailing force, striving tirelessly for social justice and the underdog? Poverty alleviation may be the rhetoric, critics argue, but in practice little that is lasting has been achieved on this front by NGO activism.

There is the compromising nature of their funding to consider – today contributions from governmental and intergovernmental aid agencies and from corporate donors often form the
largest chunks of their income. Although some BINGOs will still deny it, this influences their outlook, making them increasingly accommodated to the wishes of their donors. Their language becomes all about forming partnerships with these interests, rather than challenging them. Work within the system, and business will transform the lives of the poor – it’s the Bono school of development, but with taxes.

In a recent article Dhananjayan Sriskandarajah, the secretary-general of Civicus, a global network of civil society organizations and activists, wrote: ‘We have become a part of the problem rather than the solution. Our corporatization has steered us towards activism-lite, a version of our work rendered palatable to big business and capitalist states. Not only does this approach threaten no-one in power, but it stifles grassroots activism with its weighty monoculturalism.’6‘It’s almost as though the greater the devastation caused by neoliberalism, the greater the outbreak of NGOs’

In a short educational film called ‘Does aid work?’ made by Oxfam (‘produced with the financial assistance of the European Union’) the argument is that increased aid by rich countries will help people lift themselves out of poverty and make it a thing of the past.7 How exactly? By providing health interventions (anti-retroviral drugs for 1.4 million people in the last few years) and education (40 million children being educated). These are excellent things, no doubt about it. But Oxfam fails to mention how a poor, educated person on anti-retrovirals manages to magic themselves out of poverty in a system that is only interested in extracting their labour at the cheapest possible price.

On the other hand its latest report, ‘Even it Up: time to end extreme inequality’, is more to the point, informing us that the world’s richest 85 people have grabbed wealth equivalent to the poorest half of the world’s population.8 It makes an urgent case for progressive taxation, action on tax evasion and for governments to invest in public services. It details some of the violence inequality does, cautiously praises some countries (Brazil, China – but oddly not the more revolutionary Venezuela) for achieving higher wages for workers, and is a model of reasonableness. It makes a series of excellent recommendations – including telling governments to govern in the public interest – but stops short of calling full out for a redistribution of this obscene wealth. Instead it suggests a cap on the income of the richest 10 per cent equivalent to that of the poorest 40 per cent. A fine advocacy document no doubt, but the coalface is elsewhere.

And we have heard such noises before. Indeed, many a campaign to hold transnationals to account has petered out into ‘working with business’ and corporate social responsibility projects. We are at such a pass that some BINGOS actively seek corporate ‘partners’ with the promise to make the latter look good by association (see ‘The company they keep’).

Funding dependency and a hierarchical, corporate culture – many heads of BINGOs come from the business world – are a large part of the problem. According to Sriskandarajah: ‘Our conception of what is possible has narrowed dramatically. Since demonstrating bang for your buck has become all-important, we divide our work into neat projects, taking on only those endeavours that can produce easily quantifiable outcomes. Reliant on funding to service our own sizeable organizations, we avoid approaches or issues that might threaten our brand or upset our donors. We trade in incremental change.’6 Doing it for the donors

NGOs, not just the giants, face huge, entrenched, complex problems; due to donor pressure they are increasingly forced to respond with a discrete project with x number of deliverable outcomes. They reach out to us, too, in this way – ‘your $50 will buy mosquito nets for a family of four’. Social change doesn’t work like that, yet, increasingly, NGOs striving for it are forced to.

On assignment to cover the human cost of the military dictatorship in Burma in 2008, I came into contact with a number of NGOs run by Burmese people operating just across the border in Thailand. I was a bit taken aback by the number of reports thrust into my hands; obviously the funding of reports was popular among donors.

One particular feminist grouping impressed me with the breadth of their concerns. The usual report writing, educational and income-generation activities, were just the tip. Below the radar they were in dialogue with Burmese opposition political groupings, building up everyday feminist values, promoting co-operative social organization within the refugee camps,acting as big sisters to children orphaned by the military, doing their best to shelter other refugees who were in hiding as ‘illegals’ in Thailand. The group was reaching out,undercover, to communities back in Burma and above all keeping alive the flame of active resistance to the military regime, when it would have been all too easy to give up hope.

NGOs come in all stripes:

INGO – International NGO

BINGO – Big international NGO

TANGO – Technical assistance NGO

RINGO – Religious NGO

CONGO – Corporate-organized NGO

DONGO – Donor-organized NGO

GONGO – Government-organized NGO (not really an NGO)

PANGO – Party NGO (set up by a political party, not really an NGO)

Briefcase NGO – NGO set up only to draw donor funds

CBO – Community-based organization

These women seemed able constantly to adapt to new challenges and were respected by the people they worked with. Little of this was fundable. So they also did the conferences and presentations in hotels and labyrinthine project applications that foreign funders required. I couldn’t help thinking that their real achievements were despite what was expected of them.

Most media scrutiny of NGO accountability is of how they use funds, their accountability to donors. But what of their accountability towards the recipients of their interventions?

A common complaint is that the linkages of aid which NGOs deliver set a predetermined agenda on the kind of services they offer. Historian Diana Jeater writes of her experience:

‘When I first started working in Zimbabwe in the 1980s, I was impressed by how all the NGO workers I met emphasized the need to listen to rural women. I was quickly disillusioned
when I realised that “listening” meant “finding out how to present what we want to deliver in ways that make them acceptable to rural women”.’9 More serious are the charges that they NGOize popular resistance movements, acting as unelected spokespersons, deflecting energy away from confrontation with self-help projects and the like, and dividing communities struggling against dispossession. ‘They take sections of people into their fold,’ said one Indian activist, ‘and restrict their concern for these people, while others do not exist. They breed small hopes, solve small issues and take small actions while the movement process is attempting to address the larger issues of
displacement facing all our people, NGO beneficiary or not.’10 Indeed, many of the most radical popular movements today refuse any funding from NGOs, only forming alliances when the NGO could help spread their message.

Do they help?

So, to turn to the question posed at the beginning: do they help?

We could start with Bangladesh, which has the world’s largest national NGOs, effectively operating as a parallel government – they put more money into development activities than the government does. Most of their beneficiaries remain firmly below the poverty line. There is criticism, too, of the market model of development they have followed. This has been over-reliant on microcredit, which produces ‘rational profit-seeking individuals’ rather than community efforts – to say nothing of the debt traps many have found themselves in.

Or we could look at the Philippines, where I had the opportunity to observe first-hand how joined up small radical NGOs were, both with each other and the communities they were reaching out to, unafraid of supporting people’s resistance. Successive governments have actively encouraged NGO participation in government departments and on all kinds of local boards. Has this co-opted them? The successes they have achieved remain localized. They have been able to make no dent in the fundamental problem that has plagued the country –the concentration of wealth and land in just a few hands and continued élite governance. The 25 richest Filipinos continue to grow richer, with assets almost equal to the annual income of the country’s 55 million poorest citizens.11

It is perhaps unrealistic to expect such large structural changes to be delivered by NGOs when governments don’t tackle them either.

When it comes to emergency humanitarian assistance, certain specialist NGOs are the first port of call. Criticism often follows later about duplication of efforts, mishandling of the situation or of not being consultative enough in reconstruction efforts. But no assistance is the worse option in this instance.

Work within the system, and business will transform the lives of the poor – it’s the Bono school of development, but with taxes

On the environmental front we have some of the most activist large NGOs, whose members are unafraid to put their bodies on the line, as well as some of the most corporate friendly and compromised (read about the latter on page 20).

NGOs have achieved much in single-issue campaigning, ranging from the abolition of slavery to the landmines ban and access to HIV medication.

When it comes to defending human rights, whether it be espousing the causes of political prisoners or mounting challenges to the persecution of sexual minorities, they have often invited the ire of governments. It is this kind of work that governments want to shut down when they seek to ban NGOs or to stop them receiving foreign funds.

Sadly, this is not a disinterested field with universal values. Western NGOs can be quicker to condemn human rights abuses in the Majority World than in their own. Human Rights

Watch has come under fire for its revolving door with the US government: in 2009 its advocacy director Tom Malinowski, who had previously served as special assistant to Bill Clinton and speechwriter to Madeleine Albright, even justified CIA renditions ‘under limited circumstances’.12 It has also shown bias in its reporting of war crimes committed by Israel and Palestine.13

Even the clumsy, lumbering BINGOs achieve much in material terms, but will they really put their shoulders to the wheel behind the greatest liberation struggle of our times, the struggle of the 99 per cent for greater equality? If the largest appropriators of the planet’s wealth want to pose as grand philanthropists, should NGOs really line up to take their cash?

Can they please get beyond donor benevolence – and being delivery vehicles for highly politicized and often harmful aid – to reconnect with people’s struggles for justice?

NGOs are expected to be non-political, but everything they do, operating within highly skewed systems of power, cannot but be political. They might as well get their hands truly dirty.
=============================
Ji Giles Ungpakorn, ‘NGOs: enemies or allies?’, International Socialism, October 2004; nin.tl/1xAbhWD. ↩

In ‘Capitalism: A Ghost Story’, Outlook, 26 March 2012; nin.tl/1sztS0w ↩

Paul Vallely, ‘Giving to charity: Are we getting as good as we give?’, The Independent, 10 September 2014; and Wikipedia. ↩

Dhananjayan Sriskandarajah, ‘NGOs losing the war against poverty and climate change, says Civicus head’, The Guardian, 11 August 2014. ↩

In ‘Help that hinders’, Le Monde diplomatique, November 2004. ↩

‘NGOs losing the war against poverty and climate change, says Civicus head’, The Guardian, 11 August 2014. ↩

Oxfam website, film posted on 28 April 2010; nin.tl/1rz9A7r ↩

Posted 29 October 2014; nin.tl/1zNoTTT ↩

In ‘Zimbabwe: International NGOs and aid agencies – Parasites of the Poor?’, 5 August 2011, African Arguments; nin.tl/1u76L4U ↩

Dip Kapoor, ‘Social action and NGOization in contexts of development dispossession in rural India: Explorations into the un-civility of civil society’, in NGOization: Complicity,

contradictions and prospects, edited by Aziz Choudhry and Dip Kapoor, Zed Books, 2013. ↩

Sonny Africa, ‘Philippine NGOs: defusing dissent, spurring change’, in NGOization, see 10 above. ↩

Open letter by Nobel Peace Laureates among others, 12 May 2014, AlterNet; nin.tl/1tDiXIr ↩

Jonathan Cook, ‘Shock and awe in Gaza’, Counterpunch, vol 21 no 7, 2014. ↩
======================
NGOs, politics, and participation: A critical case study of the foreign funded NGO sector and its capacity to empower local communities
By Kimberly Vallejo

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) often employ the rhetoric of local empowerment through ‘participatory’ programming. A critical analysis of such programs, however, suggests that the capacity of NGOs to politically empower local communities is often misconstrued, especially since many of these programs overlook the ways in which foreign funding structures actually restrict local participation and limit local empowerment. This point is illustrated by a critical examination of studies claiming that the World Bank’s 1994 PLANAFLORO program in Rondônia, Brazil did politically mobilize local populations.


Introduction

At a time when nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in South America are facing political scrutiny from national leaders around the continent (Agencia de Noticias Fides [ANF], 2009; Petras, 1997), issues of the NGO sector’s political influence on and accountability to civil society are growing topics of deliberation. Some scholars have suggested that foreign funded NGOs have an impact on local, state, and national politics, as well as improve civil society’s “access to economic resources, social benefits [and] ultimately the quality of democratic representation” (Brown, Brown, & Desposato, 2002, p. 1). Such assumptions perpetuate the thinking that: NGOs promote community organization [and] mobilization … they legitimate and strengthen civil society, generate more pluralism and political participation, offer a base for civil resistance to oppressive political systems [and] contribute to democracy by helping to create a more ‘vibrant and autonomous civil society’ that can challenge despotic government.

(Boulding & Gibson, 2008, p. 483)

Following this logic, a swell in NGO activity will thus result in increased opportunities for citizens to form the “horizontal linkages,” or bonds of trust, cooperation and interdependence within civil society, which contribute to democratic participation and mobilize citizens to participate in shaping their political environment (Brown et al., 2002; Seixas, 2010). Critics,however, argue that such claims overlook the real relations of political power inherent in the organizational structures and administrative processes of organizations like NGOs, especially those which are large in scale and receive foreign funding. These scholars argue that NGOs, as organizations, are held more accountable to the desires of international donors than civil society; that they function in a way that inherently impedes critical citizen participation; and that, ultimately, they encourage neo-liberal homogeneity rather than the local and autonomous self-determination of development strategies (Ebrahim, 2003; Kamat, 2004; Wallace, Bornstein, & Chapman, 2007). While the debate between NGO and foreign aid influence on civil society and empowerment is one with substantial academic history, the topic is ever-pertinent as development institutions continue to channel aid money through NGOs and other civil society organizations (CSOs) at an increasing rate. Currently, for example, the World Bank partners with NGOs and civil society organizations in approximately 81% of its development projects, a significant jump from the 21% of projects which involved CSOs in 1990 (World Bank, 2011). In order to more fully understand the consequences of this growing NGO presence in development and civil society, the impact of past foreign funding efforts to support the NGO sector and the structural allocation of these funds should be more critically analyzed.

This paper examines the World Bank-funded Rondônia Natural Resource Management Project (Plano Agropecuário e Florestal de Rondônia, or PLANAFLORO), implemented in Brazil in the mid-1990s, as a case which can help further understanding of the relationship between NGOs, foreign funding, political participation, and empowerment within civil society. The PLANAFLORO case demonstrates how the growth of the NGO sector may have led to changes in political voting patterns, though perhaps not in the overall political structures, in spite of the project’s heavy emphasis on involving the local community via participatory programming. In viewing the case first through the lens of Putnam’s associational theory and secondly through a more critical perspective[i], the capacity of NGO participatory programs to empower civil society is called into question.

This paper begins with a brief history of the NGO sector in Brazil as it relates to the dawn of the PLANAFLORO initiative, followed, first, by an overview of the program itself and, second, by a summary of Brown, Brown, and Desposato’s (2002, 2007) interpretation of the PLANAFLORO program that is in line with associational activity theory. This synopsis will
help to contextualize the prevailing viewpoint[ii] held by many academics and international organizations that NGOs do contribute to greater democratic participation and political change (World Bank, 2011), and that NGOs do indeed serve as “bridging organizations” between social groups as well as champions of civil society (see for example Vakil, 1997).

Lastly, a critical view of PLANAFLORO’s use of participatory development practices is presented. This view, steeped in the values of critical pedagogy, suggests that the NGO sector
actually has limited capacity to promote the agency of civil society without a concordant attempt to address deeper social structures of inequality through participatory means (Ebrahim, 2003; Freire, 1974). This perspective is perhaps best supported by the fact that today, despite heavy investment in the growth of the NGO sector under the PLANAFLORO project over a decade ago, the people of Amazonia continue to struggle for local political representation and control over the development processes that pervade their daily lives (Lemos & Roberts, 2008; Osava, 2010). By critically examining the PLANAFLORO initiative and studies surrounding its impact on civil society, researchers and the development community can gain better insight into the ways in which foreign funded NGOs and CSOs can actually impede the political empowerment of marginalized populations today, despite their intent to be participatory and to incorporate local communities. Ultimately, the paper argues that (1) foreign funded efforts to organize civil society face organizational constraints in implementing the kinds of participatory practices which stem from the theoretical camp of critical pedagogy (Cervero, 2006; Forester, 1989), and that (2) the real political impact of participatory, civil society-based development programs should be carefully critiqued and assessed based on their ability to influence local empowerment, not simply on changes in voter behavior.

The Brazilian NGO sector

The Brazilian NGO sector has a long history of working within civil society to mobilize citizen participation and political change (ABONG, 2010; Fernandes & Carneiro, 1995; Landim,
2008). Born out of heavy repression during the Brazilian military dictatorship between 1964 and 1985, the Brazilian NGO sector is the direct descendant of the church, grassroots organizations, and community-led organizations that worked underground to support the radical opposition forces during that time. Originally inspired by the ideologies of liberation theology, Marxism, and Freire’s popular education movement, these social change-oriented organizations played a role in the re-democratization process after the abertura (political “opening”) in 1985, aligning themselves as political actors and representatives of the Brazilian public (Landim, 2008). Many of these community and social organizations had strong international ties due to their connections with formerly exiled Brazilian academics, political thinkers, and philosophers, including Paulo Freire. These intellectuals, who had spent significant time outside of Brazil during the dictatorship, often supported these non-profit outfits—with the assistance of foreign donors—upon returning to Brazil after abertura. The growth of community organizations as legitimate political actors offered new forms of political representation for marginalized peoples in a newly democratizing society. For example,these organizations helped once politically voiceless peoples accumulate political legitimacy by providing advising, funding, and general support for newly organized identity-based movements, as well as for trade union mobilizations and policy-related initiatives especially as the government underwent decentralization (Landim, 2008). As organized bodies, these organizations became valid political actors whose intentions were considered “desirable, proper or appropriate” within the institutionalized local social structures (Scott, 2008, p. 59).

As this system of political decentralization unfolded, the newly democratic political regime moved a number of policy decision-making processes to the local level. Initiated by the Brazilian Constitution of 1988 , decentralization increased public involvement in these procedures through the implementation of “participatory associations” that deliberately managed local and national policy initiatives related to social assistance, housing, education, women’s issues, environmental issues, care for the elderly, and indigenous and racial political issues (Landim, 2008). NGOs played a major role in fostering the development of these associations (Landim, 2008). Over time, the creation of this system solidified the bonds between NGOs, their donors, and various marginalized groups in Brazilian society, promoting the idea that through working together, they could achieve empowering changes in the political structure. This belief in the NGO sector’s power to build social capital within civil society and to serve as a valid representative of the public was perhaps best reinforced by the tremendous 1990s World Bank and government partnership to fund the growth of CSOs and the NGO sector in Rondônia, Brazil.PLANAFLORO

In the mid 1990s, the World Bank in partnership with the Brazilian government initiated a program to provide a rapid and substantial influx in funding to support the growth of the NGO sector in the state of Rondônia. The program, known as PLANAFLORO, was intended to mitigate some of the harsh environmental and political damages the state had previously faced by empowering citizens through working with participatory NGO programs and forming politically active CSOs (World Bank, n.d.). Prior to this initiative, there had been only a small NGO presence in this state. This state-wide effort to bolster the expansion of the NGO sector in Rondônia would thus contribute to an opening of social space in which people could interact, generate trust, construct collective identities, build the collective bargaining skills and develop the ‘horizontal linkages’ within society that help democracy thrive.Without building such ‘horizontal linkages’, some argue that “politics is characterized by patronage, clientelism, and corruption” (Brown et al., 2008, p. 28)

Like much of western Brazil, Rondônia is covered with delicate, pristine rainforests and is home to Amerindians, rubber tappers, and landless workers who have been traditionally marginalized from majority Brazilian society. While the people living there had traditionally survived on subsistence livelihoods, harsh and exploitative development policies brought to the area in the late 1970s and 1980s decimated the local ecology and threatened the ways of lives for many disempowered citizens (Lemos & Roberts, 2008). Projects like the government’s forced colonization program of the 1970s and the World Bank’s notoriously failed 1980s POLONORESTE development effort to construct a superhighway through the Amazon, eventually depleted almost a quarter of the state’s rainforest by the late 1980s (World Bank, n.d.). These policies and the destruction that ensued led to the rapid in-migration of ranchers, loggers and slash and burn farmers into the newly cleared area, endangering the livelihoods of over 100,000 people living in the region (Lemos & Roberts, 2008; World Bank, n.d.). In response to this development crisis, the World Bank reoriented its approach to development and natural resource management in Rondônia, crafting the PLANAFLORO project in 1994. This project was intended to mitigate some of the health degradation, poverty, land rights violations, educational issues, and environmental destruction wrought by prior destructive policies by increasing the local NGO presence in the state and by proposing that these NGOs operated  in a more participatory and inclusive manner (Lemos &Roberts, 2008; World Bank, n.d.). By inviting Brazilian professors, local agricultural workers and other rural groups to participate in strengthening grassroots coalitions, the WorldBank’s PLANAFLORO project sought to mobilize greater citizen participation in local governance and resource management via a stronger, more participatory NGO sector (World Bank,n.d.).

While the PLANAFLORO initiative is generally referred to as a World Bank development project, it functioned in coordination with the Brazilian government. The Bank was the major contributor to the program, funding approximately USD 167 million, while the Brazilian government contributed the remaining USD 61.9 million (World Bank, n.d.).[iii] While the total amount of funds granted to PLANAFLORO was a significant decrease compared to the USD 1.6 billion allocated by the Bank in the 1980s to fund POLONOROESTE, this new project channeled funding specifically to NGOs as a means of supporting more sustainable local development and resource management. These funds, which did not have to be paid back[iv],were distributed directly to NGOs in the form of grants for which NGOs first had to apply. Non-governmental organizations under the PLANAFLORO initiative were to use these grants as start-up capital, for organizational growth, and to support the organization of CSOs—like workers´ unions and other participatory associations aimed at mobilizing local communities to participate in the decision-making processes of the newly decentralized government (Brown et al., 2007, 2008).

While some authors, including the World Bank’s own program evaluators, question the extent to which PLANAFLORO was able to accomplish this goal of social mobilization for political action and resource management (Lemos & Roberts, 2008; World Bank, n.d.), a series of studies conducted between 2002 and 2007 by David S. Brown, J. Christopher Brown, and Scott W. Desposato lend support to the World Bank’s overall analysis of the PLANAFLORO project. These studies concluded that increases in NGO resources did indeed usher in a new political current and “empower[ed] new forms of political participation” in Rondônia (Brown et al., 2007, p. 135). Even if the World Bank program evaluation was critical of its own participatory mobilization techniques, civil society was nonetheless successfully mobilized to create political change as a result of the increased associational opportunities made available by a growing NGO presence in the state. In the following section, I provide an overview of Brown, Brown, and Desposato’s conclusions regarding the role of PLANAFLORO in politically empowering civil society so that (1) the case may be more critically evaluated and (2) the development community can build a better understanding of the relationship between NGO funding and political empowerment. PLANAFLORO as associational activity

The years between 1994 and 1998 presented Brown, Brown, and Desposato (2002, 2007, 2008) with an almost ideal historical scenario for analyzing the influence of NGO activity upon political change in Brazil. Between those years, the PLANAFLORO project was put into full swing in Rondônia as the World Bank rapidly increased the amount of development funds it was allocating to the NGO sector in the area (Brown et al., 2007; World Bank, n.d.). These years also happened to be the years between two national elections in which the same two candidates, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Fernando Henrique Cardoso, were the front-runners for president. Given this history, the authors built a statistical model to test for a relationship between the increases in NGO activity in the state and political changes occurring within civil society. The authors believed this relationship would symbolize collective grassroots mobilization that resulted from increased public associational activities (Brown et al., 2007).

At the time, Rondônia had long been recognized as a conservative state mired in corruption and an institutionalized patronage-based political system. Concurrently, the World Bank had begun to fuel the growth of the NGO sector as a democratizing force in the 1990s. Programs like PLANAFLORO funneled monies to local NGOs to support the construction of participatory CSOs (like farmer cooperatives or other labor organizations) with the hope of empowering local stakeholders (World Bank, n.d). These organizations used these funds to provide benefits (like farming subsidies) to individuals and were strengthened as more individuals joined (Brown et al., 2007). According to the logic of associational activity, as more individuals joined, these groups became better able to establish new collective norms and practices, thus influencing collective action in ways that are beneficial to group members (Scott, 2008). Since voting was compulsory for adult Brazilians, Brown and his colleagues (2002, 2007) posited that if voter preferences changed dramatically in Rondônia between 1994 and 1998, then they could conclude that citizens had been successfully “mobilized” to support new candidates or to vote in unprecedented ways due to new norms and practices established through new associational activities.[v] For the authors, increased associational influence on collective action dramatically affected voting patterns at the national level, supporting the logic of the World Bank that increased participatory NGO activity affects the political participation of communities. However, limited change in voting patterns in local elections suggests that a more critical examination of participatory processes must be accounted for in order to glean better insight into the capacity of NGOs to empower the local citizenry.

Aid allocation matters, too Brown, Brown and Desposato’s (2007, 2008) findings confirmed their hypothesis that associational activity has a significant influence on voting patterns. More specifically, the authors believed that increased support for NGO activity would create opportunities for “horizontal linkages” to flourish within civil society, strengthening the bonds of both associational activity and collective dissent and ultimately leading to a shift in voter preferences. Brown et al. (2007, 2008) found a strong positive correlation between the amount of money allocated to the NGO sector in a given municipality and the shift in voter preferences to support the leftist presidential candidate. The difference was quite large—almost 20 percentage points between those communities that received the most PLANAFLORO funding to support NGO growth and those communities that received the least PLANAFLORO funding. Municipalities that received no PLANAFLORO funding between the two elections actually voted more conservatively in 1998, with the left vote dropping by about 5% in the second election. In the municipalities that received the most PLANAFLORO funding, the left vote increased by about 13%. According to Brown and his colleagues (2007), voters in the well-funded municipalities were suddenly expressing and acting upon decidedly less conservative political preferences, a change attributable to the democratizing effect of associational activity embedded in participatory NGO work (Boulding, 2008; Brown et al., 2007, 2008; Kamat, 2004).

At the local level, however, Brown and his colleagues observed the opposite trends in the gubernatorial elections compared to voting trends observed in the presidential elections.

While leftist gubernatorial candidates in Rondônia did worse overall from 1994 to 1998, they lost the most votes in those municipalities that received the most PLANAFLORO funding (Brown et al., 2007). Brown and his colleagues attributed this maintenance of the conservative status-quo in these areas to the fact that the project funds were allocated at the municipal levels to governors who had control over when the funds would be released to local NGOs. While the governors did not actually have the ability to increase the funds and were not themselves responsible for bringing funding to CSOs in the area, the governors appeared in the eyes of voters to be responsible for the new programs offered by NGOs (Boulding & Gibson, 2008; Brown et al., 2007, 2008). This led to the increased support of incumbent, conservative governors by voters who simultaneously supported the more left- leaning presidential candidate.

Together, these mixed results reveal how administrative factors concerning the allocation of project funding can become a key factor in determining the political effect of a project. In this case, the local incumbents seem to have benefited enormously from the ability to control the timing of aid distribution. Similarly, incumbents could have withheld funds if citizens,

NGOs, or other CSOs mobilized in ways that did not align with their political agendas. While the observed changes in voting patterns may suggest that on some level the NGOs in Rondônia were capable of building associative activity, encouraging “horizontal linkages and produc[ing] social capital that, in turn…foster[ed] alternative political ideas” (Boulding & Gibson, 2008), this broader question regarding the political effects of funding distribution raises doubt about the overall capacity of large-scale development projects like PLANAFLORO to empower civil society, despite their emphasis on employing participatory programs via local NGOs.

Voting, and participation: A critique

From a critical theory perspective, one cannot help but argue that efforts to create real political change on behalf of marginalized communities entail more than half-hearted efforts to involve them in voting for government representatives. Instead, political change requires that the inequalities entrenched within social structures be recognized and dealt with intentionally through participatory programming (Cervero, 2006; Forester, 1989; Freire, 1974). The option to choose between two pre-selected political platforms in an election is not the same as problematizing and acting on the issues that affect people’s livelihoods and marginalized statuses on a daily basis. While breeding horizontal linkages in society such as collective identities and increased communal trust can strengthen the associational activities of CSOs and produce changes in electoral results, this does not equate to an increase in the political agency[vi] of civil society. Changes in voting preferences alone do not necessarily mean that more people are empowered to have a voice in the laws, policies, and norms that govern their everyday lives. While Brown and his colleagues (2002, 2007, 2008) present a compelling case for the power of associational activities to sway elections, they only,briefly recognize the power structures embedded in the discourse of development and the political constraints of working within internationally funded structures. Oftentimes,emphasis on power structures are excluded from analyses like Brown et al.’s due to the fact that socio-political relations are difficult to identify clearly and measure quantitatively.

Researchers working with econometric and statistical regression models often face difficulties in accounting for such social complexities. In this same light, program planners in the development community often struggle to account for the power structures embedded in their work as they are difficult to monitor and manage administratively (Ebrahim, 2003;Fischer, 2000; Kamat, 2004). As NGOs and the rest of the development community have come to embrace a more participatory rhetoric, the idea of participation has evolved into something far different from its critical roots as the idea has been adapted to something more easily managed and monitored by program donors and evaluators.

While the World Bank did not begin implementing participatory programs in Brazil until the early 1990s, participatory development practices were initiated in the 1980s as both a response to top-down planning and development strategies and as a product of new civic-engagement alternatives emerging out of the 1970s dependency theory movement  (Ebrahim,2003). Initially advanced much earlier by thinkers like Freire, critical participatory methodology is a slow and tedious process which facilitates empowerment via “the creation of institutional and intellectual conditions that help people pose questions in their own ordinary (or everyday) languages and decide issues important to them” (Fischer, 2000, p. 184). A humbler understanding of the capacity of NGOs to empower civil society through participatory engagement is important here; ‘local participation’ is a term used commonly in development today, but it has become quite decoupled in practice from its essential meaning. Many of today’s ‘participatory’ programs “have moved away from education and empowerment programs that involve structural analysis of power and inequality” and have instead turned to technical projects, emphasizing managerial-style, solution-based approaches for addressing issues of poverty and oppression (Kamat, 2004, p. 168). The “mainstreaming” of these “radical and transformative” methodologies (Wallace et al., 2007, p.21) results in their conversion to de-politicized approaches, essentially robbing them of their empowering character and diminishing the space within which citizens can genuinely participate and become more politically empowered. A loss of local problematization processes—which are the foundations of Freirean critical pedagogy and other critical program planning perspectives (Cervero, 2006; Fischer, 2000; Forester, 1989)—jeopardizes the capacity to mobilize the agency of civil society.

Though the PLANAFLORO project was intended to be participatory and to engage local citizens, the Bank concludes in its program evaluation that the participatory measures used to engage citizens in policy making failed to function effectively in practice (World Bank, n.d.). Initially geared to “[c]ontribute to the social and political organization of rural communities and traditional peoples [to] stimulate the process of democratization for the exercise of citizenship” in Rondônia (Brown et al., 2007, p. 128), local government representatives were resistant to the participation of CSOs in local decision-making dialogue (World Bank, n.d.). Oftentimes, government officials were absent from community meetings, which were meant to include stakeholders from both the government and civil society in decision-making processes. Meetings that included stakeholders from various social groups were not always productive because the language of communication (including the high usage of technical jargon) hindered participation by constituents. Citizens were often viewed as “partisan” or too “technically weak to participate in complex development projects,” making government officials reluctant to work with the participatory organizations that NGOs had organized (World Bank, n.d.). Furthermore, working together was difficult for those who had little experience or training in participatory methodologies, as the concepts of ‘problematizing’ and ‘facilitating of empowerment’ were unfamiliar to those local leaders in charge of programming (Fischer, 2000; World Bank, n.d.). Moreover, the World Bank assessment noted that the state of Rondônia had been historically run by elites and had a political system that functioned via political clientelism. The involvement of civil society in decision-making processes thus threatened to upset institutionalized oligarchic power structures. As a result, local leaders were de-incentivized from being inclusive of local citizens groups, causing

PLANAFLORO great difficulty in enacting critical participatory projects.

Perhaps the greatest indication that the PLANAFLORO project diverged from critical participatory methodologies is the fact that the goals of the project were not defined by members of the local community to begin with. Instead, the program came equipped with four major themes that happened to align with overseas donors and the Brazilian government’s interests (World Bank, n.d.). To some extent this divergence may indicate a lack of experience or training in managing participatory experiences—a shortcoming which the World Bank evaluation itself acknowledges—or to the inherent difficulties in translating such a non-hierarchical and fluid participatory discourse into the language of controllable projects which by nature must be manageable, clearly defined, generally quantifiable, and are often severely limited by both time and budget (Cleaver, 1999).

Conclusion
Overall, the PLANAFLORO project calls to attention the ways in which foreign funded participatory NGO programs may influence political affairs within a country but are still unable to facilitate transformations of power relations at the local level. This calls into question the capacity of the NGO sector to organize and mobilize civil society and, most importantly, the relationship between foreign development aid and local empowerment. As the international development community continues to pursue its course of funding participatory programs and relying heavily on NGOs to act as agents of change in civil society, a more critical view of these processes needs to be developed in order to more fully account for the political implications of such aid allocation structures and its effect on marginalized communities. Until this happens, international development efforts may offer few opportunities to politically empower local communities, whether their programs are participatory in nature or not.

References
ABONG. (2010). ABONG-Associação Brasileira de Organizações não Governamentais. Retrieved from http://www.abong.org.br/

Agencia de Noticias Fides (ANF). (2009, December 7). Evo critica a ONGs que se oponen a las actividades petroleras en la Amazonía. Los Tiempos.

Bartlett, L. (2005). Dialogue, knowledge, and teacher-student relations: Freirean pedagogy in theory and practice. Comparative Education Review, 49(3), 344-364.

Boulding, C.E., & Gibson, C.C. (2008). Supporters or challengers? The effects of nongovernmental organizations on local politics in Bolivia. Comparative Political Studies, 42(4), 479-500.

Brooke, J. (1989, March 30). Brazil wants foreign aid to fight pollution, but no strings. New York, New Yok: The New York Times.

Brown, D.S., Brown, J.C., & Desposato, S.W. (2002). Left turn on green? The unintended consequences of international funding for sustainable development in Brazil. Comparative Political Studies, 35(7), 814-838.

Brown, D.S., Brown, J.C., & Desposato, S.W. (2007). Promoting and preventing political change through internationally funded NGO activity. Latin American Research Review, 42(1),127-138.

Brown, D.S., Brown, J.C., & Desposato, S.W. (2008). Who gives, who receives, and who wins?: Transforming capital into political change through nongovernmental organizations.

Comparative Political Studies, 41(1), 24-47.

Cervero, R.& Wilson, A. (2006). Working the planning table: Negotiating democratically for adult, continuing, and workplace education. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Cleaver, F. (1999). Paradoxes of participation: Questioning participatory approaches to development. Journal of International Development, 11, 597-612.

Ebrahim, A. (2003). NGOs and organizational change: Discourse, reporting and learning. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Fernandes, R.C., & Carneiro, L.P. (1995). Brazilian NGOs in the 1990s: A survey. In C.A. Reilly (Ed.), New paths to democratic development in Latin America; The rise of NGO-

municipal collaboration (pp. 71-84). Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Fischer, F. (2000). Citizens, experts, and the environment: The politics of local knowledge. Durham & London: Duke University Press.

Forester, J. (1989). Planning in the face of power. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Freire, P. (1974). Education for critical consciousness. London: Continuum.

Giddens, A. (1979). Central problems in social theory: Action, structure and contradiction in social analysis. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Kamat, S. (2004). The privatization of public interest: Theorizing NGO discourse in a neoliberal era. Review of International Political Economy, 11(1), 155-176.

Landim, L. (2008, July). Thirty years and recent dilemmas: NGOs and third sector in Brazil (and Latin America). Retrieved from

http://www.istr.org/conferences/barcelona/WPVolume/xLandim.pdf

Lemos, M. C., & Roberts, J. T. (2008). Environmental policy-making networks and the future of the Amazon. Philospohical Transactions of the Royal Society, 363(1498). 1897-1902.

Osava, M. (2010, November 18). Brazil: Cattle ranching areas in the Amazon industrialise. Retrieved from http://www.globalissues.org/news/2010/11/18/7677

Petras, J. (1997, December). Imperialism and NGOs in Latin America. Retrieved from www.monthlyreview.org/1297petr.htm

Scott, W. R. (2008). Institutions and organizations: Ideas and interests. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc.

Seixas, C. S. (2010). Community-based enterprises: the significance of partnerships and institutional linkages. International Journal of the Commons, 4(1), 183–212.

The World Bank Group. (2011). The World Bank and civil society. Retrieved from  http://go.worldbank.org/PWRRFJ2QH0

World Bank. (n.d.). The challenges of promoting participatory development in the Amazon. Washington, DC: World Bank.

Vakil, A.C. (1997). Confronting the classification problem: Toward a taxonomy of NGOs. World Development, 25(12), 2057-2070.

Wallace, T., Bornstein, L., & Chapman, J. (2007). The aid chain, coercion and commitment in development NGOs. London: UK Intermediate Technology Publications.

[i] Critical perspective here refers to the camp of theory based heavily on a Marxist tradition. This perspective has evolved over time and across the social sciences, but is primarily concerned with the liberation of human beings from the socio-political and economic inequalities that oppress them. For a comprehensive overview of a number of critical perspectives,see The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/critical-theory/)

[ii] See works like Wallace, Bornstein and Chapman’s (2007) The aid chain, coercion and commitment in development NGOs for more insight into this perspective as well as critiques of the democratic capacities of NGOs which have evolved over the past decade.

[iii] This is a massive amount of money allotted for a single project in a single state, especially when compared to the total amount of USAID assistance given to the entire country of Brazil in 2010: USD 22.5 million (http://brazil.usaid.gov/).

[iv] Neither the World Bank (n.d.) nor Brown and colleagues (2007, 2008) address how it came to be that these “loans” from the World Bank were granted with no strings attached.

This is a far cry from the Bank’s typical loan procedures in the late 1980s and early 1990s. One possible explanation for this inconsistency is that PLANAFLORO implementers were aware of the growing criticism of this loan scheme and the growing pressure from other international donors and country leadership advocating the removal of debt repayment obligations on funds given to Brazil for sustainable development initiatives in the Amazonia region (Brooke, 1989).

[v] Brown et al. (2002, 2008)also base much of their logic on the works of Robert Putnam’s interpretation of associational theory and social capital, which attributes better functioning
democracies to increases in civic engagement. For a brief overview, see http://www.infed.org/thinkers/putnam.htm.

[vi] I use the term agency here to mean the ability of individuals or social groups to understand, control, and change the way they act and interact within social structures (e.g. the “rules and resources” which are allocated within society and upheld by social institutions) (Giddens, 1979).

காஸ்மீரில் வன்முறை வெறியாட்டம்! யாழில் அகிம்சைக் கொண்டாட்டம்!!

“அன்புக்கும் உண்டோ அடைக்கும் தாள் ”

யாழ்ப்பாணத்தில் அகிம்சை தின விழா!


யாழ் அகிம்சை தின விழாவில் அரங்கம் நிறைந்த காட்சி!
யாழ்ப்பாணத்திற்கான இந்தியத் துணைத்தூதரகமும் அகில இலங்கை காந்தி சேவா சங்கமும் இணைந்து நடத்திய சர்வதேச அகிம்சை தின நிகழ்வு இன்று 02.10.2016 காலை 9.30 மணிக்கு நல்லூர் துர்க்காமணி மண்டபத்தில் நடைபெற்றது.

மகாத்மா காந்தி பிறந்த தினமாகிய அக்டோபர் 02 ஆம் திகதி சர்வதேச அகிம்சை தினமாக ஐக்கியநாடுகளின் பொதுச்சபையால் 2007 ஆம் ஆண்டில் பிரகடனப்படுத்தப்பட்டதைத் தொடர்ந்து இந்தத் தினம் உலகளாவிய நிலையில் முக்கியத்துவம் பெற்றுள்ளது.

இன்று மகாத்மா காந்தியின் 147 ஆவது ஜெயந்தி தினம் ஆகும்.

நிகழ்வில் கலந்து கொண்டிருந்த முக்கியஸ்தர்கள் மங்கலவிளக்கேற்றியதைத் தொடர்ந்து மகாத்மா காந்தி விரும்பிப்படிக்கும் ரகுபதி ராகவ ராஜாராம் என்ற பஜனைப்பாடல் இசைக்கப்பட்டது. யாழ். பல்கலைக்கழக முன்னாள் துணைவேந்தரும் அகில இலங்கை காந்தி சேவா சங்கத்தின் உபதலைவருமாகிய பேராசிரியர் எஸ். மோகனதாஸ் வரவேற்புரையாற்றினார்.

அதனைத் தொடர்ந்து இந்தியத் துணைத்தூதர் ஆ.நடராஜன் தலைமையுரை ஆற்றினார்.

சிறப்பு நிகழ்வாக தமிழ்நாடு கோயம்புத்தூரில் இருந்து வருகை தந்த பேராசிரியர் ஜெயந்தஸ்ரீ பாலகிருஷ்ணனின் உரை இடம்பெற்றது.
“அன்புக்கும் உண்டோ அடைக்கும் தாள் ” என்ற பொருளில் உரையாற்றிய அவர் அன்புதான் மனிதனில் உள்ள அக வெளிச்சம் அந்த வெளிச்சத்தை இலகுவில் பெறலாம். ஒரு நன்றி, ஒரு வணக்கம் என்கின்ற வார்த்தைகள் அன்பை மலரச் செய்யப் போதுமானவை. சிறு புன்முறுவல் ஒன்றே அன்பை உருவாக்கும் சக்தி கொண்டது என்றார்.

தொடர்ந்து காந்தியம் இதழ் வெளியீடு இடம்பெற்றது. இதழுக்கான வெளியீட்டுரையை கோப்பாய் ஆசிரிய கலாசாலை பிரதி அதிபர் செந்தமிழ்சொல்லருவி ச.லலீசன் ஆற்றினார். இதழை துணைத்தூதர் வெளியிட்டு வைக்கப் பேராசிரியர் ஜெயந்தஸ்ரீ பாலகிருஷ்ணன் பெற்றுக்கொண்டார். அகில இலங்கை காந்தி சேவா சங்கத்தால் நடத்தப்பட்ட கட்டுரைப் போட்டிக்கான பரிசளிப்பும் இடம்பெற்றது.

நிகழ்வில் வீணை ஆசிரியர் கோ. விதுஷா குழுவினரின் வீணைக்கச்சேரி, இசையாசிரியர் வாசஸ்பதி ரஜீந்திரனின் மாணவர்கள் வழங்கிய இசைக்கச்சேரி என்பன இடம்பெற்றன. அகில இலங்கை காந்தி சேவா சங்கத் தலைவர் என். சிவகரன் நன்றியுரை ஆற்றினார்.

காந்தீயம் இதழ் 1948 ஆம் ஆண்டு தொடக்கம் வெளிவருகின்றது. இடையிடையே சில தளர்ச்சிகள் ஏற்பட்டாலும் இதன் வெளியீட்டை தற்போதும் தொடர்வது பெருமைக்குரியதே. காந்தியம் இதழின் ஆசிரியராக எம்.ஷாந்தன் சத்தியகீர்த்தி செயற்படுகின்றார் என்பது குறிப்பிடத்தக்கது. 

Sunday, October 02, 2016

Leaked Kerry Comments on Syria


‘Leaked Kerry Comments Prove US Involvement in Syrian Crisis from Onset’

By Dr. Jamal Wakeem and RT
Global Research, October 02, 2016
Assad carte


Closed-door comments by US Secretary of State John Kerry reveal much about US involvement in Syrian crisis, Dr. Jamal Wakeem, professor of history and international relations at Lebanese University in Beirut, told RT.

The New York Times acquired the taped conversation between the US Secretary of State and two dozen Syrian civilians from education, rescue, and medical groups working in rebel-held areas, during a meeting on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly.

The leaked recording reveals how angry John Kerry really is about being unable to topple President Bashar Assad by military means.

“I’ve argued for use of force. I stood up. I’m the guy who stood up and announced we’re going to attack Assad because of the weapons, and then you know things evolved into a different process,” the Secretary of State said in the tape.

He told the civilians that “you have nobody more frustrated than we are (the US)” that the Syrian issue is now being solved diplomatically.

Kerry also warned the Syrians, who sounded clearly unhappy with Washington’s contribution, that attempts to intervene militarily or provide more support to the rebels by the US may have a reverse effect.

“The problem is that, you know, you get, quote, ‘enforcers’ in there and then everybody ups the ante, right? Russia puts in more, Iran puts in more; Hezbollah is there more and Nusra is more; and Saudi Arabia and Turkey put all their surrogate money in, and you all are destroyed,” the diplomat explained.


U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry reacts in the United Nations Security Counci © Lucas Jackson / Reuters

RT: What do you think this conversation shows?

Jamal Wakeem: I believe that this proves that the US was involved in the Syrian crisis since its onset and that it was collaborating with the so-called insurgents in order to topple the Syrian regime. In addition, it proves also that the Syrian crisis had its regional and international dimension since the beginning and it wasn’t a revolution against an illegitimate regime, as the West claimed at one point.

In addition, I believe that it also proves that the Obama administration didn’t give priority to peaceful and political solution for the Syrian crisis. But it used this as an alternative to its inability to use force when it was confronted by a steadfast position by Russia who refused to be dragged into another trick by the US similar to what happened in Libya and topple the Syrian regime. I believe that the Russians are aware of the fact that the war in Syria is a war by proxy directed against them and against their ally China. It is part of a bigger plan by the US to block Eurasia from having access to the maritime trade roots. In addition, I believe there was a mentioning of the presence of the representatives of the NGOs operating in insurgent territories. And this proves also that the US was using these NGOs as a tool of soft power in order to topple the Syrian regime.

RT: The conversation happened a few days after the US-Russia-brokered ceasefire in Syria ended. How possible is it to pursue diplomacy when one side doesn’t seem to believe in it?

JW: I believe that the faction that was trying to strike a political deal with Russians over Syria was a minority in the Obama administration. It was hindered by the hawks in the US, mainly the Pentagon and the military. I didn’t believe that there would be a political breakthrough during the Obama administration, because this administration is already expired. We need to wait for the next president of the US to take over power. And the hawks in the US and also in Saudi Arabia and Turkey believe that the next president will be more hawkish than Obama and will take more confrontational steps with Russians and that is why they hindered any attempt by John Kerry to strike a deal or impose a truce in Aleppo. Maybe they wanted for the truce to be like a breathing space for the opposition or for the insurgents, but they didn’t want it to be a first step towards a political solution. And I believe that in order to talk about the political solution we need to wait for at least another year.

RT: Separately, British Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson told The Sun newspaper that, following Moscow’s policy in Syria “people now believe that Russia is in danger of becoming a pariah nation”. Who are those people he’s referring to, do you think?

JW: He is talking about himself, about the American administration, about the military industrial complex in the US. And about the oligarchy that is trying to impose a world order that would work for its own benefits. We need to admit that the essence of the war in Syria, in Ukraine, in Yemen, in the South China Sea is a part of a global American strategy to block Eurasia from having access to the maritime trade roots. And this was mentioned not only during the Obama administration but also it was mentioned by former scholars. It is part of the consistent strategy since the late 19th century to block any land power from having access to maritime trade roots, and this explains the policy of containment during the Cold War and later on the strategy of Zbigniew Brzezinski, the former national security advisor for Jimmy Carter, and other geopolitical thinkers of the US. So, when Boris Johnson says this he is admitting that the essence of confrontation is not between the West and Syria, or between insurgents or Assad regime, but it is between the West and Eurasia.

The original source of this article is RT Op Edge
Copyright © Dr. Jamal Wakeem and RT, RT Op Edge, 2016

Kashmir: DAY 86| Fresh clashes in several areas, 100 more injured

DAY 86| Fresh clashes in several areas, 100 more injured
Forces resort to ‘vandalism’ in Kulgam areas, beat up locals, set paddy harvest on fire, Police refutes allegations

ABID BASHIR/ KHALID GUL
Srinagar/Anantnag, Publish Date: Oct 3 2016 12:55AM

Photo: Mir Wasim/GK
At least 100 people sustained pellet and tear-gas shell injuries in forces’ action in various parts of Kashmir on Sunday, reports and witnesses said. Over 60 people were injured in South Kashmir areas alone where forces allegedly resorted to vandalism by damaging residential houses, set paddy harvest on fire, and also beat up inmates to pulp.

SOUTH KASHMIR
Forces allegedly went on rampage in several villages in Qaimoh area of Kulgam district, vandalized property and set ablaze two residential houses, equal number of cowsheds, a shop, paddy stacks, and granaries and also beat people to pulp, local residents told Greater Kashmir. Many people including two minors were also detained, they said. The forces’ action triggered massive clashes in the area in which 30 people were injured. A truck also went up in flames.

Locals alleged that army raided Hawoora, Mishpora, Khudwani and Redwani villages of Qaimoh in the wee hours and went berserk. “The army men straightaway barged into Jamia Masjid Hawoora where people were offering Fajr (morning) prayer and caught hold of Nimazis and beat them to pulp. They also damaged the masjid property—watches, time-board and loudspeaker,” said Imam of the mosque, Abdur Rehman Dar. He said the army men later dragged nine persons and detained them.
“Two of the arrestees are minors Bilal Ahmad Lone, 13 and Faizan Ahmad Shah, 14,” said Dar. One of the arrested youth Showkat Ahmad Shah son of Muhamad Abdullah Shah was severely tortured by army and was left in an injured state in a hospital by police, locals said. “His condition is very critical,” they said.

The army later barged inside several houses, vandalized property, smashed windowpanes, broke doors, windows and beat up inmates. “The soldiers made their way inside our home, damaging all electric and electronic appliances including washing machine, refrigerator and television and later thrashed all our family members,” said Muhamad Ramzan, a local resident. “The army men did not spare my wife and daughter and also beat them up.”

Ramzan while pointing towards bruises all over his face said that he too was beaten up with gun-butts and bamboo sticks.

A medical shop—Lone Medical Store—was also ransacked by forces. “The army men vandalized my shop and even took away the medicine,” alleged Javed Ahmad Lone, proprietor of the shop.

“The forces after ransacking our house also took along our laptop,” said a resident in Hawoora village.

“The windowpanes of at least four mosques in the area were smashed by the forces. A cowshed of a widow Saleema was also set ablaze and a grocery shop her daughter was also ransacked. I was sleeping and suddenly I heard cries and screams. I peeped through the window and saw army men setting my cowshed on fire,” she said. “They also threw away all the grocery items at our shop.”
The army later allegedly torched the house of Mushtaq Ahmad Shergojri.

“I have all lost my belongings and have been rendered homeless,” said Gojri, a laborer. “I am left with nothing.”

In adjoining Redwani Bala village, the army allegedly set ablaze house of Ghulam Muhammad Wagay and cowshed of Muhammad Abdullah Dar.  The army  also damaged around 100 vehicles, including motorbikes, cars, load carriers and sumo  vehicles parked in villages of Hawoora,
Mishpora, Khudwani and Redwani.  The villagers also alleged that the army men also set ablaze granaries, paddy stacks and paddy straw.

“Around 30 bags of my harvest were reduced to ashes after forces set it on fire,” said a farmer from Redwani Bala.

To protest the high-handedness, the villagers took to streets and staged massive demonstrations in Qaimoh town and Khudwani. They also clashed with police and paramilitary forces. “Forces lobbed teargas shells and used pellet gun to quell the protests,” witnesses said. They said at least 30 people sustained injuries with many of them hit with pellets.

“The injured were treated in Sub district hospital Qaimoh and local Primary Health Centers,” a Health department official said.  He said one of the youths who had sustained pellets in eye was shifted to District hospital Anantnag. “Many of the injured including with assault injuries were also being treated at various health facilities.”

During the clashes, a lorry passing through the area caught fire. A strict curfew was also imposed in entire Qaimoh area. Pertinently,  Hawoora village was cordoned off by army  last night after inputs about the presence of militants there. However, youth took to streets and pelted stones on them, triggering clashes that forced the army men to retreat.

At least six people were injured in protests that erupted after forces went berserk in Mohamdpora village of Kulgam.

“The forces barged into houses, vandalized property and beat up inmates including women,” said locals.

Six people were injured in the area due to beating were hospitalized. The incident triggered massive protests and clashes.

At least 15 people were injured in clashes in Muloo Chitragam village of Shopian.

Reports and witnesses said clashes erupted in the village after forces ransacked the house of Tehreek-e-Hurriyat district president Muhammad Yousuf Falahi and beat up the family members.

They said posters have been pasted in the area declaring Falahi as a proclaimed offender and asking him to surrender immediately. Falahi, they said, was instrumental in organizing rallies in Shopian.
Clashes were also reported in Nayna village of Pulwama.  A pro-freedom march called by joint resistance leadership was foiled by forces in Medoora village of Tral and Kakpora with restrictions. However, people defied the curbs in Bijbehara town and held a pro-freedom procession. “The procession began from Eidgah and culminated at Shaheed Park,” locals said.

They said funeral prayers in-absentia were also offered for two Pakistani army men killed recently in firing by Indian counterparts.

ARMY, POLICE REFUTE ALLEGATIONS

Talking to Greater Kashmir, Army’s Srinagar-based spokesman Colonel Rajesh said “Army is not involved in any sort of vandalism.”

“We are not involved in act of damage to property in Kulgam,” Kalia said.

A police spokesman said the district police administration Kulgam has clarified that in the morning, after the withdrawal of the deployment from Khudwani, Redwani and nearby areas “miscreants assembled and set on fire two heaps of paddy straw at Redwani.”

“The miscreants also set on fire a truck at Khudwani which suffered some damage. It has further clarified that there is no report of damage to any structure in the area as has been claimed in a news story. The news is baseless and far from the facts and is therefore refuted,” the police spokesman said in a statement.

NORTH KASHMIR

Intense clashes broke out between youth and government forces in Putushai village of Bandipora after forces foiled a pro-freedom rally there. Witnesses said police and CRPF fired dozens of tear smoke shells and pellets as people were trying to gather in a local Eidgah for the proposed rally. Locals had called for ‘Putushai Chalo’ where several resistance leaders were supposed to address the rally. Later, forces barged into the village and allegedly resorted to indiscriminate teargas shelling and pellet firing, triggering intense clashes.

“Several people received minor pellet injuries during the clashes,” witnesses said. They said as police entered the village, the villagers including women came out of their homes to resist their (forces’) move and chased them away while they responded by firing dozens of teargas shells and pellets. Witnesses said two CRPF personnel fell into a canal, which passes through the village, after they were chased away by the villagers. Later, they were rescued by their colleagues amid heavy tear-gas shelling and pellet firing. Locals told Greater Kashmir that the rally was again held at the same place after Zuhr prayers, where several Jamaat-e-Islami and Hurriyat leaders addressed a huge gathering. According to witnesses, the forces were stoned at nearby Qazipora and Watapora villages as they were being chased away by Putushai villagers. Restrictions were imposed in Sumbal area of Bandipora to thwart ‘Sumbal chalo’ call given by joint resistance leadership.

Witnesses and reports said police had erected barricades at various places and movement of people was restricted. “All entry points were sealed to stop people from marching towards Sumbal,” they said.

Reports from Sopore said in view of the Sopore Chalo call, police imposed strict curbs across the Tehsil. They however staged rallies in the interiors of Sopore. A major rally was held at Jamia Masjid Sopore in which hundreds of people participated.  Pro-freedom rallies were held in various villages that include Chanakhan, Bömai, Tujjar Sharief, Botengo, Dooru and Muslim Peer.

Reports said forces foiled Kralpora-Kupwara Chalo by imposing restrictions in Trehgam and Kralpora. Clashes erupted at Guglosa area after a pro-freedom rally was taken out by youth. Forces fired pellets and tear-gas shells to disperse the protestors. Reports said 10 youth sustained minor injuries in the forces’ action.

CENTRAL KASHMIR

Police had imposed strict curbs to prevent ‘Narbal Chalo’ called by the joint resistance leadership. Intense clashes, however, broke out at Kanihama, Kawoosa and Narbal.  Forces had placed barbed wire on the road at Chinar Colony Kawoosa, Narbal crossing and on Srinagar-Gulmarg road.

In Mazhama, locals alleged vandalism by forces. They said as youth tried to march towards Narbal, heavy contingent of forces arrived at the spot and resorted to damaging houses especially in Lonepur and Mir Mohalla.

Reports said 15 people mostly women sustained injuries in the forces’ action.

Reports said in Chek-e-Kawoosa Khalisa, at least six people sustained pellet and teargas shell injuries. They were treated locally. Clashes continued in Narbal area till late evening.

In Ganderbal district, six persons including a cop and three women were injured after clashes broke out between locals and forces at Saloora. Locals said forces entered Saloora locality and raised objection on playing of freedom songs on loudspeakers of a local masjid. The locals resisted the forces’ move, triggering clashes in which six youth sustained injuries. Police resorted to firing of sound-shots to disperse the protesters.

Meanwhile, locals alleged forces beat them up and also damaged residential houses.  “Among the injured, three women sustained fractures in legs and arms,” they said. Reports said three youth have been booked under Public Safety Act and sent to Kothbalwal jail in Jammu.  They were identified as Wasim Ahmad Sofi of Kondbal, Manasbal, Bashir Ahmad Rather alias Boya of Beehama and Asif Ahmad Mala of Wakura. At least 17 people have been booked under PSA from Ganderbal district so far.

SRINAGAR:

Forces foiled a rally that was heading towards Badam Wari in old Srinagar by firing pellets and tear-gas shells. Four youth sustained mild injuries in the police action. Forces also foiled a protest rally at Nadergund, Peerbagh in uptown Srinagar. People from various areas that include Umarabad and Bagwanpora also participated in the rally which culminated peacefully. Evening clashes were reported from many old Srinagar areas that include Nawakadal, Khanyar, Bohri Kadal, Nawabazar and Saraf Kadal. Similar clashes were also reported from Eidgah, Palpora, Safa Kadal, Nowpora and Soura 90-feet Road. A peaceful protest was also held in Nowgam area of uptown while peaceful protest rallies were held at Lasjan and Soiteng areas.

POLICE VERSION

According to a statement issued by the Zonal Police Headquarters Kashmir, situation remained by and large peaceful today. “A couple of stray stone pelting incidents were reported,” it said. The statement said that during the day, greater movement of people and vehicular traffic was observed in Srinagar, besides Sunday market also opened in the city which was thronged by shoppers. “Vehicles were also seen plying in the main towns as also on the inter-district roads,” it said. The statement said that police in its drive against the “miscreants arrested 60 such individuals involved in various offences of creating disturbances in different part of Kashmir.”

(With additional reporting by Ghulam Muhammad, Eijaz-ul-Haq Bhat, Sheikh Nazir) GK

India never attacked any country: PM

India never attacked any country: PM
Published at October 2, 2016 

‘We’re not hungry for any territory’

New Delhi, Oct 02:

India has never attacked any country, nor has it ever coveted anyone's territory but made “supreme sacrifice” fighting for others, Prime Minister Narendra Modi said Sunday.

"India has not attacked anyone. It is neither hungry for any territory. But in the two World Wars (in which India had no direct stake), 1.5 lakh Indian troops had laid down their lives fighting for others," the Prime Minister said at the inaugural ceremony of the Pravasi Bharatiya Kendra, a modern complex dedicated to overseas Indians here.
His statement came days after the Indian army's “surgical strikes” on militant launch pads across the Line of Control as also in the backdrop of Pakistan constantly highlighting the Kashmir issue at the international fora.

Modi lamented that despite the great price paid by Indians, India could not make the world realise the importance of its sacrifice. “Whenever I went abroad, I made it a point to visit the memorials for the Indian troops”.

He said the Indian diaspora did not believe in indulging in politics or grabbing power abroad, but on the other hand, they mingled with other communities.

Indians, the Prime Minister noted, lived abroad with the principle of "social well being. They are like water. They change their colour and shape as per the need".

Observing that the Indian diaspora should not be looked at in terms of its numbers, but in terms of its strength, he said there were countries where the Indian community was more powerful than the Indian missions and could help removing the "fear of unknown" amongst the people there towards India.

While much has been spoken about brain drain, if the strength of the Indian diaspora was channelised, "we can convert it into 'brain gain'," Modi said.

Like dams channelise the energy of water to make electricity, a source is needed to utilise the energy of the 2.45 crore strong Indian diaspora to "light up India", he said.

‘Militants attack Baramulla camp, 1 BSF man killed’

‘Militants attack Baramulla camp, 1 BSF man killed’
“We are only hearing gunshots. We don’t know what has happened,” a resident of Baramulla told Greater Kashmir over phone.

Srinagar, Publish Date: Oct 3 2016 12:56AM | Updated Date: Oct 3 2016 12:56AM


Militants attacked an army camp in north Kashmir’s Baramulla district late on Sunday evening, reports said. NDTV reported that the militants attacked army’s 46 Rashtriya Rifles camp in Baramulla town at around 10.30 am. It quoted the J&K police saying that the attackers were immediately engaged by forces and two Border Security Force (BSF) personnel were injured. “One of them later succumbed,” the news channel reported.

A BSF picket is reportedly located near the RR camp. According to residents of Baramulla town, they heard heavy firing at 10.30 pm. The firing continued for more than half an hour, triggering panic among people, they said.

“We are only hearing gunshots. We don’t know what has happened,” a resident of Baramulla told Greater Kashmir over phone.

The firing triggered concerns about safety of residents of Baramulla’s Old Town. Former J&K Chief Minister Omar Abdullah tweeted soon after the firing took place: “Colleagues in Baramulla town are phoning with reports of massive gunfire in their vicinity. Prayers for all in the area.” The Indian Express reported that it was a ‘Fidayeen’ (suicide) attack on 46 Rashtriya Rifles army camp. “Personnel of the border guarding force BSF, which is under the operational command of the Army in this area, jointly stay in the camp with the soldiers,” it quoted unnamed officials as saying. According to its report, the militants tried to enter through a public park but were not able to breach the 46 Rashtriya Rifles camp. The gunbattle was on when last reports came in.

Angry Pakistan cancels SAARC summit

Angry Pakistan cancels SAARC summit

Sunday Times LK 02 10 2016

Pakistan has formally announced that the 19th South Asian Summit which was to be held in Islamabad next month has been cancelled.

A statement from the Pakistan Foreign Office said, “The spirit of the SAARC Charter is violated when a member state casts the shadow of its bilateral problems on the multilateral forum for regional cooperation.”

Sri Lanka on Friday said it regretted that the prevailing environment in the region was not conducive for holding the 19th SAARC Summit in Islamabad on November 9 and 10.

Earlier India, Afghanistan, Bhutan and Bangaladesh also said they were skipping the summit.

Saturday, October 01, 2016

Qana massacre Shimon Peres சமாதானப் புறாவா? பிணந்தின்னிக் கழுகா?

Qana massacre
Operation Grapes of Wrath 
The Qana massacre took place on April 18, 1996 near Qana, a village in Southern Lebanon, when the Israel Defense Forces fired artillery shells at a United Nations compound. Of 800 Lebanese civilians who had taken refuge in the compound, 106 were killed and around 116 injured. Four Fijian United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon soldiers were also seriously injured.
Massacre in Sanctuary; Eyewitness
The Independent- UK, 19 April 1996 Robert Fisk
     
It was a massacre. Not since Sabra and Chatila had I seen the innocent slaughtered like this. The Lebanese refugee women and children and men lay in heaps, their hands or arms or legs missing, beheaded or disembowelled. There were well over a hundred of them. A baby lay without a head. The Israeli shells had scythed through them as they lay in the United Nations shelter, believing that they were safe under the world's protection. Like the Muslims of Srebrenica, the Muslims of Qana were wrong.



In front of a burning building of the UN's Fijian battalion headquarters, a girl held a corpse in her arms, the body of a grey- haired man whose eyes were staring at her, and she rocked the corpse back and forth in her arms, keening and weeping and crying the same words over and over: "My father, my father." A Fijian UN soldier stood amid a sea of bodies and, without saying a word, held aloft the body of a headless child.


"The Israelis have just told us they'll stop shelling the area", a UN soldier said, shaking with anger. "Are we supposed to thank them?" In the remains of a burning building - the conference room of the Fijian UN headquarters - a pile of corpses was burning. The roof had crashed in flames onto their bodies, cremating them in front of my eyes. When I walked towards them, I slipped on a human hand...

Israel's slaughter of civilians in this terrible 10-day offensive - 206 by last night - has been so cavalier, so ferocious, that not a Lebanese will forgive this massacre. There had been the ambulance attacked on Saturday, the sisters killed in Yohmor the day before, the 2-year-old girl decapitated by an Israeli missile four days ago. And earlier yesterday, the Israelis had slaughtered a family of 12 - the youngest was a four- day-old baby - when Israeli helicopter pilots fired missiles into their home.



Shortly afterwards, three Israeli jets dropped bombs only 250 metres from a UN convoy on which I was travelling, blasting a house 30 feet into the air in front of my eyes. Travelling back to Beirut to file my report on the Qana massacre to the Independent last night, I found two Israeli gunboats firing at the civilian cars on the river bridge north of Sidon.

Every foreign army comes to grief in Lebanon. The Sabra and Chatila massacre of Palestinians by Israel's militia allies in 1982 doomed Israel's 1982 invasion. Now the Israelis are stained again by the bloodbath at Qana, the scruffy little Lebanese hill town where the Lebanese believe Jesus turned water into wine.



The Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres may now wish to end this war. But the Hizbollah are not likely to let him. Israel is back in the Lebanese quagmire. Nor will the Arab world forget yesterday'a terrible scenes.


The blood of all the refugees ran quite literally in streams from the shell-smashed UN compound restaurant in which the Shiite Muslims from the hill villages of southern Lebanon - who had heeded Israel's order to leave their homes - had pathetically sought shelter. Fijian and French soldiers heaved another group of dead - they lay with their arms tightly wrapped around each other - into blankets.


A French UN trooper muttered oaths to himself as he opened a bag in which he was dropping feet, fingers, pieces of people's arms. And as we walked through this obscenity, a swarm of people burst into the compound. They had driven in wild convoys down from Tyre and began to pull the blankets off the mutilated corpses of their mothers and sons and daughters and to shriek "Allahu Akbar" (God is Great") and to threaten the UN troops.



We had suddenly become not UN troops and journalists but Westerners, Israel's allies, an object of hatred and venom. 

One bearded man with fierce eyes stared at us, his face dark with fury. "You are Americans", he screamed at us. "Americans are dogs. You did this. Americans are dogs."



President Bill Clinton has allied himself with Israel in its war against "terrorism" and the Lebanese, in their grief, had not forgotten this. Israel's official expression of sorrow was rubbing salt in their wounds. "I would like to be made into a bomb and blow myself up amid the Israelis", one old man said.


As for the Hizbollah, which has repeatedly promised that Israelis will pay for their killing of Lebanese civilians, its revenge cannot be long in coming. Operation Grapes of Wrath may then turn out then to be all too aptly named.

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